A modern history of monetary and financial systems of Congo 1885-1995 by Mambu Ma Khenzu, Edouard
Greenwich Academic Literature Archive (GALA)
– the University of Greenwich open access repository
http://gala.gre.ac.uk
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Citation:
Mambu Ma Khenzu, Edouard (2003) A modern history of monetary and financial systems of Congo 
1885-1995. PhD thesis, University of Greenwich.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Please note that the full text version provided on GALA is the final published version awarded 
by the university. “I certify that this work has not been accepted in substance for any degree, 
and is not concurrently being submitted for any degree other than that of (name of research 
degree) being studied at the University of Greenwich. I also declare that this work is the result 
of my own investigations except where otherwise identified by references and that I have not 
plagiarised the work of others”.
Mambu Ma Khenzu, Edouard (2003) A modern history of monetary and financial systems of Congo  
1885-1995. ##thesis  _type##  ,  ##institution##  
Available at: http://gala.gre.ac.uk/6158/
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Contact: gala@gre.ac.uk
A MODERN HISTORY OF
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS OF CONGO
1885 -1995
EDOUARD MAMBU MA KHENZU
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements of the University of Greenwich
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
September 2003
DECLARATION
I certify that this work has not been accepted in substance for any degree, and is not 
currently submitted for any degree other than that of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) of 
the University of Greenwich. I also declare that this work is the result of my own 
investigations except where otherwise stated.
September 2003
Edouard Mambu ma Khenzu 
PhD Student
Dr Zeljko Sevic 
Supervisor
ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the modern history of money and finance in Congo from 1885 
to 1995, against a background of pre-colonial traditional monetary practices observed 
since the 15th century and still in use today in some regions of the Congo basin 
within the current Democratic Republic of the Congo. The work makes use of 
historical research methods and is aimed, firstly, at interpreting the survival of the 
pre-colonial monetary tradition and its influence on the Congolese modern monetary 
and financial systems and, secondly, at explaining major monetary and financial 
developments that have occurred in Congo since 1885.
First of all this study explores a series of devices that were used as money in 
the ancient Kingdom of Congo (13th-17th century). Two devices used as currency in 
the Kingdom of Congo - the nzimbu, a seashell as small as a coffee bean, and the 
lubongo, a small mat made of raffia fibre - are analysed. Mbongo, the common term 
for money or wealth in today's Congolese languages, derives from lubongo. The 
mitako, a brass rod of different lengths, which was granted the quality of legal tender 
by the authorities of the Congo Free State (1885-1908) in 1886, alongside the state 
currency, is explored in the process of introducing modern currencies in Congo. New 
light is shed on some controversial issues, such as the origin and genuine identity of 
the nzimbu. Also explained are the significance and limits of the monetary functions 
of devices used for these purposes in traditional communities accustomed to 
essentially barter-based mechanisms of exchange.
Secondly the study addresses monetary and financial provisions set up for the 
Congo Free State, and analyses the six main strands of King Leopold IPs financial 
and development policy: (1) designation of non-occupied lands as State property; (2) 
setting up of a vast royal property as Crown land for the purpose of generating 
income for the King; (3) granting of concessions to various companies, in which the 
King took substantial shareholdings; (4) regime of labour-tax intended to ensure a 
sufficient workforce for both the State land and Crown land; (5) joint ventures with 
private businesses to carry out investments that required large amounts of capital; (6) 
placing trade activities under an absolute State monopoly.
Thirdly, exploring the colonial period (1908-1960), the study demonstrates 
that depending on what was at stake, the Belgian colonial power addressed 
Congolese monetary and financial issues regardless of the legal separation 
established by the 1908 Charte Coloniale (Colonial Charter) between Belgium and 
its Colony as two distinct entities.
Lastly the major political events that occurred in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo from the start of the 1960s onwards resulted in a very high cost for the 
country in terms of waste of resources and inflation, among other adverse effects. 
The Congolese monetary and financial crises that started in 1960 were a consequence 
of irrelevant and inefficient policies combined with a lack of long-term vision in the 
management of public affairs. The monetary and financial developments of the early 
1990s onwards were characterised by political imbroglio and hyperinflation that 
undermined people's trust in the national money. This study recommends further 
research on a number of issues, such as the use of foreign currencies in the economy 
that resulted from this mistrust, the development of street money markets and the 
coexistence of different monetary zones in the same country.
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Chapter One: 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Scope of the Study
This study, entitled A Modern History of Monetary and Financial Systems of Congo, 
1885-1995, aims at providing a contribution to a comprehensive analysis and 
interpretation of the monetary and financial experience of Congo, the country 
nowadays known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It begins by looking at 
the pre-colonial traditional monetary practices observed in the Congo basin since the 
15th century. The aim in this respect is to assess whether and to what extent this 
monetary tradition affected the monetary and financial system set up by the Belgian 
colonial power in the late 19th century. The study examines at first a series of 
devices in use as a medium of exchange among traditional communities of the 
western Africa coasts known in the 15th century as Lower Guinea, especially in the 
territory of the ancient Kingdom of Congo (13th-17th century) discovered by the 
Portuguese since the late 15th century.
Against this historical background, the study explores the monetary and 
financial provisions belonging to the colonial period. Then follows an analysis of the 
major developments that marked the Congolese monetary and financial system after 
attainment of independence in June 1960. The study is carried out with a particular 
focus on the monetary and financial crises characterising the post-1960 era.
The issue of money and finance in Congo has been explored by numerous 
scholars. Without being a monetary or financial study, the work on Congolese 
numismatics by Mahieu (1924) contains useful information on a large number of 
devices used as a medium of exchange in Congolese traditional communities prior to 
the colonial era. Cuvelier (1946) and Dartevelle (1953) looked at many aspects of the 
monetary practices in use at the time of the Kingdom of Congo. Monetary and 
financial regulations issued at the time of the Congo Free State, during the colonial 
period and after independence have been explored by many scholars, who are 
mentioned frequently in this study and in the bibliography section. However, their 
studies relate to specific aspects and isolated episodes. They do not offer a global 
view of the subject of money and finance in Congo over a long period of time.
The originality of this study lies in its scope, which covers a period stretching 
back over several centuries. This retrospection enables a link to be established 
between the distant past and the contemporary period by means of analysing patterns 
peculiar to the monetary experience of Congolese traditional communities since pre- 
colonial times. Chapter two of this study focuses particularly on a set of selected 
traditional monetary devices that dated from the 15th century, and were still in use at 
the start of the colonial period (and still today are used in connection with certain 
traditional customs). The Belgian colonial authorities made use of some of these 
during the process of introducing modern currencies in Congo.
If the Latin term pecus, which means "a single head of cattle", is the root of 
the English term "pecuniary" meaning "relating to or consisting of money, wealth or 
property", it is because the ancient Greeks used cattle as a medium of exchange 
(Beecham, 1986). Similarly, the Congolese common term for "money" is mbongo, a 
word derived from lubongo, the name in the Kikongo language for a small mat made
of raffia fibre. These mats were used as "money" in the north region of the Congo 
river mouth, as far back as at the era of the Kingdom of Congo. In the same region of 
Congo, "money" is also called nzimbu (also spelled n'zimbu), another Kikongo 
language word, which is the name of a small seashell used as currency over centuries 
since the time of the Kingdom of Congo (see: Cardoso, 1623).
On the one hand, the term "pecuniary" brings back nothing but a distant, if 
not forgotten, memory of a cow being used as a medium of exchange in ancient 
times. On the other hand, the use of nzimbu and lubongo as money since the era of 
the Kingdom of Congo remained in force in Congo until modern times, for several 
decades after the introduction of European-style currencies in the late 19th century. 
This evolution serves to justify the place given to those forms of ancient monies in 
this study. Among the questions to be answered are the following: (1) how did the 
Belgian metropolitan power treat the traditional monetary devices in the process of 
introducing European-style currencies? (2) how did the traditional communities react 
to this process?, and (3) what is the significance of the survival of the use of those 
traditional devices?
The objective of this work is to provide an interpretation of the modern 
monetary and financial experience of Congo. To define the beginning of modern 
times it refers to scholars such as Carr (1961), McNeil (1967), Kennedy (1988) and 
Roberts (1989). McNeil (1967) considers the 1500s to be the landmark that best 
establishes a separation between modern and pre-modern times in European as well 
as in world history. Kennedy (1988) also defines the modern period as starting in 
1500. This starting date is in line with the commonly accepted definition of the 
modern history as history up to the present day, starting from some arbitrary point 
taken to represent the end of the Middle Ages or the fall of Constantinople in 1453,
which marked the end of the Eastern Roman Empire (New Oxford Dictionary of 
English, 1998). What can be considered a turning point in 1500 is the establishment 
at around that time in the mind of Western Europeans of the conviction that "their 
continent was poised to dominate much of the rest of the earth" (Kennedy, 1988: 3). 
The fall of Constantinople (1453) caused a shift of the centre of power, leadership 
and initiative from the Eastern Mediterranean to Western Europe and the rise of new 
States. Modern times are, therefore, considered to have started around 1500 (Carr, 
1961).
In the case of Congo, there are historical written sources from the 15th 
century onwards relating to that region of Africa. These sources report on the first 
known contact between the Portuguese and the Kingdom of Congo, which they 
discovered in the late 15th century, as mentioned earlier. And yet, the era of 
prosperity observed around the 1650s did not survive the slave trade which was 
expanding at that time all over the continent, and which significantly contributed to 
the collapse of the Kingdom of Congo itself in the late 17th century (Thornton, 
1982). The fall of the Kingdom plunged back into obscurity this part of the African 
continent, which continued to be destabilised by the atrocities of the slave trade until 
the mid-19th century when West European nations launched the colonisation of 
Africa on a large scale. This study considers, therefore, the mid-19th century to be 
the starting point for the modern history of Congo, a country whose origins are 
briefly traced in the next section.
1.2. From the Kingdom of Congo
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
According to the legend, Nimi a Nzima reigned over the right bank of the river 
Congo as a powerful chief, from the late 13th century (Goffin, 1953). Wene, the
youngest of his numerous sons, gave up all hope of becoming King of his ancestors' 
land, and he went up the river and founded a new country he called the Kingdom of 
Congo. He took the name of Ntinu Wene, Ntinu meaning King in the Kikongo 
language. The new King went to war against his neighbours and expanded his 
territory. Congolese annals do not tell us very much about Wene's descendants. 
These are supposed to have been sixteen Kings (Bontinck, 1972). Nevertheless, it is 
well known that the Kingdom of Congo continued to develop to such an extent that 
by the early 15th century it comprised around 300,000 square kilometres, not 
including territories that willy-nilly pledged their allegiance (Cuvelier, 1946).
Beyond the legend, it emerges from most ancient sources referred to by 
Pigafetta (1591), such as Duarte Lopez who visited the region in 1578, that by the 
early 1500s the Kingdom of Congo was composed of five major regions, namely, 
Loango, Congo, Angola, Dongo and Benguela. These main regions were subdivided 
into a number of provinces that the Portuguese named according to European feudal 
organisation, such as grand duchy, dukedom, earldom, and marquisate. The King of 
Congo, known as Manikongo (also spelled as Mani Congo), held authority over the 
region from the Atlantic in the west to the river Kwango in the east (Cardoso, 1623).
According to some other sources, such as Felner (quoted by Cuvelier, 1946) 
and Cardoso (1623), the founder of the Kingdom of Congo, King Weze (or Wene as 
the legend says), also known as Nimi Lukeni, is likely to have reigned around 1270. 
The Kings of Congo have originated from the region of Kwango where their ancestor 
Ne Kongo (or Ne Congo) is supposed to have reigned. The name of the latter was 
given respectively to the city founded by his descendants, Mbanza Congo (City of 
Congo), the country that they inhabited, Congo, and the great river of that country, 
Nzadi Congo. The same river is called Lualaba in the eastern part of Congo where it
flows northeastward from its source before flowing northwestward and then 
southwest to the Atlantic Ocean (Dartevelle, 1953).
It is well known that the Portuguese were the first Europeans to influence that 
part of the western coast of Africa comprising a large territory of the current 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Goffin, 1953). They began trading with the 
Kingdom of Congo in 1483. This trade principally involved ivory. The Portuguese, 
however, soon started trading in slaves. This rapidly outstripped any other trade in 
both volume and importance, and continued almost without interruption until it 
reached a peak and ended in the 19th century (Slade, 1962).
Despite their early presence in the Kingdom of Congo, Portuguese explorers 
failed to go further into the heart of the continent, due to a number of obstacles, such 
as the tribes' hostility, impenetrable rain forest, waterfalls and rapids (Slade, 1962). 
However, the main obstacle stemmed from an obvious lack of interest, since further 
exploration into the continent required conquest, occupation and pacification. As will 
be seen later, this was not in their economic interest, since internal tribal conflicts, 
which most often they themselves instigated, proved to be the most efficient slave 
provider (Shillington, 1989, 1995).
The Dutch superseded the Portuguese in 1641, followed by the English, 
French and Arabic groups in subsequent years. They all came seeking silver mines 
which they believed to be located on Luanda Island, supposed to be the main source 
of the King of Congo's wealth (Dartevelle, 1953). Later on, as will be highlighted in 
Chapter two, it was admitted that the nzimbu seashells were the only source of wealth 
from the island. However, both the Europeans and Arabs all turned to and 
participated in a prosperous slave trade that lasted for about four centuries (Goffin, 
1953).
In a speech made on 17 February 1860 the future King Leopold II, then Duke 
of Brabant, filled with admiration for the Dutch pattern of colonisation, praised the 
virtue of external trade and the benefit of exports for Belgium, with a particular 
emphasis on colonies (Descamps, 1903). Later on when he became King Leopold II, 
he was attracted by the results of several expeditions into different areas of Africa, 
including the Congo basin. This comprised the territory known today as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, which includes approximately one-third of the 
ancient Kingdom of the Congo, as can be seen from the map in the Appendix section. 
Leopold II obtained agreements from numerous local chieftains, by which they were 
supposed to cede to him their territorial rights, which in aggregate covered most of 
the Congo River basin. In 1884, King Leopold II urged various European nations to 
recognise the Association Internationale du Congo (International Association of 
Congo) that he had created for the purpose of managing his African enterprise. In 
1885, he proclaimed himself sovereign of a new state he called L'Etat Independant 
du Congo, translated sometimes as the Independent State of Congo and sometimes as 
the Congo Free State, which he treated as his personal property (Slade, 1962).
In 1908, the Belgian Parliament and Government decided on the annexation 
of the Congo Free State as a colony, which was subsequently known as the Belgian 
Congo. This annexation was primarily a result of the financial difficulties that 
burdened the Congo Free State. It was also partly, if not mainly, a consequence of 
the campaign conducted in Europe and the United States against atrocities committed 
by the representatives of the King upon the local population between 1885 and 1908 
(Stengers, 1989).
During the colonial period the supply of various agricultural and mineral 
products to the metropolitan power was given priority. After half a century of
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colonial rule, Congo experienced growing nationalistic sentiment, which culminated 
in the January 1959 riots. Independence was granted on 30 June 1960. At the time of 
independence Congo lacked strong political, economic and educational foundations 
for sound self-government. In addition, as a result of the ethnic separation policy 
implemented by the metropolitan power during the colonial era, the country fell 
rapidly into ethnic and regional strife, making national unification more difficult. The 
1960-1965 period was marked by political instability and outbursts of violence. In 
November 1965 a parliamentary impasse developed between President Joseph Kasa- 
Vubu and Prime Minister Moise Tshombe. The Armee Nationale Congolaise (the 
Congolese National Army) seized this opportunity to take control and General 
Joseph-Desire Mobutu assumed power for an announced period of five years to re- 
establish domestic order.
On 27 October 1971, President Mobutu changed the name of the country to 
Republique du Zaire. Zaire was the name given to a new currency created to replace 
the Congolese Franc (CF) in a monetary reform launched on 24 June 1967, and 
which is analysed in Chapter five of this study. On the same date of 27 October 
1971 the River Congo also took the name of Zaire. As a matter of fact Zaire is the 
Portuguese corruption of the word Nzadi, a Kikongo common name for any large 
river, but the Portuguese mistakenly adopted it in 1482 as the name of the River 
Congo, as can be seen in a number of 16th-century maps that refer to the River 
Congo as "Zaire". In this study Congo is the term used to name the country even 
over the period when it was called Zaire.
Mobutu ruled the country absolutely, under a fierce dictatorship. He remained 
in power without a break until early 1997. May 1997 marked the end of Mobutu's 
regime and the coming to power of Lament Joseph Kabila, as well as the country's
return to its former name as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kabila was 
assassinated in January 2001. His son Joseph Kabila replaced him as a compromise 
solution set up by a Government rather caught out by the sudden death of the 
President, and yet anxious to avoid internal conflicts of succession and manage 
instead to preserve power.
1.3. Theoretical Issues Relating to the Study
To explain the origin of money, scholars generally agree that man's growing 
dissatisfaction with exchange by barter led him to evolve a less direct system of 
transaction (Polanyi, 1977). Surpluses were exchanged for one generally acceptable 
commodity, and stores of that commodity were used in exchange for whatever good 
was needed. Since all goods were exchangeable for the commodity, the commodity 
itself became the means of exchange. This view served as a basis for the theories of 
some scholars of the German historical school, such as Hildebrand (cited by 
Kindleberger, 1984), who stated in 1864 that evolution in economic relations had 
proceeded from a barter economy to a money economy and, finally, to a credit 
economy (Kindleberger, ibid). As a consequence, barter was reckoned to be a 
transaction process that existed in primitive communities where money was 
unknown. And yet this study considers this concept of economic evolution inaccurate 
since it has been observed that the three stages - namely, barter, money and credit - 
coexisted well into modern times in modern European countries, such as France, as 
late as the 19th century. Indeed, the rural economy in European countries used barter 
on a large scale. The national economy that depended on, for example, roadside 
markets, used silver, while the international economy operating in ports and major
financial centres used bills of exchange - a credit instrument - and settled balances 
that could not be cleared by bills in gold and silver payments (Braudel, 1977).
Any commodity that happened to serve as a medium of exchange was 
expected to meet the following characteristics highlighted by scholars such as Begg 
(1984) Beecham (1986), and Beardshaw (1992) in standard economics textbooks. 
The first characteristic of money is its acceptability. It should be generally accepted 
by virtue of its intrinsic value; if not because of that, then by decree, convention or 
convenience. The second is its scarcity. To be scarce, the supply of the commodity 
used as a medium of exchange should remain less than its demand; but it should not 
be too scarce, otherwise it would be hoarded and would not circulate freely. 
Essentially its supply must in some way be controlled. The third characteristic, 
named recognisability, serves to avoid unfair practices. Furthermore, the need to 
have recourse to special expertise or to spend time identifying a money substance 
would seriously undermine its usefulness as money. In other words, the more easily 
recognised the better is its quality as money, other things being equal (Goacher, 
1990). As the fourth characteristic, its divisibility should enable the device intended 
for monetary functions to be capable of being divided into small units. The fifth 
characteristic refers to its stability in the sense that the conditions of its supply and 
demand should remain stable, i.e. in relation to what it obtains today, it obtained in 
the past, and would obtain in the future. As the sixth characteristic, its homogeneity 
means that each of its units should be exactly the same as every other unit, otherwise 
people would hold on to the more valuable units, thereby destabilising its supply and 
demand conditions. Its portability, defined as the seventh characteristic, means that 
each unit should have small weight and bulk compared with its value, so that it could 
be easily carried about. Lastly, by virtue of its durability, defined as the eighth
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characteristic, the device should not be a wasting asset either physically or in terms 
of its value; no one wants to hold on to a wasting asset (Beecham, 1986).
The above characteristics are required for a commodity to perform the 
functions of money defined as follows. Firstly, as a medium of exchange, it divides 
exchange into two parts: a process of sale of one's goods and services for money, 
and a process of purchase of the goods and services wanted in exchange. It should 
"act as wealth with liquid purchase power, giving its possessor the freedom of choice 
in the satisfaction of wants, and enabling him to save and lend easily" (Beecham, 
1986: 4). Secondly, as a unit of account or standard of value, it measures the value of 
all other things because they are exchanged for it. Price is the value of a good in 
terms of money. By comparing the prices of various goods their value can be 
compared (Beecham, 1986). As the unit of account, it enables account to be kept in 
money-measurable terms, costs to be assessed precisely and choices to be made 
between competing projects by comparing their money-measurable costs and returns. 
Thirdly, as a store of value, it enables wealth to be stored up indefinitely without 
deterioration in value, without loss in purchasing power, for acquiring other goods. 
And lastly, as a standard for deferred payments, it enables an immediate assessment 
of contracts to be fulfilled in the future, thereby equating present and future values. 
The equation of present and future value is crucial to lenders making loans to 
borrowers who contract to repay an agreed sum regularly over several months or 
years (Beecham, 1986).
From the characteristics mentioned earlier it emerges essentially that money 
has two basic functions: it is to serve, firstly, as a means of payment and, secondly, 
as a unit of account. Each function has two dimensions in time. In the short term, as a 
medium of exchange, money eliminates the necessity of barter, which is inefficient.
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Over time, money is a store of value that enables production and consumption to be 
temporally independent; this is another gain in efficiency as one does not have to 
spend simultaneously with earnings or earn at a given moment in order to spend. As 
a unit of account, money simplifies comparison of values. "Over time, the unit of 
account functions as a standard of deferred payment, used in contracts involving 
payments or debts" (Kindleberger, 1984: 20). The development of money appears as 
a process shaped by continuous innovation sought in order to better discharge the 
functions for which money was required. There was no object or commodity 
predestined to serve as money. It was up to the users, regardless of the object or 
commodity concerned, to decide which device could qualify to fulfil the functions of 
money and to what extent it could do so.
With regard to the financial constituent of the study, reference is made to the 
classical structure of a contemporary financial system comprising the following 
components: 1) central monetary authority; 2) banking system; 3) financial markets 
and 4) financial instruments (Sevic, 1999). In this context, on the one hand, the study 
tracks the evolution of public financial institutions and public finance to analyse the 
raising and spending of public funds. On the other hand, it follows the development 
of private financial institutions and mobilisation of private funds to explain the 
origins, forms and development of private wealth (Kindleberger, 1984). The study 
refers to this theoretical background to explain the chain of cause and effect of the 
Congolese monetary and financial experience across the period analysed.
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1.4. Significance of the Study
This study refers to a series of patterns that contribute to confer on the case of Congo 
an acknowledged degree of specificity, if not uniqueness, such as the following, 
highlighted by Slade (1962) Salmon (1988) and Stengers (1989).
(1) As a territorial entity, Congo was created in 1885 not as a colony but as a 
private property of a single person, the Belgian King Leopold II. It was known at that 
time as the largest territory in the continent, if not in the world, to be recognised 
under international agreement as privately owned land - eighty times larger than the 
Kingdom of its owner.
(2) Unlike all other European territorial possessions in Africa, Congo was 
formed not as a colony but as an internationally recognised free State. This status 
meant that within Congo's boundaries there was to be, for all nations, free trade, free 
movement of persons, free movement of goods, free movement of capital flows, and 
free circulation of the currencies of major colonial powers (Wack, 1905). 
Nevertheless, the French name given to the territory, L'Etat Independant du Congo, 
literally translated as Congo Independent State, was merely misleading.
(3) At its creation, the Congo Free State was the only African territory 
prevented from levying import and transit dues, as a consequence of its status as a 
free land.
(4) In comparison with most of the other colonies created in Africa at that 
time, Congo was created at a very low cost, as the occupation of the territory was 
carried out with little resistance from the local peoples and did not, therefore, 
necessitate conquest war expenditures.
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(5) As a result of an immediate exploitation of abundant natural resources, 
such as ivory and, in particular, rubber, the payback period for funds invested in the 
Congo Free State proved to be exceptionally short.
(6) The status of King Leopold II in his capacity as the Belgian constitutional 
King, and the Sovereign of the Congo Free State with absolute power, resulted in an 
ambiguity, which affected monetary and financial affairs in Congo.
(7) On the other hand, starting from the creation of the Congo Free State in 
1885, Belgium was already acting as a metropolitan power in many respects, and 
tended to treat the royal possession as a colony even prior to the formal annexation in 
November 1908 (Stengers, 1989).
(8) Belgium was unlike all other colonial powers settled in Africa in the 19th 
century, in that it held only one colony on the continent and had no other colonial 
possession anywhere in the world.
(9) Congo became a Belgian Colony in November 1908. And yet, unlike 
other African colonies, the Belgian Congo remained, formally at least, open to all 
nations for free trade and free circulation of people, goods, financial resources and 
currencies. From this perspective the Belgian Congo appeared rather as an 
international colony (Salmon, 1988).
1.5. Methodology and Organisation of the Study
This study makes use of historical research methods to explore the monetary and 
financial experience of Congo starting from the second half of the 19th century with 
a preliminary review of traditional monetary practices known since the 15th century. 
It refers to a large range of secondary sources of data, such as books, journals, annual 
reports and periodical bulletins of specialised institutions, archive documents, most
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of them gathered with the assistance of the Bibliotheque Scientifique de la Banque 
Nationale de Belgique, and unpublished notes kindly provided by private sources.
The annual reports of the Banque Nationale du Congo/Banque du Zaire, in 
particular, were cited frequently as they are reckoned to be the most reliable source 
of data, to which most of the works on the Congolese economy refer to 
systematically. Most of the sources consulted for this study are written in French. To 
avoid any distortion of the meaning, names of institutions and a number of specific 
terms were kept in French, with, sometimes, a suggested English translation into 
brackets.
Furthermore, as far as the post-colonial period is concerned, the study 
focused on the banking system and deliberately ignored non-bank financial 
institutions. This option is justified by the insignificant share of non-bank financial 
intermediaries in the process of money creation, as a source of inflation, which has 
been the dominant factor in the development of monetary and financial crises in 
Congo from the 1960s onwards.
Lastly, the study did not consider the emerging informal financial sector 
comprising various forms of small savings institutions, such as the cooperatives 
d'epargne et de credit, which developed from the late 1970s and became widespread 
throughout the country over the 1980s. However, regardless of their large number 
these savings institutions did not play a significant role on the Congolese money 
market. As a consequence of a lack of managerial effectiveness they failed to 
establish a solid network of branches and to collect a noteworthy volume of savings.
The study is conducted on the basis of the ensuing plan. Following this 
introductory chapter, the second chapter looks at the major devices in use over the 
centuries as a medium of exchange among traditional communities settled in the
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Congo basin territory, as observed since the first contact with the Portuguese. The 
reason for this retrospective survey is to track the history of devices that survived 
into the late 19th century. In order to urge the population to accept the European- 
style currencies introduced at that time the colonial authorities made use of some of 
those traditional devices as a medium of exchange over a transitional period. The 
analysis developed in this chapter challenges some generally accepted ideas, such as 
the claim put forward by Mahieu (1924), Cuvelier (1946) and Wertz (1952), among 
others, that the Portuguese introduced the use of seashells as money in this part of 
Africa. It also clears up the confusion in which cowries are considered identical to 
the seashell nzimbu. In conclusion, Chapter two suggests an answer to the question of 
why, beyond a short transitional period of time, traditional monetary devices could 
not have a place within the colonial economic order.
Chapter three is devoted to the issue of money and finance in the era of the 
Congo Free State. It considers the ambivalent position of Leopold II, mentioned 
earlier, as the Belgian constitutional King and the Sovereign of the Congo Free State. 
This chapter also addresses the transitional period during which traditional monetary 
devices, such as the mitako, a brass wire cut into rods of variable lengths, played a 
key role in the process of introducing the European-style State currencies.
Chapter four examines the major features of monetary and financial 
organisation in Congo during the colonial period. It analyses the development of the 
monetary and financial system in the context of a dual economy consisting of a small 
number of industrial development centres where monetization grew at a fast pace, 
settled in larger areas where the process of monetization had scarcely begun. The 
study reveals a number of contradictions between the legal provisions defined by the 
metropolitan power for the colony, such as the separation of Belgium and Congo as
16
legal entities, and their implementation in the real world, marked by conflicting 
interests and balance of power a priori unfavourable to the Colony. This chapter 
explores the monetary and financial impact of these contradictions.
What emerges from Chapters three and four is that, contrary to a widespread 
view, as echoed by Wertz (1952) and Heenen (1955), monetary and financial 
provisions set up for the Congo Free State were so incomplete and grafted on to the 
Belgian monetary and financial system that it can hardly be considered a genuine and 
distinct monetary system. On the other hand, the monetary and financial system of 
Congo as a Belgian colony showed a number of shortcomings similar to those 
observed at the time of the Congo Free State. As a result, it should not be considered 
a complete monetary and financial system prior, for instance, to the promulgation, in 
the early 1950s, of a Decree that granted the Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du 
Ruanda-Umndi (BCCBRU) control over banking and financial institutions. 
Furthermore, this part of the study comments on the limits of the introduction of 
money and money-based transactions within large areas of the colony, due to the 
dualist structure of the economy.
Chapter five is devoted to the post-independence era starting in 1960. It looks 
at the changes that occurred in the monetary and financial constitution of the country, 
following the major political and sociological changes that accompanied its 
attainment of independence. This chapter points out how the fragility of political 
institutions and the inefficiency of monetary policy instruments resulted in endemic 
inflation, essentially due to ineffectiveness of public revenue and expenditure 
policies. These were the main reasons for a dramatic inflationary credit expansion in 
favour of an unproductive public sector. The chapter explains how, apart from a 
small number of short-lived periods of ephemeral stabilisation, the Congolese
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monetary and financial experience has been subject to chronic crises. It analyses how 
an ongoing economic and political fragmentation of the national space into several 
isolated areas, together with the juxtaposition of a legal economy and an unofficial 
one, has fuelled those hyperinflationary crises. The chapter analyses the coexistence, 
within the national boundaries, of several monetary areas with separate local 
currencies in circulation, but using foreign currencies - mainly the US Dollar (USD) 
- which are accepted all over the country as a means of payment, medium of 
exchange, unit of account, store of value and standard of deferred payment, or, in 
brief, as a real money, in view of the continuing collapse of the national currency.
Chapter six is the concluding part of the study. It presents a summary of the 
work, assesses the outcome of this research project in the light of considerations 
developed in the concluding sections of chapter two to five, and underlines the limits 
of the interpretation and meaning of any findings. The chapter also suggests some 
recommendations and directions for further research.
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Chapter Two:
TRADITIONAL MONEY AND EXCHANGE 
MECHANISMS IN PRE-COLONIAL CONGO 
(15TH-19TH CENTURY)
2.1. Introduction
This chapter addresses the issue of money as a medium of exchange in pre-colonial 
Congo. The analysis begins in section two with an outline of monetary traditions 
that the Portuguese observed in the Kingdom of Congo in the late 15th century. The 
interest of this review lies in the survival of those practices. More than five hundred 
years later, the same devices used as money at the time of the Kingdom of Congo 
continue today to play a monetary role for some traditional transactions in those 
Congolese regions that were part of the ancient Kingdom (Dartevelle, 1953).
European nations that had been interested in the West African coastal region, 
including the western part of the current Democratic Republic of the Congo, since 
the 15th century were in search of silver mines that they expected to find in that 
area, especially near Luanda Island. As mentioned in Chapter one, what they found 
instead, as the King of Congo's main source of wealth, was nothing but a local 
device, a shell named nzimbu, which was used as the main currency of the Kingdom 
(Cardoso 1623). The analysis carried out in this chapter focuses, therefore, on the 
nzimbu, the Kikongo name of a small seashell, as one of the best-known traditional 
currencies in this part of the African continent. It also concentrates on a number of
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other monetary devices, among those the libongo and mitako, for the reasons 
explained in Chapter one.
Moreover, the slave trade that developed as the main commercial activity 
between Europe and Africa starting from the early 16th century is implicitly 
addressed. This is because the funding of this trade and settlement of the related 
transactions in the region covered by this study were carried out in local currency, 
namely the nzimbu. The development of the slave trade required an increasing 
volume of funds. This led to the import of cowries as a substitute, due to their 
similarity to the nzimbu, from other countries such as Brazil, Gabon and 
Madagascar. This import on a massive scale resulted in significant inflation in the 
Kingdom of Congo (Cuvelier, 1946).
The analysis of the major local means of exchange in use in the Kingdom 
highlights the prominent role of the nzimbu in the history of pre-colonial monetary 
practices in Congo. A clear distinction is made between the nzimbu and other shells, 
local and imported, and various other devices, local and imported, such as fabrics, 
metal items, slaves, livestock, salt and pearls. It emerges from the analysis carried 
out in this section that a very large number of diverse devices were used as a 
medium of exchange. This multiplicity and diversity resulted in a lack of 
standardisation and was a consequence of poor communications between traditional 
communities. It also explains the small volume of money-based transactions on 
account of the mechanisms of exchange established in the traditional communities.
Section three addresses the cultural dimension of exchange mechanisms 
among Congolese traditional communities. The analysis highlights the relatively 
limited role of money in these exchange mechanisms compared with other means of 
settling debts in traditional communities. It consequently leads to a consideration of
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the whole social role of the device used as a medium of exchange beyond its 
monetary function, which explains the survival of some of the devices still in use 
today in a number of traditional transactions.
Section four analyses the role of one of the traditional currencies, namely the 
mitako, made of brass rods, in the process of introducing European-style currencies 
issued by the Congo Free State. The analysis explores the provisions set up by the 
State administration to manage a transitional period during which the mitako, as a 
traditional means of exchange, was declared legal tender in the same capacity as 
modern currencies issued by the State. Section five concludes the chapter and 
introduces Chapter three, which explores the monetary and financial history of the 
Congo Free State.
2.2. Early Money in Pre-Colonial Congo
2.2.1. Shells as a Medium of Exchange 
2.2.1.1. Nzimbu Shells
For centuries, as in other parts of the world, the people of Angola and Congo dealt 
with various kinds of molluscs in their everyday life. While the body of the creature 
was consumed the shell was used for a number of purposes, such as ornament, 
finery, symbol, ceremonial, fetish and currency (Fisher, 1949). The nzimbu seashell, 
scientific name olivancillaria nana (Dartevelle, 1953), adopted as currency by the 
Kingdom of Congo, was not the only shell used for that purpose. Shells of other 
snails that were eaten also played the role of money in the Congo basin as well as in 
other parts of the world, including other regions of Africa (Chinn, 1945; Adriaens, 
1951).
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Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present study, the interest in tracking 
the history of the nzimbu lies in the particular way this device influenced the modern 
history of money in Congo. In this respect, although the survival of the monetary 
function of the nzimbu is limited to some specific transactions, as will be seen later, 
the term has become the common name in the Congolese current language for 
money-measurable wealth and any European-style currency. Similarly, "mbongo", 
the Congolese common term for "money", derives from "lubongo", the Kikongo 
name of a small mat made of raffia fibre, that had also been used as money in the 
northern region of the Congo River mouth known as Mayumbe, since the era of the 
Kingdom of Congo (Dartevelle, 1953; Bontinck, 1987).
Old maps, such as those in an atlas in the National Library of Madrid 
referred to by Mirales de Imperial y Gomes (1952), mentioned Luanda Island as 
Ilha de Dinheiro, or Money Island. In the section devoted to the Kingdom of Congo 
the Atlas of Mercator (1608) notes that the whole region of the Kingdom of Congo 
was rich in precious metals, such as silver. The belief in the existence of silver 
mines, especially in the area of Luanda Island, explains the keen interest taken by 
European nations, such as Portugal, Holland, France, Britain and Spain, in the 
region. This resulted in a war of conquest, among other confrontations, in the 17th 
century, when Holland attempted to replace Portugal as the ruler. 1
As a matter of fact it was discovered later on that Luanda Island was 
mentioned in old maps as a money (or silver) island for its quality of being the main 
provider of the seashells called nzimbu used as money in the Kingdom of Congo. 
Various sources reported by Dartevelle (1953), such as Bowdich (1824), Duarte 
Pacheco Pereira (1750) and Nobre (1909), establish that apart from Luanda, the
1 See: Arquivos de Angola (1945) N° 2, 3, 6, & 8: Principals datas da chronologia luso-hollandaisa, 
reported in Dartevelle (1953: 97).
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nzimbu seashells were also collected from Benguela to be sent to the King of Congo. 
Manuel Cerveira Pereira, a Portuguese governor and founder of the city of Santo 
Philipe de Benguela, mentioned above, indicated in a report written some time 
between 1617 and 1622 that the nzimbu was "used as legal tender in the Kingdom of 
Congo where it was known as the best currency existing in that area" (Dartevelle, 
1953: 95).
From a comprehensive study carried out by Dartevelle (1953) relating to the 
seashells of West African coasts it emerges that the nzimbu (olivancillaria nand) 
could be found exclusively on the Angola coasts between Luanda and Benguela. 
This clears up the confusion created by some authors, such as Cuvelier (1946), who 
indiscriminately treated the nzimbu and cowries as identical. It also explains how, as 
discussed later in this chapter, due to a strong likeness, the cowry shell was 
introduced into the Kingdom of Congo in large quantities and gradually replaced the 
nzimbu in almost all its functions.
With regard to the use of the nzimbu as a medium of exchange, Pigaferta 
(1591) reports that at the time of Duarte Lopez's visit in 1578, the local people had 
no recourse to gold or silver or any other metal as a medium of exchange. To 
explain the monetary function of the nzimbu shell it is worth mentioning the 
Bakongo people who in the early 14th century lived as farmers in villages spread 
across the fertile uplands just north of Malebo Pool on the lower river Congo. The 
fertility of soils in that area led to food surpluses, which were traded. The Bakongo 
people were known for being particularly skilled in art and crafts, and as metal 
workers, potters and weavers (Shillington, 1989,1995). They also produced fine 
cloths woven from fibres of the raffia palm. These were traded as far as the Atlantic 
coasts where they were exchanged for salt and seashells called nzimbu, used as local
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currency. The nzimbu seashells were the only currencies used to purchase anything, 
including even gold and silver (Mahieu, 1924). This monetary device was used in 
the inter-regional trade stimulated by the tribute system set up by the King of 
Congo.
There has been no research carried out on the question as to when the 
olivancillaria nana or nzimbu was adopted as a currency in the Kingdom of Congo. 
Authors, such as Pigafetta (1591), Nobre (1909) and Cuvelier (1946) among others, 
mention the use of the nzimbu as money of the Kingdom of Congo but provide no 
indication as to the time when the small shell was granted the status of legal tender 
in the Kingdom. Nevertheless it is generally agreed that the nzimbu as a medium of 
exchange contributed to the establishment and consolidation of the authority of the 
Kings and their Kingdom. It is also reckoned that its use expanded regardless of any 
external influence and is likely to have been launched long before the reign of the 
first King (Wene) known to the Portuguese (Dartevelle, 1953). In this respect the 
family tree of the Kings of Congo, especially prior to Dom Joao I who reigned at the 
time of the Portuguese discovery, is not well established. The difficulty lies in the 
fact that all attempts had failed to overcome the complexity of the matrilineal 
system of filiation and succession code, as well as the meaning of names in the 
Bakongo people communities (Dartevelle, 1953).
From Duarte Lopez's account (1578), Pigafetta (1591) described how, at the 
time of the Kingdom of Congo, women were appointed to collect from the sea a 
specific kind of shell; these shells, named 'nzimbu\ were as tiny as coffee beans. 
The shells were grouped by sex, because female shells, smaller and brighter, were 
more valuable. The harvest was delivered to the King, who deposited them on a 
small island, opposite Luanda, established as a kind of issuing house ruled by a
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comptroller appointed by the King (De Cadornega, 1681). However, available 
sources are silent on the question as to how money supply was regulated under the 
authority of the King and how it was spread over the Kingdom.
The need for nzimbu as a sign of wealth and power contributed to the 
development of the slave trade in that the King of Congo went to war with an 
increasing number of neighbouring regions which, once defeated, provided him with 
more slaves to sell for nzimbu. As a result of the expansion of inter-tribal wars 
aimed at providing more captives, the authority of the King of Congo weakened 
gradually and the Kingdom disintegrated during the 17th century (Slade, 1962).
Due to the preference for nzimbu currencies in the Kingdom of Congo, 
possession of Luanda Island, the main source of the valuable nzimbu, became 
obviously a strategic objective, which gave rise to harsh battles over the 16th and 
17th centuries. Successive Kings of Congo were attacked by Portuguese troops and 
forced to give up their rights on Luanda Island. Mani Congo Don Garcia II was 
defeated and, as a consequence, lost Luanda Island in 1649. The decline of the 
Kings of Congo was complete when Dom Antonio was defeated and killed in 1666 
in the battle of Ambuila. From that moment the subsequent Kings could acquire 
nzimbu only by exchanging them for slaves, ivory or other goods (Dartevelle, 1953). 
In view of this development, it can be concluded that the desire to compensate for 
the loss of Luanda Island pushed the Kings of Congo to boost the slave trade in 
order to meet their need for the nzimbu as a medium of exchange and as their main 
source of wealth (Dartevelle, 1953).
Furthermore, the need for a constantly increasing amount of local currency 
due to a dramatic expansion of the slave trade resulted in the introduction of other 
shells called cowries. Due to their similarity with nzimbu, cowries were imported in
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large quantities by European traders, especially from Gabon, Madagascar and 
Brazil, to make up for the shortfall of genuine nzimbu. The value of cowries when 
they entered landlocked territories during the 16th century was so high that two 
cowries were sufficient to purchase a female slave in Uganda, for instance (Quiggin, 
1949). However, as a consequence of the massive quantity of cowries imported, 
these monetary devices became subject to severe inflation. By the middle of the 
19th century a female slave required 300 to 400 cowries whereas a cow was priced 
at 2,500 cowries (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960).
2.2.1.2. The Nzimbu as a Unit of Account and 
the Established Rates of Exchange
The oldest source available on the exchange rate of the nzimbu is a letter dated 20 
October 1575, written by Garcia Simoes, a Jesuit priest, and published by the 
Portuguese Society of Lisbon (see: Dartevelle, 1953). In relation to the Portuguese 
currency at that time, namely the reis, the letter mentions an exchange rate of 10 
nzimbu for \reis. At the same time it considers the measurement of greater amount a 
cumbersome exercise with reference to 1 'lafuttf estimated 2 'tostoes" or 200 reis 
with changes in the value depending on eras (Dartevelle, 1953). To give more 
details about the units of measure, with their local names, used to count the nzimbu, 
and their rate of exchange with the Portuguese currency, Dartevelle (1953) quoted 
the Portuguese geographer Cordeiro de Sousa (1883), who referred to a manuscript 
of Da Silva Correia (1782) entitled Historia de Angola. A translation of the 
Portuguese geographer's comment, from which the figures summarised in Table 2.1 
have been extracted, is reproduced as follows:
"In an interesting manuscript dated 1782, History of Angola, written by Elias 
Alexandre Da Silva Correia, we find the second division of the n 'zimbu and its 
equivalence in Portuguese currency: 1 bondo (obviously the cofo) 10 lifucos 
(lufucos in our text) \Wjundas, 100,000 n'zimbu, 5,000 reis. One/wmfo, 1,000
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;; 'zimbu. 50 reis. Thefiwda is divisible in parts equivalent to 25. 20, 12 1/:. 10 and 
5 reis. this concerning the best /; 'zirnbu." (Dartevelle. 1953: 1 10).
Table 2.1: Nzlmbu unit of measure and rate of exchange (1782)
Unit Bondo ______ Lifucos ____ Fun da _____ \:irnbii _____ Reis ___ Gold Franc 
Value i 10 100 100.000 5.000 28.00
1 10 10.000 500 2.80 
- - 1 1.000 50 0.28
Source: based on Dartevelle
It emerges from this comment and from further investigation on the topic
that the locals used a decimal system to count the monetary shells, in which the 
mimbu were grouped by tens, hundreds, thousands, etc. (Bontinck. 1987). One 
bondo was equivalent to one cofo. a name given to the small basket in which the 
nzinibu shells were placed on collection from the sea and Luanda Island beaches 
(Bontinck. 1987). The same source indicates that the normal weight of one cofo was 
approximately 30 kilos. On the other hand one funda was subdivided into parts 
equivalent to 25. 20. 12.50. 10 and 5 reis for the nzimbu of the highest quality. In his 
work devoted to the Kingdom of Congo. Cuvelier (1946) carried out a review of the 
variation of the exchange rate of the niimbu from the start of the reign of Dom 
Alfonso (1516) to 1787. Table 2.2 contains a summary of the outcome of this 
review.
Cuvelier (1946) mentions difficulties encountered in retracing the value of 
the niunbu due. for instance, to the misleading effect on the estimates of the 
translation of Portuguese terms, such as 'dots' (two) and *de:' (ten). The same 
remark applies to the conversion into gold francs, as it was already complicated for 
the Portuguese currency of that time for various reasons, including uncertainties 
regarding the exchange and alloy rate of gold and silver coins as well as 
counterfeiting of Portuguese metropolitan coins in the colonies.
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Table 2.2: Rate of Exchange nz/m/ni/Portuguese currency
Year
16th century
1516
1553
1 7th century
1615
1646
1651
1692
1 8th century
1787
Value
in cruzados
33
50
25
5
2.5
2
2.5
for one cofo
in reis
46,000
10,000
2,000
100
800
1,000
of nzimbu
in gold franc
260
56
11.2
5.6
0.3
5.6
Source: based on various sources cited by Cuvelier (1946)
What emerges from the figures above, given for a purely illustrative purpose, 
is the sharp fall since the early 17th century in the value of one cofo of nzimbu, 
following, as pointed out earlier, a massive arrival of cowries, shells similar to the 
nzimbu, imported from Brazil and later on from the West African coast (Gabon) and 
from Madagascar. On their way back to Africa, ships that took slaves to their 
American or Asiatic destination loaded, as cheap ballast, cowries, among other 
goods, to exchange for more slaves (Cuvelier, 1946).
In his manuscript mentioned earlier, Correia (1872 cited by Dartevelle, 
1953) identifies three inferior qualities of shell imported mostly from Brazil, and 
used as currency, starting from the 17th century. The lowest quality was called 
'scraps of nzimbu\ the medium 'selected scraps' and the third made of unbroken 
shells. The introduction of those inferior shells, considered false currency, had a 
negative impact on the financial wealth of the Kingdom of Congo. This led the King 
to promulgate a Decree prohibiting further importation. However, the Portuguese 
continued to provide the West African coastal areas with an increasing volume of 
cowries and other shells similar to the nzimbu for the purpose of the slave trade 
(Dartevelle, 1953).
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In the early 1500s, the second Christian King of Congo, the Mani Congo 
Alfonso Nzinga Mbemba, in old age, requested the King of Portugal to exchange 
150 cofos of nzimbu (approximately 4,500 kilos) for 5,000 cruzados. These 
resources were intended to cover the expenses of delegates he planned to send to 
Rome to ask the Pope for indulgences reserved for Christian princes. The cofos of 
nzimbu offered could be exchanged for slaves. The request was refused, as the King 
of Portugal disliked the prospect of a direct relationship between the Holy See and 
the King of Congo. In 1514 the King managed to send an Ambassador, Dom Pedro, 
and his son, Prince Dom Henrique, to the Pope. On this occasion the Pope 
consecrated Dom Henrique as Bishop of Utique to become the first Bishop of 
Congo (Cuvelier, 1946). This episode is mentioned to point out that the King of 
Congo resorted to some other sources of revenue, such as ivory, indigenous fabrics, 
and slaves, when in cases like this the Portuguese refused to be paid in nzimbu. And 
yet even at the time of the Kingdom of Congo, regardless of its predominance, the 
nzimbu circulated along with some other currencies, such as the lubongo mentioned 
earlier, while sometimes it was not even in use in some other parts of the Kingdom 
(Bontinck, 1987).
Most of the sources referred to in this study in connection with money shells, 
such as Mahieu (1924), Cuvelier (1946) and Dartevelle (1953), provide detailed 
description of the nzimbu and other shells, local or imported. They recount how and 
where the shells were collected, and mention the role of the King as he held control 
over the money supply. However, as pointed out by Rivallain (1994), they do not 
provide sufficient information, if any, about the volume of nzimbu extracted from 
the Angola coasts over several centuries. Nor do they provide quantitative 
information about the import of shells from other parts of the world in relation to the
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development of the slave trade, or in line with further changes that affected the local 
population.
Nevertheless, in the absence of such data on the evolution and management 
of the money supply, as well as on the regulatory provisions that governed money 
circulation, a rough answer to the questions raised above is given by the inflationary 
effect of imported shells. These gradually overtook the monetary function of the 
nzimbu, while the massive flow of cowries into the Kingdom from various origins 
resulted in a sharp decline in the purchasing power of the currency, as can be seen 
from Table 2.2. And yet, although cowries supplanted the nzimbu as a monetary 
device, the latter continued to be collected from its original site in Angola and 
imported into the Congo to be used as money in some traditional transactions, such 
as marriage payment and fetishist service fees, or for the other non-monetary 
purposes mentioned earlier in this section.
2.2.1.3. Other Shells
The use of shells as a currency was common in different parts of the world and 
widespread in Africa. In the volume of his Encyclopedic des Voyages that relates to 
this continent, Grasset S. Sauveur (1796) mentioned the term bugis as the name of 
small shells used by local people in western Africa as money. In western Sudan 
another kind of shell called koroni, similar to the nzimbu, was also used as a 
medium of exchange. The large quantity of seashells found in the region of 
Timbuktu, 1,450km from the sea, led some scholars, such as Chevalier (1908), to 
suggest the existence of an ancient sea in that region. Further studies established that 
these seashells were brought into the region to serve as money (Monod, 1938). 
Jeffreys (1953) adopted the same view as Monod (ibid) but claimed that the term
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koroni was likely to have originated from cowries. At the Conference of the French 
Association for the Progress of Science held in Paris in 1878, it was established that 
the large quantity of seashells found in the regions of Algeria and Tunisia were 
formerly used as a currency (Dartevelle, 1953). With regard to the Congo, apart 
from the nzimbu, shells of snails known as achatina, cowry and conns were also 
used as money.
First, the achatina is a large snail, the body of which could serve as food or 
fishing bait, depending on the region, and the shell cut in slices of 5mm to 12mm 
diameter. The slices were perforated in the centre and threaded to form strings of 
approximately 45cm in length. Six strings formed a quiranda that looked like a 
garland, known as "quiranda de Dongo", Dongo being a contraction of Pungo 
Andongo, name of the region where the strings were produced (Morelet, 1934 cited 
by Dartevelle, 1953). The quirandas were used as money in traditional exchange 
operations, such as marriage payment, as well as in purely commercial transactions, 
as shown in Table 2.3 below.
Table 2.3 provides a sample of essential information on the use of achatina 
slices as a medium of exchange with an indication of the user population, region, 
local name, features, value in goods or State currency and main purposes. It 
essentially emerges from Table 2.3 that beyond their monetary function as a means 
of exchange used in trading operations, the achatina slices could also be an integral 
part of a ceremonial process, such as a marriage payment, where there is a 
customary exchange of cash and goods between the parties involved on a non- 
pecuniary basis.
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Table 2.3 Use of Musanga, Achatina slices strings as a medium of exchange
Population Location Name of Special 
string feature
Value Use
Wa Zimba N.E. Nyangwe _
East Lualaba 
Wa Rega East Kindu Mbembe measured in
Wa Rundi Uvira
foot
Special
10 feet=l Marriage 
Access to
'=3. 65m indigo drills Moamy
fees 
Trade
Ba Bengele between
BaSuku
Emandju small slices
4 to 5mm
Lokandu-Kindu diam. 
West Lualaba
near Lokandu- 
Kindu 
West Lualaba
strings of 45cm
2 strings = 1 chicken 
50 strings^ 1 goat
Trade
Wa Songola S.E. Lowa
Wania 
Mituku
West Lowa
mororo
(plural long string^ mororo Marriage
meroro) = 10cmapprox.= l=10cts Trade
1 single
string 120tol506o/a 8=Uo/o=80cts
20= ikumi (^slices) of \Q=beratano=\fr
sometimes 5 to 7 mm 20=ikumi=2fr
\6=kiringi roughly cut 3Q=ikumi
na beratano =3fr 
5Q=makumi bill
na beratano=5fr 
mororo
(plural slices 6 to 12 Marriage 
meroro)= mm diameter Trade 
1 single
string length 
4=ishake mororo= 
8=kako 39.3cm 
\6=kiringi 10cm=86slices 
(plural
viringi) 1 kiringi= 
5,409 slices 
weight= 
______515 grams_________________
Source: Compiled by the author, based on Mahieu (1924) and Dartevelle (1953)
An account drawn up in 1857 by the Department of Finance of Luanda 
mentions a tax payment made in quirandas valued at that time at 2,000 reis each 
(Dartevelle, 1953). In Congo, the same set of achatina slices was called musanga, 
which means 'string', nsanga, (plural minsanga) in Kikongo language (Mahieu,
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1924). The main regions of Congo where the musanga were used for traditional and 
trading purposes are indicated in Table 2.3. Furthermore, a slice of achatina was 
found in a cave in Kivu, in the east of Congo, among palaeolithic tools (Bouttakoff, 
1927). Another slice similar to a musanga element was discovered in a fossil- 
bearing stratum, near the city of Kisenyi by Lake Kivu (Dartevelle, 1947). This 
serves to prove that the use of perforated and threaded slices of achatina in Congo 
dates back to prehistoric times. Eventually, the strings of achatina shell slices lost 
their monetary function, while they remained in use as ornamentation, but for this 
purpose too, they were gradually replaced by manufactured beads imported by 
traders (Mahieu, 1924).
Second, the cowry shell is also known as cypraea, a clear evocation of 
Cyprus, the island of Aphrodite, goddess of beauty, fertility and sexual love; 
primitive people considered the shell's slit to be of symbolic significance, 
comparing it to an eye, a navel or a female external genital organ. Such was the case 
in Congo and Angola, as can be seen from the number of statuettes regarded as 
fetishes, bearing cowries in place of those organs (Dartevelle, 1953). It is common 
knowledge in Congo and Angola that women very often wear a belt trimmed with 
cowries (or other shells) to ward off sterility.
For many centuries the cowries had already been in use as a currency and as 
personal decoration almost all over the Pacific area and in Egypt and eastern Africa 
Most of the cowries in use originated from the Maldive Islands. With regard to 
western Africa, the cypraea known as cowry shells were introduced into Senegal, 
Dahomey and Nigeria coasts as early as the 14th century, probably at the same time 
as Islam. They rapidly replaced other local shell currencies (Gouilly, 1951). The 
Arabs introduced cowries into the eastern regions of Congo, and traders into the
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KasaT and Uele regions, where they largely served as a means of exchange, personal 
decoration, ornament, symbol and insignia of power, as well as in games of chance. 
The cowry shells gradually replaced the strings of achantina slices and other local 
currencies, including the nzimbu shells (Dartevelle, 1953).
Table 2.4 is a rough guide to the purchasing power of cowry shells as 
estimated in the early 20th century: in 1910, they were worth 100 times less than in 
1860 (Torday, 1910). According to the same source (Torday, 1910), at a time when 
cowry shells were scarce the Bangongo used to fix the traditional marriage payment 
at 300 to 400 cowries. In the 1910s the same type of payment amounted to 3,000 
cowries, due to the abundance of these shells imported from various sources, as 
indicated earlier
Tabie 2.4: Cowry Shells purchasing power__________
Item Number of cowries in the region of
Bambala Bangongo
Hoe 300 
Cockerel 40 
Chicken 500 
8 yards of imported fabric 5,000 5,000 
1 knife ikula 5,000 3,000 
1 billy goat 10,000 13,000 
1 nanny goat 15,000 15,000 
1 slave male 60,000 30,000 
1 slave female_________________80,000_________40,000 
Source: Mahieu (1924)
At the same time the Bushongo imposed fines of 20,000 to 30,000 cowries 
for attempted murder, and 20,000 cowries for an unsuccessful suicide attempt, as the 
latter was considered a criminal offence. The heir of someone who committed 
suicide was fined 5,000 to 6,000 cowries, to be paid to the chief of the tribe, while 
an adulterer was fined 7,000 cowries (Torday, 1910). By 1909, on the European 
market, 1,000 kilos of a specific type of cowries known as "blue shells" were worth 
BF520 to BF580, and cowries from the Maldive Islands BF620 to BF870,
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depending on size, while 1,000 kilos of genuine nzimbu were worth BF4,350. As a 
result of the low value of the cowry it was necessary to transport a large volume of 
these shells; a person could carry a burden of 5,000 cowries and a camel 150,000 
(Mahieu 1924).
The import of other shell currencies similar to the nzimbu into the Congo 
from Brazil, and later on from elsewhere, explains why many writers who addressed 
the topic of money in general in pre-colonial Congo, such as Wertz (1952), or of 
Congolese numismatics in particular, including Mahieu (1924), believed that the 
nzimbu shells were of Brazilian origin. In reality, local people regarded the money 
shells from Brazil, Gabon or Madagascar as false nzimbu (Dartevelle, 1953). 
Furthermore, contrary to what is claimed by some writers, the massive import of 
shells similar to the genuine nzimbu was not due to exhaustion of the reserves of the 
latter on Luanda Island. The real cause was, on the one hand, the traders' greed for 
easy money at the expense of the King of Congo. On the other hand the King, who 
was steadily losing his power, failed to impose a ban on the import of false nzimbu, 
and lost control over Luanda Island as a source of revenue in genuine nzimbu, as 
mentioned earlier, (Dartevelle, 1953).
The third type of shell came from the gasteropod-type snail known as conns. 
The upper tapering part of the spiral shell was cut in the form of discs to be used as 
adornments, such as pendants, especially among the population of southern Angola. 
Conus shells originated mainly from the Moluccas Islands and were imported into 
the coastal regions of eastern Africa but could also be found on the western coast 
between Gabon and Angola. They served as currency in southern Angola and 
partially replaced the quirandas de Dongo in this function (Mahieu, 1924). As far as 
Congo is concerned the conus shells served as adornment and insignia of power in
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the regions of Katanga and Kasai among Lunda and Luba communities, whose 
chiefs and notables wore conus shells and discs cut from the same shells. Conus 
shells were used as adornment and insignia of power in some other regions, such as 
Lukenie and Lake Leopold II (now Lake Maindombe) as well as present-day 
Burundi (Mahieu, 1924). However, due to their scarcity, conus shells were hardly 
used at all as currency in Congo (Dartevelle, 1953).
2.2.2. Other Devices used as a Medium of Exchange
In preceding sections it has been stated that despite its predominance the nzimbu 
was never at any time in its history the sole currency in use in the Kingdom of 
Congo. Apart from other shells mentioned earlier, various other devices were 
simultaneously used as a medium of exchange, such as local and imported fabrics, 
metal and wooden objects and tools, salt, livestock, and even humans (Mahieu, 
1924; Dartevelle, 1953).
2.2.2.1. Fabrics
A wide range of fabrics, the best known of which are mentioned in the following 
paragraphs, served as a medium of exchange. In the Mayumbe region, northwest of 
the estuary of the river Congo, pieces of fabrics made of raffia and pineapple leaf 
fibre were used for this purpose. The most common material was the mbongo or 
lubongo as already mentioned. With a unit of exchange of approximately three feet 
called cortade, a Portuguese name, the lubongo was available in pieces of 5, 10, 20, 
40, 50, and 100 cortades (Bontinck, 1987).
The use of this term was finally extended to refer to pieces of European 
fabric 90cm wide and 7.30m or 14.60m long. The mbadi (or mbari), a bundle of
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fabric pieces, was woven with fibre extracted from a special raffia palm tree called 
dibondo to produce pieces of fabric named didiba (plural madiba) in the Bakongo 
and Kasai' regions. A madiba loincloth unit of account measured 60cm x 40cm. 
Small plaits called Matey a woven with a type ofpandanus fibre were also in use as 
a means of exchange among Bakongo communities. The Ipeko, a raffia fibre woven 
loincloth measuring 1.00m to 1.20m in length by 0.40m in width was used as a 
means of exchange in northeastern Congo, along with a bangle made of raffia fibre. 
Fifty bangles were worth one chicken, which was the monetary unit in that region 
(Mahieu, 1924).
Table 2.5: Purchasing power ofAmericani B55 fabric_______
per unit of 1.83m valued 4fundu (800 grams) of red pearls 60/5 
_____________________Number of units (1.83m) of American! B55 
1 young bull 4 to 6 
1 big sheep 2 
1 big nanny goat 2 
1 small sheep 1 
1 small nanny goat 1 
6 big or 8 medium-sized chickens 1 
Ikilo
tobacco 1 unit (1.83m) of American! B 16 
______________________or 190 grams of blue pearls Hahn_____ 
Source: based on Macs (1911)
On the other hand, the success of the wide range of fabrics imported from 
Europe was due to three major features. Firstly, they were solid, easy to transport 
and, above all, subject to a large and constantly growing demand. The local people 
of Congo had a preference for all kinds of fabrics in cotton, unbleached, bleached, 
dyed, printed, as well as for fabrics in cotton and wool and printed canvas. As an 
illustration of the expression of these preferences, Table 2.5 indicates the purchasing 
power of one of the most prized fabrics among the Wania-Bungu population, known 
under its brand name as Americani B55, a coloured cotton piece of fabric measuring 
approximately 0.91m by 14.63m (Maes, 1911).
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2.2.2.2. Metal
The majority of the peoples who inhabited the Congolese territory generally 
possessed the skills to make agricultural and craftsmen's tools, weapons and 
ornamental objects out of iron, copper and brass, as well as devices used as a 
medium of exchange. In some cases specific devices were created exclusively to 
fulfil a monetary function, but in other, if not most cases, common utilitarian tools 
were used for this purpose. While iron and copper could be found almost anywhere 
across the country, brass was imported and regarded by local people as a precious 
metal which they preferred to gold, which they seldom, if ever, used (Mahieu, 
1924). Depending upon the circumstances, different kinds of axes, spearheads, hoes, 
assegais, arrowheads, knives, bars, bells, rings, bracelets, necklaces, greaves, pearls, 
etc. were, by turns, sometimes used for their original purpose, sometimes invested 
with monetary functions. Table 2.6 shows the most significant metal devices used 
locally or across regions as a tool, merchandise, ornament, and medium of 
exchange. 
Table 2.6: Tools used as a medium of exchange ___________
Tool's Name Description/ 
Function
Region/ 
User tribe
Value as a medium 
ofexchange
Axes
Kas'uyu
Shoka
(or Iwenga)
Spearheads
Linganda 
Likonga
iron or copper 
crescent-shaped 
carved with human 
heads handle: bare or 
covered with copper 
solid: woodcutter 
hollowed: ornament
spearhead-shaped 
25cm height 
68cm width (in larger 
part); 250 grams weight
1.50m height 
hunting/battle
Kasai
Oriental 
Bankutu
10 Mitako
Lomami 
Mobenge
100 Mitako
N. Likonga 
per slave: 
male: 20 to 30 
female: 50 to 100
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Kundja
Table 3 continued
(or Iwenga)
Trumbash
Mapuka
hum a
Makonga
Hoes
Kikongo: Ntsengo;
Kiluba: Lukasu;
Lingala: Kongo
(or Lokongo);
Swahili: Jembe;
Wanande: Isuka
Kwer
Libako
dagger-shaped
large
small
billhook-shaped
various kinds,
sizes & usage
a bent at angle-handle
hoe with 2 branches
sort of adze used
to make pirogues
8 cm height; 4 cm width
Oriental
Lukenie
Uele, Ubangi
Sankuru
Wanande
Aruwimi
Mangbetu
Bakongo
Kasai
Equator
Oriental
East (Kivu)
Alulu (Kivu)
Oriental
1 = 2
1 0 large = 1 Boloko
N. Kundja per
1 male slave: 10
1 billy goat: 10
1 nanny goat: 20
N. Ituma per
1 chicken: 1
6 to 16 strokes
of fabrics: 1
300 nzimbu
4 chicken for 1 .
Isuka
N. Kwer per
1 chicken Va
1 nanny goat 5
9 Mitako
Picks (no local iron pick-shaped Lomami 1 Elunja per slave:
name mentioned)
Bells
Gunga (or Ngunga)
Elunja (or Elunza)
Iron bars and
ingots
Mambili
Mokanga
Iron/copper
pearls and balls
pieces; 4 to 5 cm
length 1 mm depth
single bell
double bell
flat, without clapper
30 to 50 cm length
1 kilo weight, used to
make hoes, knives,
axes spearheads etc
iron rod;
1 5 cm length
ornament
10 to 15 cm diameter
Mobenge
Mobenge and other
regions & tribes
Aruwimi
Lukenie
Lesa
Uele
Lukenie
1 female
2 male
1 double bell
1 female slave
2 male slaves
1 bar or ingot for
1 chicken; 10 small
pieces of local
loincloth; 2 strokes of
imported fabric
N. Mokanga per
1 1. palm oil 2
1 sugar cane stem 2
1 kilo salt 14
4 str. indigo drill 45
1 duck male 45
1 duck female 90
no longer in use as a
medium of exchange
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Copper crosses
Lukanu 
Other names: 
Lukano; Tstimbo 
Same name for 
copper 
Plural: Biombo
Milambo 
or Miambo
Copper rings
Nsambu
(ring of copper 
wires)
Lukanu (plural 
Tukanu) 
copper hoe
Boloko/Kunga
Mitako 
(singular Lutako)
Ngetele
Longele
flat ingot St Andrew- 
shaped cross with 
slightly enlarged ends; 
large range of weights: 
from a few grams to 
several kilos; average 
length of arms: 2 1-28
cm
600 grams weight; 
2 1 cm length
curved U-shaped wire
red copper cylinder
1 cm diameter 2 to 3 cm 
length; bought from - 
Boko Songo (ex-French 
Congo) Copper mines 
Copper rods 1A inch 
diameter, 3 inches length
copper wire 10 to 12 
inches length
Originally: 
Katanga 
and KasaT from 
where they largely 
spread across 
Central Africa
Bayeke
Bayeke
Bankutu
Bohindu
Bateke
Bayanzi 
Bobangi
1 cross (average size): 
2 strokes of fabric 
3 to 4 kilo of rubber 
5 to 6 chicken 
6 small axes 
6 crosses for 1 goat
Number of Milambo 
per 
10 kilos/local/flour 1
1.53 fabric 5
4 chicken 5
1 hunting rifle 10
N. Nsambu per 
1 chicken 5 
lOkilo/local/flour 10
3.6 m fabric 50
1 goat 100 
1 hunting rifle 400 
1 male slave 400
1 female slave 800
N. Tukanu per
50 Nsambu 1 
1.83m fabric 1
4 chicken 1
1 goat 5 
1 hunting rifle 10 
1 male slave 40
\l\QKundja
N. Boloko for
1 billy goat 1
1 nanny goat 2
1 male slave 2
1 female slave 3
1 spouse dowry 10
30 mitako 
for 1 Franc
no longer in use as a 
medium of exchange 
replaced by
Longele [mitako} )
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Necklaces, 
bracelets, greaves
Bongombwa 
(necklace) 
Lokolo (leg) greave
Likonga
(plural Makonga)
Minkata
brass necklace
7 to 8 kilo weight
10 kilos
3 to 4 kilo weight
brass or copper
bracelet
Wrist or ankle copper
bracelet made of a
copper string of 4 to
5 cm diameter wound
in 5 to 18 turns
Wangata
Mongo
Dekese 
Yaelima
400 to 600 mitako 
up to 1000 mitako 
up to 400 mitako
50 mitako 
(2.50 Francs) 
mostly used as finery 
for chiefs (iron) and 
their wives (brass)
Source: compilation by the author, based on Mahieu (1924)
As far as possible, the table above presents major features of the tools and
their value as merchandise or as a medium of exchange. In many cases, the value of 
the monetary standard is given in relation to the price of a slave in such a way that 
the latter is referred to as a unit of account rather than as a medium of exchange 
(Mahieu 1924). The malleability of iron and copper, and their abundance across the 
country, especially in the Katanga region in the case of the latter, explains why local 
people made use of these metals as a medium of exchange. For this purpose they 
fashioned various objects, such as bracelets, necklaces, rings, crosses and greaves, 
to serve in their commercial transactions, notably with their neighbours in the KasaT 
region.
In addition to the lack of standardised measurement rules and the consequent 
absence of common standards, the fact that people lived in small, separate 
communities, also explains why in many cases there are at least two names for the 
same object, one used in the exporting region, the other(s) in the importing 
region(s). For instance, the Luba from Kasai region call the copper cross lukanu 
(which means 'bracelet') or tshiombo (their word for copper) or, more commonly, 
nhami ya biombo (copper rings). This suggests that copper was firstly introduced 
into that region in the form of rings. Similarly the Bankutu people used to sell a
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thick copper wire called kunga to the Bohindo people, who called the same wire 
boloko (Mahieu, 1924). While, according to the same source, the milambo, tax due 
from a vassal to his suzerain, had to include a certain number of copper crosses, 
local people could pay the State tax with copper crosses at the time of the Congo 
Free State, a topic which will be addressed in the next chapter.
The mitako used on a large scale across the Congolese territory was 
produced in the region known as the Middle-Congo in the form of cylinder-shaped 
copper rods. The Bateke people used to buy them from the Boko-Songo copper 
mines in the French Congo (about 300km to the west) through the Manyanga 
people, and to sell them to the Bayanzi people of Bolobo, 200km to the east. Used 
as a medium of exchange and called musanga by both the Bobangi and Bayanzi, the 
mitako could be melted and converted into buckshot, necklaces, bracelets, greaves, 
etc.
Among the imported metal devices, brass was obviously the best known as it 
gradually replaced local red copper tools traditionally used as a medium of 
exchange. The preference for the imported metal was due to its higher resistance 
and malleability as well as its brightness and shining aspect, praised by the local 
people. Brass was imported in the form of 3mm to 4mm diameter coiled wire in 
units of 16, 30, and 45 kilos. The wire was initially cut in pieces 50cm long called 
mitako. Successive owners generally reduced the length of the original 50cm piece, 
so that eventually it was cut into lengths of between 8 and 25cm, which became the 
standard range of lengths. Each region was free to determine the length of the 
mitako in use within the limits of its boundaries according to local custom. As a 
result, a set of 16 kilos of brass wire measuring 185m produced variable number of
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mitako depending on the region, as illustrated in Table 2.7. A set of 45 kilos with a 
thicker wire produced proportionately a smaller number of mitako (Mahieu, 1924).
Table 2.7: Number of mitako per 185m brass wire (16 kilos)___________
Region/District Length (cm) Number
Bangala 40 450
Equate 32 580
Stanley Pool 20 900
Source: based on Mahieu (1924)
As will be explained in Section 4 of this chapter, the role of the mitako as a
medium of exchange became so significant that the State, later taken over by the 
colonial administration, decided to issue a specific regulation aimed at controlling 
the use of the imported brass wire. Eventually, the mitako became a unit of account 
of variable length, to which everyone referred when determining the value of local 
and imported merchantable goods (Mahieu, 1924).
2.2.2.3. Human, Livestock, Salt and Pearls
Apart from shells, fabrics and metal devices, several other miscellaneous objects 
have served as a medium of exchange in addition to their normal purpose as 
merchantable goods. Men and women, goats, cows, salt, fibre bracelets, pirogue etc. 
all fulfilled this monetary function. In the early 1900s, depending on their sex, age, 
strength, mental and physical qualities, and on where the transaction took place, the 
exchange value of a slave was estimated as shown in Table 2.8 (Mahieu, 1924). 
Table 2.8: Slave exchange value
Region/Tribe
Bangala
Bayaka
Mobenge
Gunga
Likonga
North Sankuru
Katanga
Unit of account
Mitako
Nzimbu
Kamba-barakuta
Billy goat
Nsambo
Tukasu
Male
30000
9
1
20-30
2
400
40
Value 
Female
1000
or 1 four-man pirogue
20000
10
2
50-100
8
800
80
Source: based on Mahieu (1924)
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A kamba-barakuta was a type of belt, 87cm long and 5cm wide covered 
with 500 to 600 cowries (Maes, 1910). The Basonge of north Sankuru in Kasai 
region used to exchange one elephant's tusk for two slaves (Mahieu, 1924). 
Livestock generally offered the advantage of representing units with a value of 
medium importance and therefore was suitable as a medium of exchange, especially 
in regions where it abounded.
Table 2.9 shows a sample of livestock terms of exchange recorded in 1893 in 
three Congolese regions. The Wanande, on the other hand, produced a palm-fibre 
bracelet called mabondo, which was worth one chicken. The Warundi (Barundi) 
produced a fine bracelet called utego made of two twisted rush fibres (2mm 
thickness, 10cm diameter), which was exchanged as follows: 1 goat or sheep: 50 
utego; a pregnant goat: 60 utego; I bull: 200 utego; 1 cow: 400 utego; marriage 
payment: 400 to 500 utego or even more, depending on the social status of persons 
concerned (Mahieu, 1924).
Table 2.9: Livestock as a medium of exchange____________________
Region_____________Medium of exchange____________________Value____
Lusambo (KasaT) N. glasses of white pearls
nanny goat 10 
chicken 2 
5 eggs 1 
1 cow 1 hunting rifle or
2 woollen blankets
Wanande (Ituri) 1 nanny goat 20 chicken or
5 hoes
Bangala_____________1 chicken_____________________100 - 150 mitako____
Source: based on Mahieu (1924)
It emerges from the figures in Table 2.9 that the purchasing power of 
livestock varied significantly from one region to another. In this respect Mahieu 
reports on a transaction he completed in December 1898 on the River Congo when 
he exchanged for a total of 10,000 mitako (18cm brass rod): 2,000 loaves of cassava 
bread at 5 mitako each, 400 chickens at 20 to 25 mitako per unit, 36 ducks at 80 to 
100 mitako each, and 16 goats at 200 to 300 mitako per unit (Mahieu, 1924).
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Salt extracted from swamps or produced through the combustion of herbs 
played a relatively important role as a medium of exchange. According to Mahieu 
(1924), local people in Lukenie region exchanged salt for copper rods 30cm to 35cm 
long, copper rods or bracelets, called konga, on the basis of 3 kilos of salt for 50 to 
60 konga. In the region of Lesa, salt, due to its scarcity, was exchanged in small 
packets of approximately 60 grams for iron rods 15cm to 18cm long, called 
mekonga. For three pots of salt of approximately 2 kilos, local people in Nepoko 
could get five 4-litre pots of palm oil, or one curved knife, or one brand-new shield, 
or 20 small spears. The Basonge (Kasai) set great value on the salt that traders 
brought into the region from the Malela and Katanga swamps. Two or three pots of 
salt were worth one slave (Mahieu, 1924).
Imported salt was prepared in the form of 40-gram tablets, which were 
widely used as a medium of exchange across the country, regardless of the 
instability of its value due to its fungible nature. One kilo of imported salt was 
supposed to produce 25 tablets worth 1 mitako each. Imported salt, scarce and in 
great demand, offered some other characteristics, such as recognisability, 
divisibility, and portability, which made it acceptable as a medium of exchange 
among local people.
To explain the monetary function of salt the analysis goes beyond the 
generally accepted characteristics an object should possess, such as scarcity, 
divisibility and portability, to qualify as a medium of exchange. Salt was regarded as 
money despite its fungible nature, essentially because of its usefulness in day-to-day 
life as a consumable product, which, combined with its scarcity, justified its great 
demand and, thus, high price.
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As early as the 16th century, glass jewellery was imported into Congo from 
Venice. Thanks to their brightness and colours, pearls imported from Europe and the 
East competed so successfully with shell currencies such as cowries and nzimbu that 
they managed to take the name of the latter and came to be known as nzimbu. In this 
respect, as mentioned earlier, eventually the use of the term nzimbu was generalised 
across many regions of Congo until it was applied to any currency. In the region of 
Ituri the Wania-Bungu people used as a currency unit a pearl necklace, its length 
equivalent to that of a forearm, called kete (plural makete). One kete of red pearls, 
the pearls most commonly used as a medium of exchange, weighed 20 grams while 
a kete of blue pearls weighed 180 grams. The units of measure applied to these pearl 
necklaces that were most commonly used in the same region were as follows: 10 
makete made 1 fundu, \Qfundu made 1 lugole, 10 lugole made 1 kinono, 10 kinono 
made 1 kikumbi or 10,000 makete (Macs, 1911). Table 2.10 shows what could be 
purchased, in transactions between local people, at the exchange value of red pearls 
in terms of makete, as reported by Maes, curator of Congo Museum, in La Revue 
Congolaise, 1911.
Table 2.10; Pearls rate of exchange___________________________
500 Fundu:_______________300 Fundu:__________________200 Fundu:
1 cow or 1 young bull or 1 male calf or
2 bulls, 4 large nanny goats 3 large nanny goats 
12 large nanny goats, 6 medium-sized nanny goats 
16 medium-sized nanny goats, 
1 female calf, 
10 large nanny goats 
1 large + 10 medium-sized 
nanny goats
8 to 10 Fundu: 6 Fundu: 3 Fundu: 
1 large sheep or 1 small sheep 2 local spears 
3.66m indigo drill fabric 1.83 m fabric 
1 small nanny goat + 1 local knife
3.66m 'American? fabric__________________________________________ 
Source: based on Maes (1911)
Alternatively, one fundu could be exchanged for 1 large piece of meat or 20 
to 25 kilos of beans, 1 local hoe or 1 large pot of banana beer. Furthermore, 20 to 25
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kilos of sweet potatoes were exchanged for 6 makete, 1 bunch of bananas for 4 
makete, 1 large copper bracelet for 5 makete, 1 small brass bracelet for 1 kete or for 
3 young tobacco plants, 1 small pot of banana beer for 1 kete. With regard to 
transactions between local people and Europeans, as a rough guide the exchange 
value could be fixed as follows: 100 grams of blue pearls were exchanged for 8 
eggs, 500 grams for 20 to 25 kilos of beans or sorghum flour, 625 grams for 100 
kilos of sweet potatoes and 380 grams for 10 bunches of bananas (Maes, 1911).
2.3. Exchange Mechanisms in Traditional Communities
To explain the nature, function and evolution of money in the pre-colonial economic 
environment of the Congo basin this study refers to works relating to Congolese 
traditional communities by ethnologists, sociologists and economic historians, such 
as Mahieu (1928), Einzig (1966), Meillassoux (1956), Polanyi (1957), Dartevelle 
(1938), Dupriez (1959), Bohannan (1959), Baeck (1959) and other scholars 
mentioned in this section. Reference is made to these scholars as it emerges from 
their works that transactions in the traditional communities were carried out 
according to complex exchange mechanisms in which money played a very limited 
role.
One of the key explanatory factors is that, unlike most of the countries in 
northern Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the region of central Africa, with a few 
exceptions, is characterised by a lack of areas with a high population density (Davis 
& Golden, 1954). Two main features explain the sparseness of population density in 
this part of the continent. Firstly, there is the inhospitable element of a rain forest 
that, in addition, comprises large areas covered with swamps, especially in the 
central region of the Congo basin. Secondly, there is the history of four centuries of
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slave trade starting from the early 16th century, which resulted in a systematic 
depopulation of the sub-Saharan Africa on a large scale (Goffin, 1953). As a 
consequence, people tended to live in communities, each consisting of a cluster of 
small villages that grouped families and clans in a variety of ethnic sub-groups 
belonging to the same stratified ethnic group.
Following conquests and infeudation of neighbouring ethnic groups, some of 
those communities developed into genuine empires and kingdoms, such as the Luba 
and Lunda empires, as well as the Kingdom of Congo frequently referred to in this 
chapter (Vansina, 1957; Biebuyck, 1957). On the other hand, this dispersion of 
compartmentalised social cells resulted in strengthening cohesion and integration of 
tribal groups, which allowed a relatively perfect autarky. Within a given social cell 
or tribal group, the structure of blood relationship served as a keystone defining the 
hierarchy and all social functions, including those of a political, economic and ritual 
nature. The chief was accepted and respected in the village because beyond his 
hierarchical position he was linked to most of the community's members by family 
ties (Thurnwald, 1937). Within the community, all duties, rights and prerogatives 
were determined on the basis of an individual's genealogical position in their 
family's line of descent. This social organisation applied to the system of production 
and distribution of goods and services, where functions and economic relations 
appeared as a result of and extension of family prerogatives.
Traditional communities that have been studied by scholars were known for 
living in self-contained worlds. Their economies were predominantly self-sufficient, 
producing all the goods and services needed to secure the perpetuation and 
development of the community, using natural resources within their reach. The 
division of labour was based on social status and sex. Tasks requiring muscular
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strength and agility, such as hunting, cutting trees, clearing fields and building 
houses, were reserved for males. Domestic and food-related tasks, such as collecting 
wood for heating and cooking, water transport, cultivating, harvesting and cooking, 
were reserved for females. Some of the most important tasks, such as moving 
components of a house from one place to another within the village, were carried 
out collectively by a team of males, all friends and/or relatives (Leiris & Pauvert, 
1952).
In such economic conditions, there was no stock of accumulated reserves 
that could be exchanged for external resources (Bauer, 1957). However, reserves, 
such as seeds for the next season's sowing, were laid in to secure the survival of the 
community. This state of affairs was consistent with the key feature of the system. 
In such a self-sufficient environment, production and distribution of goods and 
services were performed within an extended family framework, almost completely 
excluding onerous transactions, and yet operating on the basis of a tight network of 
family and solidarity obligations and rights. The reason for this was that production 
of goods and services in traditional communities was not profit-oriented. The 
accumulation of surplus provisions and reserves for exchange purposes beyond the 
need for immediate survival was, therefore, limited (Bauer, 1957).
Exchange of goods and services between members of a community fell 
within the frame of family institutions that provided every single member of the 
group with the means of meeting vital needs. In the long run, the benefits exchanged 
should balance, since any gift offered was subject to reciprocity somehow, some 
time. The nature and size of the counterpart (or corresponding item) depended on a 
series of criteria, such as the status of both the donor and the receiver, and their 
familial relationship. On the other hand, a donation not reciprocated with an
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equivalent counterpart expressed the superiority of the donor and subordination of 
the receiver (Firth, 1951).
Further analyses distinguish three sets of benefits exchange in traditional 
economic systems. The first concerned goods and services for survival, such as food 
products and domestic utensils. The exchange was completed on the basis of direct 
family relations or barter. The second organised the exchange of prestige goods, 
such as livestock, slaves, special pieces of fabrics and clothes, and magic and 
medicinal information. Transactions in this sphere were subject to a well-defined 
social ritual and ceremonial. The third, considered the most prestigious, regulated 
rights and prerogatives relating to humans, especially females and children (de 
Heusch, 1955). This sphere considered two categories of rights deriving from 
matrimonial relations or exchange between families. The first category related to 
procreation rights that ensued from the capacity of a female to give birth. The 
second category comprised uxorial rights that followed from the capacity of a 
female as a spouse and housewife. Matrimonial transaction mechanisms varied 
depending on whether the exchange was concerned with uxorial rights exclusively, 
as in matrilineal communities, or with both uxorial and procreation rights, as in 
patrilineal communities (Bohannan, 1959). The compartmentalisation of the three 
spheres was such that each one dealt with its own means of exchange for the 
category of goods and services the sphere was concerned with. This segmentation of 
types of exchange within communities led scholars such as Einzig (1949 [1966]) to 
establish a distinction between "special purpose money" and "general purpose 
money" as mentioned in Chapter one.
The analysis of the pre-colonial monetary experience of Congo reveals a 
constellation of cumbersome and intricate transaction systems characterised by a
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large number and extreme variety of devices regarded as a medium of exchange. No 
consistent connection could be established between different devices used as means 
of exchange, of which the value was, in addition, subject to frequent changes. The 
first step of any transaction consisted in relating all the items to be exchanged to a 
given standard. The choice of the standard was made by the entities involved in the 
transaction, subject to local customs and, thus, varied from one region to another. 
There was no consistent means of determining the exchange value of the unit of 
account and equivalence between disparate devices, especially across regions 
perceived as countless different monetary areas. Given the plethora of these devices, 
it was hard, if not impossible, to integrate them into a framework allowing any 
definition of a monetary system.
2.4. Defining an Exchange Rate of the Mitakoi 
Brass Rods versus State Currency
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, apart from their monetary function, most of the 
devices used as a medium of exchange in the essentially barter-based traditional 
system of exchange originally had a utilitarian function. As a result, local people 
regarded with caution the introduction of modern currencies, as these had no other 
function than to serve as money. In order to urge local people to steadily move from 
this barter-based traditional system to the use of modern currencies the Congo Free 
State provided a transitional period. During this period the State listed a large 
number of everyday utilitarian devices to be used as a medium of exchange 
(Mahieu, 1924).
As stated earlier, the question is whether in the traditional concept of 
money, the ability of a device to fulfil the monetary function of a medium of 
exchange was determined by its intrinsic value, among other features, as an asset
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potentially intended for some other social functions. The nature of the main 
problems encountered in the introduction of European-style currencies on a large 
scale in Congo from the late 19th century suggests that this was the case. It is not by 
accident that in many Congolese dialects "to spend money" is literally translated as 
'dia zimbongo' or 'kolia mbongo', which means 'to eat money'. These terms reflect 
the overall dimension of the social and economic usefulness of the device used as 
money.
During the transitional period starting from the foundation of the Congo Free 
State in 1885, the brass wire cut into rods of variable length called mitako, as 
mentioned earlier, gradually became the most widespread medium of exchange 
across most of Congo. This expansion was the result of local people's preference for 
brass, due to its brilliance, at the expense of copper, which led the State Public 
Administration to legalise its status as money.
To complete a transaction the value of goods to be sold was, firstly, fixed in 
mitako. In exchange for all or part of the value the seller received imported or 
locally produced merchantable goods listed by the State as means of exchange. 
Small transactions were directly completed in mitako. As a result of the fast- 
growing role of brass wire as the predominant medium of exchange, the 
Administrator General of the Congo Free State on 30 July 1886 issued, as a first 
regulatory act, a Decree aimed at controlling and stabilising the value of the mitako. 
The Decree provided that the price of brass should no longer be subject to any 
increase and should instead remain unchanged since the rods of this metal, namely 
the mitako, were to be considered a currency rather than a merchantable good. The 
value of existing stock of brass was fixed at 15 centimes per mitako (Mahieu, 1924).
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On 15 December 1893 the Governor-General of Congo issued a second Decree 
in order to improve the relationship between local people and the State 
Administration and to manage the substitution of brass monetary devices by the 
European-style State currency. Table 2.11 shows how the exchange rate between 
State currency and mitako was calculated in 1900.
Table 2.11: Exchange rate State currency /mitako in 1900
Fabrics as Unit of account
Americani
Red Savedlist
Handkerchief
Flowered Blanket
Striped Blanket
Blue prints
Stripes
Indigo Mottle
Loincloth
Indian
B 1
B20
B27
B36
B41
B 175
B 12
B9
B33
B35
Price per unit Local 
Francs Mitako
8.85
72.25
2.2
6.45
6.15
7.05
9.7
9.55
6.25
3.88
132.33
170
1,500
30
100
100
180
180
200
100
60
2620
Exchange rate 
State currency/ A//taA:0
Average
132.33
2620
=
5 centimes
Source: Mahieu (1924)
According to the Decree, each administrative district was asked to determine 
the value in mitako of all merchantable goods listed in the State's stores as exchange 
instruments. The value calculated in mitako was to be converted into State currency. 
Another Decree issued on 28 November 1901 confirmed the role of the mitako as a 
medium of exchange. In this respect, it referred to article 9 of the State 
Administrative and Accounting Regulations. This article provided that on the basis 
of a brass No 9A set of 45 kilos measuring 478m in length or 1,707 units of 28cm, 
the value of one mitako should not be less than 8 centimes (Mahieu, 1924). As a 
result, the exchange rate of one mitako was fixed at approximately 9.5 centimes 
inclusive of all sundry costs. The value of the other types of brass, namely brass No 
10A and 12A, was fixed at 8 centimes and 6 centimes respectively. Those values 
were applied to transactions between local people, in the case of an exchange of 
mitako for State currency, or for payments of salaries to soldiers and workers. With
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regard to transactions concerning merchantable goods exchanged for mitako, the 
Decree stipulated that they should be completed on the basis of the law of supply 
and demand. To comply with the instructions of the Decree mentioned above, every 
Head of a State-owned trading station requested the assistance of local people to 
convert in mitako the value in State currencies of his stock of merchantable goods. 
He could then calculate the average exchange rate of 1 mitako by dividing the value 
of the goods in State currencies by the local value of the same goods in mitako.
2.5. Conclusion
This chapter looked at the major devices used as money by communities settled in 
the Congo basin, as known since the late 15th century. The reason for this was to 
track the history of devices that survived and are still in use today. As far as the 
nzimbu currencies are concerned the patterns analysed in this chapter help to explain 
the role of these seashells as a medium of exchange. At the same time, they throw 
light on the same seashells as objects fulfilling various cultural purposes, and on the 
interconnection of their monetary and cultural purposes (Dartevelle, 1924). The 
demand for the nzimbu was, therefore, explained by transaction motives as well as 
by other roles such as decoration, personal adornment, power symbol, and magical 
protection.
With regard to the transaction motives, the demand for the nzimbu depended 
on the extent to which, on a market day on the coast, a supplier of goods from inland 
had to satisfy his need for the nzimbu as money. This could be determined by the 
size of his liability in terms, for instance, of tribute due to the King. To this 
motivation was added the need for the nzimbu intended for cultural purposes 
mentioned above. The rest of the supply was subject to barter-based exchange
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mechanisms, which enabled the supplier to acquire goods for his subsistence if need 
be.
The transaction motives faded away over time as imported shells or other 
devices, such as cowries, pearls and cotton fabrics (in place of the raffia fibre fabrics 
lubongo}, gradually replaced the nzimbu shells as money. However, the demand for 
the nzimbu for cultural purposes remained and explains the continuing flow of these 
shells from the Angola coast into Congo until the mid-20th century as mentioned by 
scholars such as Mahieu (1924), Dartevelle (1953) and Rivallain (1994). The 
research carried out in the context of this study revealed, as mentioned earlier, that 
nzimbu shells still today continue to play a ritual role in some regions of Congo. 
This cultural dimension is, therefore, to be considered the main explanation for the 
survival of a certain monetary function of the nzimbu long after the introduction of 
European-style currencies in the Congo.
Some generally accepted ideas have been challenged, such as the claim that 
the Portuguese introduced shell currencies into this part of Africa. New light has 
also been shed on the difference between a cowry and a nzimbu with regard to a 
misapprehension which led to cowries being wrongly considered identical to the 
nzimbu (Dartevelle, 1953). In a comprehensive study of African snails Dartevelle 
(1953) established that the nzimbu, known under the scientific name of olivancilaria 
nana, were exclusively found along the western Africa coasts between Benguela 
and Luanda, and that they were different from all other forms of olivancilaria found 
in other coastal regions of Africa or of Brazil. It has been explained that the survival 
of the monetary function of some traditional means of exchange is a consequence of 
the interaction between this role and the other cultural and social functions of the 
same devices in traditional communities. In the traditional context a device intended
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to play the role of money is also, if not first and foremost, perceived in relation to its 
usefulness as an object for some other purposes, such as decoration, personal 
adornment, ceremonial, fetish, magic symbol, power insignia, or simply an ordinary 
everyday tool.
Furthermore, the question as to why, beyond a short period of time, 
traditional monetary instruments could not fit into the colonial economic order has 
been answered. The final part of this chapter dealt with the process of determining 
the value of merchantable goods listed by the Congo Free State as a medium of 
exchange in mitako and converting the latter into State currency at an exchange rate 
fixed by the State government. The implementation of this process marks the 
transition from traditional currencies to modern money based on the same principles 
as those in use at that time in Western Europe. Chapter three will analyse the main 
features of this transitional period.
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Chapter Three:
MONEY AND FINANCE
IN THE CONGO FREE STATE (1885-1908)
3.1. Introduction
Chapter two addressed the issue of pre-colonial traditional monetary experience in 
Congo and looked at a number of devices, local and imported, used as currencies 
over the centuries. This chapter analyses the main features of the monetary and 
financial history of the Congo Free State that existed from 1885 to 1908. The 
second section after this introduction addresses the topic of money. It looks at the 
currencies issued by the Congo Free State and foreign currencies in circulation in 
the State, as a result of the free circulation of people, goods, capital and monies 
from all nations within the boundaries of the Congo basin, as stipulated by the 1885 
Berlin Act. It also looks at the monetary institutional framework and regulation 
established for the Congo Free State. The analysis carried out in this section 
establishes a connection between the Congolese traditional monetary experience 
explored in the previous chapter and the introduction of European-style currencies 
in Congo since the late 19th century.
The third section considers the issue of finance in the economic context of 
the State to assess the impact of the ambiguity of King Leopold IPs status in his 
capacity as the constitutional King of Belgium on the one hand, and the Sovereign 
of Congo on the other. The analysis conducted in this section highlights the wide
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gap that existed between the official humanitarian reasons proclaimed by King 
Leopold II to justify his personal involvement in the foundation of the Congo Free 
State and the real economic and financial motivation - unconfessed and yet 
obvious. It shows to what extent, in view of the atrocities to which the local 
population was subjected, even the humanitarian reasons put forward to make the 
royal creation internationally recognised, were swiftly forgotten. For the sake of the 
economic and financial wealth of King Leopold II and metropolitan Belgium, the 
Congolese people were forced to work like slaves and many of those who failed to 
produce quantities assigned to them were sentenced to death (Slade, 1962). The 
abuses committed in this respect were so shocking that they gave rise to 
international condemnation, which led the Belgian government to take over the 
Congo Free State from the King and convert it into a formal Belgian colony 
(Cattier, 1906).
As Cattier (1906) pointed out, King Leopold II applied an economic and 
financial policy marked by his megalomania. Beyond the misappropriation of 
considerable resources at the expense of Congo, this policy resulted in a debt 
burden borne by the Congo Free State but intended for prestige investments in 
Belgium and in some other European countries, such as France (Cattier, 1906). As 
a conclusion, the fourth section underlines the shortcomings of the monetary and 
financial provisions set up over the era of the Congo Free State to show that, 
contrary to the situation formally defined by law, there was, in fact, no real 
separation between Belgian and Congolese money and finance.
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3.2. Monetary System Design
3.2.1. Early European Currencies in Congo
At the time when the whole of Black Africa was known as Ethiopia, the King of 
Portugal was also titled Dominus Aethiopia. Later on, when the same region of 
Black Africa was called Guinea, divided into Upper and Lower Guinea, the King of 
Portugal took the title of Dominus Guineae, on the basis of the rights he claimed 
from his possession of these territories. The lands of Congo and Angola were part 
of Lower Guinea. This is the reason why the inscription ' Dominus Guineae' was 
engraved in the commemorative coin issued by King Joao II when the navigator 
Bartolomeu Diaz reached the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. The same period 
witnessed the spread of cruzados, justos and espadinus in gold coins, and later, of 
testaos, indios and reales in silver coins as well as reales preto in copper coins, all 
over the Western African coast (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960). However, the first 
significant minting of coins intended for circulation in Africa started in 1694 under 
the reign of Pedro II. These coins circulated along with the traditional means of 
exchange, such as the nzimbu, lubongo, mitako, salt and fabrics, as analysed in 
Chapter two (Bontinck, 1987).
On the other hand, people from the coastal regions of Angola and Congo 
used a device called nkuta or khuta, with variant khoto (also spelled nkutu or 
khutu}, as a unit of account; this is a term in the Kikongo language to name a 
bundle of pieces of fabric, wood or metal as well as a pack of food or a bag. The 
origin of this term goes back to the Kingdom of Congo where a khoto (or khutu) as 
a bag, one of the insignia of power, was intended to contain the tributes paid to the 
King in nzimbu money. Due to mishearing on the part of the Portuguese nkuta or 
khuta was spelled macula in Portuguese (Dartevelle, 1953). At the time of slave
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trade the value of a slave was determined in a given amount of macuta, and on this 
basis the value of goods to be exchanged was expressed in macuta. In Chapter two 
the term libongo was mentioned to name a small mat woven out of raffia fibre, 
which was used as currency. Bontinck (1987) claims that local fabrics were the 
origin of the term makuta - singular dikuta, which was a bunch of four libongo. 
One libongo was worth 12.5 reis, the Portuguese currency of the time. One dikuta 
was, therefore, worth 50 reis. However, as a result of the prestige attached to the 
coat of arms, the value of one libongo bearing the Portuguese coat of arms could 
amount to 50 reis.
By issuing copper coins to be sent to the West African coast, engraved with 
the Portuguese coat of arms and crown, and referred to as macuta, the Portuguese 
King's goal was to introduce, under a local name, an African unit of account 
defined on the basis of the same patterns as an European currency, with a fixed 
value equal to half the Portuguese testao or 50 reis, in replacement of a fluctuating 
traditional unit of account. The new unit was minted in copper coins subdivided 
into copper halves and quarters, while coins of 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 macuta were, 
later on, minted in silver (Mahieu, 1924).
At the Belgians' arrival in Congo in the late 19th century, the macuta was 
still in circulation. It ceased to be minted under the reign of King Louis I (1861- 
1889). However, the locals maintained the term macuta - most commonly spelled 
makuta -to name copper and nickel fractional currencies issued by the Congo Free 
State and, later on, the Belgian colonial authority (Mahieu, 1924). The term makuta 
constitutes one of the links between the pre-colonial monetary experience and 
present times, as it was re-introduced as one-hundredth of one Zaire (Z), a 
monetary unit created by the Government of Congo, as mentioned in Chapter one,
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in the framework of the monetary reform of 24 June 1967, which will be addressed 
in Chapter five in discussion of the post-colonial period.
In the late 17th century, the Portuguese gave local names to the coins they 
issued to be used in their African territories in order to facilitate the progress of 
trade. The value of those coins was defined with reference to the Portuguese 
currency, namely the Portuguese testao. One century later, as mentioned in Chapter 
two, the same approach was repeated by the Belgians who made use of the mitako, 
a local medium of exchange, to manage the transitional period during which 
traditional currencies were in use alongside European-style currencies that were 
introduced with the colonial occupation.
Nonetheless, on the one hand, problems regarding navigability of the river 
Congo beyond Matadi prevented the Portuguese from penetrating further into the 
continent. On the other, the conditions for overland transport were too harsh to 
encourage the Portuguese travellers to undertake more exploration (Slade, 1962). 
As a result, Portuguese currencies did not spread over the country on a large scale. 
And yet, evidence of imported ancient metal currencies was found in various areas 
inland, confirming the presence of external traders and other travellers. In this 
respect, there was evidence of the earlier presence of Arabs and, later on, of 
Portuguese, who used to extract copper and gold from the Katanga mines, from the 
Middle Ages until the early 17th century (Wangermee, 1909). European trade in 
silver currencies with Africa and the East was fairly profitable, as can be seen from 
the considerable importance Austria gave to it in the 18th century, especially with 
the introduction into Africa of the Thaler known as the "Marie Therese Year 1780" 
(Mahieu, 1924). Although the Thaler was no longer legal tender in Austria after 
1854, it continued to be minted and exported to Africa until the late 19th century. A
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Decree of 27 July 1887 issued by the Governor-General of the Congo Free State set 
at three francs the rate at which the Marie Therese Thaler could be exchanged at 
the State Treasury (Revue Beige de Numismatique, 1896, cited by Mahieu, 1924).
3.2.2. Merchantable Goods as a Medium of Exchange
The State tariff of imported goods used as a medium of exchange in the Congo 
Free State covered more than 2,000 items of various sorts. These comprised the 
following main items: 5 types of shells, 836 of pearls, 5 of place settings, 10 of 
hooks, 12 of machetes, 5 of salt, 212 of fabric etc. There were also many other 
devices, such as weapons, iron tools, nails, copper crosses, and various kinds of 
fancy goods, such as tinware, cutlery, hats, haberdashery and musical instruments 
(Mahieu, 1924).
Table 3.1. Some merchantable goods used as a medium of exchange________
___Region_____________________Items________________________
Bakongo blue pearl necklaces, red handkerchiefs with black and white prints
Middle-Congo fabrics, brass wires cut into rods
Upstream from
Coquilhatville long knives, copper spiral strings (minkatd)
Eastern region Americani fabric handkerchiefs (dot!)
Kasai basin gilded nails, copper crosses, iron tools to make pirogues, pearls, cowries
Sankuru region copper crosses, fabrics, other (undetermined) tools
Uele mitako, small white pearls, guns
Ubangi and Bomu iron hoes, machetes, pearls, copper ribbon rolled up round sticks, copper bracelets
Northeast, region red and blue pearls, Americani, indigo drills fabrics, bracelets
Lake Leopold II cowries (kesa\ mitako (lufuk\\ small pearls (mayeye), pearls N. 1706
(kasakengele), big pearls (takele), cylindrical pearls(taw6«), black pearls N. 1701 
& 1706, blue & white pearls N. 4693, Americani & Guinea fabrics
Source: based on Mahieu (1924)
While a number of items were generally accepted everywhere, different 
regions of the State had a clear preference for some specific items as indicated in 
Table 3.1. Items such as cigars, copper or brass bracelets and rings, used as 
personal adornment, machetes, hoes, guns, gunpowder, hats etc. were generally 
needed over the whole State. In the region of Bakongo people had a preference for
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blue pearl necklaces (nzimbu), and red handkerchiefs with black or white prints 
(Mahieu, 1924).
In the Middle Congo local people favoured fabrics and brass wires cut into 
rods. In the region upstream from Coquilhatville (present-day Mbandaka) along the 
River Congo, the preference was for long knives and copper spiral wire (minkatd). 
In the eastern region (Province Orientale) people preferred Americani fabric 
handkerchiefs called doti.2 In the Kasai' basin people favoured gilded nails, copper 
crosses, iron tools for making pirogues, pearls and cowries. In Sankuru region, 
payments were made half in copper crosses, half in fabric or other objects. The 
people of Uele preferred to use mitako, small white pearls and guns. In Ubangi and 
Bomu regions, people favoured iron hoes and machetes, pearls, copper ribbon 
rolled up round sticks, and copper bracelets, while in the northeastern regions they 
had a preference for red and blue pearls, Americani, indigo drill fabrics and 
bracelets. Around Lake Leopold II the most favoured imported objects were 
cowries (kesd), mitako (lufuki), small pearls (mayeye\ pearls N° 1706 
(kasakengele), large pearls (takele), cylindrical pearls (tambu), black pearls N° 
1701 and 1706, blue pearls N° 1706 and blue and white pearls N° 4693, Americani 
and Guinea fabrics (Mahieu, 1924)
State officials, namely the District Commissioners in the areas exploited by 
the State, determined the value in mitako of merchantable goods used as means of 
exchange. In all other areas agents of companies were responsible for this task. 
This system gave rise to obvious arbitrary decisions and abuse since it was to the 
advantage of the State officials and companies' agents to assign the greatest value 
to the goods used as a medium of exchange. The price of the latter varied from one
2 Americani is the name given to several types, known by series numbers, of colour-printed cotton 
fabrics, very popular among the Congolese population.
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region to another depending on local patterns and the goodwill of State officials 
and companies' agents (Carder, 1906).
On the other hand, the local population could hardly purchase valuable 
imported goods matching their need, as the State and private companies were not 
keen to accept as means of payment goods of little interest which they themselves 
had previously given in exchange for products, such as rubber, acquired from the 
local people. The introduction of European-style currencies helped to put an end to 
numerous abuses that occurred under the regime of State lists of merchantable 
goods used as a medium of exchange (Cattier, 1906).
3.2.3. State Metal and Paper Currencies
On 27 July 1887 the Belgian King Leopold II issued a Decree (Bulletin Officiel de 
1'Etat Independant du Congo, 1887) by which the Congo Free State adopted the 
international monetary system in force at that time, based on the Franc (F) as unit 
of account and in line with the Latin Monetary Union, a topic which will be 
addressed in Chapter four. The system comprised a gold coin of F20, silver coins 
of Fl, 2 and 5 and of 50 centimes, as well as copper coins of 1, 2, 5 and 10 
centimes. The F20 gold coin was to be struck at 900/1000 fineness, 6.45161 grams 
weight with respectively 2/1000 and 2/1000 allowance (Royal Decree of 27 July 
1887).
The Banque du Congo Beige in its capacity as Congo's first issuing house 
ordered the Banque Nationale de Belgique (National Bank of Belgium), acting on 
its behalf, to strike F20 gold coins for a total of F50,000. The order was not 
executed and the F20 gold coin has never been issued in Congo. As will be 
explained later, at that time, no gold coin was in circulation in the Belgian
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monetary system either. As money of account the Franc was divided into 100 
centimes and equivalent to 1/3100 of one kilo of gold at 9/10 fineness. Silver coins 
were struck with the features reported in Table 3.2 (Mahieu, 1924).
Table 3.2: State silver coins minting conditions/Decree of 27/07/1887
Coin format 
Franc
5
2
1
Centime
50
Fineness
900/1000
835/1000
835/1000
835/1000
Allowance
2/1000
3/1000
3/1000
3/1000
Weight/gram
25
10
5
2.5
Allowance
3/1000
5/1000
5/1000
7/1000
Coin diameter 
mm
37
27
23
18
Source: based on Mahieu (1924)
The same mould was used to strike all coins issued in 1887, 1891, 1894 and 
1896, while the Royal Mint of Brussels carried out the minting. Fractional copper 
currencies were issued in 1888, 1889 and 1894. They had a circular hole in their 
centre and characteristics as indicated in Table 3.3. The hole pierced in these coins 
was supposed to help people form strings and bracelets, in line with the traditional 
practice in the use of nzimbu, cowries and other local monetary devices made of 
shells or some other material, as described in Chapter two.
Table 3:3: State copper coins minting conditions/Decree of 27/07/1887_____ 
Coin format Weight Allowance Coin diameter Hole diameter 
Centime gram mm mm mm
10
5
2
1
20
10
4
2
20
20
20
20
55
30
23
18
7
6
4.6
3.6
Source: Mahieu (1924)
However, this study claims that by reproducing the same hole in the middle 
of metal coins intended exclusively for a monetary function, the monetary authority 
failed to take into consideration that the slices of shells mentioned in Chapter two 
were pierced not for their monetary function but in order to form strings that people 
could wear as necklaces, bracelets or around the waist. Women used to wear those
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strings to protect their maternity in particular and fertility in general, combining 
this motive with a decorative function (Dartevelle, 1953). The hole pierced in metal 
coins had no monetary significance and contributed instead to their discredit, as in 
addition to the small face value, it led local people to consider those coins 
worthless.
Currency circulation in the Congo Free State grew rapidly due to the 
expansion of local trade. While between July 1887 and January 1895 the total 
number of coins of different value that were issued was 268,000, it amounted to 
342,000 in September of the same year, recording an increase of about 28 per cent 
in eight months. And yet a larger amount of coins was required to meet the fast- 
growing demand for money. The King issued a Decree of 19 December 1895 for 
the minting of Fl million in new silver coins. To carry out this final minting of the 
Congo Free State the King instructed the National Bank of Belgium to purchase 
4,369.943 kilos of fine silver metal on the London market. The metal bought was 
delivered to Brussels in February 1896 at a price of F113.30 per kilo or 
F495,114.54 carriage paid (Mahieu, 1924). The result of the issue is shown in 
Table 3.4
Table 3.4: State silver coins minted in 1896 
Decree of 09/12/1895
Format
Franc
5
2
1
Centime
50
Total value
Fixed
No. coins
110,000
50,000
250,000
200,000
by Decree
Value
550,000
100,000
250,000
100,000
1,000,000
Effectively
No. coins
110,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
1
struck
Value
550,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
,000.000
Source: based on Mahieu (1924)
The development of mining activities in Katanga attracted a growing 
number of workers from distant regions, who came to settle closer to their
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workplace. As a result, what had been the practice until then, of payment in kind, 
of a fast-growing number of workers, became increasingly cumbersome as the 
volume of imported and local goods used as wages exceeded the needs of the 
workers (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960). 
Table 3.5; Fineness account of 1896 minting as at 09/06/1896
Fineness
900/1000
835/1000
835/1000
835/1000
Total
Total weight 
Kg
2,475.209298
834.445520
625.669513
416.498675
4,351.823675
Coins 
Format
F
5
2
1
centime
50
Number
110,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
Nominal value 
F
550,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
1,000,000
Source: based on Mahieu (1924)
At the same time, the collection of taxes in kind, especially in ivory and 
rubber, favoured during the Congo Free State era, was subject to criticism because 
of widespread abuse. In addition, this method of payment proved to no longer suit 
the changed economic conditions of the State, which was compelled to meet 
various obligations and administrative expenditures that required payment in cash, 
and this necessitated collecting taxes in cash (Droogmans, 1906). In view of these 
considerations, payment in cash gradually replaced the widespread method of 
payment of salaries in kind. As a consequence of this change in payment methods, 
the King issued a Decree of 27 August 1906 for the minting of a series of fractional 
currencies made of an alloy of 75 per cent copper and 25 per cent nickel. Coins of 
centimes20, 10, and 5 were struck between 1906 and 1908. Table 3.6 presents a 
general account of State coins minted from 1887 to 1908.
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Table 3.6 General account of State coins minted from 1887 to 1908
Silver
Year
1887
1891
1894
1896
Total coins
Nominal value/F
Copper
1887
July
December
1889
June
1894
November
Total coins
Nominal value/F
Nickel
1906
August
1908
May
December
Total coins
Nominal value/F
Effective circulation
Nominal value/F
%
Number of coins
F5
8,000
30,000
50,000
10,000
198,000
990,000
10 centime
40,000
-
100,000
148,870
288,870
28,887
F2
15,000
25,000
80,000
100,000
220,000
440,000
5 centime
100,000
-
75,000
148,274
323,274
16,163.7
20 centime
100,000
50,000
350,000
500,000
100,000
61,000
12,200
12.2
Fl
20,000
70,000
70,000
150,000
310,000
310,000
2 centime
-
25,000
100,000
-
125,000
2,500
1 0 centime
100,000
175,000
625,000
900,000
90,000
275,000
27,500
30.6
50 centime
20,000
60,000
40,000
200,000
320,000
160,000
1 centime
100,000
-
75,000
-
175,000
1,750
5 centime
100,000
150,000
650,000
900,000
45,000
250,000
12,500
17.8
Source: based on Mahieu (1924: 87- 88)
As will be seen in the next chapter, the Conseil Colonial claimed that the 
local population disliked fractional currencies, on the grounds that there were no 
goods so small as to be worth only 5 to 10 centimes, and if they did exist, they 
would be exchanged on a barter basis. According to the Conseil Colonial the local 
population used to attach importance to a currency in relation to its intrinsic value 
as determined by its metal weight or alloy (Conseil Colonial, 1909).3 This study 
considers questionable this assertion, since it emerged from traditional monetary
3 Article 24-26 of the Charte Coloniale created the Conseil Colonial. Chaired by the Minister of 
Colonies, the Conseil comprised fourteen members, eight appointed by the King, three by the 
Chamber of Representatives, and three by the Senate. It was empowered to deliberate upon issues 
brought to its attention by the King, such as Decree proposals on which it was to formulate written
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practices examined in Chapter two that items of small value could be exchanged 
for a small amount of nzimbu or other shells or devices used as a medium of 
exchange. The main reason stems rather from the fact that with those fractional 
currencies one could hardly obtain anything worthwhile from the State or 
companies' shops. Later on, as a result of a wider range of goods for sale in the 
shops it became possible to use the most valuable of the coins of small face value 
to purchase small goods, such as matches, salt, etc. (Mahieu, 1924).
King Leopold II issued a Decree of 7 February 1896 (Bulletin Officiel de 
1'Etat Independant du Congo, 1896, referred to from now as Bulletin Officiel) to 
create State paper currencies. Following this Decree, the Governor-General of the 
State promulgated an instruction of 10 April of the same year to state that the first 
issuing authorised would comprise banknotes of F10 and 100 for a maximum of 
F400,000 nominal value.
The instruction made it clear that the bearer paper currencies were to be 
accepted for any payment due to the Treasury along with the State metal 
currencies. Tax collectors were allowed to exchange paper currencies for metal 
State currencies, provided that the exchange would not result in any inconvenience 
for the Treasury. The State bills, the issue of which was not hedged, were payable 
at the General Treasury of the Congo Free State in Brussels (Louwers, 1934). To 
prevent dishonest Europeans from issuing false paper currencies that could be 
taken by the local population to be real, the Governor-General prescribed eight 
days' to three months' prison sentence and a F25 to 1,000 fine for the production, 
hawking and distribution of such kind of printed paper (Mahieu, 1924).
and justified opinions, and to request any information from the government (Moniteur Beige, 1908: 
5891-92)
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The issuing of State paper currencies met with no success among local 
people. The notes were subject to rapid deterioration caused by humidity and 
insects. As a result they could not be reused, unlike metal coins which, in addition, 
could be melted down again for some other use, such as spear ornaments, belt 
buckles or bracelets. Moreover, local people had no confidence in State bills 
bearing an unknown signature. In this respect, they had greater trust in foreign 
metal currencies, such as Portuguese coins in the southwest region known as Bas- 
Congo, and Marie Therese Thaler in the east. They also had more confidence in 
coins minted by some locally well-known figures, such as those bearing the image 
of Antoine Gushoff, manager of a Dutch trading company in the Bas-Congo 
region, and zinc coins struck by the religious community known as the Peres 
Blancs that had been established beside Lake Tanganyika (Banque du Congo 
Beige, 1960).
The Decree of 27 July 1887 (Bulletin Officiel, 1887) aimed at organising 
the monetary regime of the Congo Free State, stipulated, among other provisions, a 
temporary acceptance of foreign currencies as a medium of payment in the State. 
This provision was intended to overcome the shortage of currency in a new 
territory expected to witness fast-growing commercial activity and, at the same 
time, comply with one of the prescriptions of the Berlin Act, which proclaimed free 
trade and circulation for all nations in the Congo basin. As a consequence, a Decree 
of 3 January 1891 fixed, as shown in Table 3.7, the exchange rate of foreign 
currencies in circulation, namely the Pound Sterling (GBP), Mark, Rupee and 
Marie Therese Thaler (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960).
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Table 3.7: Foreign currencies exchange rate at 03/01/1891______
Currency Gold Gold Rupee Marie 
____________Pound St.__________Mark_____________Therese 
Coin Pound 1 Marks20 Marks 10 Thaler 1 
Exchange rate/Franc 24.20 24.40__________12.20 1.30 3.00 
Source: based on Banque du Congo Beige (1960)
For a long time, the traditional system of commercial transactions continued 
to be implemented, based on a wide range of local and imported merchantable 
goods used as a medium of exchange. The State resorted to recognising the value 
of those goods and taking various strategic measures to gradually make the local 
communities accept the State money. In 1886, in readiness for the launching of its 
currency, the State decided that the mitako, mentioned earlier in Chapter two, was 
to be treated as money rather than as merchandise and used as a medium of 
exchange. For this reason, its value fixed at 15 centimes for one mitako was to 
remain unchanged. For a long period the mitako continued to play a crucial role as 
money alongside currencies issued by the State.
Be that as it may, the success of the dissemination of State currencies 
depended partly on the goodwill and personal influence of State officials and their 
ability to persuade the local population of the validity of these monies. The normal 
length of one mitako was approximately 50cm, and its exchange value was 15 
centimes, while the market value was around 10 centimes, due to various 
reductions in length over time. It was obvious that for a very long period, the local 
population's preference was for the mitako as a monetary unit. On many occasions 
State currencies disseminated by administrative officers were immediately 
exchanged for mitako, demand for which, in some cases, was likely to trigger a 
premium.
Captain Lothaire, District Commissioner in the Equatorial region of Congo 
in 1892 recounted an anecdote (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960) which illustrated
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measures he took to challenge local people's preference for the mitako and urge 
them to accept the State currency. As he received from the State government a few 
thousand Francs in coins of Fl, 2 and 5, and 5 and 10 centimes, he called together 
the most important personages of the region. He explained to the latter that the new 
currency was to replace the mitako at the exchange rate of 10 centimes for 1 
mitako, Fl for 10 mitako, and F5 for 50 mitako. The reaction of the audience was 
mixed. The elders were suspicious while young people were quite enthusiastic 
since a number of them had had some experience of the advantages of the new 
currencies during visits to Boma, capital of the Congo Free State. In the end, as 
suspicion prevailed, Captain Lothaire said that people who were to receive their 
wages in cash the following day and did not want to keep the coins they received 
would be allowed to exchange them for mitako. As a result, the following day 
almost all the cash paid out as wages was exchanged for mitako. A few days later 
Captain Lothaire asked the manager of a large trading company who arrived in the 
region with a boat full of merchantable goods to accept payment in State currency 
as well as in mitako, at the exchange rate of 10 centimes for 1 mitako. The manager 
duly complied. As a result, since the local people noted that the manager of the 
Dutch company was happy to accept the State currency, their suspicion was allayed 
and from then on the State currency steadily accepted in that region.
The situation varied from one region to another. In the Bas-Congo region, 
for instance, the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo used to pay workers 
part of their wages in cash. As a result, the State currency started to spread 
throughout the region more rapidly than in many other areas where traditional 
currencies, such as salt, fabrics, mitako and copper crosses, continued to be 
preferred over the State currency for a long time. When the Congo Free State was
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annexed as a Belgian Colony (15 November 1908), the Mint and Treasury of the 
Congo Free State held 1,275,439 nickel coins of 5, 10 and 20 centimes, which had 
never been issued (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960).
3.3. Financial System Design
3.3.1. General Background
To mark the realisation of his long-nurtured plan, the creation of an issuing house 
in Congo, King Leopold II issued a Decree on 21 July 1894 to establish the Societe 
Generale Africaine with an initial capital of F3 million, to which he assigned a 
financial mission. The company was also invested with many other functions, in 
the fields of agriculture, industry, commerce, mining and transport. The Decree 
stipulated that members of the Board of Directors were appointed by Decree and 
that the President and the Secretary of the Board were appointed and dismissed by 
the King himself. Another Royal Decree of 1 September 1898 increased the capital 
to F12 million. In addition it defined more precisely the company's function as an 
issuing house, stating that the company could print and issue banknotes guaranteed 
by the Congo Free State, subject to an agreement with the latter. The King issued a 
Decree to appoint the President and other members of the Board of Directors for a 
mandate that was due to expire on 31 May 1905.
By a Royal Decree of 25 June 1903 a new company was created under the 
name of Societe Generale Africaine et Banque de Commerce et d'Industrie with 
capital of F9 million, to replace the Societe Generale Africaine, taking over all its 
assets and liabilities. On 26 June 1905 the new company was put into liquidation, 
following a subscription for the capital of the Banque Sino-Belge, which later 
became the Banque Beige Pour L'Etranger. On 5 September 1907 the Societe
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Commerciale et Financiere (abbreviated to Comfma) was created in Brussels on the 
initiative of the Societe Generate de Belgique, Comagnie du Kasa'i, and S. A. 
Plantations Lacourt. One of the functions assigned to Comfma was that of initiating 
and carrying out all types of financial transactions. In 1920, Comfma merged with 
International Anglo-Belgian Trading Company. The new entity took the name of 
Intertropical-Comfma, better known as Interfina (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960). 
Many other companies that had been created prior to the annexation of the Congo 
Free State as a Belgian colony, such as Credit Commercial Congolais founded in 
1898, Banque Coloniale de Belgique in 1899, Entreprise Africaine in 1900, and 
Commerce Intertropical in 1907, considered financial transactions to be one of 
their activities, but none of these companies established an operational financial or 
banking branch in Congo.
The Royal Decree of 27 July 1887 defined the monetary unit and all 
conditions for issuing currencies in the Congo Free State. However, on the one 
hand, it did not establish any State monetary institution either in Congo or in 
Belgium. On the other, as already stated, none of the companies mentioned above, 
despite having been invested with a financial function, among others, had set up a 
bank or financial institution in the Congo. Thus, no bank or any other financial 
institution had been established in Congo Free State before its annexation as a 
Belgian colony in November 1908.
King Leopold II was the only decision-maker on monetary matters 
regarding the Congo Free State and his decisions were executed through Belgian 
institutions. These institutions fulfilled all the monetary provisions of the Royal 
Decrees, carrying out their operations in Belgium. Metal currencies were struck by 
the Belgian Royal Mint while the National Bank of Belgium was instructed, on an
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'at need' basis, without a general mandate, to execute the King's orders regarding 
Congo's monetary matters, such as the purchase of silver metal required for the 
strike of coins to be sent to Congo, as mentioned earlier.
The first banking institution to settle in Congo was the Banque du Congo 
Beige created in 1909 on the initiative of Banque d'Outremer, a name given in May 
1899 to the Compagnie Internationale pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie founded in 
January of the same year with capital of F32.5 million (Banque du Congo Beige, 
1960). The creation of a Congolese banking institutional framework started, 
therefore, at the beginning of the colonial era, which will be examined in Chapter 
four.
There was no doubt about the economic and financial motivation of King 
Leopold II, who once wrote: "If Belgium, which already possesses its railways, 
could add to them some new Java, one might be able to hope for a reduction in the 
salt duty, the suppression of customs dues, etc., etc., etc., all achieved without the 
slightest call on our own resources or on current expenditure... " (le Febve de 
Vivy, 1955: 31). On the other hand, the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference (February 
1885) agreed that Congo should be the personal property of Leopold II. The 
Belgian Parliament approved this provision on 28 April of the same year with the 
following text: "His Majesty, Leopold II, King of the Belgians, is authorised to be 
the chief of the state founded in Africa by the Association Internationale du Congo 
(International Association of Congo). The union between Belgium and the new 
State of Congo shall be exclusively personal" (Hennessy, 1961: 19). Furthermore, 
the Berlin Conference set up a number of regulations, the most important of which 
are the following, aimed at organising trade within the boundaries of the Congo 
basin: "(1) The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom. (2) All flags,
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without distinction of nationality, shall have free access. (3) All differential dues on 
vessels, as well as on merchandise, are forbidden. (4) No power which exercises or 
shall exercise sovereign rights in the above-mentioned regions shall be allowed to 
grant therein a monopoly of favour of any kind in the matters of trade" (Wack 
1905: 110).
Since the Congo Free State was founded as a private property the King was 
to bear the first few years' expenses out of his personal fortune before he received 
any return from his patrimonial lands. First of all there were the everyday 
administration expenses. Secondly there was a costly and urgent programme to be 
undertaken for vast areas of the State territory that remained unoccupied, to prevent 
the Arabs from advancing down into the State's lands. Finally, to enable economic 
exploitation of the possession, it was urgent that a railway be built between Matadi 
and Stanley Pool (Kinshasa) to overcome the non-navigability of the River Congo 
in that region (Slade 1962).
It is estimated that between 1878 and 1885 the King spent more than F10 
million on funding a series of expeditions through Congo (Stengers, 1956). At the 
creation of the Congo Free State the King assured the Belgian Parliament that the 
new State would request no money or agents from Belgium. Nevertheless, given 
that the Berlin Act had forbidden the imposition of import duties within the area of 
the Congo basin specified in the Act, apart from funds provided by the King, the 
State depended almost entirely, in the first years of its existence, on export duties 
from ivory and rubber, as these were the main products likely to provide a quick 
return.
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3.3.2. Financial and Development Policy
3.3.2.1. Loans and Financial Assistance
In view of the conditions mentioned in the preceding section, as early as 1887, 
King Leopold was to admit that the Congo State could not continue on such a weak 
financial basis. As a consequence, on the one hand, he undertook to seek funds 
from the Belgian Government and, on the other, he decided later on that the State 
should undertake commerce on its own account. As a starting point, a Royal 
Decree of 5 July 1887 created a debenture loan of Fl 1.087 million, representing 
funds received from the subscribers of the Comite d'Etudes du Haul-Congo to 
cover expenses of the latter, of which the outcome was transferred to the Congo 
Free State. The loan bore 2.5 per cent interest starting from 1900. Following the 
cancellation of F 10.665 million due to the King out of the total amount, a balance 
of F422,000 remained due (Stengers, 1956). 4
In response to a request by the King in 1886, a law of 29 August 1887 
authorised the issuing in Belgium of a 5 per cent loan of F150 million, in F100 
notes, redeemable by six drawings over 99 years. The authorisation was granted 
"provided that it would never imply any liability or financial and legal 
responsibility likely to bind Belgium, due to the union of the two Crowns"
4 In November 1878, King Leopold II invited representatives of important financial interests from 
England, France, Germany, Holland and Belgium. He persuaded them to form a Comite d'Etudes 
du Haut-Congo, for the purpose of studying "trading prospects in Congo and the possibility of 
building a railway to round the cataracts on the river Congo between Matadi and the Stanley Pool" 
(Slade, 1962: 37). The subscribers (i.e. members of the Comite) raised funds amounting to Fl 1.087 
million intended to cover expenses relating to the mission of the Comite. Soon after its creation, the 
Comite was dissolved and King Leopold II made use of his personal funds to return the 
subscriptions. This allowed him to take full control of the Congo enterprise (Slade, 1962). The 
results of the studies financed by these funds were transferred to the Congo Free State created in 
1885. To represent the debt of the latter in this respect, the King issued a Decree on 5 July 1887 to 
authorise a debenture loan of Fl 1.087 million at 2.5 per cent interest starting from 1 January 1900. 
King Leopold II cancelled the certificates, representing an amount of F 10.665 million, which was 
due to him. The debenture loan was consequently reduced to the balance of F422,000 (Heenen, 
1955).]
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(Heenen, 1955: 267). This provision was made to reassert the separation of the 
Belgian and Congolese financial holdings, especially at a time when Belgium was 
still most doubtful about the Congolese venture undertaken by the King.
In accordance with the law of 29 August 1887, a Decree of 7 February 1888 
authorised a F150 million lottery loan intended to promote the development of 
industry in Congo. For this purpose the Congo Free State signed an agreement of 8 
February 1888 with the Societe Generate, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the 
Banque de Bruxelles, Mr L. Lambert, Mr Philippson, Mr Horwitz and Co, Mr 
Cassel and Co, and Mr Balser and Co, for the issuing of the first 100,000 bonds 
with a nominal capital of FIO million (Cattier, 1906). In the end the lottery loan 
issue raised only F98 million, which was considered no more than a partial success 
(Keith, 1919).
In terms of direct financial assistance from Belgium, the Congo Free State 
received a first loan of F25 million in 1890 based on an agreement of 3 July, 
approved by a law of 4 August of the same year (Cattier, 1906). The origin and 
clauses of this loan are analysed as follows. In August 1889, the King's will was 
published, providing that at the death of Leopold II, Congo would pass to Belgium. 
In 1890 the financial situation of the State was so serious that the King sought to 
borrow straight away from Belgium F25 million against the possibility of annexing 
Congo ten years later. Following this, the Belgian Government provided the Congo 
State with a loan of F25 million of which F5 million were paid immediately and the 
balance in 10 annual instalments of equal amount (Heenen, 1955).
On the occasion of this loan the King committed himself not to borrow on 
behalf of the Congo Free State without the consent of the Belgian Parliament. 
However, regardless of this commitment, in 1892 he borrowed from an Antwerp
banker, Mr Browne de Tiege, F5 million payable in 1895 against 4,000,000 acres 
of land in the Congo as security (Cattier, 1906). In Autumn 1894, as the loan was 
unlikely to be repaid, in order to raise the required funds, the King signed a secret 
Decree to create, with an English syndicate, the Societe Generate de Culture to 
which lands were to be sold in the Maniema and Arwimi regions as well as around 
Lake Leopold II and Lake Tumba. The Decree stipulated that the State would keep 
the right to collect natural products of the lands for fifty years and take two-thirds 
of the profits from their sale. Later on the Belgian Government asked King 
Leopold II to withdraw the Decree and renew the promise that in the future he 
would not borrow large sums of money without the consent of the Belgian 
authorities, i.e. the Government and Parliament (Stengers, 1949).
In view of this, a law of 29 June 1895 authorised the Congo Free State to 
receive another loan of F6,850,000. Of this loan, F6,753,825 were received the 
same year, and F93,551.12 in 1896. The balance of F2,623.88 was carried forward 
and cancelled in 1897. The total amount of F6,847,376.12 received was essentially 
used as follows: (1) F5,287,415.65 to reimburse the loan from an Antwerp banker 
mentioned earlier, which was due on 1 July 1895, and (2) F 1,517,000 to remedy 
insufficient budgetary resources for 1895 and 1896. (Stengers, 1956).
Some other loans were authorised by Royal Decrees, between 1896 and 
1904, payable by the Congo Free State. A Decree of 17 October 1896 created 4 per 
cent bearer bonds for a nominal capital of F 1.5 million. A Decree of 14 June 1898 
authorised another loan for a nominal capital of F12.5 million issued on the same 
conditions as the previous one. No term was fixed for the reimbursement of the two 
loans. A Decree of 15 October 1901 created 4 per cent bearer bonds for a nominal 
capital of F50 million, payable in 90 years. This was followed by another Decree of
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1 February 1904, which created 3 per cent bonds for a nominal capital of F30 
million (Carder, 1906).
Table 3.8: Congo Free State Loans, 1887-1907
Year
1887
1888
1890
1892
1895
1896
1898
1901
1904
1906
1907
Legal 
basis
Decree
5/7/1887
Decree
7/2/1888
Law
4/8/1888
Law
29/6/1895
Decree
17/10/1896
Decree
14/6/1898
Decree
10/15/1901
Decree
2/1/1904
 
 
Interest Duration 
% Redemption 
Other conditions
2.5
5 99 years
6 annual drawings
3.5 subject to
annexation
renouncement
_ secret deal with
Antwerp banker
4 to reimburse
Antwerp banker
5,287,415
4 bearer bonds
4 bearer bonds
bearer bonds
4
3 bearer bonds
4
 
Capital (in F)
422,000
150,000,000
25,000,000
5,000,000
6.850,000
1,500,000
12,500,000
50,000,000
30,000,000
150,000,000
649,000
Source: compiled by the author, based on Cattier (1906), Keith (1919) and 
Heenen(1955)
King Leopold IPs financial policy was marked by a striking lack of 
information on the purpose for which borrowed funds were used. One of the 
reasons allegedly put forward to justify the dramatic increase in public 
expenditures of the Congo Free State and recourse to borrowed funds between 
1885 and 1891 was the cost of military campaigns against Arabs to end the slave 
trade and to quell the Batetela rebellion. Table 3.8 lists loans the Congo Free State 
received between 1887 and 1907.
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In addition to these direct loans the Congo Free State received financial 
assistance from Belgium insofar as the latter provided the Congo with military and 
diplomatic services paid by the Belgian budget and not included in the expenses 
payable by the Congo Free State. With regard to military services, starting from the 
early beginning of his African venture, King Leopold II had recourse to a number 
of Belgian army officers, who undertook military and administrative tasks that 
contributed to shaping the Congo. The cost of these services over the entire era of 
the Congo Free State amounted approximately to 8.07 million Belgian Francs (BF), 
including BF7.05 million, as cost of direct services provided by Belgian officers, 
and BF1.02 million as an additional pension cost for the families of officers who 
died in Congo. The cost of diplomatic services paid by the Belgian Government 
between 1885 and 1908 on behalf of the Congo Free State was estimated at 
BF200,000 (Stengers, 1956). 5
3.3.2.2. Concessions, Domaine Prive and Domaine de la Couronne Policy
With regard to the direct involvement of the State in industrial and commercial 
activities, the King referred to the principle of terres vacantes (vacant lands) 
proclaimed in 1885. This principle stated that apart from the lands occupied by the 
local people, over which they were to keep their rights, all other lands considered 
'vacant' were to belong to the State. As a result, the Administrator-General of the 
Congo Free State promulgated an Ordinance dated 1 July 1885, of which article 2 
stipulated that (1) no one had the right to occupy terres vacantes nor to dispossess 
the local people of the land they occupied and that (2) terres vacantes should be
5 As will be explained in Chapter four, prior to the First Second World War, the only currency 
mentioned in documents relating to Belgium and Congo was the Franc, symbol F, i.e. the Belgian 
Franc. The distinction between Belgian Franc (BF) and Congolese Franc (CF) was introduced after 
the First World War.
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considered State property. Furthermore, the King issued a Decree of 14 September 
1886, which stated that traditional laws and customs should regulate the land 
occupied by the local population. In addition, another Royal Decree of 30 June 
1887 stipulated that foreigners who wanted to purchase land should negotiate with 
the inhabitants, provided that the agreement eventually concluded was subject to a 
final approval by the Administrator-General of the State (Bulletin Officiel, 1887).
The same rule was later on adopted by other colonial powers in Equatorial 
Africa. Britain granted British Imperial East Africa Company the right to exploit 
vacant lands in 1888. In the French Congo and Tanganyika, the right of vacant land 
was also established and implemented in 1891 and 1895 respectively. However, in 
general, colonial powers, such as Britain, Germany, France and Portugal, defined 
the vacant lands and the rights of the local population in a manner that was more 
generous in relation to the local population than was the case in Congo (Cattier, 
1906). With regard to Congo, no step had been taken so far to define the limits of 
the land regarded as belonging to the local people or of the lands declared vacant. 
In this respect a Decree of 9 August 1893 stipulated that the local people were 
allowed to cultivate only the lands surrounding and close to their village, or vacant 
lands sold or let by the State to private individuals (Cookey, 1968).
As a result of the considerable returns earned from successful rubber 
collection, the State land policy was dramatically extended. Strict implementation 
of the provisions of this policy resulted in the local population being denied the 
right to gather any product from the forest, especially from the State and Crown 
lands. In the end local people were even no longer allowed to move their village 
from a site considered unsuitable to one that was more acceptable for safety, 
hygienic or economic reasons (Cattier, 1906)
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On the other hand, in apparent compliance with the 1884/1885 Berlin 
Conference provisions aimed at promoting free trade, King Leopold II issued a 
Royal Decree of 22 August 1885, which requested that foreigners should have the 
lands they occupied in Congo registered at a fee of F25. In the meantime, the 
Decree of 30 June 1887 mentioned earlier stipulated that merchants in the Upper 
Congo were allowed to "occupy lands up to 10 hectares without formal 
authorisation from the government" and to "own the land if they paid F100 as costs 
of its demarcation" (Cookey, 1968: 8).
The foundation of the King's financial policy consisted in granting 
concessions to various companies in which he took substantial shares to provide 
himself with a large part of any profit earned. In order to achieve this goal a system 
of labour-tax was established, where individuals were required to work for a 
defined period of time for a minimum payment, and the largest part of the work 
was counted as tax payment. As the State public administration was understaffed, it 
was necessary to entrust commercial agents with legislative authority all over the 
State territory. These commercial agents were designated as chief in the region 
where they operated. Each chief in the field was, therefore, authorised to collect 
taxes on the basis of this mode of payment, which gave rise to numerous abuses 
(Hennessy, 1961).
Starting from 1891, as the State launched the regime of labour-tax it 
managed to hinder the settlement of colonists in the region of Upper Congo that 
had been established as State land. On 4 May 1893 the Governor-General received 
an order from King Leopold II to abrogate the fairly liberal Decree of 30 June 1887 
mentioned earlier in order that any potential witnesses who might report on
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brutalities of the State agents in the process of labour-tax collection would be 
obliged to leave the region (Cattier, 1906).
This policy contradicted the statement of the Association Internationale du 
Congo made on 22 April 1884 for the attention of the United States. By this 
statement the Association guaranteed that it would grant foreigners who decided to 
settle on its territories "the right to purchase, to sell or to rent lands and premises, 
to establish trading houses and to trade under the only condition to comply with the 
law" (Cattier, 1906: 27). The same principle was included in agreements the Congo 
Free State signed on 8 November 1884, 16 December 1884, and 19 December 
1884, with Germany, Britain and Italy respectively.
The basic objective of the Berlin Conference was to facilitate access to 
Africa for all trading nations, the reason why article 5 of the Berlin Act stated that 
"foreigners should indistinctly enjoy the same regime and rights as the nationals for 
the protection of their persons and possessions, for the acquisition and transfer of 
their movable and immovable properties" (Cattier, 1906: 28). In view of the new 
provisions established in the field it became more and more obvious that King 
Leopold II was determined to implement his own financial policy, regardless of 
any international agreement to which he formally subscribed. 6
The Association Internationale Africaine created in 1876 was originally presented as a 
philanthropic organisation. As early as 25 November 1878 it was instead transformed into a 
commercial undertaking under the name of the Comite d'Etudes du Haul Congo, in which British, 
Dutch and the King's interests were associated, and the King held the largest share. In February 
1882 Adolphe Gillis established in Boma the first trading company of a series of several companies 
that were established thereafter across the State by order of and with financial support from the 
King. Those companies were intended to serve as a means of enabling the King to acquire a 
diversified portfolio of shares in his personal interest. Also in 1882, King Leopold created an entity 
called the Association Internationale du Congo, he intended to be, in due course, regarded as an 
important political organisation, as mentioned in Chapter one. In fact, at the 1884/1885 Berlin 
Conference, King Leopold II presented and obtained the recognition of the Association 
Internationale du Congo as the founder of the Congo Free State. (Slade, 1962).
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In November 1885, a syndicate of English investors was formed to promote 
the creation of a company whose main object was "to establish direct and regular 
communication between the Upper and Lower Congo by constructing a railway 
and placing light-draught steamers on the river", from Banana, mouth of the river 
Congo, to Stanley Pool (Kinshasa) (Anstey, 1962: 191). Although the British 
syndicate failed to sign an agreement with the Congo Free State, it is worth 
considering the main provisions of the proposal it put forward. The interest in such 
an analysis lies, as will be explained later, in the fact that King Leopold II used the 
British proposal as a model for the financial policy he implemented on a large scale 
to organise the economic exploitation of the Congo Free State.
The cost of the line (approximately 250 miles) was initially estimated at £1 
million. The investors looked forward to making a profit, as carriers, from the trade 
that the railway would bring about. Furthermore they offered "to actively 
participate in the economic development of the Congo" (Anstey, 1962: 192). In this 
respect "they sought powers to develop land, to acquire the assets of any trading 
concern, to open trading stations and to carry on trade at any place within the 
territory of the State or elsewhere, and to carry on mining, banking, or any 
industrial enterprise, including transport by road, rail, or water, and any other 
commercial undertaking which might be of advantage to the enterprise... " 
(Anstey, 1962: 192) They also proposed that the company should have "the first 
option of acquiring or undertaking any railway, canal, or road projected or to be 
made" (Anstey, 1962: 193).
It was provided that the company would carry the whole of the State 
Government's traffic between Vivi (Matadi) and Stanley Pool (Kinshasa) for a 
Pound Sterling (GBP) 10,000 yearly payment during the first ten years of operation
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(Anstey, 1962). Moreover, the company would be given the right of customs 
collection over the whole length of the river. It would retain 50 per cent of the 
revenues collected after deduction of collection expenses. King Leopold was 
invited to be the honorary president of the company, to be credited with shares to 
the value of one-twentieth of the paid-up capital, and to have the right, extended to 
his heirs and successors, to appoint one director. The proposal provided that the 
company would have to be British (Anstey, 1962).
As a result of further amendments the final proposal, signed as a 
provisional agreement on Christmas Eve 1885, provided that the company would 
take the name of The Royal Congo State Railway and Navigation. It would receive 
concessions by Royal Charter, and enjoy the first option to construct or acquire any 
other line of communication for fifty years only. The company "would receive 40 
per cent, and not 50 per of customs duties, and only in respect of export duties if 
such ever came to be levied, and only to the extent necessary to make possible a 
dividend of 6 per cent on the capital of the line of communication". The new 
version made no reference to the collection of customs duties by the company or to 
the clause, in the earlier version, providing that "the Free State should redress to 
the company for any neglect or misadministration affecting the company by the 
officials of the Congo State or any person over whom the State shall have 
jurisdiction" (Anstey, 1962: 194).
The State would designate two directors instead of one. The proposal for an 
agreement with the Congo Free State, intended to reserve to the British 
Government the right to intervene for the protection of the company in the event of 
interference by a third Power was abandoned. Another important provision that 
was added stipulated that no clause of the agreement was to be interpreted in a
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sense contrary to the 1885 Berlin Act, considered to be the formal and immediate 
outcome of the Berlin West Africa Conference. The amended proposal also 
provided that subscriptions to the GBP1 million capital up to an amount of 
GBP50,000 in each country were first to be "sought in the fourteen States 
represented at the Berlin Conference, unsubscribed shares only then being offered 
in London" (Anstey, 1962: 194).
Despite several further amendments and the prospect of a second British 
consortium envisaged by manufacturers of railway material and Yorkshire 
ironmasters, the negotiations failed to resolve disagreements regarding a number of 
issues, such as the question of jurisdiction. In this respect, in the absence of 
published Congolese laws, the Congo Free State claimed that any disputes between 
the State Government and the company was to be treated according to Belgian law. 
Also the syndicate firmly insisted that "any actions between the Congo Free State 
and the company should be brought before British courts, and that the company 
should be unequivocally regarded as a British registered and based company" 
(Anstey, 1962: 195). In fact the main reason why King Leopold showed little 
eagerness to sign with the syndicate was the hope he nurtured of raising money for 
the Congo railway by himself, consequently avoiding the syndicates' conditions 
and British domination.
On 12 September 1886 the Congo Free State authorities rejected the draft 
charter put forward by the syndicate on the grounds that "acceptance would 
compromise the sovereignty of the Congo State", while some of the terms of the 
proposal infringed the Berlin Act, as they would imply a real monopoly (Anstey, 
1962: 198). In fact, the reason for the failure of the negotiations overall was the 
growing opposition of groups representing Belgian financial and industrial
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interests. These groups, obviously supported by the King, became increasingly 
resistant to any international interference in a project that was to be especially 
Belgian (Keith, 1919).
On 9 February 1887, the person most active in this campaign, the Belgian 
Captain Thys, was instrumental in the creation of the Compagnie du Congo Pour le 
Commerce et 1'Industrie. In March of the same year the latter concluded a new 
arrangement with the Congo Free State, for the construction of the railway. In 
return "for surveying the route of the railway within eight months, the State 
committed itself to concede to the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et 
1'Industrie 150,000 hectares of land". Moreover, "if the company agreed to 
construct the line, the State guaranteed to concede to it all the lands the company 
might desire to obtain within a zone of 200 metres on each side of the track as well 
as 1,500 hectares of land for each kilometre of track laid and opened to traffic". In 
July 1889, the Compagnie du chemin de Fer du Congo was established with a 
capital of BF25 million, of which the Belgian Government provided BF10 million 
at 3.5 per cent interest (Cookey, 1968: 7-9). The company received an initial 
concession of 4,000,000 hectares with provision for an increase in this area in line 
with a raise in the initial capital of BF25 million. It took the name of Compagnie 
des Chemins de Fer du Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains by a Decree of 
2 January 1902 (Bulletin Officiel, 1902) (Cattier, 1906).
The Congo Free State required more resources for its development than the 
amount it could raise from implementing the existing financial clauses of the 1885 
Berlin Act; the King therefore undertook to have these clauses changed. By 
exploiting popular sentiment that favoured suppression of the slave trade, King 
Leopold II sought means of reopening the question of restrictions regarding the
imposition of import duties before the expiry of the twenty-year period prescribed 
by the Berlin Act (Slade, 1962).
The Brussels Conference convened for this purpose in November 1889 
brought together 17 major colonial and industrial powers. It focused essentially on 
the issue of liquor traffic and means of increasing resources to be devoted to the 
effective suppression of the slave trade. A declaration attached to the General Act 
of Brussels Conference stipulated that powers which had territories in the free-trade 
zone as defined in the Berlin Act should be at liberty to levy import duties. The rate 
was not to exceed 10 per cent ad valorem on the value of the goods at the port of 
entry, except in the case of liquor duties expressly regulated by the Act. The 
declaration also considered the establishment of a general set of customs 
regulations.
This provision was of the greatest importance to King Leopold II who 
immediately undertook to draw up the needed customs tariff, which nevertheless 
failed to produce the anticipated amount of revenue, due to subsequent changes in 
policy. One of these policy changes, which led to a significant decrease in import 
duties, was the prohibition of the import of firearms within the area between the 
two oceans (Atlantic and Indian) from latitude 20° North to latitude 22° South. 
Trade in firearms was considered "to be playing a pernicious and preponderating 
part in the carrying on of the slave trade and in the intestine wars of the natives" 
(Keith, 1919: 79). This underperformance partially explains why, despite his 
commitment not to borrow without the consent of the Belgian Parliament, the King 
borrowed BF5 million against 40 million acres of land as security in 1892 from an 
Antwerp banker, repayable in 1895 as mentioned earlier.
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Furthermore, the Congo River was a common boundary between the Congo 
Free State and territories occupied by France, so that access to parts of the French 
territory was easier through the Congo Free State. Also, the Portuguese had no 
ports on their side of the river and used, instead, those of the Congo Free State. In 
view of this situation, the Congo Free State, France and Portugal entered into 
negotiations in order to fix the terms for exercising the right to raise import duties 
as allowed by the Brussels Act. In April 1892, the three countries signed an 
agreement to set up a uniform tariff for customs and export duties in the western 
part of the Congo basin. After a number of periodical renewals, this arrangement 
ceased in July 1911, mainly because France was no longer interested and instead 
exerted pressure for reopening the question of the rate of taxation permitted (Keith, 
1919).
Until 1890 State officials and European traders were competing over the 
same areas to purchase ivory and rubber. The former were paid a commission on 
the products they bought and therefore behaved as fierce rivals of the latter. In 
1891, in order to address the problem of insufficient resources, the State 
Government began considering the idea of systematically exploiting the "vacant 
lands" mentioned earlier, which would enable the State to generate the means 
needed to achieve its goals. In September of the same year a secret Royal Decree 
ordered State officials in the Arwimi and Ubangi-Uele basins to secure all the ivory 
and rubber they could on behalf of the State (Slade, 1962). The Societe Beige du 
Haut-Congo operating in that area protested against State officials' involvement in 
the ivory trade. The King paid no attention to the objections and, instead, 
encouraged an Englishman, Colonel North, and the two Browne de Tiege brothers, 
the Antwerp bankers mentioned ealier, to create a group of commercial companies
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in Antwerp, to which the State granted large concessions of land (Stenmans, 1949). 
In 1892 several circulars were issued forbidding local people from selling ivory or 
rubber to private traders.
Despite the resignation of the Governor-General of Congo in protest, and 
the strong opposition expressed by several of his Belgian close assistants, the King 
ignored the disapproval (Slade, 1962). In October 1892 he issued another Decree, 
which defined the scope of "vacant lands" in more explicit terms than the 1891 
one. As a result, about half of the area of the State, to be known as its "Domaine 
prive", created by a Decree of 5 December 1892, in accordance with the Decree of 
October of the same year, (Bulletin Officiel, 1892), was reserved for the exclusive 
exploitation of the State itself (Carrier, 1906: 65). For example, while part of the 
Kasai region remained open to private traders, almost all the territory north of the 
Equator was reserved for the State (Slade, 1962).
The Anglo-Belgian Indian Rubber Company (ABIR), formed in 1892 with 
Colonel North, mentioned above, as Chairman was granted the right to exploit the 
lands in the Lopori and Maringa basins for 30 years. Further investigations 
revealed that Colonel North invested no money in the business but instead served 
as representative of the King's interests (Waltz, 1917, cited by Anstey, 1962). Soon 
afterwards, the Mongala basin was entrusted to the Societe Anversoise du 
Commerce au Congo for 50 years. However, on 1 July 1892, following persistent 
public criticism of the company's cruel treatment of local people, the State took 
over the company for a period of 15 years (Cattier, 1906). In October 1892 the 
Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who was directly related to the Belgian royal family, 
was granted a concession around Lake Leopold, (now called Lake Maindombe).
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Table 3.9 indicates the most important concessions created in accordance with this 
policy of 'vacant lands' and concession-granting initiated in 1891. 
Table 3.9: A cluster of large concessions
Name of company Date of creation Location Surface (hectares)
Compagnie du Katanga
created:
Syndicat Commercial du Katanga
became:
Compagnie du Lomami
replaced by:
Comite Special du Katanga
15/04/1891 Lualaba basin 1/3 of
State land 
above 
21/10/1891 Riba-Riba
July 1898 and
Upper-Lomami
19/06/1900
Comptoir Commercial Congolais 
26/07/1895
Compagnie des Chemins de Per du Congo 
Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains 02/01/1902
Societe d'Etudes du Chemin de Per du 14/03/1903 
Stanley Pool au Katanga et de L'ltimbiri 
a 1'Uele et a un point a determiner 
sur la frontiere franco-congolaise
Compagnie du Kasai 3 1 / 1 21 1 903 
comprised 15 companies owned by: 
Private interests: 50% 
King Leopold II: 50%
Wamba basin
Between Kisangani 
and Lake Albert 
(Lake Mobutu) 4
Uele basin 
Kisangani
Kasai 
basin
,000,000
10,000 
10,000
the whole 
Kasai 
basin
Source: compiled by the author based on Keith (1919); Cookey (1968)
A Decree of 8 March 1896 enlarged this concession and gave it the name of 
Domaine de la Couronne (Crown land), personal property of the King; however, 
the first mention of this Domaine in the Bulletin Officiel was as late as 1901. By 
another Decree issued on 23 December 1901 the 'Crown land' was granted legal 
status; it covered a total rubber-producing territory of 289,375 square kilometres, 
which included the basins of the Lukenie and Bussira-Momboyo rivers, in addition 
to the Lake Leopold area (Cookey, 1968).
In the southeastern region of the country, King Leopold II set about 
extending the influence of the Congo State to Katanga. As a result, the Congo Free 
State and the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie concluded an
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agreement on 15 April 1891 for the creation of the Compagnie du Katanga, whose 
mission was to exploit this southeastern region of the State (Cookey, 1968). The 
company was also entrusted with carrying out military functions on behalf of 
Leopold II. The reason for this was that Msiri, the local chief and a powerful slave 
trader, had been charged by the colonial authorities with the criminal offence of 
ruling as though it were an independent State a region regarded under the Berlin 
Act as part of the Belgian King's possession. Msiri refused in 1891 to allow King 
Leopold's agents to hoist the Congo Free State flag in the land of which he 
declared himself to be the sole master, namely the Kingdom of Garenganze. During 
a subsequent heated discussion, a Belgian officer killed Msiri (Shillington, 1989, 
1995).
The Compagnie du Katanga was granted ownership of one-third of the State 
lands in the two separate river basins of the Lualaba above Riba-Riba and of the 
Upper Lomami, while two-thirds remained in the King's hands. The agreement 
stipulated the sharing of the region's administration and exploitation between the 
State and the company.
On 21 October 1891, in order to exploit its lands, the Compagnie du 
Katanga created the Syndicat Commercial du Katanga, whose activities were to 
cease as early as in May 1892, due to the Arabs' destabilising activities in the 
region (Keith, 1919). The Syndicat reappeared in July 1898 under the name 
Compagnie du Lomami (Cookey, 1968). In 1898, the Congo Free State succeeded 
in repelling an attempt by Arabs to occupy Katanga, and found itself in a position 
to reinforce its active role in developing of that region. At this prospect a new 
entity called Comite Special du Katanga was created on 19 June 1900, with the 
right to exploit the land and minerals in Katanga for 99 years.
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In fact the Comite Special du Katanga was created after Robert Williams, a 
Scottish engineer who possessed mining concessions in the north of Rhodesia, on 
the edge of Katanga, discovered gold in the tributaries of the river Lufira, on the 
Congolese side. The circumstances of this discovery urged the Congo Free State 
and the Compagnie du Katanga to sort out a number of difficulties in interpreting 
the agreement of 15 April 1891 with the Company and speed up exploitation of the 
region's resources in order to forestall external designs on this wealthy region 
(Cookey, 1968).
Another Royal Decree issued on 6 December 1900 granted the Comite legal 
status and gave it responsibility for all administrative functions in Katanga, except 
the administration of the legal system justice, taxation and postal services (Keith, 
1919). The Comptoir Commercial Congolais was formed on 26 July 1895 to 
exploit the basin of the Wamba. The Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo 
Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains, which was created on 2 January 1902 for the 
construction of the railway from the Stanley Falls to the upper lakes, received 
4,000,000 hectares located between Stanleyville (nowadays Kisangani), and Lake 
Albert (renamed Lake Mobutu during the latter's regime). The Societe d'Etudes du 
Chemin de Fer du Stanley Pool au Katanga et de ritimbiri a 1'Uele et a un Point a 
Determiner sur la Frontiere Franco-Congolaise, founded on 14 March 1903, 
received 10,000 hectares, to be chosen from among "vacant lands" in the Uele 
basin, and another 10,000 hectares on the left bank of the River Congo below 
Kisangani. The Compagnie du Kasa'i, created on 31 December 1901, received the 
whole Kasai basin. Fifteen private companies that survived the fierce scramble for 
this region controlled 50 per cent of the latter company's shares while King 
Leopold held the other 50 per cent (Cookey, 1968). In the areas outside the
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Domaine prive the State granted several large concessions to various groups, to 
such an extent that by the early 1900s most of the territory of the Congo State was 
divided into concessions and monopolies, as can be seen from the related map in 
the Appendix section (Cattier, 1906).
3.3.3. Financial Returns of King Leopold IPs Investment Policy
In terms of revenues and expenditures, the peculiar legal nature and economic 
background of the Congo Free State resulted in a financial history characterised by 
two contrasting aspects. On the one hand, there was the State Government Budget 
showing, for the period prior to the already-mentioned constitution of the Domaine 
prive by a Decree of 5 December 1892, a lack of internal resources and a need for 
borrowings in large amounts from the Belgian State and other lenders. On the other 
hand, there were large profits accumulated essentially from the exploitation of the 
Domaine prive and Domaine de la Couronne, evidence of which was brought to the 
world's attention by various accounts of travellers, religious missionaries and 
diplomats established in Congo and by investigations conducted by the Morel's 
Congo Reform Association (Stengers, 1950). 7
The Belgian King Leopold II who undertook the Congo venture as a 
personal business had spent a large portion of his fortune for this purpose, as 
indicated earlier in this section. In this respect, the Congo enterprise was 
considered a personal investment from which he expected consistently significant 
economic and financial returns. Beyond his personal interest, the King's colonial
7 The Congo Reform Association (CRA) was founded in December 1904 in Britain and extended 
later to the United States by a British citizen, Edmond Morel, assisted by Sir Roger Casement and 
backed by Liverpool financial and industrial interests, to denounce the exploitation system set up by 
King Leopold II in the Congo Free State regardless of the provisions of the 1885 Berlin Act relating 
to the Congo basin. The CRA led to public outcry and legislative hearings in Europe and the United 
States relating to Leopold H's monopoly position, granting of concessions, the forced-labour policy,
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doctrine was, indeed, driven by his concern for the needs of Belgium's economy. 
Congo was therefore seen as a commercial enterprise to increase Belgium's well- 
being. (Slade, 1962)
However, in view of the initial expenditures mentioned earlier, such as war 
against Arabs and construction of the Matadi-Kinshasa railway, as well as day-to- 
day administrative expenses, for the first few years the revenues of the Congo State 
were dramatically insufficient. The situation was aggravated by the provisions of 
the Berlin Act, several times referred to in this chapter, which had forbidden the 
imposition of import duties within the agreed boundaries of the Congo basin. As a 
result, the State depended almost entirely upon export duties imposed on ivory and 
rubber, which were then the main - if not the only - export products. Even if direct 
taxation on trade and industrial activities had been established it would not have 
generated sufficient resources for the State, due to the small volume of the 
import/export trade at that time.
Table 3.10: Official export revenues, 1887-1890
Year Export revenues in F
1887 1,980,441.45
1888 2,609,300.35
1889 4,297,543.85 
1890__________________8,242,194.43 
Source: Bulletin Officiel de 1'Etat Independant du Congo, N° 4, Apr. 1891
The creation of both the Domaine prive and the Domaine de la Couronne 
was, therefore, an answer to the concerns that arose from the considerations above. 
And yet, prior to these provisions, from the very first years of the territory's 
exploitation, the Congo venture proved to be promising. Though insufficient with 
regard to the State's need for resources, the official export revenues achieved
and the brutalities inflicted on the local population by the Congo Free State authorities (Cattier, 
1906).
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between 1887 and 1890 were encouraging, since the relevant figures had more than 
quadrupled over four years, as shown in Table 3.10 above.
3.3.3.1. Fiscal Returns from the Domaine Prive
Exploitation of the Domaine prive, whether directly by the State itself or indirectly 
through concessionary companies, required workers. Two key measures were taken 
for this purpose. The first was the establishment of a labour tax, which forced local 
people to work in order to pay, with their labour, their fiscal duties. This labour tax 
was established on the grounds that the local population had no pecuniary 
resources, and possessed nothing but their huts, tools and plantations for 
subsistence purposes. It was added to the existing tax payable in kind, which until 
then the State had applied for the same reasons, hi this respect the local people 
were generally forced to deliver a fixed volume of products, such as rubber, 
groundnuts, or supplies such as cassava bread for soldiers of the Force Publique 
(State army), or livestock and game meat for Belgian colonial civil servants. In 
some other cases, they had to perform chores, such as woodcutting, plantation 
maintenance, paddling or porterage (Cattier, 1906).
Prior to 1903, there was no legislation of any kind intended to regulate the 
tax per capita payable by the local population. This meant that the State officials 
and the company agents were free to levy whatever taxes they liked, to collect them 
by any means they chose, and to impose any punishment they liked in case of 
failure to pay. In this respect, failure to deliver products or complete tasks assigned 
was severely punished by various means characterised by arbitrary cruelty and 
humiliation inflicted not only on the guilty individual but also on the whole 
community of which he was a member (Cattier, 1906).
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For a long time the Royal Decree of 5 December 1892 that ordered the 
State Secretary to take all necessary steps to enable exploitation of the State lands 
served to justify the right of the State Administration to impose labour tax. And yet 
a decision of the Court of Appeal of Boma, the capital of the Congo Free State, 
pronounced on 29 August and 8 September 1903, declared it illegal to force local 
people to work (Carder, 1906). According to this decision the tax per capita 
collected from 1892 to 1903, and paid in kind (i.e. goods or hours of labour) by the 
local population was, therefore, levied unlawfully. Local officials brought this 
lacuna in the law to the attention of the Governor-General but the latter did nothing 
to legally fill the gap, as everybody could get something out of the existing 
practices (Commission d'Enquete, 1905). A Decree of 18 November 1903 
(Bulletin Officiel, 1903) fixed the per capita tax on the local population at 40 
hours' labour per month. This rate was to be considered a maximum, to be reached 
gradually, but in practice, there was little change in relation to the previously 
established practices.
The objective of the second measure was to urge the local population to 
work for remuneration. Both the State and the concessionary companies were free 
to determine the amount of labour required and the related remuneration or fiscal 
charge. State officials were poorly paid and, moreover, like the company agents, 
they were paid a commission on the volume of rubber and ivory collected. As a 
result, the more rubber and ivory collected, the higher the commission paid, or the 
greater the chance of being promoted (Keith, 1919)
The instructions of the Governor-General of the State stipulated that local 
people employed on the State lands should receive wages equivalent only to the 
cost of harvesting the product, regardless of the (much higher) market value of the
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product. This statement was made on the ground that products collected from the 
State Lands were property of the State, not of the person who collected them. 
(Bulletin Officiel, 1896). However, in practice, the Governor-General dictated 
maximum wage levels without determining the minimum wages that District 
Commissioners were authorised to pay. As a result, wages were systematically far 
below the maximum authorised, and often paid in goods reckoned worthless 
(Commission d'Enquete, 1905).
The Commission d'Enquete (Commission of Inquiry), which the King set 
up under pressure from other European nations, described in severe terms the 
asymmetric nature of the system, which systematically worked to the advantage of 
the State and concessionary companies. It emerges from Table 3.11 that the 
proceeds of the per capita tax collected from the local population represented a 
significant share of total State revenues. Between 1891 and 1906 receipts from 
State land and per capita tax paid by the local people in kind (labour and products) 
amounted on average to 38.3 per cent of the State revenues (Carder, 1906).
Table 3.11: Receipts from Domaine prive (in 'OOP F)
Year
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
Total receipts
4,180
4,730
5,440
4,950
6,000
7,000
9,370
14,800
20,000
26,250
30,750
28,709
28,090
29,825
29,936
29,452
State land & Tax per capita
860
237
300
1,250
1,200
3,500
6,700
10,200
10,500
17,425
15,452
16,440
16,440
16,500
16,100
% *
18.2
4.4
6.1
20.8
17.1
37.4
45.3
51.0
40.0
56.7
53.8
58.5
55.1
55.1
54.7
* Share of receipts from State lands and tax per capita in total receipts 
Source: based on Cattier (1906)
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Table 3.12 provides a comparison of tax paid by the local population of 
various African possessions of colonial Powers, for the period for which data are 
available, 1902-1904. It shows that Congolese taxpayers' contribution to the State 
revenues was much larger than the share collected from the local populations of the 
British East Africa Protectorate, German East Africa territories and from the 
French Congo. The individual contribution imposed on local people was so high 
that it led a large majority of the population to avoid paying tax, which was 
relatively easy in view of the scarcity of tax inspectors in such a vast territory.
Table 3.12: Congo Free State receipts compared with receipts of other 
_______African colonial territories______________________
Period Congo Free State British East Africa German East Africa French Congo
Total Tax per Total Tax per Total Tax per Total Tax per 
receipts capita receipts capita receipts capita receipts capita
______OOOF_________GBP_________OOOMarks_______OOOFF_____
1902-190356,799 31,892 408,600 14,698
56.1% 3.6%
1903-190457,915 32,880 365,000 24,177 9,162 1,398 4,500 180 
____________56.8%_________6.6%_________15.3%_______4% 
Source: compilation by the author based on Cattier (1906)
As a consequence, the whole financial policy of the Congo Free State 
resulted in a systematic impoverishment of the local population, in addition to the 
cruelties mentioned previously. As early as 1890, international opinion started to 
develop serious concern about the management of the Congo Free State. In 1890, 
an American visitor to the State denounced the violation of the Berlin Act by the 
Congo Free State, as the State "was engaging in trade on its own account and 
exempting itself from all financial burdens while taxing other traders" (Slade, 
1962: 178). Moreover, numerous missionaries' reports mentioned "cruelties 
practised upon the Africans of the Congo State" (Slade, 1962: 178). In 1896 Sir 
Charles Dilke and Mr H.R. Fox Bourne formally launched an international 
campaign against the Congo Free State regime. The Congo Reform Association,
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formed by Edmond Morel in 1904, as mentioned earlier in this section vigorously 
continued and extended this campaign, carrying out a series of investigations in 
Congo, which forced King Leopold II to establish a Commission of Inquiry the 
same year. The report of the Commission d'Enquete unveiled such atrocities that 
Paul Costermans, Vice-Governor- General of the Congo Free State, committed 
suicide (Hochschild, 1998).
3.3.3.2. Financial Returns from the Domaine de la Couronne
The foundation of a Domaine de la Couronne (Crown land), by a Royal Decree of 
8 March 1896, is another cornerstone of the financial policy of King Leopold II, as 
an integral part of his ownership of the whole Congo. In 1902, the Bulletin 
Officiel unveiled for the first time the existence of the Decree of 8 March 1896, 
along with another Decree secretly issued on 23 December 1901 (Slade, 1962). 
According to the provisions of the two Decrees the Domaine de la Couronne was 
granted the status of legal entity, to be managed by a Committee of three Directors 
appointed by the King. The Monarch held the power to determine how the 
Committee was to operate, which he did by a Decree of 22 July 1904, published in 
the Bulletin Officiel of December 1905 (Carder, 1906). The regulations stipulated, 
among other provisions that in case of a vacancy the two existing Directors should 
elect a successor. This provision was intended to present the Committee with a 
semblance of autonomy vis-a-vis the King who had, in fact, power to revoke the 
mandate of a Director at any time. The Committee therefore had no real power and 
could not oppose any of the royal proposals.
The King granted the Domaine de la Couronne proprietorship of various 
areas, including, in particular the following: (1) all vacant lands in the basins of
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Lake Leopold II and the Lukenie and Bussira Momboyo rivers; (2) six mines to be 
allocated in areas the Domaine had the right to determine; (3) any other properties 
and assets that might be given to the Domaine free of charge or not. The vacant 
lands around the basins of Lake Leopold II and the Lukenie and Bussira Momboyo 
rivers covered 289,375 square kilometres. This expanse represented 10 times the 
size of Belgium and about one-third of the total Congolese area reserved for rubber 
collection, which covered 1,026,875 square kilometres, or almost half the total area 
of the State (2,345,410 square kilometres). The provision granting the Domaine de 
la Couronne the right to select six mines was included in view of the prospect of 
discovering deposits of precious minerals (Cattier, 1906).
The figures relating to financial returns generated by the Domaine de la 
Couronne were kept secret. However, on the basis of the size of the lands held and 
in comparison with returns generated by the Domaine prive (State land) from 
exports of the same products - essentially, rubber, ivory and copal - Cattier (1906) 
suggested two scenarios which he created by extrapolating from figures for rubber 
exported by the State between 1896 and 1905, as follows.
The first scenario established an estimate of the share of the Domaine de la 
Couronne in the total volume of rubber exported by the State from 1896 to 1905, 
which amounted to 41,195 tons. The Domaine de la Couronne owned 28 per cent 
(289,375 square kilometres) of the areas regarded as rubber lands, covering in total 
1,026,875 square kilometres, which represented 11,535 tons of rubber at an average 
net profit of F7,000 per ton, assuming in this respect that collection costs were paid 
by the Domaine itself. On this basis, the net revenues of the Domaine de la 
Couronne from the export of rubber amounted to 80,745,000 Francs (Cattier, 
1906).
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In the second scenario, Cattier (1906) compared the areas of both the 
Domaine prive and the Domaine de la Couronne, within the area known as rubber- 
producing lands, which were 242,000 and 289,375 square kilometres respectively. 
The area of the Domaine de la Couronne was, therefore, 1.196 times the that of the 
Domaine prive. According to budget estimates published in the Bulletin Oficiel, the 
net revenues generated from the Domaine prive amounted to F71,345,214, as 
shown in Table 3.13
Table 3.13: Returns from the Domaine prive, 1896-1905 (in F)
Year
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
State land & tax per Transport, 
capita receipts paid in Wages paid to insurance & export 
kind by local population local population duties Net revenues
1,200,000
3,500,000
6,700,000
10,200,000
10,500,000
17,424,630
15,452,000
16,440,000
16,440,000
16,500,000
114,356,630
1,690,000
1,875,000
2,237,690
2,815,190
2,802,190
2,802,190
2,802,190
2,802,190
19,826,640
1,528,711
2,145,720
2,950,715
2,950,715
2,950,715
3,219,000
3,719,600
3,719,600
23,184,776
1,200,000
3,500,000
3,481,289
6,179,280
5,311,595
11,658,725
9,699,095
10,418,810
9,918,210
9,978,210
71,345,214
Source: Cattier (1906:216)
By extrapolation, the revenues generated from the Domaine de la Couronne 
were estimated at around F85 million (71,345,214 x 1.196). Taking into account a 
number of considerations aimed at weighting the estimates, the two valuation 
methods led to the conclusion that the revenues earned from the Domaine de la 
Couronne were somewhere between F70 million and 80 million (Cattier, 1906).
On 3 July 1903, Comte de Smet de Naeyer, Chief of the Belgian Royal 
Office (Chefdu Cabinet beige), delivered before the Chamber of Representatives a 
speech which partially answered some of the questions relating to the objectives of 
the Crown Domain and to resources allocation. Concerning the objectives, the 
Chief of the Royal Office declared that the purpose of the Domaine de la Couronne
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was to establish and subsidise, even after the death of the King, works and 
institutions of public benefit, such as institutions for colonial studies, and scientific 
or colonial health institutes. It was regarded that the benefits of these initiatives 
would in the long run extend to the Kingdom of Belgium, given the prospect that 
the Congo would belong to and, eventually, merge with Belgium (Cattier, 1906).
With regard to the allocation of resources, the Chief of the Royal Office 
advanced the view that, according to the rules governing the Domaine de la 
Couronne, the King was entitled to receive part of the surplus revenues after all 
expenses had been paid. King Leopold II had declared that he renounced this right 
for the duration of his reign. Furthermore, Comte de Naeyer argued that since the 
Domaine was carrying out activities that were outside the responsibilities of the 
Government, there was no reason to include its resources in the government 
budget. However, he made it clear that part of the resources of the Domaine could 
be used to finance budget deficits. In this respect, F700,000 served to cover part of 
the State budget deficit in 1900 (Cattier, 1906).
Moreover, about F20 million were used to finance the acquisition of a large 
number of properties in the Belgian regions of Brussels and Ostend alone. Many of 
the properties were acquired for the embellishment of Brussels and the coastal 
region of Ostend (Cattier, 1906). On the basis of officially certified purchase 
documents, Cattier established a list of these properties, providing all details, such 
as dates of the sale documents, notary's name, vendor's name and address, 
location, nature, content, and purchase price of the property. The list comprised 
hotels, villas, houses, woods, land, fields, gardens and stables, from which it can be 
concluded that not all of the properties were for a so-called public benefit. Part of 
the revenues not backed up by published figures was used to fund public works.
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These comprised the construction of the Royal Palace of Laeken, erection of the 
Arcade du Cinquantenaire in Brussels for the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary 
of Belgian independence, and construction of a 'Colonial School' at Tervueren 
(Brussels). Resources generated by the Domaine de la Couronne served also to 
cover Press Bureau expenditures, as the latter was committed to ensuring press 
support for the Congo Free State, which had been violently attacked in the press for 
several years because of its economic, commercial and financial policies and the 
related atrocities (Cattier, 1906).
The institution of the Domaine de la Couronne resulted in depriving the 
Congo State of large amounts of its resources. This gave rise to such strong 
criticism that the Commission of Inquiry clearly condemned the overall financial 
policy implemented by King Leopold II in the Congo Free State. "The labour tax 
should serve only the needs of the Government": such was the statement by the 
Commission of Inquiry in its overall judgement of the King's management of the 
State resources in the absence of control from any Government or Parliamentary 
institution (Cattier, 1906: 243)
3.3.4. The Congo Free State's Budget
Every year, the Bulletin Officiel de 1'Etat Independant du Congo contained rough 
estimates of revenues and expenditures for the State. However, there was no detail 
to show how the estimates were arrived at. Since no information was given to 
assess whether and to what extent the estimates of expenses and revenues had been 
realised, the Budgets published by the Congo State were of little value (Cattier, 
1906).
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According to an agreement of 3 July 1890, the Congo Free State committed 
itself to provide the Belgian Government with all information the latter might 
request regarding the financial situation of the State. Namely, the Belgian 
Government was entitled to request all information on budgetary receipts and 
expenditures as well as customs duties records. The same agreement stipulated that 
the Congo Free State could no longer contract a loan without the consent of the 
Belgian Government and Parliament. The agreement was to remain in force until 
1901. However, it has already been noted in this section that, as early as between 
1892 and 1893, the King, acting for the Congo Free State, infringed this agreement 
as he managed to borrow 5 million Francs from a Belgian banker in Antwerp 
without the Belgian Government's knowledge (Cattier, 1906).
In compliance with the 3 July 1890 agreement, the final accounts relating to 
the budgets for the years 1890 to 1893 were published in the Belgian Parliamentary 
documents. After 1893 the publication of these accounts ceased without any 
apparent reason. The real reason was that the King was reluctant to comply with 
the financial supervision that the Belgian Parliament and Government exercised 
over the Congolese financial affairs. The reason for this was that King Leopold II 
stuck to his position as the indisputable owner of Congo. Accordingly, on King's 
order, a letter was attached to the preamble of the budgetary law of 10 August 1901 
stating that there was no risk of abuse of the right to freely alienate the land 
allocated to the Crown (Domaine de la Couronne) and to contract loans. As a 
result, the law of 10 August 1901 exempted the Congo Free State from Belgian 
financial supervision; this law was the reason for the total and definitive cessation 
of the publication of budgetary final accounts (Cattier, 1906).
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The financial history of the Congo Free State can be divided into three 
periods. The first, marked by a relative prudence ended in 1890. It was 
characterised by the establishment of an economic system that led to the "claim 
over the soil, the produce of the land and the labour of people", and the 
establishment of concession-holding companies and monopolies (Slade, 1962: 176- 
177). During this period, a Public Debt was created with a nominal capital of F150 
million represented by 1,500,000 bonds redeemable in 99 years by drawings on a 
lottery basis. In 1890 the covenant relating to this Public Debt became effective 
(Stengers, 1956). This year was the start of a second period that ended in 1898, and 
can be considered transitional as it served to tune and consolidate the development 
policy launched since the late 1880s. The third period from 1899 onwards, termed 
"the era of prodigality" was characterised by a dramatic increase in loans 
contracted under such onerous conditions that the total indebtedness of the Congo 
Free State rose from F2.3 million in 1898 to F12.5 in 1899 and to F80.6 million in 
1905 (Carder, 1906).
Table 3.14, relating to budget figures officially published by the Congo 
State's Government, shows a cumulative deficit amounting to F27,l37,979 for the 
period between 1892 and 1906. However, loans received by the Congo Free State 
amounted to F80,631,425, as indicated earlier. To this should be added the net 
amount produced by the loan issued on a lottery system, estimated at F50 million, 
as mentioned earlier in this chapter, which represented, therefore, a total debt of 
F130,631,425. (Carder, 1906).
With regard to the deficit of F27 million reckoned by the State itself, as 
shown in Table 3.14, it appears that F 103,631,425, or 79 per cent at least of the 
debt contracted by the Congo Free State, did not serve the needs of the State. And
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yet, as already been pointed out, during the same period King Leopold II subtracted 
from the Domaine de la Couronne about F70 million to F85 million for various 
purposes external to the Congo Free State itself. 
Table 3.14: The Congo Free State Budgets, 1887-1905
Ordinary Budgets (in OOOF)
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
Total
Receipts
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
4,554.93
4,731.98
5,440.68
4,949.44
6,004.76
7,002.74
9,369.30
14,765.05
19,966.50
26,256.50
30,751.05
28,709.00
28,090.00
29,825.00
29,936.65
250,353.58
Expenditures
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
4,554.93
4,731.98
5,440.68
4,858.91
7,370.94
7,018.37
8,875.34
14,727.06
19,672.97
27,731.25
31,256.05
28,549.00
27,900.56
29,635.56
29,936.65
252,260.25
Surplus
90.54
493.96
37.99
293.53
160.00
189.44
189.44
1,454.90
Deficit
1,366.18
15.64
1,474.75
505.00
3,361.57
Non- 
recursive 
Expenditures
800.00
2,524.65
1,217.93
1,266.53
2,524.92
2,546.82
3,856.49
2,364.99
2,864.99
4,864.00
24,831.32
Total 
Deficit
800.00
2,434.11
1,366.18
1,233.57
772.57
2,486.93
2,653.29
1,474.75
505.00
3,696.49
2,175.55
2,675.55
4,864.00
27,137.99
Public debt 
outstanding
2,283.32
12,533.32
12,783.32
15,672.20
41,974.45
35,939.02
55,939.02
80,631.42
80,631.42
Source: Cattier (1906: 309)
To answer the question why the Congo State had borrowed much more than 
the budgetary deficit justified, and what had become of the balance of about F103 
million, reference must be made to the King's motivations analysed in the section 
in this chapter relating to the economic background. In line with the essence of his 
colonial economic and financial policy, King Leopold II thought himself entitled to 
dispose of the Congolese Treasury as though he owned it. He thought himself 
entitled to apply the resources of Congo to the most diverse uses, far removed from 
any colonial purposes. The nature and object of the financial activity of the Congo 
Free State were in accordance with this basic motivation of King Leopold II.
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Furthermore, the King understood that he was unable to convince the 
Belgian Chambers of Representatives as easily as he could convince his Ministers 
of the validity of his expenditures on public works in Belgium. Determined, 
however, not to renounce these projects, he borrowed through the Congo Free State 
the money that was indispensable to his plans. He succeeded in escaping all 
Parliamentary control. Funds generated in the Congo Free State were, in the hands 
of King Leopold II, a means of achieving personal goals out of the reach of any 
government or Parliamentary controlling body. As a result, the Congo Free State 
was overloaded with an absolutely unfair debt incurred in its name, but applied, for 
a significant portion, to unproductive works in the metropolitan territory, and to 
acquiring properties and stakes in companies, which had nothing to do with the 
State (Cattier, 1906).
3.4. End of the Congo Free State
3.4.1. Final Monetary Arrangements
As mentioned in section one of this chapter, the monetary system of the Congo 
Free State was established by a series of Royal Decrees, the first of which was 
issued on 27 July 1887. The Royal Decree of 7 February 1896 instituted the State 
bills payable at the Congo State Treasury in Brussels, while the Royal Decree of 27 
August 1906 introduced the striking of fractional currency. Featured with a reduced 
volume of free trade, a barter-based system of exchange, tax payments in goods 
and labour, and the faculty of the State to pay local people in goods, the economic 
regime of the Congo free State did very little to promote the use of currencies. As a 
result, the money circulation was dramatically limited. Moreover, on the one hand, 
there was a formal separation between the Belgian and Congolese monetary
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systems. On the other, the monetary circulation in Congo comprised coins defined 
according to the same standards as the Belgian ones, and State bills. The latter 
could hardly be considered real paper money since it was not secured and nor was 
it legal tender in private transactions, and was not convertible externally.
Shortly after the annexation, a Royal Decree of 14 April 1909 decided on 
the withdrawal of silver coins of Fl, 2 and 5, and of 50 centimes, struck by the 
Congo Free State, starting from 1 October 1909. Those coins could be exchanged 
at the Colonial Treasury in Brussels and at a number of designated Public Treasury 
branches in Congo until 1 July 1911. Another Decree of 30 June 1913 extended the 
deadline to 1 July 1914. Furthermore, the general regulation concerning public 
accountancy issued on 22 August 1922 provided that the Public Treasury could 
accept those currencies until much later (Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du 
Ruanda Urundi (BCCBRU), 1957).
3.4.2. Final Financial Arrangements
The project for the annexation of Congo was voted by the Belgian Parliament on 1 
April 1908 and ratified by the Senate on 9 September of the same year. On 15 
November 1908, the date of the Treaty transferring the former entity to Belgium, 
the Congo Free State formally became a Belgian colony. All the liabilities and 
financial commitments of the Congo Free State were included in the transfer. The 
Transfer Treaty stipulated that all the agreements of the Congo Free State with 
companies were to be honoured. All the possessions known as Domaine prive to be 
transferred were valued at gold-F 110,336,947.41, while financial commitments 
amounted to F235,431,700 (Heenen, 1955).
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At first, Belgium committed itself to respecting the Foundations created by 
King Leopold II in Congo, among them the Domaine de la Couronne (Crown 
Foundation). However, due to the size of the Domaine (it covered 25 million 
hectares), this clause gave rise to scathing criticism. As a result, a new agreement 
concluded on 5 March 1908 abolished the Domaine de la Couronne, which was 
therefore added to the list of possessions to be transferred (Heenen, 1955).
Following the withdrawal of the Domaine's legal status, a Decree of 5 
March 1908 transferred the Domaine de la Couronne to the Congo State, apart 
from two pieces of land of 20 thousand hectares each, which remained as private 
property of the King, in the region of Mayumbe (in the far southwest, near the 
mouth of the River Congo). The properties in Europe were divided into three lots. 
The first, valued at F 1,659,802, was transferred to Belgium as a freehold. The 
second, valued at F2,123,762, was transferred to Belgium with the usufruct to the 
King. The third, valued at F334,068, was given to the Monarch as a private 
property (Heenen, 1955). By this sharing out, the Belgian authorities were anxious 
to partially correct some of the most abusive appropriation that had ensued from 
the discretionary concept of proprietorship applied by King Leopold II to the 
Congo Free State. However, the corrective effect was meaningless, compared with 
the invisible part of the iceberg in terms of the atrocities that had been inflicted on 
the local population.
Furthermore, in order to hedge a F30 million loan received from the Congo 
Free State, the Crown Foundation had transferred to the latter a number of 
properties in Belgium valued at F18 million in 1906. At the time of the annexation 
that real estate became the property of the Congo Free State and was, therefore, 
included in the possessions to be transferred. Altogether, according to Heenen
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(1955), the value of the assets transferred to Belgium amounted to F27,793,446, 
comprising F4,896,702.12 as the value of the work completed in Belgium by the 
Crown Foundation, which had undertaken various projects of construction and 
embellishment in the Metropolitan territory; The total cost of the planned 
programme of works had been estimated at F150 million.
Belgium took over the Foundation but reduced the funding of its 
programme to F45 million, financed by the Belgian emergency budget. Among 
other liabilities inherited from the Crown Foundation were private income paid to 
Prince Albert and Princess Clementine, F 120,000 and F75,000 respectively, and 
annuities of F60,000 paid to Directors and Officers of the Foundation. Also, the 
Belgian Government took over other charges, for which there are no accurate 
figures available, such as those relating to a number of colonial collections of 
objets d'art and the tropical greenhouse at the Laeken Palace (Heenen, 1955).
In a final attempt to retain ownership of part of the possessions of the 
Crown Foundation, King Leopold II issued a Decree of 9 September 1907 
(Moniteur Beige, 1907) to create an entity called the Niederfullbach Foundation. 
The new Foundation was to assume ownership of certain properties belonging to 
the German Saxe-Coburg family, and a series of assets estimated at F25 million. 
Income generated from these assets were to be used for financing the completion of 
refurbishment and embellishment works in Belgium and maintenance of royal 
properties in France.
After the death of the King, as a result of an investigation carried out in 
order to determine the origin of the Niederfullbach Foundation's properties, it was 
proved that the largest part of the latter came from the Congo Free State and the 
Crown Foundation (Heenen, 1955). Following trials and difficult negotiations, an
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agreement of 28 January 1911 yielded to Belgium all rights on the Congolese part 
of the Niederfullbach Foundation's assets. For its part, Belgium granted the 
Foundation Fl.l million capital and renounced all rights on the portion of the 
Foundation's assets inherited from Leopold I. On the other hand, at the completion 
of the annexation process, King Leopold II was given a F50 million fund as a token 
of gratitude, to be used by himself and his successors for various purposes 
regarding the Congo. The fund was payable out of the colonial budget in 15 
annuities of F3.3 million each, starting from 1909, except for the first annuity 
which amounted to F3.8 million. The final annuity was due in 1923 (Heenen, 
1955). The yearly F3.3-million instalments were effectively paid from 1909 to 
1923, as recorded in annual official reports on the Belgian Congo administration.
3.5. Conclusion
The Congo Free State was unique in view of its political organisation. In his 
capacity as the Sovereign of the State, King Leopold II held all power. He literally 
forged a personal union with the Congo Free State, which he considered and 
treated as his personal property and which he included in his will like any other 
personal belongings. He did so, as stated in his will, on the grounds of "his 
sovereign rights on the Congo as recognised by statements, agreements and treaties 
established from 1884 onwards between foreign powers, on the one hand, and the 
Association Internationale du Congo and the Congo Free State, on the other" 
(Stengers, 1989:93).
The uniqueness of this case stems from the fact that the statements, 
agreements and treaties the King referred to in his will were signed between 
foreign powers and the Association Internationale du Congo of which he was not
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even a formal member. A Belgian officer named Colonel Strauch was formally 
appointed as the President of the Association. And yet all foreign powers were 
aware that King Leopold was the head of and identified with the Association 
(Stengers, 1989).
With regard to the economic organisation of the State, contrary to his 
commitment to favouring free trade in the Congo basin, King Leopold II soon 
established a strong State monopoly, especially starting from 1891-1892 with the 
concept of terres vacantes (vacant lands) and the creation of State lands. The 
largest volume of the most rewarding products exported, namely ivory and rubber, 
was collected from the State lands. As a result, no one but the State was entitled to 
purchase these products throughout the State lands, which covered more than three- 
quarters of the whole country.
However, King Leopold II had recourse to private enterprises to carry out 
investments that required large amounts of capital. The creation of the Compagnie 
du Chemin de Fer du Congo in 1889 and of the Compagnie des Chemins de Per du 
Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains in 1902 for the construction of a 
railways network - all of them private companies - was the result of this policy. 
The same policy was implemented for the development of the mining sector, which 
led to the foundation of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga in 1906. It emerges 
from these provisions that while King Leopold reserved the most lucrative trade 
activities for the State, he managed to get private enterprises involved in the most 
high-risk investments.
To derive maximum profit from the monopolistic regime, the State 
established a coercive exploitation system, which resulted in abuses inflicted on the 
local people. In this respect, on the one hand, the occupation of the Congolese
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territory was conducted almost peacefully or at least with a minimum of brutality, 
apart from military campaigns against the Arabs and their troops in the 
southeastern region of the Congo. On the other, the economic exploitation gave rise 
to a surge of violence (Stengers, 1956).
The instructions regarding the collection of rubber in State lands were clear 
about the objective, namely to maximise the outcome. In order to achieve this goal 
the State agents were allowed recourse to various means of constraint and coercion. 
These mainly consisted of close military watch over villages, corporal punishment, 
hostage-taking or punitive expeditions against recalcitrant villages, the amputation 
of countless hands, ears and even genital organs, and executions. The local 
inhabitants of the State lands were subjected to forced labour, especially for rubber 
collection, which absorbed the major part of their time. This coercive system was 
applied even more fiercely in the lands managed by concessionary companies, such 
as the ABIR and the Anversoise. Another distinctive feature of Leopold's Congo 
was that a rich European State was feeding itself off the major part of the resources 
belonging to a poor African State (Stengers, 1956). In the late 19th and early 20th 
century, it was generally agreed, at least in principle, that resources generated in a 
colony should exclusively be used in the interest of the colony itself (Reinsch, 
1899, cited by Carder, 1906).
From 1885 to 1890 the Congo Free State generated insufficient resources 
from customs duties, taxes and ivory exports for its survival. This survival was 
maintained thanks to external funds provided by King Leopold II out of his 
personal fortune, issuance of securities in the Belgian financial market and direct 
borrowings from banks and from the Belgian Government. Starting from 1890 a 
significant change took place with the discovery of rubber as a natural resource.
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European demand for rubber dramatically increased in that period, in line with the 
widespread development of bicycles with rubber wheels. As a result of the harsh 
exploitation system, rubber production figures climbed sharply. While in 1890 
Congo exported not more than about 100 tons of rubber, export of the same product 
amounted to 1,300 tons in 1896, 2,000 tons in 1898, and 6,000 tons in 1901, or 
more than 10 per cent of world output (Stengers, 1989).
In 1890, as a result of the State land policy, Congo generated about 
F 150,000 from its Domaine prive. In 1901 the returns from the State lands' 
products amounted to F18 million. From then on, the Congo Free State budgets 
recorded surpluses that were spent on financing investments in Belgium, such as 
the construction of the 50th anniversary arcade and the Tervueren museum, 
enlargement of the Royal Palace of Laeken, and the embellishment of Brussels and 
many other sites in Belgium, as already mentioned (Cattier, 1906). The funding of 
these public works programmes was given a permanent element with the creation 
of the Domaine de la Couronne (Crown Lands), later called Crown Foundation. 
The Congo Free State granted the Foundation about 250,000 square kilometres of 
land or 10 per cent of the State territory, or half the area of France (Slade, 1962). In 
addition to the receipts generated from the sale of products harvested from the 
Crown land, especially rubber, the Foundation received a portion of funds 
borrowed by the State (Stengers, 1956).
From 1901 to 1908, the Foundation acquired a significant number of 
properties, lands and buildings, in Brussels and all over the Kingdom of Belgium, 
as well as in the French Riviera. At the annexation of the Congo Free State as a 
Belgian colony in 1908, as the Crown Foundation was dissolved, Belgium took 
over all the properties, worth a total of more than F60 million. Compared with the
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financial assistance the Congo Free State received from Belgium, estimated at F40 
million, the net cash outflows from Congo between 1885 and 1908 amounted to 
F20 million in favour of Belgium (Stengers, 1989). From the analysis above it 
emerges that the whole system established in the Congo Free State was dominated 
by the special relationship that existed between King Leopold II and the State, 
namely as it might exist between a mere business and its owner as sole proprietor.
As a general conclusion, it is clear from the overall analysis made in this 
chapter that the monetary and financial system that King Leopold II of Belgium 
established in the Congo Free State in his capacity as Sovereign of the State was 
basically marked by the ownership that he claimed over the Congolese territory. 
From the analysis carried out in Chapter two it emerged that the monetary history 
of the Kingdom of Congo was dramatically affected by the introduction of shells 
similar to the nzimbu shells used in the Kingdom as currency, namely the cowries 
imported from various origins by traders in order to boost the funding of the slave 
trade that developed along the western coast of Africa from the 16th century 
onwards. The discovery of the Kingdom of Congo by the Portuguese in the late 
15th century was followed by an unprecedented development of slave trading that 
contributed to the impoverishment of the African continent as a whole (Rodney, 
1972). At the same time, the funding of this trade led to the import of large 
quantities of shells to be used as a medium of exchange along with the nzimbu 
shells, which resulted in a dramatic inflation rate that undermined the wealth of the 
Kingdom. The evidence of a direct link between the slave trade and major aspects 
of the monetary history of the Kingdom of Congo has therefore been established.
In this Chapter the Congolese origin of the Portuguese term "macutcC has 
been traced, which led to establishing a link between the Portuguese currency
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'macula' intended for circulation in Portuguese African territories and the past 
monetary experience in the Kingdom of Congo as analysed in Chapter two. No 
matter whether ' macula" resulted from phonetic changes to the word nkula, nkulu, 
khulu or khula, the name of a basket used to contain tributes paid to the King of 
Congo in nzimbu shells, or from the term makula defined as a bunch oflibongo i.e. 
small pieces of cloth made of raffia. In both cases, there is a direct reference to 
ancient currencies in use in the Kingdom of Congo since the 15th or even the 14th 
century, and still in use in present times. In order to introduce a European-style 
currency the Portuguese made use of local monetary practices.
This Chapter established that the Congo's monetary history commencing 
with the foundation of the Congo Free State began on the basis of a model 
comparable to the one applied by the Portuguese in their relationship with the 
Kingdom of Congo. Firstly, the system of payment established for the settlement of 
transactions between the local population and the State itself or through its 
representatives made use of local traditional monetary devices as a means of 
introducing currencies defined according to European patterns. Secondly, in 
addition to the atrocities inflicted on the local population who were forced to 
produce goods demanded by the administration of the State, the use of 
merchantable goods as a medium of exchange and the reference to the milako as a 
unit of account gave rise to another series of abuses. These consisted of arbitrary 
methods of determining the exchange rates, and contributed to the impoverishment 
of the country and its inhabitants. Thirdly, the whole system established to 
administer and economically exploit the Congolese territory was organised for the 
sake of King Leopold II who held all discretionary power for this purpose and 
could change the rules just as he liked.
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This state of affairs explains the major shortcomings observed, among other 
patterns, in the organisation of the monetary system and its institutional framework, 
as well as in the financial system, such as a total absence of efficient mechanisms 
of control that would have prevented King Leopold II from carrying out a financial 
policy that resulted in a financial burden for the Congo Free State in favour of 
external beneficiaries, including metropolitan Belgium.
The monetary provisions set up by King Leopold II for the Congo Free 
State can be essentially characterised as follows: (1) based on Gold Standard; (2) 
no free minting of gold coins; (3) no internal circulation of gold coins; (4) silver 
coins externally convertible, and (5) unsecured State bills. Since no gold coins 
were struck, the monetary system, which was derived from the Royal Decrees 
regarding money in Congo, was considered a virtual Gold Standard (BCCBRU, 
1957). As a result of the small volume of trade and the still widespread barter 
practices, and payments in kind favoured by the State for a long time, internal 
monetary circulation was restricted.
At the start of King Leopold IPs African venture in the 1870s Belgium was 
extremely cautious, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the still young Kingdom was 
keen to focus on its independence that had been acquired only in 1830. Secondly, 
the country was so small that it was reluctant to throw itself into the colonial arena 
where larger European nations, such as Britain, France, Germany and Portugal, 
were fighting to enlarge their colonial empires with some additional African 
territories. Thirdly, according to an opinion widespread among participants at the 
1884/1885 Berlin Conference, all odds were against the royal Congolese enterprise, 
and Belgium turned a blind eye to it, provided that it remained a personal
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endeavour of the King without involvement of any kind for Belgium as a nation, 
and without any cost for the Belgian Treasury.
However, as time went by Belgium became increasingly involved in 
Congolese affairs for the various reasons mentioned in this chapter. In the 
meantime, the general opinion had changed about the economic and financial 
profitability of Congo as a colony. Admittedly, King Leopold II was forced to give 
up the Congo he perceived as his personal possession and Belgium had to resort to 
taking over the Congo Free State and it turning into a Belgian colony in order, 
among other proclaimed civilising reasons, to put an end to atrocities that had been 
internationally denounced. However, in this respect, Belgium was no longer 
reluctant to undertake and pursue the colonial development of Congo, in view of 
the considerable economic and financial returns it would yield. This issue is 
addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four:
MONEY AND FINANCE
IN BELGIAN CONGO (1908-1960)
4.1 Introduction
It was pointed out in Chapter three that, at first, the Belgians, public opinion and 
politicians included, were reluctant to get involved in any colonial ventures in 
general, and in the Congolese enterprise undertaken by King Leopold II in 
particular. As time passed by, on the one hand, Belgians became steadily aware 
of the economic and financial benefits that Congo could have for Belgium. On 
the other hand, as a result of growing criticism from abroad, they gradually 
became concerned about the atrocities that the Congolese population was being 
subjected to in the context of the exploitation of the royal possession (Hennessy, 
1961).
As a result of the Campaign mentioned in Chapter three, against the 
atrocities of King Leopold IPs regime in Congo, the idea of putting an end to 
the union between Congo and the person of the King and turning the State into a 
formal Belgian colony gained ground. This background is marked by an element 
of international pressure, which proved to be a constant factor in the history of 
Congo (Slade, 1962). The Congo Free State was born in 1885 under the 
auspices of the Berlin Conference of the same year, which witnessed the 
participation of the most powerful European nations and the United States; the
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end of the Congo Free State was a result of international pressure intended to 
enforce reforms in the administration of Congo in compliance with the 
provisions of the 1885 Berlin Act. Chapter five will show that soon after the 
attainment of independence Congo had to request the assistance of the United 
Nations, to deal with the major crisis that had arisen as a result of the disastrous 
conditions under which the Belgian metropolitan carried out the decolonisation 
of Congo.
This chapter addresses the main features of the colonial monetary and 
financial history of Congo starting from the annexation of the royal African 
possession as a formal Belgian Colony on 15 November 1908. The second 
section of the chapter analyses the monetary and financial provisions of the Law 
on the Government of Congo known as the Charte Coloniale (Colonial Charter) 
published in the Moniteur Beige of 19-20 October 1908. It highlights several 
cases of contradiction between the legal framework set up by the metropolitan 
power for its Colony, marked by a clear separation between Belgium and Congo 
as two distinct legal entities, and the monetary and financial reality on the 
ground. To illustrate the wide gap between official statements in this respect and 
the real situation, section three looks at the main practical aspects of the link 
established over time between the Belgian Franc (BF) and the Congolese Franc 
(CF). The analysis looks at the de facto subordination of the CF to the 
metropolitan currency and assesses the impact of this dependency on the overall 
monetary and financial system of Congo.
Section four looks at the inclusion of Congo in the Latin Monetary 
Union to explain the Belgian motivation for involving the Colony in the Union. 
It provides the main features of a brief monetary history of Belgium in
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connection with the creation of the Latin Monetary Union to explain how the 
inclusion of the Colony in the Union was aimed at solving nothing but a Belgian 
internal problem of monetary mismanagement. From this analysis it emerges 
that the history of Congo's membership of the Latin Monetary Union was bound 
up with the history of Belgium and this Union, and could have sense only in 
relation to what were exclusively Belgian interests. This motivation was so 
deeply established that the Belgian Congo was hardly mentioned in the 
agreements of 4 November 1908 signed by the Latin Monetary Union member 
countries, which also included the latters' African colonies, such as the French 
possessions of Algeria and Madagascar.
Section five addresses the development of monetary and banking 
institutional network and activities. The point in analysing the development of 
the banking network is to underline the effect of the dualistic aspect of the 
colonial economy. The aim is to establish a link between the presence of 
banking branches in a small number of areas and the degree of industrial and 
commercial development of these areas located in the middle of vast yet 
unexploited territories.
Section six treats the role of the Banque du Congo Beige as an early 
issuing house for the Colony prior to the creation of the Banque Centrale du 
Congo Beige et du Ruanda-Urundi (BCCBRU) in the early 1950s. It also 
addresses the subsequent promulgation in 1951 of a Decree granting the 
BCCBRU controlling power over banking and financial institutions. Section 
seven analyses the role of the BCCBRU as a monetary authority and central 
bank established in 1951 for both the Belgian Congo and the mandated territory
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of Ruanda-Urundi. Section eight looks at the structure of money circulation by 
exploring the developments of banking activities and money supply.
Section nine addresses three other major issues, namely the colonial 
portfolio, colonial debt, and the Ten-year Development Plan for 1950-1959, as 
they significantly contributed to shape the monetary and financial evolution of 
Congo. Analysis of colonial portfolio and debt serves to establish another link 
between the colonial period and the Congo Free State era. The reason for this is 
that the Colony inherited a considerable part of its portfolio of stakes and 
various other financial assets as well as a large amount of debt contracted since 
the same Congo Free State period. The analysis of the Ten-year Plan for 1950- 
1959 serves to display the unfinished process of setting up the infrastructure that 
Congo needed to boost its economic and social development beyond the 1950s. 
It also serves to explain how implementation of the plan led to a financial 
imbalance that became apparent on the eve of independence. As a conclusion, 
section ten analyses the constraints that affected the introduction of modern 
currencies and money-based transactions into a territory marked by a dualistic 
economy.
4.2. Monetary and Financial Provisions of the Charte Coloniale
Article 1 of the Charte Coloniale declared a complete separation of legal 
entities, governing laws, and capital accounts between Belgium and its Colony. 
Nevertheless, Article 11 of the same Charte Coloniale defined the monetary 
statute of the Belgian Congo as follows: "(1) gold and silver currencies that are 
legal tender in Belgium play the same role in the Colony; (2) silver currencies 
minted by the Congo Free State are no longer legal tender or exchangeable at
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the Colonial Treasury; (3) any profit that may arise from the issuing of Belgian 
currencies needed by the Colony is attributable to the colonial budget; (4) the 
King is allowed to strike special fractional coins for the Colony, provided that 
those coins are not legal tender in Belgium" (Moniteur Beige, Journal Officiel, 
1908: 5887-5889).
A fixed link was established between the BF and the CF, which were 
exchanged at par. In practice, the exchange rate of the Congolese currency was 
dependent on the BF. This contradicted the principle of legal separation stated in 
Article 1 of the Charte Coloniale. The BF was particularly unstable at that time, 
and this instability affected the Congolese currency and finance (Louwers, 
1925). Although silver coins struck by the Congo Free State ceased to circulate 
shortly after the annexation, they continued to be exchanged for new coins 
issued by the Colony until late 1924 (BCCBRU, 1957).
With regard to fractional coins that the King could strike in the Colony, 
the reason put forward for forbidding their circulation in the metropolitan 
territory was that Belgium was anxious to protect itself against 'a flood of 
fractional coins valued on a too conventional basis' (Halewyck, 1910: 13-14). 
On the same principle, Belgian fractional coins were not granted the quality of 
legal tender in Congo either. In both cases, should such coins have been 
exported from one country to the other, the cost of transport would have 
exceeded their low face Value.
Article 7 of the Charte Coloniale stipulated that the King was 
responsible for setting regulations regarding the issue and circulation of notes 
representing legal currency. As mentioned in Chapter three, the Congo Free 
State issued State notes, which were gradually withdrawn after the annexation.
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However, due to a rapid increase in the Colony's business volume, it became 
urgent to issue new banknotes and coins. To deal with the most urgent matters 
first, notes issued by the National Bank of Belgium were put into circulation in 
the Colony during the first years of its existence, i.e. between 1909 and 1911. 
During this period, various banknotes issued by the National Bank of Belgium 
amounting to F2,175,000 were shipped to Congo (BCCBRU, 1957). The silver 
currencies issued by the Congo Free State were withdrawn, starting from 
October 1909, while a large amount of Latin Monetary Union silver coins 
flowed into the Colony. However, the use of the Belgian central bank's notes 
was subject to various legal and technical problems, due essentially to the much- 
debated management of the Belgian monetary system itself in relation to its 
Latin Monetary Union membership - this is an issue that will be addressed later 
in this chapter with reference to various sources, such as Willis (1901), De 
Lannoy (1931), Dupriez (1949), Wertz (1952), and Moens (1976). The use of 
Belgian central bank's notes was, therefore, rapidly abandoned and the 
metropolitan authorities decided to issue banknotes proper to the Colony (de 
Lannoy, 1928).
In July 1911, the Belgian Government concluded an agreement with the 
largest banking institution established in Congo, namely the Banque du Congo 
Beige, which was given exclusive issuing rights in the Colony for 25 years with 
the possibility of a review after a 15-year period (Banque du Congo Beige, 
1960). The set of successive agreements concluded between the Colony and the 
Banque du Congo Beige will be analysed in detail in the section relating to the 
role of the bank in its capacity as an issuing house.
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As a matter of fact, the Congolese monetary system was, from the outset, 
supposed by law to be independent from the Belgian system. This was to result 
in a clear distinction and separation between the BF and the CF. However, 
although it was clearly established by law that the Colony would have its own 
balance of payments and monetary reserves, and, if need be, its exchange 
control applicable to all countries including Belgium, in reality, things were 
different. From the earliest days of the colonial period Belgium always managed 
to maintain the same par rate of exchange between the two currencies.
Actually, as claimed earlier, because of the disparity in the balance of 
power between Belgium and its Colony, the CF could not escape the influence 
of the Belgian monetary zone. In relation to this, Belgian parliamentary annals 
reveal that by the end of the First World War, the exchange rate of the CF 
against the British Pound sterling (GBP) exceeded that of the BF by more than 
20 per cent. Nevertheless, on 30 June 1919, the Belgian Government, obviously 
put under pressure by industrial and commercial interests established in the 
Colony, decided on the alignment of the two currencies. The official reason for 
this was that maintaining disparity would have resulted in detrimental effects on 
new Belgian investments in Africa (Annales Parlementaires, 1920-1921). The 
next section explores the development of the relation between the BF and the 
CF, and the process by which the Belgian metropolitan power managed the 
issue of the exchange rate at the expense of its Colony all through the colonial 
period.
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4.3 Relationship between Congolese Franc and Belgian Franc
Prior to the First World War the question of the exchange rate of the Congolese 
currency was not considered to be of significant concern or likely to affect the 
economic development of the Colony. Moreover, the exclusive issuing right 
granted by the agreement of July 1911 to the Banque du Congo Beige 
mentioned earlier helped to resolve the problem of means of payment (Gerard, 
1925). The issue of the exchange rate arose since the barter-based mechanisms 
of transaction mentioned in Chapter three proved to be inefficient in the new 
context of fast-growing economic activities in the Colony.
While the agreement of July 1911 regulated the issuance of bank notes 
among other matters, the strike and circulation of metallic currency were ruled 
by a series of Decrees issued over time starting from 1887. In this respect, 
before the First World War, the only currency mentioned in the legal and 
regulatory provisions was the Franc, which meant the Belgian Franc. The term 
Congolese Franc (CF) emerged as a consequence of the effective separation 
between Belgium and Congo imposed by the First World War (Gerard, 1925).
Following the outbreak of that war, the Banque du Congo Beige opened 
a branch in London on 8 September 1914 (Wertz, 1952). This branch served as 
the bank of the Colony's Treasury. As the latter was unable to obtain funds from 
the Belgian Ministry of Finance based in Le Havre, it borrowed funds in GBP in 
London. At the same time, Congo started to sell on the London market gold 
extracted from the Kilo mine in the northeast of the country. This was the 
starting point for a stream of commercial transactions in GBP to which the 
Congolese currency was pegged from then on (Wertz, 1952). As a result, the 
Colony's currency note became independent from the BF and was granted the
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quality of legal tender in Congo by late October 1914. From that time the CF 
gained a formal identity distinct from the BF regardless of the at par link 
established in 1909 (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960).
The London branch of the Banque du Congo Beige became the only 
financial intermediary between the Colony and the rest of the world. The bank 
succeeded in carrying out the management of its GBP cash flows smoothly. The 
amount needed to achieve a balance was withdrawn from credits in GBP granted 
to the Belgian Government, and from export proceeds received for Congolese 
supplies to Britain. This was done at the same exchange rate as the one at which 
Belgian refugees in the United Kingdom were allowed to exchange BF against 
the GBP, namely, GBP1 for BF25.40. The Banque du Congo Beige bought 
GBP1 at CF25.40 CF and sold at CF25.45 (Wertz, 1952). This exchange rate 
remained stable until the end of the First World War. By mid-1918, when 
Belgium was still under the German occupation, the real exchange rate of the 
Belgian currency was estimated at GBP1 for BF50. This rate was 50 per cent 
below the exchange rate applicable to the CF in Holland, where the quotation 
was considered more in line with the real economic situation, in contrast with 
the arbitrary exchange rate applied in the United Kingdom in favour of Belgian 
refugees (Gerard, 1925).
Following the Armistice of November 1918 the United Kingdom broke 
the agreement between the Allies that maintained relatively stable the exchange 
rate of the GBP against the French Franc (FF) and the BF, namely around GBP1 
for BF27. As a result, both the FF and the BF depreciated dramatically, driving 
the Belgian currency down to more than BF100 for GBP1. By late June 1919, 
while the Belgian currency was quoted at F31 for GBP1, the Congolese
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currency continued to be quoted at CF25.45 for GBP1 and the Banque du Congo 
Beige was still selling GBP1 for CF25.45 and buying at CF25.40 (BCCBRU, 
1957).
However, shortly afterwards, regardless of the legal separation of the 
metropolitan and colonial currencies mentioned earlier, the Belgian metropolitan 
authorities decided to align the Congolese currency with the BF, which resulted 
in a devaluation of the CF by about 22 per cent (Gerard, 1925). As a 
consequence of this alignment, the legal separation between the two currencies 
was denied as the Congolese currency resumed its linkage with the metropolitan 
currency. The official reasons put forward by the Belgian Government to justify 
a par rate of exchange between the two currencies were vague: psychological 
grounds, identical denomination, close relationship between the two economic 
entities, easy capital flows (Gerard, 1925). As pointed out earlier in this section, 
the objective explanation stems from the nature of the unbalanced relations that 
existed between the Colony and the ruling metropolitan power. The instability 
of the Belgian currency was arbitrarily transferred to the Congolese money, 
which affected colonial export and fiscal revenues.
Due to its impact on the organisation of the colonial monetary authority, 
the question of the relationship between the two currencies will be subject to 
further analysis in the section relating to the role of the Banque du Congo Beige 
as an issuing house and the creation of the BCCBRU in the early 1950s. 
However, it is worth pointing out at this stage that, despite the formally distinct 
identity stated in all legal provisions elaborated for the Colony by the Belgian 
metropolitan power, the CF remained in fact permanently linked to the Belgian 
currency. This link between the two currencies was justified by the alleged need
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to preserve interconnected Belgian and Congolese economic and financial 
interests. These were essentially represented by large industrial and financial 
groups founded, in most cases, in the time of the Congo Free State, and heavily 
involved in investments in the colonial mineral, agricultural and manufacturing, 
as well as financial services sectors, as mentioned in Chapter three. And yet, as 
will be underlined later in this chapter, opinion was growing among Belgians 
involved in the metropolitan and colonial administration, in favour of a real 
separation between the two currencies.
In the meanwhile, starting from its creation in 1887, the Congolese 
currency unit was defined on a par with the Belgian one. At times, as during the 
period of Congolese prosperity derived from the Colony's contribution to the 
First World War, the CF did meet the required conditions for its autonomy. 
However, it was systematically brought back under the influence of the BF in 
such a way that the monetary separation proclaimed by law between Belgium 
and its Colony can be considered no more than an historical illusion. The history 
of the inclusion of Congo in the Latin Monetary Union analysed in the next 
section provides another eloquent illustration of the contradictory attitude of 
Belgium vis-a-vis its own laws regarding the management of its Colony.
4.4. Belgium and the Belgian Congo 
in the Latin Monetary Union
The rationale that governed the establishment of a tight link between the Belgian 
currency and the CF was marked by the desire to preserve metropolitan 
monetary and financial interests. The same rationale also applied to the 
inclusion of Congo in the Latin Monetary Union. This section aims to explain
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this claim and to demonstrate that the inclusion of Congo in the Union was not 
driven by any motivation specifically concerned with Congo.
Just before Belgium became an independent Kingdom in 1832, the 
national monetary unit was the Dutch florin, as established by a law of 1816. 
However, the State Treasury could accept metallic currency of the former 
Austrian Dutch provinces and French currency on an official rate basis (De 
Lannoy, 1931). At the proclamation of independence, the Belgian government 
adopted the Franc instead of the Florin as a monetary unit because, in reality, the 
FF was the most widely circulating monetary unit in Belgian provinces. This 
situation was due to the fact that Belgium had a greater volume of trade with 
France than with any other neighbouring country.
A law of 5 June 1832 (Moniteur Beige, 1832) defined the BF, with the 
same weight and fineness as the FF: 5 silver grams at 900/1000 fineness. The 
law prescribed the strike of coins of BF40 and 20; 15.5 silver grams for 1 gold 
gram, as in France. From 1832 to 1847, Belgium struck BF5 silver coins for a 
total of BF9.84 million and coins of BFl, 2, 50 centimes and 25 centimes for a 
total of BFl2 million. No gold coin was struck during this period because the 
market value of the metal exceeded the face value of gold coins. The subsequent 
premium due to this situation prevented gold coins from circulating in Belgium 
as well as in France (Willis, 1901).
The withdrawal of gold from circulation decided by Holland in 1847 
resulted in increased flows of 10 florin gold coins into Belgium, where they 
remained legal tender. Moreover, as a consequence of an increased volume of 
gold imported from Russia, France increased its coinage of gold pieces to 
replace an equivalent amount of silver. Since the French gold pieces of FF20
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and 40 were also legal tender in Belgium, the Belgian monetary system received 
a larger volume of gold pieces from both France and Holland. And yet, to 
overcome the shortage of coins in circulation due to insufficient production by 
the Belgian Mint, a law of 4 March 1848 granted the English sovereign the 
status of legal tender at the exchange rate of 1 English Sovereign for BF25.50, 
while its market value fell sharply from a rate between BF26 and 27 to 25.225 
(Willis, 1901).
The most confusing situation resulted from the discrepancy in the gold- 
to-silver ratio among different currencies in circulation: 1 to 15.50 for the 
French coins, 1 to 15.67 for the English coins, 1 to 15.80 for the Belgian coins 
and 1 to 15.87 for the Dutch coins (De Lannoy, 1931). As a consequence, this 
situation triggered a massive entry of large amounts of gold into the country. To 
overcome the subsequent confusion and following the fall in the original value 
of French gold pieces, the Belgian Parliament decided to successively deprive 
foreign gold currencies of their status as legal tender. It also decided to abolish 
the bimetallism gold-silver currency, halt the strike of gold pieces, and establish 
the silver currency as the sole standard (Willis, 1901).
Despite the withdrawal from circulation of both Belgian and French gold 
coins, people continued to use them even though the French gold F20 coin was 
worth BF19.75. At the time, as the market value of gold was slightly lower than 
the face value, the Paris Mint struck a large amount of gold pieces which flowed 
into Belgium to be exchanged for silver coins. By 1858, Belgian monetary 
circulation was essentially composed of French gold coins and a small amount 
of the most worn Belgian and French silver coins. The confusion was 
aggravated by the fact that both French and Belgian currencies were known by
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the same name - 'Franc'. People did not take into consideration the fact that, as 
a result of the law of 1848, the two currencies no longer had the same value. To 
deal with this situation a new law passed by Parliament on 4 June 1861 merely 
re-established the French system adopted in 1832, namely the use of gold-silver 
bimetallism with the same ratio: 1 to 15.50 (De Lannoy, 1931).
Furthermore, due to growing demand for silver from India, the market 
price of this metal went higher than the official quotation. As a result, 
speculators bought for gold large amounts of silver to be melted down and 
exported. This reduced the amount of fractional currencies dramatically and 
caused difficulties in France and other countries, namely, Belgium, Italy and 
Switzerland, as they adopted the French silver Franc as a monetary unit. To 
prevent speculators from melting silver currencies, Switzerland decided to strike 
coins of this metal at 800/1000 fineness instead of 900/1000. Because of their 
lower value, other countries did not accept these coins (Willis, 1901).
Later on, Italy and Switzerland struck coins of Fl, 50 and 20 centimes at 
835/1000 fineness, as France had done in 1864 at the same fineness for the 50- 
and 20-centime coins (Willis 1901). The effect of these measures was that the 
circulation of fractional coins was fairly well protected in all three countries. 
Since Belgium did nothing similar speculators continued to buy for gold 
fractional silver pieces, which they melted for export purposes. In the end 
Belgium decided to make its fineness conform to that of the other countries 
using the Franc, i.e. Switzerland and Italy, along with France, and suggested that 
France arranged a conference with the participation of Italy and Switzerland, in 
order to deal with the issue. The Latin Monetary Union was born from this 
Conference, with the four countries named above as its founding members,
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joined by Greece in 1868. The major aim of the Conference was therefore to sort 
out drawbacks that had arisen from the variety of fractional currencies of 
countries using the Franc as monetary unit (Kindleberger, 1984).
At this Conference Belgium, along with Italy and Switzerland, 
recommended the abolition of bimetallism, which France opposed. The treaty of 
23 December 1865 confirmed, therefore, the status of legal tender of both gold 
and silver pieces while acceptance of the silver coins by the Public Treasury of 
any member of the Union (discretionary until then) became compulsory. All 
fractional coins were from then on to be struck at 835/1000 fineness throughout 
the Latin Monetary Union (De Lannoy, 1931).
Starting from 1867, the value of silver decreased constantly. In 1873, 
from a kilogram of silver bought in London at BF217.38 one could strike coins 
worth BF220.25 and make, therefore, profit from exporting gold and importing 
silver. From early September of the same year monetary authorities of member 
countries decided to restrict the strike of silver coins. By an agreement of 5 
November 1878 the strike of silver was completely banned. From that date, 
bimetallism was abandoned de facto. However, member countries were reluctant 
to terminate the treaty since a subsequent liquidation of the Union would have 
forced each member country to compulsorily redeem in gold at equal face value 
its silver coins in circulation in all other countries (De Lannoy, 1931).
This question was of the greatest interest to Belgium, since, at the 
beginning of King Leopold IPs reign, some of his Ministers of Finance, strongly 
in favour of bimetallism, minted too large an amount of silver coins while the 
value of the metal was sharply declining. In 1908, of the total BF350 million in 
silver token coins in circulation that had been struck by Belgium from 1865 to
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1873, only BF150 million was located in Belgium. This meant that, should the 
Latin Union, as guarantor of a fixed gold/silver rate, be dissolved, Belgium 
would be forced to refund BF200 million in gold. As silver had recorded 50 per 
cent depreciation since 1865, Belgium would have lost approximately BF100 
million (De Lannoy, 1931).
The inclusion of Congo in the Latin Monetary Union was, therefore, 
perceived by the Belgian Government as a means of disposing of a substantial 
amount of risky silver currencies of which a large amount was to be transferred 
to the Colony. In the case of dissolution of the Union, the Colony would have 
had to bear the burden of losses caused by the Belgian Governments' excessive 
issuance of BF5 silver coins, regardless of legal separation of monetary and 
financial responsibility between Belgium and Congo (BCCBRU, 1957).
The negotiations of 1885 aimed at renewing the Latin Monetary Union 
Treaty of 1878, which was to expire in 1886, led to an agreement that defined 
conditions of redemption accepted by all member countries, in case of the 
liquidation of the Union. Following the annexation of Congo as a Belgian 
colony, which became effective on 15 November 1908, the Belgian quota for 
fractional coins issued was increased by an additional amount based on the 
population of Congo, estimated at 10 million people at that time, while the 
Belgian population totalled 7.3 million (Wertz, 1952). Congo served to increase 
the amount of fractional coins that Belgium could issue for circulation in 
Belgium. At the same time, it seems obvious that Congo was regarded as an 
outlet for the excess silver coins issued by Belgium and doomed to bear the 
related loss in the event of the Latin Monetary Union being liquidated, with 
compulsory redemption of silver coins for gold at par.
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However, on 6 August 1908, Liebaert, the Belgian Minister of Finance, 
explained before Parliament the following six official reasons to justify the 
inclusion of Congo in the Latin Monetary Union. Firstly he stressed the necessity 
of avoiding the introduction of any form of nationalism, even monetary, and of 
keeping good relations with neighbouring colonial powers. Secondly, the new 
membership was considered an opportunity to strengthen the Union. Thirdly, the 
entry of Congo into the Union was an opportunity to provide the Colony with a 
large amount of currencies so as to encourage their use by the local population. In 
any case, it was difficult, if not impossible, to withdraw from circulation French 
coins introduced into Congo through French Equatorial Africa. Furthermore it was 
advisable to follow the example of France, which adopted the Latin Union for its 
African colonies, in order to allow the circulation of currencies from other 
member countries. Lastly, both Belgium and Congo would clearly benefit from 
the project under consideration by the Union to strike a larger number of coins 
with a lower degree of fineness using old silver F5 coins (Annales parlementaires, 
Chambre des Representants, 1908, p. 588)
The entry of Congo into the Latin Monetary Union confirmed the 
principle of equal definition for the metropolitan and colonial currencies. 
Belgium and Congo had the same unit of account since gold and silver coins in 
circulation in one country were to circulate in the other under the same 
conditions (Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1909). In practical terms, the 
transfer of F5 silver coins to Congo between the second half of 1909 and late 
1912 gave rise to a rather sharp exchange of correspondence between the 
Belgian Minister of Finance and the Minister of Colonies on the one hand, and 
the Governor of the National Bank of Belgium and the Banque du Congo Beige,
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on the other. Namely, at the request of the Minister of Colonies for certain 
amounts of F5 silver coins to be sent to Congo, the National Bank of Belgium 
pointed out the difficulty of honouring the request on the grounds that Belgium 
was facing a shortage of that type of coin, of which a large volume was 
circulating outside Belgium (Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1909-1912).
In 1914, because of a shortage of gold coins to exchange for banknotes, 
Belgium resumed minting gold coins for the first time since 1882. That same 
year the First World War started. As a result, all gold and silver currencies 
disappeared from circulation, although France continued to mint silver coins 
during the war in order to maintain the public's confidence in banknotes that 
were issued in a very large volume. This resulted in an inflationary spiral in 
France as well as in Belgium. Starting from 1919, the exchange rate of the 
Belgian currency and of the FF deteriorated dramatically while, at the same 
time, the price of silver declined sharply for lack of confidence in this metal, in 
favour of gold. Switzerland was the only country to maintain the conditions that 
prevailed prior to the First World War.
As a consequence, in 1920 the exchange rate was as follows: 1 Swiss 
Franc (SF) for BF2.30 on average, whereas, according to the agreement of 1885 
still in force, the Swiss Government was committed to treating at par the BF and 
the currencies of all other members of the Union. In the end it was no longer 
possible to re-establish the conditions that were in force before the First World 
War. An agreement was consequently concluded in 1920 and 1921 to dissolve 
the Union and determine the conditions under which Belgian coins circulating in 
all other member countries were to be redeemed. Belgium terminated its 
membership of the Latin Monetary Union on 28 September 1925 (Moens,
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1976). The membership of Congo ended at the same time, and as an effect of the 
Belgian withdrawal from the Union. Its membership ended as it had started, that 
is, in the shadow of Belgium's involvement in the Union.
4. 5. Development of Financial Infrastructure
As will be developed in the section of this chapter relating to banking control, 
most of the banking institutions operating in Congo voluntarily opted to be 
subject to Belgian banking control regulations. The reason for this was that 
banks established in Congo were in fact considered mere subsidiaries of Belgian 
metropolitan banks. However, this subjection was not legally compulsory. It 
allowed, therefore, a relative flexibility in the definition of the Congolese banks' 
functions. In Belgium, following the economic crisis of the 1930s, as will be 
seen later, a clear separation was established in 1935 between banking 
institutions in charge of banking activities, and financial intermediaries 
operating as holding companies. In the Colony, there was no legal provision 
preventing banks from carrying out both banking and financial intermediation 
activities within the same institution (Lefebvre, 1956).
Within the framework of this study the term "financial system" is 
considered not in the broadest sense as it refers only to banking institutions, 
which played a key role in the process of money creation. In view of the small 
contribution of non-banking financial intermediaries in the formation of 
monetary liquidity, these institutions are merely mentioned in this section, while 
the rest of the analysis focuses instead on banking institutions. During the 
colonial era, apart from banking institutions, the Congolese financial system
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comprised a number of holding companies, various semi-public financial 
institutions, and specialised credit institutions.
Holding companies were responsible for long-term financing and the 
acquisition of equity. Some of these, such as the Compagnie du Congo pour le 
Commerce et 1'Industrie, CCCI, the Compagnie du Kasai' and Interfina, 
mentioned in Chapter three, had existed since the era of the Congo Free State. 
The most important of these holding companies received special prerogatives 
from the State, which granted them large concessions of land that they were 
authorised to contract out and administer on behalf of the colonial authorities. 
This was the status of a number of concessionary companies mentioned in 
Chapter three, such as the Comite Special du Katanga, CSK, which combined 
both public administration powers and private interests. The same status was 
held by the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs 
Africains, CFL, and the Comite National du Kivu, CNKi, among others 
(Lefebvre, 1956).
Joint-venture companies combining, mostly, Belgian, British, French 
and American interests were established in various forms, and were involved in 
a wide range of activities. In the absence of capital markets in Congo, joint- 
venture companies played a major role in the development of economic 
activities in the Colony. Most of the enterprises grew through internal financing 
or group equity participation. In this respect holding companies enabled a better 
allocation of resources and made it possible to increase financial means at the 
disposal of each enterprise (Heenen, 1955).
A number of other financial institutions were also established, such as 
property development companies, and insurance companies, which started on a
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brokerage basis and became full insurance companies later on. This category of 
financial intermediaries comprised a number of institutions financed by the 
colonial budget, such as the Caisse Coloniale des Pensions et Allocations 
Familiales pour Employes (Empoyees Pension and Child Benefit Fund), and 
Fonds Special d'Allocations (Special Benefit Fund). A colonial Decree 
established these institutions to ensure the implementation of social legislation. 
Their involvement in this area was significant in view of the financial means at 
their disposal. As an illustration, in 1954, the capital of the Caisse Coloniale des 
Pensions et Allocations Familiales pour Employes amounted to CF3.5 billion 
(Lefebvre, 1956).
Apart from the banks, holding companies and other financial institutions 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Colony established another category 
of specialised credit institutions. These were intended to meet another type of 
need for credit, which could not be resolved by the then existing institutions, 
due to the specific nature of those operations. In this respect, the Colony created 
a number of funds for the purpose of financing the development of projects of 
public interest for local communities. These institutions, such as the Fonds de 
Credit Agricole (a kind of Farm Credit System), Fonds d'Avance (Small Loans 
Institution), and Office des Cites Africaines (African Housing Office), were also 
financed by the colonial budget. The Societe de Credit au Colonat et a 
1'Industrie was a joint venture established by banks, some financial institutions 
and the public authorities, with the function of granting credit to colonists and 
small industries (Lefebvre, 1956).
The two other specialised institutions to be mentioned in this section are 
the Comptes Cheques Postaux, CCP (Post Office Cheque Accounts) and the
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Caisse Generale d'Epargne du Congo, CADECO (Congolese Savings Bank). 
The CCP specialised in collecting the savings of households and businesses. 
The Caisse Generale d'Epargne du Congo, CADECO (which became Caisse 
Generale d'Epargne du Zaire, CADEZA, following the change in the name of 
the country in 1971) was created by a Decree of 10 June 1950 and owned a 
widespread network of branches all over the country. It is specialised in the 
collection of savings from all investors including the smallest savers in rural 
areas (Kuyena, 1984).
If the structure of a financial system includes the following components: 
(1) central monetary authority, (2) banking system, (3) financial markets and (4) 
financial instruments (Sevic, 1999), a monetary system should comprise a 
central monetary authority, banking system, money markets and monetary 
instruments. As mentioned in Chapter three, the Congo Free State did not 
establish a central monetary institution or a banking system of its own. All 
monetary provisions regarding the State were implemented through Belgian 
monetary and banking institutions, such as the Belgian Royal Mint and the 
National Bank of Belgium acting on its behalf. Moreover, although several 
companies created during the era of the Congo Free State included banking and 
financial operations in their Articles of Incorporation as one of their statutory 
activities, no bank was created or functioning in Congo prior to the annexation 
of 15 November 1908.
The first banking institution to operate in the Colony was created on 11 
January 1909 and was named Banque du Congo Beige. By an agreement of 7 
July 1911 the Colony granted Banque du Congo Beige an exclusive issuing 
right. Following this agreement Banque du Congo Beige founded Banque
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Commerciale du Congo, which took over the commercial activities that Banque 
du Congo Beige had to give up because of their incompatibility with its status as 
an issuing house. Prior to the First World War, apart from a branch of the 
Standard Bank of South Africa opened in Elisabethville (today Lubumbashi) in 
1911 and closed in the late 1920s, Banque du Congo Beige and Banque 
Commerciale du Congo remained, therefore, the only banking institutions 
operating in the Colony. In 1919, the Banque du Congo Beige had 24 branches 
in Congo, two in Tanganyika territory, one main branch in London, established 
as headquarters during the First World War, a head office in Brussels, and one 
other main branch in Antwerp (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960).
The rapid economic expansion of the Congo over the inter-war period 
aroused a growing interest among financial circles in the economic development 
of the Colony, which resulted in the establishment of other banks. The 
Portuguese Banco Nacional Ultramarino set up a branch in Kinshasa in 1919. 
With the creation of the Credit General du Congo in 1920, the Banque de 
Bruxelles group started the process of establishing itself in Congo, which it 
completed in successive stages, opening four branches, in Kinshasa, 
Elisabethville, Matadi and Stanleyville (Kisangani) in 1923. In 1924, the Credit 
General du Congo took over all banking activities of the Banque de Bruxelles in 
Congo. In the end, the Banque Beige d'Afrique, created in 1929, took over all 
banking activities of the Credit General du Congo and became a genuine 
commercial bank (BCCBRU, 1957).
Following the First World War Belgium was entrusted with a mandate 
over the territory known as Ruanda-Urundi (today as two countries named 
Rwanda and Burundi respectively). From then on economic data relating to
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Congo and the territory under mandate were presented as a whole (Wertz, 
1952). As a result, most of the figures from the colonial period mentioned in this 
work relate to both Congo and the territory under mandate. Given the small 
proportion of figures relating to the territory under mandate, no attempt has been 
made to separate them, as the outcome of such a complex process would not 
prove significant in the context of the present study.
Table 4.1 shows the development of the banking institutions network 
from the creation of the first bank to be established in Congo in 1909 to the 
outbreak of the Second World War (BCCBRU, 1957). In addition to its presence 
in Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, the Banque Beige d'Afrique established branches 
in French African colonies as well. In the meantime, the Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino branch was taken over by the Banco de Angola in 1926 and was 
transferred from Kinshasa to Boma in 1934. It is also worth mentioning the 
short-lived presence of the Union de Credit d'Elisabethville and the withdrawal 
of the Standard Bank of South Africa in 1936 (BCCBRU, 1957). 
Table 4.1 Banking institutions network ,1919-1939
Name of the bank
Banque du Congo Beige and
Banque Commerciale du Congo
Standard Bank of South Africa
Credit General du Congo
Banco de Angola
Union de Credit d'Elisabethville
Banque Beige d'Afrique
Total number of branches
Year of
creation
1909
1911
1911
1920
1926
1928
1929
Number of branches
1919
24
1
25
1928 1939
33
1
14
1
1
50
23
1
10
34
Source: BCCBRU (1957)
The recession of 1930-1935 caused a decrease in banking activities and 
led banks to restructure and rationalise their services. In 1939 the banking 
network was reduced to 34 branches of which 23 belonged to the Banque du 
Congo Beige and Banque Commerciale du Congo, 10 to the Banque Beige
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d'Afrique and 1 to the Banco de Angola. After the Second World War, other 
Belgian banking institutions contributed to a wider diversification of the 
Congolese banking network with the foundation of the Societe Congolaise de 
Banque (24 December 1947), Banque Congolaise pour 1'Industrie, le Commerce 
et 1'Agriculture (5 October 1950), and Credit Congolais (28 September 1951) 
(BCCBRU, 1957).
Furthermore, two French banks were established in Congo in 1951 with 
the opening of a branch of the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et 
1'Industrie, while, during the same year, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas 
opened a research unit to carry out a feasibility study, following which the unit 
was converted into an operating branch on 5 July 1954. Lastly, the Belgian 
Kredietbank opened a branch in 1952, took over the Banque pour 1'Industrie, le 
Commerce et 1'Agriculture in 1954, and adopted the corporate name of 
Kredietbank-Congo. The Banco de Angola withdrew from Congo in 1947, while 
the Banque Beige d'Afrique and Banque Commerciale du Congo opted for the 
status of Societe Congolaise par Actions a Responsabilite Limitee (Congolese 
public limited company) (BCCBRU, 1957).
The creation of the BCCBRU, whose functions will be analysed later, 
triggered a dramatic change in the status of the Banque du Congo Beige (BCB), 
with the transfer of the exclusive issuing right from the latter to the new central 
bank. As a result the BCB was once again able to resume all normal banking 
operations like any other commercial bank.
Following this, the Banque Commerciale du Congo lost its raison d'etre 
and was taken over by the BCB on 19 November 1952, while the latter became 
a Congolese public limited company by a decision of 16 September 1952. At the
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end of 1956, the commercial banking institutions network in both Congo and 
Ruanda-Urundi comprised 52 branches distributed as indicated in Table 4.2. In 
addition to these 52 commercial bank branches there were 7 head offices and 
branches of the BCCBRU as well as 13 other branches of the latter operating in 
the premises of the Banque du Congo Beige (BCCBRU, 1957).
Table 4.2: Banking institutions network in 1956____
Number of 
Name of the bank branches
Banque du Congo Beige 24 
Banque Beige d'Afrique 16 
Societe Congolaise de Banque 4 
Credit Congolais 2 
Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie 1 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas 1 
tCredietbank-Congo__________________________4 
Total number of branches______________________52 
Source: BCCBRU (1957)
Compared with the banking network of the late 1930s as indicated in 
table 4.1, the number of branches in 1956 represented an increase of about 53 
per cent. However, in relation to the area of Congo, namely 2,345,410 square 
kilometres, 52 branches represented on average one branch for every 45,096 
square kilometres. If one considers that most of those branches were located in 
urban areas, it is obvious that there was a dramatic lack of financial 
intermediation over the vast territory of the Colony.
4.6. The Banque du Congo Beige as an Early Issuing House
The creation of the Banque du Congo Beige in 1909 as the first bank to operate 
on Congolese territory was the opportunity for the Colony to entrust this bank 
with the role of an issuing house. Following the establishment of the bank, 
negotiations were launched with the Belgian Department of Colonies, aimed at
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determining the conditions under which the bank could be granted an exclusive 
issuing right. Three agreements were successively concluded in this respect 
between the Colony and the bank.
The first Agreement concluded on 7 July 1911, granted the bank the 
authority to issue banknotes. This Agreement was approved by a Decree of 18 
July 1911 (Bulletin Officiel du Congo Beige, 1911). A second Agreement was 
concluded on 10 October 1927 as a revision of the issuing charter of 7 July 
1911, justified by the economic development of the Colony since the signing of 
the first agreement. It was approved by a Decree of 14 November 1927 (Bulletin 
Officiel du Congo Beige, 1927). A third agreement concluded on 21 June 1935 
as a consequence of the 1929 recession and subsequent Belgian banking turmoil 
was approved by a Decree of 17 July 1935 (Bulletin Officiel du Congo Beige, 
1935). The motivation and impact of changes made to and introduced by the 
three agreements are analysed in the next paragraphs.
The necessity of issuing banknotes proper to the Congo was justified by 
a rapid economic and trade development of the Colony, which rendered 
insufficient and inadequate further recourse to banknotes issued by the National 
Bank of Belgium. Following negotiations, an agreement was concluded between 
the Belgian Congo and the Banque du Congo Beige, which granted to the latter 
authorisation to issue banknotes.
The bank was authorised to issue notes in four branches in Congo. 
Banknotes issued were repayable on demand at their face value, in gold 
currencies of all countries or in gold and silver currencies of the Latin Monetary 
Union member countries, in compliance with Article 2 of the Treaty of 1865,
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oand solely at the place of issue or in Brussels. The issuing guarantee was 
provided by specific limitations imposed on the bank's transactions and a 
metallic cover equal to one-third of total notes issued. Moreover, the bank 
committed itself to managing the Colony's Cash and Treasury services under 
the provisions of a specific agreement.
The 7 July 1911 Agreement granted the Banque du Congo Beige an 
exclusive issuing right under the following conditions: (1) capital increase from 
F3 to F5 million of which 20 per cent to be paid-up; (2) opening of two 
additional branches, one in Boma and another in Stanleyville (now Kisangani); 
(3) re-definition of the bank's functions with reference to the limitations 
imposed by the agreement; (4) sharing of profits with the Colony on an equal 
basis after allocation of 5 per cent to the legal reserve and deduction of 6 per 
cent of paid-up capital to form a special reserves; (5) control of operations by a 
Government Commissioner; (6) commitment of the bank to provide the Colony 
with Cash and Treasury services on the basis of a special agreement of 7 July 
1911 (BCCBRU, 1957). As the issued banknotes were payable at sight and 
nominal value at their issuing branches, this obliged the latter to hold an 
equivalent amount of gold and silver reserves. Banknotes were repayable in the 
non-issuing branches at the current rate in force at the issuing branch plus a 
premium that could not exceed the cost of cash transport.
The total amount of banknotes in circulation and sight deposits, 
excluding those deposited by the Colonial Government, could not exceed three
8 The second paragraph of Article 2 the Treaty of 1865 of the Latin Monetary Union provided 
that the member countries were to admit coins from other member countries without distinction 
into their respective public treasuries, under the conditions defined in the first paragraph of the 
same article, in any one of the four States, with the reservation, however, that they exclude coins 
whose weight may have been reduced through wear by 0.5 per cent below the tolerance stated, or
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times the issued capital and reserves, unless it was fully hedged by gold and 
silver reserves. This particular provision was aimed at confining the 
interventions of the bank within the limits of its own resources. According to 
another provision of the agreement, one signature from an individual or legal 
entity was sufficient as guarantee for a Colonial Government loan transaction 
(BCCBRU, 1957). This entailed the risk of potential pressure on the bank to 
accept unlimited Treasury certificates issued by the Colonial Government, 
regardless of the provision limiting the amount of public funds issued or 
guaranteed by the Belgian or Colonial Government up to the level of the issued 
capital plus reserves (Martin, 1949).
Starting from 1911, beside metal currencies that simultaneously 
circulated in Belgium as well as in the Colony, Congo had its own banknotes 
guaranteed by a stock of gold and silver reserves distinct from the Belgian ones. 
Congolese banknotes were not legal tender in Belgium, and Belgian banknotes 
were not legal tender in the Colony. Furthermore, Congo was provided with 
other special copper fractional coins bearing the image of the Colony's emblem, 
issued in addition to similar coins minted by the Congo Free State (BCCBRU, 
1956). In 1912, the National Bank of Belgium commissioned the Berlin 
Reichsdruckrei, at the request of the Banque du Congo Beige, to print the 
Congo's first banknotes. Banknotes of CF20, 100 and 1,000 were printed in four 
colours and issued in October 1912 for an amount of CF10 million dispatched 
from Matadi (3.5 million), Kinshasa (2 million), Stanleyville (1.5 million) and 
Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi: 3 million). At the same time, CF25 million 
were issued in silver coins of the Latin Monetary Union, 3.5 million in nickel
whose devices may have disappeared (See: 1865 Latin Monetary Union Treaty in Willis, 1901: 
271).
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coins of 5, 10 and 20 centimes, and CF50,000 in copper coins of 1 and 2 
centimes (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960).
No major change was made to the 7 July 1911 agreement until 1914. 
However, following the outbreak of the First World War Belgium was occupied 
and consequently separated from its Colony, as already mentioned in a previous 
section of this chapter. As a result, the Belgian Congo established a new 
commercial relationship with Britain, which proved to be a profitable business 
partner interested in strategic raw materials, such as copper and rubber among 
other tropical products needed for military purposes. Such were the 
circumstances on the basis of which the Belgian Congo was associated with the 
Sterling Zone. It was also mentioned earlier that the Banque du Congo Beige, 
which became the Colony's only financial intermediary with the rest of the 
world, opened a head office in London to replace the Brussels headquarters 
(Wertz, 1952).
From an internal point of view a set of Decrees were issued to free the 
issuing house from a number of obligations, such as the abolition of banknotes 
convertibility, to ban the export of gold and silver, and impose banknotes as 
legal tender by a Decree of 6 September 1915. At the same time there was, in 
addition, a gradual withdrawal of coins that circulated both in Belgium and 
throughout Latin Monetary Union. As an outcome of the whole process the 
Congolese franc de facto gained its proper identity as an autonomous and 
specific means of payment (Moeller, 1938).
However, during the interwar period metropolitan Belgium implemented 
a policy aimed at tightening the dependency of the CF vis-a-vis the BF, whose 
weakness was systematically transferred to the Colonial currency, in
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contravention of the legal provisions set up to formally assert the latter 
currency's almost total autonomy. This policy started with the decision of 30 
June 1919 communicated by the Belgian Minister of Colonies to the Colonial 
Administration to pay at par BF1 for CF1 despite a premium of 20 per cent in 
favour of the Colonial currency in terms of the exchange rate against the 
Sterling, which resulted in a de facto devaluation of the CF. To justify this 
decision the metropolitan authorities underlined the fact that an exchange 
differential would negatively affect the flow of new Belgian investments in 
Congo. Parliamentary documents revealed that the Government was subject to 
pressure exerted by industrial and commercial interests established in the 
Colony, anxious to reduce the burden of their banking liabilities (Annales 
Parlementaires, 1920-1921).
Meanwhile the Congolese currency continued to be regulated by the 
provisions defined by the Latin Monetary Union until Belgium terminated its 
membership of the Union in 1926. As a consequence, gold and silver coins were 
withdrawn from circulation and replaced by notes and coins made of copper and 
nickel alloy issued by the Banque du Congo Beige, starting from 1920. From 
then on the Colonial currency became entirely fiat money while Belgian and 
Latin Monetary Union currencies ceased to circulate in the Colony (Wertz, 
1952).
Following a long-lasting depreciation process due to an excessive 
issuance of banknotes and a persistent trade deficit, the BF was sharply 
devaluated again on 25 October 1926 with a new parity fixed at 0.0418422 fine 
gold or 1/7 of the previous par rate of exchange (BCCBRU, November 1957). 
This marked the end of bimetallism, which was replaced by a gold
monometallist regime. At that time, there was a fairly widespread and growing 
opinion, as expressed in Belgium by Collet and Van de Ven (1925), in favour of 
Congolese monetary emancipation. According to this view, complete freedom 
of the Colonial currency vis-a-vis the metropolitan Franc was likely to 
consolidate the stability of the colonial Franc and improve the Colony's external 
standing. However, the view of those who favoured maintaining the Congolese 
currency's link to the BF prevailed. Consequently, the CF was devaluated by the 
same amount, at the same date (Wertz, 1952).
In this respect a new agreement was signed between the Colony and the 
Banque du Congo Beige on 10 October 1927. The appropriateness of the new 
agreement was justified by a significant economic expansion recorded in the 
Colony, which required a further adjustment of the major monetary provisions 
as the banking sector was expanding in line with the ascendant economic trend. 
At the time of the 1911 Agreement, apart from its headquarters in Brussels, the 
Bank had established five branches in Congo. Between 1911 and 1927 the 
number of the Bank's branches in the Colony rose from 5 to 29. The receivables 
that amounted to about CF3 million as at 30 June 1911 had climbed to more 
than CF320 million by 30 June 1927. As the first issue of notes took place in 
1912, the amount in circulation increased gradually from CF3.4 million at the 
end of June 1913 to CF5.2 million at the end of June 1914. It doubled, to CF11 
million, at the end of June 1918 and reached CF 107.5 million at the end of June 
1927. Between 1911 and 1927 the bank's share capital was increased from CF5 
million, of which 1 million paid up, to 20 million fully paid up, and sizeable 
reserves had been accumulated (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960).
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An analysis of the main legal provisions of the new agreement will help 
to explain the process that gradually led to the establishment of a monetary 
regulatory authority by the early 1950s with the creation of a genuine central 
bank. The main reason for the new agreement was the restoration of the 
convertibility of notes. The major issues that were revised, as mentioned in the 
report on the Conseil Colonial's sessions of 20 October and 5 November 1927 
(Bulletin Officiel du Congo Beige, 1927, pp. 3088-3095) were the following: (1) 
the new agreement applicable to the Colony and mandated territories; (2) 
authorisation of the Minister of Colonies as a prerequisite for the creation of 
new branches outside the Colony; (3) a clearer definition of operations the Bank 
was allowed to conduct; (4) same legal conditions as those applicable to the 
National Bank of Belgium for the redemption of notes; (5) same exchange rate 
in all branches of the Bank (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960). Moreover, the 
Bank was no longer allowed to hold financial claims payable by the Colonial 
Treasury beyond strictly defined limits. Furthermore, it was required to hold in 
gold and gold currencies an amount equal at least to 40 per cent of its notes in 
circulation, provided that all other liabilities at sight were hedged by receivables 
easily realisable. Half of the gold and gold currencies reserves were to be in gold 
(Rousseaux, 1966).
The 1927 Agreement provided a new definition of the CF in gold, equal 
to one-fifth of a belga, a name given to a new Belgian monetary unit, equivalent 
to BF5. As a result, the CF was given parity of exchange with the BF. The new 
agreement contained further provisions concerning the Bank's commitments 
vis-a-vis the Colony with regard to cash facilities, free cashier service, share of 
the Colony in the Bank's profits and reserves, the Colonial Government's
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permanent control of the Bank, in particular through the presence of a 
Commissioner appointed by the Colony and invested with extended powers. 
Article 2 of the Decree of 14 November 1927 stated that the authorisation, i.e. 
the exclusive issuing right, granted by the agreement of 10 October 1927 was 
valid until 30 June 1952. The Bank was allowed to seek a renewal of the 
authorisation, provided that the request had to be submitted 2 years before 
expiry date, so that it could be appraised, and a ruling on it given before 31 
December 1951 (Wertz, 1952).
While the agreement of 1911 established several issuing centres, the new 
one provided free circulation of banknotes throughout the entire Colony, 
regardless of their place of issuance as a significant step towards the 
establishment of a central and specific monetary institution as a unique 
regulatory authority. Moreover, this circulation was extended to the mandated 
territories that Belgium was entrusted with following the First World War, 
namely the former German colony of Ruanda-Urundi, as mentioned ealier in 
this section.9 As a result, the Banque du Congo Beige became the issuing house 
of both the Colony and Rwanda-Urundi. Whereas at the early beginning of the 
First World War a forced currency regime was established, the new agreement 
provided the return to the redemption of banknotes under the same conditions as 
those prescribed by law for the National Bank of Belgium (Preamble of the 
Decree of 14 November 1927).
As was the case previously, the liquidity of the Bank was secured by 
limiting the number of allowed transactions and setting up a special cover for 
the banknotes in circulation and other liabilities at sight. However, the list of
9 In the early 1960s this territory split up to form the two independent countries known as 
Rwanda and Burundi.
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transactions was revised in the light of sixteen years of experience. The new 
agreement provided that the Bank should continue to operate as Cashier of the 
Colony. The service was to be provided free of charge and through a larger 
number of branches. The colonial Treasury continued to receive 50 per cent of 
the Bank's profits after allocation of a dividend representing 6 per cent of the 
paid-up capital. The rights of the Colony over the reserves of the Bank were 
clarified (Rousseaux, 1966).
The term of the exclusive issuing right granted to the bank by the 
agreement of 1911, which was due to expire on 18 July 1936, was extended 
until 30 June 1952 (Wertz, 1952). The major changes introduced in the new 
agreement are analysed below. Firstly, in order to limit the amount of the 
Bank's liabilities covered by the Colony, and to protect the Bank from too great 
a burden of public liabilities, the new agreement stipulated that the Bank's total 
investment in securities issued or guaranteed by the Colony could not exceed its 
share capital and reserves. In addition, apart from those investments, the Bank 
could not possess receivables payable by the Colonial Treasury in excess of an 
amount to be specified (Preamble to the Decree of 14 November 1927).
The Banque du Congo Beige was required to provide currencies that 
were legal tender in the Colony, i.e. either gold, or cheques payable in towns 
specifically designated by the Ministry of Colonies. These provisions were 
aimed at ensuring the stability of the colonial currency that was necessary in 
order to support the constant flow of capital and steady export surpluses that had 
been experienced for many years. The Bank was required to hold cash resources 
in various type of assets for exchange purposes, in the proportion of 40 per cent
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of the value of banknotes in circulation, to ensure that any very large 
reimbursement demand could be met.
To ensure that these cash resources retained a constant value, and that 
the Bank maintained optimal liquidity, the agreement provided that they should 
consist of gold for at least 20 per cent, while the balance would be composed of 
gold foreign currencies. Furthermore, to reinforce the provisions intended to 
limit the Bank's assets invested in public securities, the agreement stressed that 
the amount of notes and other liabilities not covered by cash resources in gold 
and gold currencies, should be hedged by receivables easily convertible into 
cash (BCCBRU, 1957).
The link established between the two currencies was so close that the CF 
followed the fate of the metropolitan currency when the BF was devaluated for a 
second time in 1935, as a result of the 1929 crisis and the subsequent Belgian 
banking turmoil. In this respect a Decree of 1 April of the same year authorised 
the Banque du Congo Beige to exchange at par BF1 for CF1. A new agreement 
signed on 21 June 1935 between the Colony and the Banque du Congo Beige, 
and approved by a Decree of 27 July of the same year, fixed a new parity for 
CF1 at 0.0301264 fine gold gram, the same as for BF1 (Wertz, 1952).
The Decree of 27 July 1935 comprised major changes in the monetary 
organisation of the Colony. Firstly, the gold exchange regime introduced in 
1927 was extended and clarified. Namely, the Bank was required not only to 
hold gold reserves and gold foreign currencies but also to convert paper money 
into foreign currencies negotiable in Belgium and abroad. According to the 
Decree of 27 July 1935 the bank was authorised to issue not only bearer notes 
but also metallic currencies payable at sight. Furthermore, starting from 1
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October 1935, the Bank committed itself to reimbursing metallic currencies 
issued by the Colony. As a result, the obligation to cover its issued notes with 
gold and gold currencies was extended to these metal fiduciary currencies 
(Wertz, 1952). The years preceding the Second World War were marked by the 
relative stability of the CF evolving under the gold exchange standard. The 
Colony and the metropolitan territory resumed their specific economic 
partnership, as illustrated by the development of Belgian private investments as 
well as significant public interest shown by the Belgian authorities (BCCBRU, 
1957).
The German occupation of Belgium in 1940 resulted in another 
disruption of the special links between Congo and metropolitan Belgium. 
However, contrary to the situation of the First World War analysed in section 
4.3, provisions were set up to enhance solidarity between the BF and the CF. In 
this respect an agreement was concluded between the United Kingdom, France 
and Belgium on 14 May 1940, which fixed an exchange rate of BF120 for 
GBP1, and BF68 for FF100. A Decree of 30 May of the same year fixed the 
same exchange rate for the CF. After the surrender of the Belgian army, the 
Banque de France decided to exchange BF1 for FF1, while the CF was given the 
same definition as the currency of the African French territories known as 
Afrique Equatoriale Fran9aise (AEF) (BCCBRU, 1957). The Belgian 
Government and, especially, colonists' industrial, commercial and financial 
interests received these provisions favourably as the devaluation they 
represented was perceived as a means of granting Congolese exports a 
considerable advantage and potential new outlets.
157
On the basis of an agreement of 7 June 1940 between France, the United 
Kingdom and Belgium, a Decree of 21 June of the same year fixed the new 
exchange rate at BF 176.625 for GBP1, and BF100 for FF100 (Wertz, 1952). 
However, by the end of 1940 the Belgian government-in-exile installed in 
London partially changed the agreement of 7 June 1940 by putting back the BF 
exchange rate to BF120 for GBP1, especially for the calculation of budget, 
salaries and pensions paid to Belgian officials based in London. In the meantime 
the Congolese currency remained at the exchange rate of CF176.625 for GBP1 
(Wertz, 1952). Furthermore, a number of measures were taken to preserve the 
Belgian Congo's foreign exchange reserves. In this respect the Banque du 
Congo Beige was exempted from the obligation of convertibility, exchange 
control was installed, a fixed exchange rate was imposed and restrictions on 
loans the Bank could make to the Government were abolished (BCCBRU, 
1957).
As during the First World War, most of the Congo's exports were 
directed to the United Kingdom, which resulted in another set of special links 
between the latter and Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. Belgium and the United 
Kingdom concluded an agreement for this purpose on 21 January 1941. The 
accord provided for the purchase of large volumes of Congolese products by the 
United Kingdom and the purchase of British Pounds by Congo for monetary and 
commercial gold in excess of its needs. Starting from September 1942 the 
United States became a member of this agreement, which was implemented but 
never signed for lack of an arrangement covering the possibility of Congo 
regaining its freedom of action after Belgium's liberation (Academic Royale des 
Sciences d'Outre-Mer, 1983).
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Following the liberation, there was the same lack of cohesion between 
Belgian and Congolese economies as that observed after the First World War, 
marked by hyperinflation in Belgium and stable and solid money in Congo, as 
the Colony had taken advantage of particularly favourable economic 
circumstances during the War period. One might expect that in view of the role 
played by the Congolese currency over that period, it was time for Congo to free 
itself once and for all from dependence on the BF. However, once again the 
metropolitan power decided to put an end to the autonomy that the Congolese 
currency had enjoyed during the war period (Zimmer, 1988).
On 5 October 1944 an agreement was concluded between Belgium and 
the United Kingdom to replace the 21 January 1941 agreement, which had made 
Congo and Ruanda-Urundi members of the Sterling Zone, and take them back 
into the Belgian monetary zone. The exchange rate of the Belgian currency was 
fixed at BF 176.625 for GBP1. No mention of the CF was made in the 
agreement, which clearly meant that the colonial currency was no longer 
different from the BF. To explain this state of affairs the Belgian Government 
claimed that the monetary freedom that Colonial Congo had enjoyed during the 
War was accidental, due to extraordinary circumstances (Wertz, 1952). As a 
matter of fact, it was in the interest of Belgium whose economy was weakened 
by a four-year War. Belgium was anxious to maintain a tight at-par link between 
the two currencies in order to avoid the cost that would affect capital flows 
between Belgium and Congo should a premium exist in favour of the Colonial 
currency over the BF.
On 26 December 1945 Belgium joined the Bretton Woods agreement 
and signed the related final Act in its own name and on behalf of its colonies
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and mandated territories, including, consequently, Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. 
On 18 December 1946, Belgium complied with the IMF clause regarding 
monetary parity by fixing a new par exchange rate of 0.2027675 fine gold grams 
for both one BF and one CF. A Decree of 19 June 1947 abrogated all previous 
provisions, such as currency gold definition, notes' inconvertibility and 
exchange rate of the CF vis-a-vis the Sterling (BCCBRU, 1957).
The same Decree instructed the issuing house to buy and sell gold and 
foreign currencies on the same exchange rate basis as the Banque Nationale de 
Belgique until a new gold definition of the CF was determined. This provision 
resulted in reinforcement of the Congolese currency's dependence on the 
metropolitan BF. Following the resurgence of debates on this issue a study 
carried out at the request of the Minister of Colonies concluded that the CF was 
not bound to follow, should the Belgian Franc be devalued. However, to 
maintain the principle of solidarity the study recommended that in case of a 
devaluation of the BF by 15 per cent or less, the CF should be equally devalued. 
On 21 September 1949, the Belgian Government declared to the IMF a new 
gold definition for the BF fixed at 0.0177734 fine gold for one BF, which 
represented another 12.34 per cent devaluation of the metropolitan currency. 
The CF was equally devalued at the same date (Wertz, 1953).
In the absence of convertibility this new gold definition was intended to 
ensure stability of the exchange rate of both the BF and the CF, as means of 
international payments. The Banque Nationale de Belgique fixed the price of 
gold and exchange rate of foreign currencies on the basis of the gold definition 
declared to the IMF. The BCCBRU established its exchange rate on the basis of 
the exchange rate in use in Belgium. A Decree of 17 February 1950 instructed
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the Banque du Congo Beige to revalue its gold reserves at the same rate as the 
Banque Nationale de Belgique, as prescribed by a Belgian law of 10 August 
1950 (BCCBRU, 1957).
4.7. The Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du Ruanda-Urundi 
(BCCBRU) as a Monetary Authority
The monetary history of Colonial Congo relating to the period starting in 1950 
was marked by three major events, namely, (1) operational start-up of the 
Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du Ruanda-Urumdi, (2) revision of 
exchange control regulations and (3) decision on a legal gold definition of the 
Congolese monetary unit. The analysis carried out in the following sections will 
show that it was only from the 1950s that a genuine and complete monetary 
system started to be established in Congo, with a Decree of 30 July 1951, which 
determined the controlling and regulatory functions of the central bank.
Prior to the Decree of 16 November 1956, which established provisions 
regarding control of Congolese banking institutions, the central bank had no 
legal means of intervening in and adjusting the development of banking credit. 
Furthermore, in view of the highly liquid position of the Congolese banks, the 
central bank had no means of intervening as the lender of last resort. One of the 
fundamental requirements of this Decree with regard to the birth of a truly 
Congolese banking system, at least on a legal basis, was the obligation imposed 
on any firm willing to act as a banking institution in the Colony to form a 
Congolese limited liability company, thus subjected to Congolese laws. The 
analysis will also address a number of provisions aimed at authorising banking 
institutions to hold share capital in industrial and commercial companies, in 
order to compensate for the absence of capital markets in a colonial economy
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where it was vital to encourage and facilitate investments (See: Preamble to the 
Decree of 30 July 1951).
4.7.1. The Role of an Issuing House
The agreement of 1935 between the Colony and the Banque du Congo Beige 
was to expire on 30 June 1952. In view of the development of banking 
institutions over the previous decades, it became hardly conceivable that 
regulatory functions regarding monetary provisions could continue to be 
handled by a private bank, which would have to control and supervise other 
banks that were its competitors, and to exert exchange control functions over its 
own operations.
Moreover, monetary policy, which was becoming more than ever a 
means of economic policy, as well as implementation of the Congolese Ten-year 
Plan 1950-1959, required economic and financial institutional reforms. In the 
light of this, a Decree of 30 July 1951 authorised the foundation, under public 
law, of an institution called Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du Ruanda- 
Urundi (BCCBRU), intended to take over all the functions of the Banque du 
Congo Beige in its capacity as an issuing house, starting from 1 July 1952. As 
indicated by its name the new institution was created for both the Belgian 
Congo and the mandated territories known at that time as Ruanda-Urundi 
(BCCBRU, 1957).
The BCCBRU was assigned the typical functions of an issuing house 
and central bank in a modern economy, namely: issuance of notes, operations in 
discount, credit, capital markets and exchange regulation and control, as well as 
acting as State cashier and banker. In relation to the role of the Banque du
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Congo Beige as an issuing house, the Decree of 30 July 1951 authorising the 
creation of the BCCBRU introduced two major innovations.
Firstly the terms of the Bank's monetary policy were defined in relation 
to the potentially conflicting constraints of a development policy. That is to say, 
the Decree of 30 July 1951 mentioned earlier assigned to the Bank the double 
objective of maintaining monetary stability and yet ensuring economic growth. 
The issuance of bearer notes and metallic currencies was to be carried with these 
objectives in mind. In line with these provisions the Decree prescribed that 
paper money, coins and other liabilities at sight were to be hedged by easily 
realisable receivables. Furthermore, the Bank was required to hold a gold and 
possibly gold currency cash position. The proportion of cash to hold in gold and 
gold equivalent in relation to total liabilities was to be determined by Decree 
before 1 July 1952. This proportion, initially fixed at 25 per cent, was later 
raised to 33.3 per cent. These requirements were dictated with a view to 
enabling the Bank to mobilise a maximum of monetary resources for the 
economy without undermining monetary stability goals (Preamble of the Decree 
of 30 July 1951, published in the Bulletin Officiel du Congo Beige, 1951).
Secondly, the Bank was required to manage the control of: (a) banks and 
non-bank institutions in charge of financial and insurance operations, (b) 
issuance of public securities, and (c) foreign exchange. In fact, a Decree of 26 
March 1957 established the Bank's control of banking institutions operating in 
the Colony. Prior to that Decree, almost all the banks established in Congo had a 
head office in Belgium. Therefore, as mentioned earlier in section 4.5 of this 
chapter, they were de facto subject to the control of the Belgian Commission 
Bancaire, on the basis of an agreement concluded with the Minister of Colonies.
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By entrusting the BCCBRU with the control of banks the aim was to more 
efficiently take into account local considerations in the organisation of this 
control (Preamble to the Decree of 30 July 1951).
Although insurance companies were mentioned in the Decree of 30 July 
1951, the provisions of the Decree of 26 March 1957, and of any other Decree 
regarding control, did not concern them. Likewise, no regulation was ever 
issued in the Belgian Congo regarding insurance or the sale of public securities. 
It is clear, then, that the Central Bank was established as the banking system's 
regulatory authority, whereas the insurance sector was not subjected to any 
regulatory authority formally entrusted with a controlling function (BCCBRU, 
1957).
The measures decided in 1952, as referred to in this paragraph, did 
nothing to change the existing link between the metropolitan currency and the 
CF, which remained at par (Rousseaux, 1966). With regard to exchange control, 
the creation of the BCCBRU was the occasion for revising and co-ordinating 
foreign currencies transfer regulations, which were established in June 1940 and 
subsequently modified several times. This was achieved with a Decree of 12 
December 1952 on exchange control and external trade. Prior to this Decree, an 
Ordinance of 25 June 1952 had transferred to the BCCBRU all relevant 
activities carried out by the Banque du Congo Beige until then. Similarly, 
starting from 1 July 1952, as the BCCBRU replaced the Banque du Congo 
Beige, the Institut Belgo-Luxembourgeois du Change (IBLC) (Belgo- 
Luxemburg Institute of Exchange) accordingly amended all its directives related
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to operations with Congo (Bulletin Administratif et Commercial du Congo 
Beige, 1952). 10
The BCCBRU was entrusted with regulating and controlling foreign 
currency transfers. The new regulation was based on the principle that any 
transfer of goods and assets into and out of the territory of Congo and Ruanda- 
Urundi was subject to the Central Bank's authorisation and control. All foreign 
currencies received as export proceeds were to be totally or partially sold to the 
Central Bank at its request. Similarly, the use of such foreign currencies was 
subject to authorisation from the Central Bank. The effect of these provisions 
was that of a protective screen between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi on the 
one side, and the rest of the world, theoretically including Belgium, on the other 
(BCCBRU, 1957).
Nevertheless, since Congo and Ruanda-Urundi were members of the 
Belgian monetary zone, there was, in practice, free transfer between Belgium 
and the two territories within the limits defined by the regulations of the Union 
Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise (UEBL) (Belgo-Luxemburg Economic 
Union). 11 In this respect, in July 1952, the IBLC, issued a general licence
10 The IBLC was created by a Law of 6 October 1944 with responsibility for controlling 
external payments of the Union Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise (UEBL), which was 
established in July of the same year. In this respect it was responsible for collecting and 
analysing data used for drawing up the balance of payments of the UEBL as a whole and a 
separate balance of payments for each State member. The Banque Nationale de Belgique was 
entrusted with the day-to-day management of the IBLC. The IBLC was in charge of 
implementing legal and regulatory provisions with regard to exchange control during the period 
when such provisions were in force, which they have not been since the abolition of the dual 
exchange rate on 5 March 1990 (See: Banque Nationale de Belgique, 2002).
11 An agreement of 25 July 1921 created the UEBL, whose role was to form an economic union 
between Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, based on a customs union with a 
common customs tariff, common measures of quantitative restrictions, and a monetary 
association. Following the signing of the BENELUX and EEC Treaties, the customs union issue 
became of less interest. The main features of the monetary association were as follows: (1) a 
single central bank, namely the Banque Nationale de Belgique (National Bank of Belgium), (2) 
unified balance of payments, (3) a preferred currency, i.e. the Belgian Franc, and (4) common 
legislation with regard to exchange control. The latter was entrusted to the Institut Belgo- 
Luxembourgeois du Change, IBLC, created in 1944. BENELUX, an acronym derived from the
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authorising the BCCBRU, Banque du Congo Beige (BCB), Banque Beige 
d'Afrique (BBA), and Banque Commerciale du Congo (BCC) to make transfers 
from BF into CF for payments relating to the following: (1) goods imported 
from the Colony, (2) services supplied by the Colony to the UEBL, (3) 
dividends, interest and other revenues to the UEBL, (4) travel expenditure and 
maintenance costs, (5) economic investments, and (6) loan repayments. 
Transfers relating to these payments were subject to authorisation by the 
BCCBRU as a prerequisite (Bulletin Administratif et Commercial du Congo 
Beige, 1952).
The third event that marked the development of Congo's monetary 
history in the early 1950s was the setting of a new gold parity for the Congolese 
monetary unit. The last time the gold parity of the CF was fixed was by the 
Decree of 27 July 1935, which set it at 0.0301264 fine gold grams, following a 
devaluation of the BF. In 1940, as a result of the Second World War, the 
convertibility of both the BF and the CF that had been established in 1927 was 
suspended (Wertz, 1952).
A Decree of 25 October 1956, which modified a Decree of 10 February 
1953 regulating the conditions for the acquisition of gold and foreign exchange 
currencies in Congo, established a new gold parity for the CF at 0.01947824 
gold grams at 0.900 fineness. This new parity served from then to determine the 
exchange rate that the BCCBRU used as a basis for its transactions in foreign 
currencies. In this process the link between the two currencies was maintained,
names of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg, started as a monetary and customs union 
agreement concluded in London in 1943 and 1944 between Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The agreement was revised in 1958 to become an economic union 
(Van Meerhaeghe, 1987).
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as both the BF and CF were defined on the same basis of gold weight and 
fineness (BCCBRU, 1957).
4.7.2. The BCCBRU as a Controlling Authority
For a long time up to the 1950s, the only monetary instrument used in Congo to 
regulate the supply of money was the fixing of interest rates. However, given 
the abundant liquidity in the Congolese economy, which was essentially 
provided by external trade, banks operating in Congo seldom needed to borrow 
money from the central bank in order to carry out their credit operations. In such 
a context the use of interest rates as a monetary instrument could hardly 
influence the volume of money supply and demand. Nonetheless, as the volume 
of bank credit was growing in line with the colony's economic development, the 
law of 1951 creating the BCCBRU provided that the latter, being responsible for 
monetary policy, should also be in charge of banking control (Preamble of the 
Decree of 26 March 1957).
To justify the introduction of banking supervision the following 
considerations were put forward. Firstly, the management of banks operating in 
Congo had been regarded so far as cautious. Nevertheless, it was time to prepare 
for an increase in the local population's income in the foreseeable future, which 
was likely to result in a larger volume of bank deposits. In this respect, prior to 
introduction of banking control regulations i.e. in the absence of legal 
constraints, the Governor of the BCCBRU, right from this institution's creation, 
began to strongly recommend that banks be more selective and cautious in their 
credit operations. These recommendations were justified by an expansion of the
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volume of credit, as well as an increasing number of borrowers (Preamble of the 
Decree of 26 March 1957).
On the other hand, with an economy largely dependent on the export of 
raw materials, Congo was likely to remain for a long time subject to the 
instability linked to the conditions of external trade. Furthermore, Table 4.3 
shows that at the end of 1954, a year taken as an example, banknote and coin 
circulation in Congo amounted to CF4.8 billion for CF12.8 billion bank 
deposits, while banknote and coin circulation in Belgium amounted to BF 108.1 
billion for BF70 billion bank deposits. With regard to bank money circulation 
(up to 30 days bank deposits), it represented 44.9 per cent of the banknote and 
coin circulation in Belgium, and 196.3 per cent in Congo. The relative 
importance of bank money in the total money supply in Congo represented a 
potential source of credit, which constituted another justification for the setting 
up of banking control under the authority of the central bank.
Table 4.3. Proportion of bank money in circulation 
as at end 1954
Banknote & coin circulation 
Up to 30 days bank deposits 
More than 30 days bank deposits 
Total bank deposits
Total bank deposits/banknote & coin circulation 
Bank money circulation/banknote & coin circulation
Millions Francs
Belgium
108,066 
48,506 
21,498 
70,004
64.8% 
44.9%
Congo and 
Ruanda-Urundi
4,785 
9,395 
3,398 
12,793
267.4% 
196.3%
Source: Preamble to the Decree of 30 July 1951 on banking control 
in Bulletin de la BCCBRU, 1957
Moreover, the existing situation, under which Congolese banks 
established in the Colony by Belgian banks as Belgian-registered companies 
were submitted de facto to the Belgian Commission Bancaire, was about to
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come to an end.' This situation was not suitable for the Congolese banks, given 
that, despite a number of dispensations granted to them, they could not really 
comply with the constraints assigned to banks operating in an economic 
environment proper to a developed country, such as Belgium. At the same time, 
as Congolese banks created in the Colony by non-Belgian financial interests 
were not subject to the control of the Belgian Commission Bancaire, this 
resulted in a regime that discriminated between the two groups of banks. In the 
absence of a colonial authority in charge of banking control, Congolese banks 
created by Belgian financial interests agreed to be subject to the Belgian 
Commission Bancaire's control on a voluntary basis, as they could in a sense be 
regarded as an extension of the Belgian banking network (BCCBRU, 1957).
As from 1 May 1957, all banks operating in Congo and Ruanda-Urundi 
became subject to the control of the BCCBRU, whose role in broad terms 
covered matters such as registration of companies seeking authorisation to 
operate as banking institutions, reserve funds, immovable assets, financial 
shareholdings, credit limits, ministerial regulatory power, incompatibilities, in 
relation to, and to prevent possible conflicts of interest, and monitoring. 
Namely, registration by the Central bank was a prerequisite for an institution to 
be authorised to operate as a bank in Congo. A bank was defined as an
12 The Belgian Commission Bancaire was established by a Royal Decree of 9 July 1935 with the 
mission of controlling the compliance of banking institutions and financial intermediaries' 
activities with legal requirements set up following the 1930s financial and economic crisis. Prior 
to this most of the major banks were operating on a mixed basis combining banking and 
financial activities, which led them to use part of their sight deposits to finance long-term loans 
and even purchase capital shares in industrial and commercial companies. As a result many of 
these banks failed to meet the massive cash withdrawals triggered by the confidence crisis and 
growing distrust at that time of recession. To prevent the development of the distrust climate 
from worsening a Royal Decree of 22 August 1934 imposed the split of each mixed financial 
intermediary into two separate institutions, namely a deposit bank on one side, and a holding or 
investment company on the other. The role of the Commision Bancaire was, therefore, to make 
sure that each institution operates in compliance with the legal requirements of its statute 
(Vandeputte et al., 1981).
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institution created with the principal object of receiving deposits of funds 
repayable at sight or in less than two years, for its own use in banking 
operations, or credit or investment purposes (BCCBRU, 1957). In this respect, 
the institution was obliged to register as a Congolese limited company with a 
minimum capital of CF30 million. Furthermore, the regulations prescribed the 
establishment of an undistributable reserve fund, which would receive 5 per cent 
of the bank's annual net profit until it amounted to 10 per cent of the bank's 
subscribed capital. The reserve funds were to be invested in public securities 
issued by the Colony or by Ruanda-Urundi or in shares backed by their 
guarantee (Preamble of the Decree of 26 March 1957 on control of banking 
institutions, published in the Bulletin Officiel du Congo Beige, 1957).
Under the banking control regulations, banks were authorised to own 
premises for their operating activities and for employees' housing. They were 
authorised to hold shares in commercial or industrial companies amounting to 
not more than one-third of the bank's shareholder funds after deduction of 
undistributable reserve funds. However, this limitation was not applicable to 
shareholdings in banks or shares guaranteed by the Colony, Ruanda-Urundi or 
Belgium. Nor was it applicable to shares acquired in a bank or a company 
covered by a guarantee of the Colony, Ruanda-Urundi or Belgium, or to shares 
in a credit institution created or regulated by a special Congolese or Belgian law. 
In the absence of a formal financial market and stock exchange, these provisions 
were especially intended to promote the creation of new companies in various 
sectors as required for the development of the Congolese economy (Decree of 
26 March 1957 on control of banking institutions, published in the Bulletin 
Officiel du Congo Beige, 1957).
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The total of fixed assets in the form of property could not exceed the 
amount of shareholders' funds after deduction of undistributable reserve funds. 
The total credit of more than six months' duration a bank was authorised to 
grant a company in which it held shares could not exceed 25 per cent of the 
company's shareholder funds, or 10 per cent of the bank's shareholder funds. At 
the suggestion of the Conseil de Regence of the Central Bank, the Minister of 
Congo and Ruanda-Urundi was responsible for determining certain ratios and 
operating rates, relating to different categories of assets and liabilities and 
banking activities respectively (Decree of 26 March 1957 on control of banking 
institutions).
The regulations regarding banking control prevented members of the 
managing body of a bank from undertaking management functions in a 
company in which the bank held an interest or to which it granted credit for 
more than 6 months' duration, except in the case of another bank, mortgage 
company, insurance company or savings institution. The aim of this interdict 
was to prevent a bank from taking decisions under the influence or pressure of 
its own interests in a business, regardless of whether the regulatory requirements 
were met by the business in question. And lastly, banking operations were 
subject to monitoring by auditing commissioners registered by the Central Bank 
(Decree of 27 March 1957 on control of banking institutions).
In order to avoid an abrupt change in the structure and habits of banks, 
the implementation of the Decree of 26 March 1957 on banking control was 
carried out gradually, starting from 1 May 1957. For instance, the provision 
regulating the share of banking investment in fixed assets, share capital, and 
restrictions on credit of more than six months' duration to companies in which a
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bank had a shareholding, did not come into effect until 15 January 1958 
(Ministere des Affaires Africaines, 1958). 13
Furthermore, a number of other provisions came into force on 15 July 
1958, such as the following: (1) obligation for a bank to possess capital of at 
least CF30 million; (2) a bank was not allowed to grant loans or stand guarantor 
for loans in favour of anyone involved in the management of the bank and 
anyone in such a position was barred from guaranteeing a public issuance of 
securities carried out by the bank, without sufficient collateral; (3) the 
possession or acquisition by a bank of its own shares was barred; (4) situation of 
incompatibility regarding persons responsible for the day-to-day management of 
a bank and to members of the auditing body of the bank (Decree of 26 March 
1957).
Prior to the introduction of banking control, Congolese banks had 
already agreed to submit to the Central Bank monthly financial statements 
compiled according to the same statutory model as in Belgium. However, banks 
were required to present two separate series of statements, one regarding the 
operations and activities of the bank as a whole, and another relating to the 
operations and activities of the bank in Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. Furthermore, 
the auditors were required to make sure that all banks complied with the 
statutory requirements regarding the layout, classification and standardisation of 
the items to be disclosed in the financial statements. This harmonisation enabled 
the Central Bank to track the financial position of banks on the basis of 
standardised criteria and to start publishing banks' financial statements, as 
prescribed by the Decree. The banks' first consolidated financial statements,
13 In the lead-up to independence, especially following the political developments in Congo 
starting from 1957-58, the metropolitan Ministere des Colonies (Ministry of Colonies) changed
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relating to their position as at 31 December 1957, were published in the Bulletin 
Officiel du Congo Beige on 15 April 1958 (Ministere des Affaires Africaines, 
1958).
It emerges from the analysis carried out in this chapter that the function 
and objective of the Central Bank during the colonial era steadily evolved over 
time from a passive role of issuing paper and metallic fiduciary currencies to a 
more active involvement in the implementation of monetary and economic 
policy. In the end the Central Bank assumed the function of regulation and 
control within the framework of its articles of association. The aim of the 
Central Bank's mandate was to achieve monetary stability and economic 
development. As a means of achieving its goals, the Bank was to adopt an 
appropriate credit and exchange policy. To what extent this was successful is 
assessed in the next section, in particular by tracing changes in the focus of 
attention of banking institutions and through an analysis of the development of 
money circulation.
4.8. Structure of Money Circulation 
4.8.1. General Evolution of Banking Activities
Section 4.8 looks at the role of banking institutions as a means of disseminating 
the use of modern money in Congo. The analysis focuses on the developments 
of deposits, and the structure of money circulation over the colonial period 
divided into three phases. The definition of these phases is based on a number of 
studies carried out on the topic by scholars, such as Martin (1952), and by 
banking institutions, such as the Banque Nationale de Belgique (1952).
its name to Ministere des Affaires Africaines (Ministry of African Affairs).
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The first phase runs from the annexation of Congo as a Belgian Colony 
(November 1908) to the late 1930s. Before the Second World War, the economy 
of Congo was almost exclusively export-oriented and strongly import- 
dependent, with the majority of trade flowing between the metropolitan State 
and the Colony. As a result, banking activities mainly consisted of transactions 
with foreign countries and particularly with Belgium. Furthermore, while 
actually operating in Congo, large Congolese companies conducted their 
financial management from Belgium as they were generally considered mere 
subsidiaries of metropolitan holding companies. As a consequence, a large 
amount of their cash flow generated in the Colony was drained off into the 
metropolitan territory. Banking institutions operating in Congo therefore 
complied with this situation. On the one hand, they took a leadership position in 
financing Congolese international trade, especially transactions with Belgium. 
In this respect, in accordance with the nature of their resources, they 
concentrated a large proportion of their investment in financial assets on the 
Belgian market (BCCBRU, 1957).
On the other hand, in Europe, the period between 1910 and the late 
1930s was characterised by a free exchange regime, which favoured a large 
circulation of liquid assets and capital, and the convertibility of most of the 
major foreign currencies allowed constant exchange arbitrage. With reference to 
these conditions, Congo, as a result of its embryonic financial structures, could 
not offer industrial and commercial companies or banks competitive 
opportunities to invest their cash and liquid assets surpluses, compared with the 
yields and security offered by international markets (BCCBRU, 1957).
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The second phase commences with the Second World War and lasts 
until the creation of the BCCBRU in 1951. The War dramatically changed the 
situation in Congo as a result of the isolation that followed the separation 
between Belgium and Congo. This separation lasted beyond the four-year war 
period and helped to promote the autonomous development of companies 
operating in Africa. The substantial effort made by the Congolese economy 
during the War in order to survive and, at the same time, assist Allies, boosted 
its expansion with an impetus that continued to produce effects for a long time. 
This expansion affected banking institutions operating in Congo as the 
development of their local branches centred their activities on the Congolese 
internal economy more than before the War (BCCBRU, 1957).
As an increasing volume of resources was required to support the 
Colony's economic expansion, companies established in Congo began to retain 
in Congo their locally generated cash flows. This gave rise to an increasing 
amount of savings deposited by economic agents in Congolese banks, which 
consequently had more opportunities to finance the fast-growing needs of the 
Congolese economy. Furthermore, the exchange control imposed since the very 
start of the Second World War helped to increase the concentration of monetary 
resources in Congolese banks (BCCBRU, 1957).
Exchange control regulations stipulated that all Congolese residents had 
to transfer back to Congo any foreign currency earned from international trade, 
and to keep it in Congolese banks (Martin, 1952). External payments for 
imported goods and services and any external transfer in foreign currency had to 
be authorised by the Banque du Congo Beige, in its capacity as a central bank, 
and depository of foreign exchange reserves. As the exchange control was
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maintained after the Second World War, the upward trend that had started 
during the conflict period continued and grew in line with the expansion of the 
internal market, which was supported by a growing local industry. As a result, a 
large number of Congolese companies started to increase their cash position in 
their bank accounts in Congo. This change in the management of companies' 
liquid assets can be seen, at least formally, as the starting point of a slow shift of 
the centre of gravity of activities from outside, essentially from Belgium, 
towards the Colony. These steps forward were accompanied by an extension of 
the banking network and changes in banks' memorandum and articles of 
association, as for the first time they renounced their status as Belgian limited 
companies to become Congolese limited companies (Martin, 1952).
The third phase runs from the creation of the BCCBRU in 1951 to 1960, 
the year of Congo's independence. Section 4.6 mentioned a turning point that 
occurred in 1951/52 in the structure of the Congolese banking system with the 
creation of the BCCBRU by a Decree of 30 July 1951. It also addressed the 
devolvement of the exclusive issuing right, exercised until then by the Banque 
du Congo Beige, to the BCCBRU. The BCCBRU was entrusted by a Decree of 
30 July 1951, which was analysed in section 4.7, with the essential functions of 
a genuine central bank, including that of organising banking control in Congo.
In compliance with a decision of the Conseil Colonial, the provisions 
defining the legal status of banks and terms of their control were to come into 
force on 1 May 1957. However, as mentioned earlier, prior to this deadline, 
some banks operating in Congo, especially those which had started as Belgian 
companies and then changed into Congolese limited companies, had already
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consented, on the basis of an unofficial agreement, to place themselves under 
the control of the Belgian Commission Bancaire (BCCBRU, 1957).
4.8.2. Money Supply
Two major tendencies marked the overall evolution of bank deposits in Congo. 
For a long time, apart from local public services and enterprises, the clientele of 
banks exclusively comprised foreign customers, namely colonists, farmers, 
traders, industrialists, manufacturers, and various private businesses of different 
sizes owned by foreigners, most of them Belgian. The first tendency observed 
was that depositors preferred to deposit their funds in metropolitan banks, as 
these had relatively lower overheads and obtained higher yields on invested 
assets, and could, therefore, pay a higher interest on fixed-term deposits. 
Moreover, for many customers, bank deposits represented export receipt 
surpluses, a large proportion of which was intended for financing imports to 
Congo. This proportion was kept abroad in the form of deposits in order to 
avoid double transfer costs. As a result, only a small proportion of those 
resources were transferred to the Colony, for the purpose of meeting local cash 
needs (BCCBRU, 1957).
On the other hand, although the CF was at parity with the BF, the 
provisions governing the monetary and financial relationship between the two 
countries were formally similar to those between Congo and any other country, 
at least in theory. As a consequence, trade relations between Belgium and 
Congo were subject to the same exchange control as those between Congo and 
other countries. Nevertheless, the Congolese Central Bank tended to be more 
concerned with capital inflows from Belgium into Congo than by the capital
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outflows from Congo to Belgium. There were two main reasons for this. First, 
the Congolese Central Bank was anxious to prevent a massive flow of capital 
into Congo, which would have undermined monetary stability (Bezy, 1957). 
Second, until the middle of the 1950s, no restriction was imposed on the flow of 
capital from Congo to Belgium. Exporting companies were authorised to hold 
accounts in local banks, in external foreign currencies a portion of the foreign 
currencies they had received from exports. Starting from 1955, the prospect of 
major political changes in the Colony's status triggered a dramatic increase in 
the proportion of foreign currencies retained abroad, which became a source of 
concern for the BCCBRU.
In order to discourage increasing capital outflows, the Central Bank 
made it clear that it was unlikely to conclude an agreement with the 
metropolitan monetary and financial authorities to allow relevant transfer of 
funds, should foreign currency account-holders wish to rapidly exchange large 
amounts of their foreign currencies held abroad for CF. As the beginning of the 
Korean War (1950-1953) gave rise to fears of a third World War, capital 
outflows from Congo declined. However, this restraint ceased in 1952 as, 
starting from that year, high profits from short-term investments in Belgium 
encouraged an increasing capital outflow from the Colony (BCCBRU, 1957).
In the early stage of banking activities in Congo, bank deposits were 
held more as a means of liquidity requirement for cash payment rather than as a 
means of payment by cheque or transfer. As a result, the velocity of bank money 
circulation remained rather low for a long time. Bank deposit figures shown in 
Table 4.4 should, therefore, be viewed with caution for a number of reasons. 
First, due to the large proportion of liquid assets that companies operating in
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Congo used to invest outside the Colony, as mentioned earlier, bank deposits 
held in Congolese banks could not be considered representative of the 
Congolese economy's liquidity as a whole.
Second, before 1945, figures for bank deposits were derived from 
balance sheets of banks operating in Congo, which used to record under the 
same heading deposits in various currencies, such as CF and BF, from accounts 
held in Congo, in Belgium or in other foreign countries. The third reason for 
caution when referring to Table 4.4 is that because of the lack of information, it 
was not possible to include in the statistics bank deposits received in Congo by 
branches of foreign banks, such as Standard Bank of South Africa or Banco 
Nacional Ultramarino. Lastly, there is also the fact that the estimate of annual 
bank deposits was calculated on the basis of balance sheets stated at different 
dates was likely to distort the representative nature of the figures (BCCBRU, 
1957).
Despite these reservations, Table 4.4 shows a rapid growth of bank 
deposits over two periods. The first period, running from 1910 to the end of the 
First World War (1918), was the era of the establishment of the banking 
network. In the absence of data relating to the period between 1915 and 1918 it 
is worth pointing out, however, that from a figure of CF20 million in 1914, total 
bank deposits and paper currency amounted to CF69 million in 1919, showing 
an increase of 245 per cent.
Bank deposits climbed from CF11 million in 1914 to CF52 million in 
1919, recording a rise of 373 per cent, much higher than the increase of 133 per 
cent in paper currency that rose from CF9 million in 1914 to CF17 million in 
1919 (BCCBRU, 1957).
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Table 4.4: Bank deposits and Banknotes and coins 
(in millions CF)
Year
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
Bank
deposits
1
5
8
12
11
52
125
117
115
119
157
250
344
637
729
858
886
907
857
912
806
765
694
862
745
773
1,090
2,449
4,261
6,701
9,509
9,577
9,621
10,717
12,141
11,104
15,696
20,457
banknotes
& coins
3
4
4!
7
9
IT1
45
45
62
86
114
164
243
295
343
377
344
288
238
233
234
252
306
387
396
410
457
609
875
1,151
1,401
1,525
1,610
1,844
2,168
2,422
2,912
3,838
Post Office
cheque 
deposits
-
-
-
-
-
-
25
15
10
11
11
11
14
20
21
22
26
37
58
84
111
130
146
120
132
171
212
745
Tota
4
9
12
19
20
69
170
162
177
205
271
414
587
932
1,072
1,235
1,255
,210
,105
,156
,051
,028
,014
1,269
1,162
1,205
1,573
3,095
5,194
7,936
11,021
11,232
11,377
12,681
14,441
13,697
18,820
25,040
Deposits
25
56
67
63
55
75
74
72
65
58
58
60
59
68
68
69
71
75
78
79
77
74
68
68
64
64
69
79
82
84
86
85
85
85
84
81
83
82
Share i
Pape 
currency
75
44
33
37
45
25
26
28
35
42
42
40
41
32
32
31
27
24
22
20
22
25
30
30
34
34
29
20
17
15
13
14
14
15
15
18
15
15
n the total %
Post Off. 
ch. deposits
-
-
-
-
.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
Source: BCCBRU, 1957
Trade and financial benefits that Congo gained from the war economy, 
as mentioned earlier, explain the dramatic expansion of bank deposits. At the 
same time, the development of paper currency, though of lesser importance, 
indicates a gradual monetisation of the economy as a whole, including an
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expanding use of modern money as traditional communities gradually began to 
be involved in the Colony's economy.
The second period covers the interwar era during which the banking 
network expanded from 1920 to 1929 and then declined from 1930 to 1939, as 
demonstrated by the fall in the number of branches and volume of deposits, due 
to the worldwide economic recession of the 1930s. A third period can be 
observed starting from the Second World War years, during which bank 
deposits recorded rapid growth from 1940 to 1945, as a reflection of trade and 
financial profits and general prosperity achieved in the context of the Second 
World War. They recorded relative stabilisation between 1945 and 1949, 
probably due to a temporary decline in performance as an effect of the change of 
management in major companies between 1945 and 1946, and expanded again 
from 1949 to 1951 (BCCBRU, 1957).
Moreover, a decline in the relative importance of paper currency 
circulation is observable over the period under examination. This development 
suggests at first sight a significant change in the means of settling payments and 
the structure of the monetary economy. However, while banknote and coin 
circulation declined more (27 per cent) between 1930 and 1935 than bank 
deposits (14 per cent), after that period, as indicated in Figure 4.1, its growth 
proved to be more regular than that of bank deposits.
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Figure 4.1. Bank deposits and banknote and coin circulation
Source: compiled by the author, based on BCCBRU, 7957
Bank deposits recorded a small decrease in 1937-38 and in 1949, 
following a slight economic recession that occurred at those two points in time. 
Paper currency circulation continued to increase as a result of wider 
monetisation of local communities' economy with a growing use of banknotes 
and coins by the local population. (BCCBRU, 1957). 
Table 4.5. Distribution of money supply (in million CF)
Joint-stock companies
Public Treasury
Public enterprises and Administration
Local households and businesses
Other households and enterprises
1953
7,534
5,205
582
3,481
2,760
19,562
%
39
27
3
18
14
100
1954
7,934
5,687
545
4,219
3,029
21,414
%
37
27
3
20
14
100
1955
7,395
6,947
956
4,269
2,622
22,189
%
33
31
4
19
12
100
Source: BCCBRU, 1957
Further analysis of the money supply shows the share held by each of the 
major components of the Colony's economy, namely, joint-stock companies, 
Public Treasury, local individuals and businesses, and other individuals and
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companies. In the middle of the 1950s, the distribution was as shown in Table
4.5. 14
4.9. Colonial Portfolio, Colonial Debt 
and the Ten-year Plan 1950-1959
4.9.1. Colonial Portfolio
At the prospect of the Domaine de la Couronne's abolition within the 
framework of Congo's annexation as a Belgian Colony, King Leopold II made a 
final attempt, as mentioned in Chapter three, to maintain control over a number 
of assets acquired in Congo or with Congolese resources. For this purpose he 
created the Niederfullbach Foundation on 9 September 1907, a German entity to 
which he allotted shares from his Congolese investments valued BF45 million, 
combined with assets acquired from the German descendants of the Belgian 
royal family. The official objective of the Foundation was a BF26 million 
programme of 'works aimed at improving a number of sites in Belgium and 
providing the maintenance of royal properties in France' (Heenen, 1944: 286)
After the death of the King, further investigations carried out by the Belgian 
Government and Parliament revealed that most of the Foundation's assets 
belonged to or came from the Congo Free State or the Domaine de la Couronne. 
On the basis of an agreement of 28 January 1911, Leopold IPs heirs renounced, 
in favour of the Belgian State, for compensation of BF1.1 million capital, all 
claims on assets the Foundation had received from the Congo Free State or from
14 The category of 'local households and businesses' comprised native Congolese and non- 
Congolese African individuals and their businesses, while the group of 'other individuals and 
companies' was formed by European and non-African individuals and their businesses other 
than joint-stock or public limited companies.
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elsewhere, provided that the agreement did not concern any of the 
Niederfulbach assets regarded as part of the royal inheritance (Heenen, 1955)
In general, the counterpart of the public debt is all the economic institutions 
and elements known as a State's assets. The unusual feature of the Belgian 
Congo's healthy financial situation was that in addition to the traditional assets 
held by a State, the Colony possessed a considerable less traditional portfolio of 
large assets. This portfolio included properties and shares acquired from the 
King Leopold II inheritance and the Niederfulbach Foundation, as well as shares 
and rights transferred to the Colony by the former Congo Free State, including 
the Domaine de la Couronne, in exchange for concessions granted for the 
exploitation of Congolese resources. The stakes and rights received that way 
varied in their proportions and could amount to up to 50 per cent in the case of 
concessionary companies (Heenen, 1955).
The ownership of such a considerable portfolio provided the Colony with 
significant means of controlling the territory's economic development. 
Furthermore it increased the Colony's credibility with regard to the need for 
borrowed funds. In 1925, whereas the public debt amounted to BF750 million 
the value of the colonial portfolio amounted to about BF1.2 billion at the lowest 
estimate (Louwers, 1925).
As mentioned in Chapter three, the Colony's portfolio was largely a result of 
the investment policy implemented by King Leopold II, who made the State 
directly involved in the exploitation of natural resources of Congo. The Colony 
adopted and continued to apply this policy. After the Second World War, the 
Colony's portfolio included additional shares acquired in a number of newly 
created companies. Among these were companies in the banking sector and
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other financial institutions, such as the BCCBRU, Societe de Credit au Colonat 
et a 1'Industrie. The Colony took shares in the property development sector, 
through the Office des Cites Africaines, and in semi-public companies for water 
and electricity supply, through Societe Force de 1'Est du Bas-Congo, and 
Regideso (Wertz, 1952).
Furthermore, the portfolio included a large acquisition of interest in the 
borrowings of local authorities that did not have access to capital markets, such 
as towns, co-operatives created and owned by local people, and non-traditional 
urban centres (centres extra-coutumiers) intended for the development of houses 
for local people. A Decree of 7 November 1927 published in the Moniteur Beige 
established a Portfolio Committee (Comite du Portefeuille) with the role of 
assisting the Minister of Colonies in the management of the Portfolio (Wertz, 
1952).
Table 4.6: Structure of portfolio at the end of 1951 
_____(in 'OOP CF)__________
Railways and transport companies
Mining companies
Commerce, industry, agriculture
Public Authorities loans
Financial interests
Others
TOTAL
4,887,704
675,361
1,151,612
278,200
4,962,800
2,282
11,957,959
Source: Source: Wertz (1952)
Figure 4.2: Structure of portfolio as at the end of 1951
41.5% 40.9%
2.3% 9.6%
Source: compiled by the author, based on Wertz (1952)
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From a valuation carried out in the early 1950s and reported by Wertz 
(1952), it emerged that the colonial portfolio was worth about CF12 billion, as 
shown in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2. The benefits of the portfolio can be assessed 
on three levels. Firstly, it enabled joint ventures between public and private 
interests to be managed with a high degree of efficiency and profitability, while 
at the same time taking into consideration the requirements and expectations of 
the public general interest (Wertz, 1952). Secondly, it enabled the Colony to 
monitor the development of colonial interests, in line with the financial policy 
initiated by King Leopold II. Management of the portfolio enabled the 
authorities to control the exploitation of the Colony's resources and the 
activities of concessionary companies within reasonable boundaries that 
combined the principles of a free-market-oriented economy and a tendency 
towards a managed economy (Heenen, 1955).
Table 4.7: Portfolio revenue, 1940-1950 (in 'OOP CF)
Cash flow 
Year
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
Reimbursement
13,063
2,171
1,452
1,520
3,306
73,430
104,517
1,429
3,348
1,893
2,099
5,725
Revenue
109,688
134,172
127,216
114,205
112,820
103,581
144,831
152,893
146,818
235,961
276,432
339,066
Total
122,751
136,343
128,668
115,725
116,126
177,011
249,348
154,322
150,166
237,854
278,531
344,791
Source: Wertz, 1952
Thirdly, the portfolio provided the Colony with earnings that represented 
a significant contribution to the Colonial budgets. For the period 1940-1951, 
taken as an example, the colonial operating budget (budget ordinaire}, evolved 
as shown in Table 4.7. In 1951 portfolio revenue represented 6.7 per cent of
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total ordinary revenue under the operating budget (Wertz, 1952). A further 
analysis of the figures relating to 1951, taken as an example, revealed that 
portfolio revenue for that year represented 6.7 per cent of the colonial operating 
budget for the same year. On the basis of the Congolese public debt of that time, 
portfolio revenues roughly covered the annual debt servicing cost. 
Figure 4.3: Structure of portfolio revenues in 1951
Source: compiled by the author, based on Wertz (1952)
As can be seen from Table 4.7 and Figure 4.3, in 1951 portfolio revenues 
amounted to CF339.1 million, including 230.1 million from financial interests, 
67.5 million from railways and transport companies, 27.8 million from the 
mining sector, 12.7 million from commerce, industry and agriculture, and about 
1 million from loans to local public authorities (Wertz, 1952). Moreover, as will 
be seen in the next section, the value of the portfolio as at 30 June 1952 was 
almost equivalent to the greater part of the public debt at the same date. As 
underlined earlier, this helped to strengthen the Colony's credit rating on the 
international financial markets where it sought loans to finance implementation 
of the Ten-year Plan 1950-1959 (Wertz, 1952).
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4.9.2. Colonial Debt
At the time of the annexation the entire debt of the former Congo Free State 
amounted to 235.4 million francs. On the one hand, the Transfer Treaty of 28 
November 1907 stipulated that Belgium was responsible for the debt contracted 
by the Congo Free State prior to the annexation in the event that Congo failed to 
repay the debt. On the other hand, article 1 of the Charte Coloniale stated, as 
already mentioned, that the cost of servicing the Colony's debt was to be borne 
by Congo. Eventually the stipulations of the Charte Coloniale prevailed and, 
regardless of the provision of the Transfer Treaty, servicing the debt inherited 
from the Congo Free State was regarded as the Colony's duty (Heenen, 1955).
The cost of developing the Colony was so high compared with the small 
amount of internal resources available that Congo was obliged to borrow. In this 
respect, a public debt and borrowing policy was set up in the early 1920s. 
Assessment of the Colony's credit rating had to take into consideration that by 
1925, forty years since the foundation of the Congo Free State in 1885, the 
Belgian Congo had accumulated a large number of assets. These could be taken 
as representative of a healthy financial position. At that time, the Colony 
possessed fairly well structured administrative and economic organs and 
infrastructure, including 3,000 kilometres of railways, a extensive telephone and 
telegraph network, as well as a large, well-equipped and well-run merchant navy 
(Heenen, 1955). Its debt amounted to only BF772 million, hedged by a portfolio 
of easily realisable assets worth BF1.2 billion. Given this background, a 
question was raised in the early 1920s as to whether a loan contract regarding 
the Colony was to be concluded by the metropolitan power, by Congo itself or 
by the latter with the guarantee of Belgium. The answer was that in view of the
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size of the resources held by the Colony, a metropolitan guarantee was not 
required (Louwers, 1925).
In order to replace the small-scale borrowing that had been the practice 
to date, characterised by a lack of proper planning and by squandering, a new 
strategy was adopted, which favoured large-scale borrowings. The funds 
borrowed under these conditions were to be used to implement investment 
programmes subject to a prior in-depth appraisal that would allow the relevant 
authorities to carry out the necessary monitoring and auditing. A law of 21 
August 1921 enabled the Minister of Colonies to float bonds for up to BF300 
million for the purpose of financing a series of public works that required 
BF660 million over a fixed period of time (Annales Parlementaires, 1920-1921). 
However, implementation of the law of 21 August 1921 revealed a number of 
shortcomings, such as vagueness and lack of detail regarding the financial 
organisation of the loan, debt servicing, and absence of accurate information on 
the investment projects to be financed (Louwers, 1925).
With regard to debts contracted after the annexation they were of one of 
three types: (1) a consolidated debt, (2) a floating debt, or (3) a guaranteed or 
indirect debt. The consolidated debt was defined as a loan contracted on the 
basis of a Royal Decree taken as a prerequisite, in accordance with a specific 
law. A floating debt related to Treasury bonds, the issuance of which was 
regularised at a later date. The floating debt represented financial support 
provided by the Colony to publicly-owned transport companies that encountered 
difficulties due to the economic recession (Heenen, 1955).
Congo contracted loans sometimes on the basis of budget laws, and 
sometimes according to particular laws concerning borrowing. As already
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mentioned, before 1940, the Congo Free State and then the Colony contracted 
loans to partially finance ordinary budget deficits. About 10 per cent of total 
borrowings between 1934 and 1939 were used for this purpose (Wertz, 1952). 
Public works were financed in several ways. In some cases, the concessionary 
companies provided the funds without any State guarantee. To compensate for 
the risk taken, the companies received large areas of land, mining concessions 
and various rights (for example, Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo, for 
the first stage of the construction of the railway). In other cases, the funding was 
provided by the State (Chemin de Fer du Katanga). In a third category of cases, 
concessionary companies collected funds by issuing bonds secured by the 
Colony (Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs, Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo - 
Katanga).
In the particular case of the third category, the Colony resorted to buying 
out the Matadi-Leopoldville (Kinshasa) railway in 1936 as, following the 1931- 
1934 recession, the Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo-Katanga could no longer 
cover the debt servicing costs relating to the bonds that had been issued to 
finance the modernisation of the line completed between 1923 and 1932 
(Stengers, 1989).
With regard to secured debt, Chapter three mentioned that as early as in 
1901 the Congo Free State stood as guarantor of 4 per cent interest for the share 
capital in the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo Superieur aux Grands 
Lacs Africains. Starting from 1922 Belgian Congo undertook to implement a 
policy aimed at entrusting private entrepreneurs with the task of carrying out 
and managing industrial projects of public interest, with appropriate guarantees 
provided by the Colony for the capital invested (Heenen, 1955). This policy was
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intended to provide the Colony with the means, especially in the transport 
sector, upon which economic development depended.
Table 4.8: Congolese Public Debt, 1909-1952 (in CF millions)
As at 3 1 Dec
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
(1) 1952
Source: Wertz (1952: 604)
Consolidated
110.6
120.6
130.6
140.4
150.3
175.3
175.3
175.3
175.3
175.3
249.9
249.7
324.6
324.5
324.4
322.2
930.7
,773.3
,770.5
,767.5
,764.4
,760.9
1,127.3
1,177.9
1,170.3
1,758.4
1,882.4
2,630.4
3,903.2
4,017.2
3,993.0
3,979.8
3,968.1
3,943.7
3,917.7
3,907.0
3,862.2
3,832.7
2,803.4
2,774.9
2,890.0
6,242.0
6,189.1
7,493.0
(1) As at 30 June
Floating
14.5
21.5
28.5
62.5
91.5
103.2
27.1
27.1
25.8
25.8
33.6
8.3
8.3
73.3
70.4
166.7
209.2
122.6
135.6
61.1
263.0
621.0
983.5
1,001.1
1,609.6
1,207.3
1,167.2
1,076.0
495.5
418.5
480.0
526.0
568.2
561.2
557.2
415.7
23.5
1,625.0
1,400.0
800.0
2,495.0
4,400.0
4,650.0
1952
Total
125.1
142.1
159.1
202.9
241.8
278.5
202.4
202.4
201.1
201.1
283.5
258.0
332.9
397.8
394.8
488.9
1,139.9
1,895.9
1,906.1
1,828.6
2,027.4
2,381.9
2,110.8
2,179.0
2,779.9
2,965.7
3,049.6
3,706.4
4,398.7
4,435.7
4,473.0
4,505.8
4,536.3
4,504.9
4,474.9
4,322.7
3,885.7
3,832.7
4,428.4
4,174.9
3,690.0
8,737.0
10,589.1
12,143.0
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By the same token, Congo stood as guarantor of interest payments for a 
number of other companies, such as the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du 
Katanga, Societe des Chemins de Fer Vicinaux, Chemin de Fer Leopoldville- 
Katanga-Dilolo, Union Nationale des Transports Fluviaux, Sabena, Compagnie 
de Chemin de Fer du Congo, Societe des Chemins de Fer du Kivu, Societe de 
Credit au Colonat, Office des Cites Indigenes et des Centres Extracoutumiers, 
Caisse d'Epargne du Congo Beige et du Ruanda-Urundi, and Societe de Peche 
Maritime (see: Wertz, 1952).
This support policy implemented by the Colony was applied to about 
CF2.5 billion of capital secured at an interest rate that varied between 4 and 7 
per cent. However, as a result of more cautious budget management following 
the recession years of the early 1930s, as mentioned previously in this chapter, 
the period 1934 to 1939 witnessed a reinforcement of debt consolidation and a 
significant decrease in the volume of floating and secured debt (Heenen, 1944). 
Table 4.8 shows the Congolese debt from 31 December 1909 to 30 June 1952.
4.9.3. The Ten-year Plan 1950-1959
The Second World War offered the Congolese economy a great opportunity to 
reinforce its presence on the international markets. In order to consolidate this 
position, starting from the early 1950s, the Colony launched an investment 
programme known as the Ten-year Plan 1950-1959, which was aimed at 
developing its infrastructure (Vanderlinden et al, 1980). At the same time, the 
plan aimed at better integration of the local population into the process of 
economic expansion, through investments designed to improve their social 
conditions. Starting from 1948, the idea of further economic and social 
development in Congo as a means of achieving better living conditions for local
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people began to be put into effect. The launching of public work projects was 
aimed at preventing the lack of public infrastructure from holding back the 
Colony's economic development (Wigny, 1949).
This first economic and social expansion programme of Congo from 1950 
to 1959 covered a crucial period for the development of the colony. The Ten- 
year Plan was based on an analysis of the real situation, which led to 
determining the direction and defining the stages of its implementation, in 
collaboration with the private sector, which was mainly involved in the 
development of the local production of manufactured goods intended for both 
internal and external markets. The carrying out of public investment projects 
and creation of new enterprises in various sectors required an increased number 
of workers, thus triggering an expansion of revenue and demand in the local 
population (Wigny, 1949).
As public and private investments were interconnected, both the public and 
private sectors provided the funding for the Plan, with about CF30 billion from 
the Colony's budget, and CF25 billion from the private sector. With regard to 
the public funds, credits were provided by the extraordinary budget for this 
purpose. Expenditures items in this budget were grouped by province. Relevant 
credits consisted of payment authorisations, which were reflected in 
corresponding cash budget forecasts spread over several years depending on 
how long it took to complete the work. (Ministere des Colonies, 1949).
As a counterpart of the budget surpluses, mentioned earlier, from the time 
of the Second World War, the Colonial Treasury held large amounts of bank 
deposits. At the same time, local savings were mobilised in the form of short- 
term Treasury bonds of two to three years' duration. The funding of the Plan
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gave rise to the development of a form of bank credit known as "Fonds Publics" 
(Public Funds), which enabled the public authorities to mobilise idle bank 
reserves for the purpose of financing the Plan (Sambwa, 2001).
Further analysis revealed that the capital investment forecast for the Ten- 
year Plan proved unrealistic. Whereas a law of 27 May 1952 authorised the 
Minister of Colonies to implement a programme worth CF25.2 billion, a law of 
24 December 1957 adjusted the cost of the programme to CF48.1 billion. A note 
on the Plan's execution attached to a report to the Senate from the Commission 
for Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi concerning extraordinary receipts and 
expenditures of the Congo for 1960, mentioned an amount of CF51 billion as 
the estimated total cost of the Ten-year Plan, of which CF43.4 billion had been 
spent by 1959 (Zimmer, 1988).
With regard to the results of the Plan, as early as 1958 it could be 
observed that investments completed since 1950 had significantly contributed to 
the improvement of Congo's economic structure. The colonial economy was 
more diversified, and the internal market could absorb a larger volume and 
range of products from the local agricultural sector and industry. Measured in 
the light of the evolution of the National Income, it can be seen that the 
Congolese economy recorded a significant improvement over the period covered 
by the Ten-year Plan. As a reflection of the expansion of GNP, National Income 
showed significant growth, which was uninterrupted until 1956 (BCCBRU, 
1958).
Figures in Table 4.9 indicate a relative increase in the share of the local 
population in the National Income over the period 1950-1958. A further analysis 
of this share reveals a higher increase in the income held by wage-earners than
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by the other components of the population. From 1950 to 1958 wage earners' 
income grew from 38 per cent in 1950 to 57 per cent in 1958 (BCCBRU, 1959).
Table 4.9: Distribution of National Income and GNP, 1950-1958 
______(in CF billions)______________________
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958
Local
Population's
Income 13.5 46 20.5 49 23.3 52 26.5 54 27.9 58
Others'Income 15.8 54 21.0 51 21.1 48 23.0 46 20.2 42
National Income 29.3 41.5 44.4 49.5 48.1
GNP 33.7 49.4 54.1 61.2 59.6
Source: BCCBRU, 1959
The local population's increased share in the national income is a 
reflection of the process of gradual monetarisation of the whole economy, which 
was steadily reaching an ever-larger portion of the rural areas as these provided 
a growing contribution in terms of supply of agricultural products to local 
industry, urban consumers, and for export (Mambu, 1964).
4.10. Conclusion
From the early years of the Congolese colonial era, the metropolitan authorities 
placed particular emphasis on the formal separation of Belgium and Congo as 
legal entities. At the same time, however, the Law on the Government of Congo 
(Charte Coloniale) included a number of articles, such as the provisions 
regarding money and finance, which contradicted the formally proclaimed 
separation. Regardless of this legal separation the Belgian authorities established 
such tight links between the metropolitan monetary system and monetary 
provisions set up for the Colony, that Belgium and Congo both had the same 
gold and silver currencies as legal tender (Wertz, 1952). Furthermore, the 
inclusion of Congo in the Latin Monetary Union in order to resolve the purely
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Belgian problem of too many silver coins having been struck is another 
illustration of metropolitan practices contradictory to the law. No evidence can 
be provided in support of a clearly defined Congolese direct interest to justify 
the inclusion of the Colony in the Latin Monetary Union (BCCBRU, 1957).
The fact that currencies of the members of the Union could circulate 
freely in Congo cannot be considered a sufficient motive since the 1885 Berlin 
Act contained provisions guaranteeing such free circulation of currencies and 
capital flows. Congo was included in the Union in order to enlarge the 
demographic base for calculating the quota for the issuing of Belgian coins and 
to serve as an outlet, as mentioned earlier, for the BF5 silver coins issued in 
excess quantity at the time of King Leopold II (Moens, 1976).
To explain the ambiguity of Belgian policy regarding how Congo was 
ruled, one has to bear in mind the following considerations. At the time, a 
generally accepted principle was that "a national territory should be defined as 
the whole space under the sovereignty of every State" (Vattel, 1758, 1863; cited 
by Halewyck, 1910). According to this principle, although Belgium and Congo 
were organised and identified as two distinct territorial entities subject to 
different legal provisions, which did not grant the same civil and political rights 
to their inhabitants, they were nevertheless considered two parts of one single 
State. The Congolese land was considered an integral part of Belgium in the 
same way as the Belgian metropolitan territory (Halewyck, 1910). This concept 
implied that the metropolitan power was entitled to circumvent any legal 
provisions whenever Belgian interests required it, as demonstrated in the 
following paragraphs.
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From the analysis carried out in this chapter it emerges that the legal 
provisions governing the separation between Belgium and its Colony were 
systematically ignored whenever this proved to be in the best interest of the 
metropolitan power. The early monetary system established in the Colony 
appears as a mere extension of the metropolitan monetary system, with the same 
gold and silver metallic currencies, on the one hand, while paper money issued 
by the Colony was to be backed by the Colony's own stock of gold and silver 
reserves, on the other. This is another illustration of the metropolitan motivation, 
as Belgium managed to let its metallic currency, especially silver coins, circulate 
in Congo along with metallic currencies of other members of the Latin 
Monetary Union. However, the principle of separation was applied when it 
came to guaranteeing the circulation of banknotes and fractional currency, as 
these represented a potential cost that the Colony was to bear on its own.
During the colonial period, regardless of the separation established by 
law between Belgium and its Colony, the Congolese currency was subject to 
devaluations that were decided on the basis of external conditions relating to 
metropolitan economic and monetary development. This policy was applied on 
the disputable grounds that a differentiation of the exchange rate between the 
two currencies would be detrimental to both the Belgian and the Congolese 
economies. And yet the separation of the two currencies was systematically 
either cited or merely ignored, depending on what was in the interest of 
metropolitan Belgium. Whenever Belgium devalued its currency the CF was 
forced to devalue in the same way. As pointed out by Wertz (1952), while it was 
obvious that a devaluation of the CF would not trigger an automatic and 
equivalent devaluation of the BF, given the legal separation of the two
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currencies, by the same token the reverse ought to be applicable. In practice, as a 
result of the political balance of power, metropolitan interests defeated legal 
provisions.
In addition to all the considerations described above, behind the 
metropolitan concern for maintaining a formal separation between Belgium and 
Congo in terms of their respective legal, monetary and financial status, lay a 
number of internal and external motives. On a domestic basis, the metropolitan 
power was anxious to demonstrate to public opinion that the Government's 
colonial enterprise would not lead to a costly involvement on the part of the 
Belgian taxpayer. All things considered, very few Belgian citizens had a direct 
interest in the colonial venture (Slade, 1962). It was important, therefore, for the 
Belgian Government to show that there was this legal and formal separation 
between the metropolitan power and its colony with regard to money and 
finance-related issues.
As far as the external perspective was concerned, Belgium had to 
pretend to comply with the 1885 Berlin Act, which provided for free circulation 
of person, goods, trade, currencies, and capital flows within the boundaries of 
the Congo basin. In such a context, originally marked by an international desire 
to establish Congo as an international colony (Calvo, 1887), it was important for 
the Belgian Government to keep up appearances by displaying a formal 
separation, clearly defined in legal terms, even if the operational reality was far 
removed from the legal provisions.
An analysis of the evolution of banking institutions in the Colony, 
measured in terms of the network's development, has shown that the opening 
and location of branches were a function of the presence of industrial and
commercial activities in the area, which underlines the dualistic nature of the 
colonial economy. In 1959, the largest bank in the Colony, the Banque du 
Congo Beige, had four main offices, nineteen regional branches, one local 
branch and four small offices. At that time this bank's own network represented 
more than 50 per cent of the whole banking network. In view of the size of the 
Congolese territory it is obvious that the development of banking services was 
driven exclusively by the presence of industries and commerce, modern 
agricultural enterprises managed by large companies, or small and medium- 
sized farms ran by colonists. These areas of modern economic development 
were relatively limited in number, spread out over the colonial territory, and 
were not interconnected or integrated with the vast areas, characterised by a 
traditional economy, which surrounded them.
The structure of money supply displayed development in two directions. 
On the one hand, the expansion of bank deposits, especially after the Second 
World War, confirmed the tendency of enterprises to maintain the larger part of 
their deposits in the Colony. Retention of larger amounts of cash in the Colony 
was attractive because the territory offered more profitable investment 
opportunities and because of security, a lesson learnt from the War and the 
subsequent separation between Congo and occupied Belgium (Wertz, 1952).
This structure of the money supply indicates a volume of bank money 
that was almost three-quarters of the total money supply. This structure shows 
that the local population did not hold a significant share of the bank money, but 
instead held their monetary assets in cash, which accounted for one-quarter of 
the total money supply. This relationship shows a low level of monetization of
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the economy as a whole and particularly of the traditional communities' 
economy.
By and large Congolese monetary and financial development during the 
colonial period was essentially marked by three major factors, namely (1) the 
status of the territory as a colony, (2) its export-based economic and commercial 
activities and (3) its dualistic economy made up of a small number of modern 
industrialised sites and large underdeveloped areas. As a result of its political 
and economic dependence as a colony, Congo, on several occasions, was subject 
to decisions designed to resolve monetary and/or financial problems regarding 
the metropolitan power's economy. Furthermore, during the colonial period, 
monetary and financial developments in Congo were subject to the effects that 
external market risks had on the balance of payments and public finance.
It has been observed that because of the dualistic nature of the colonial 
economy, Congo experienced a two-speed monetary and financial evolution. 
Money was introduced among the local population more rapidly in areas of 
significant industrial and commercial activities than in rural areas which were 
not engaged in modern economic activities. In those rural areas dominated by 
subsistence economic activities the introduction of modern currencies depended 
essentially on the existence of surpluses that could be marketed in a modern 
trade network, i.e. outside the traditional mechanisms of exchange, which were 
analysed in Chapter two. The introduction of modern currencies into rural areas 
was achieved more rapidly in those regions involved in the production of 
commodities intended for export or used by domestic manufacturing companies 
as raw material. This situation explained the correlation observed between the
volume of banknotes and coins in circulation among the local people in those 
areas and the sequence of agricultural seasons and harvests.
The fact that most of the local population engaged in traditional systems 
of exchange explains the small volume of resources that they held in cash in 
modern currencies, because of their low income and the weakness of monetary 
penetration. In rural areas, the demand for money was linked to the purchase of 
imported or locally manufactured goods. With the development of economic 
activities carried out by modern enterprises, which paid wages in cash, the 
possession and circulation of modern currencies in banknotes and coins steadily 
spread among the local population. This process was noticeable especially in 
industrial development zones and large towns. Similarly, the marketing of 
agricultural products that local people sold to export businesses, to domestic 
manufacturing companies, or in the markets for consumption, helped to 
gradually extend the use of modern currencies in traditional communities.
Nevertheless the predominance of traditional mechanisms of exchange, 
the low income of the local population and the very low density of the banking 
network were limiting factors in the introduction of modern money among local 
people. By the end of the colonial period there was scarcely a village where 
modern currencies were unknown. However, in many areas the demand for 
money was reserved for targeted purposes confined to specific limits of space 
and time. This could lead someone to register, for instance, as a worker at the 
nearest mining company in order to earn a salary intended for the acquisition of 
a sewing machine or a bicycle in a given period of time.
To conclude, the process of integration of these rural areas, where the 
vast majority of the local population had been settled for many generations, into
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the monetary economy was still at too early a stage to be considered significant. 
Moreover, the process slowed down during the first few years after the 
attainment of independence on 30 June 1960, as can be seen from the problems 
of postcolonial developments, which are analysed in Chapter five.
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Chapter Five:
MONEY AND FINANCE
IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO (1960-1995)
5.1 Introduction
From the analysis carried out in Chapter four it emerged that over the colonial 
period until the declaration of independence on 30 June 1960, export activities had 
a decisive influence on money and finance in Congo. Congolese monetary and 
financial affairs in the early 1960 were marked to a certain extent by the effects of a 
systemic political crisis that hit the country's government and administrative 
structures from the very first month of the independence era. The context of that 
crisis was the fragmentation of the national territory into several operational zones 
and the emergence of an unofficial or grey economy funded with resources drawn 
from the official economy.
This chapter addresses the period from the date of independence to the end 
of 1995, the dawn of the end of Mobutu's regime. It comprises six sections: an 
introduction, four analytical sections and a conclusion. The four analytical sections 
successively look at the following periods: 1959-1967, 1967-1976, 1976-1985, and 
1985-1995. The second section addresses the period 1959-1967. It provides, as a 
starting point, an analysis of the political and economic background of the period 
1959-1961, during which Congo gained its independence, perceived as a turning
point. It also looks at the monetary and financial developments over the period 
June 1960 to June 1967, and examines the two attempts at monetary and financial 
adjustment, launched on 6 November 1961 and 6 November 1963, that preceded 
the first far-reaching monetary and financial reform of 24 June 1967. The analysis 
highlights the impact of both the major changes introduced and the subsequent 
anarchy in the monetary and financial management of the newly independent 
country, marked by a total lack of technical and administrative skills and absence 
of control over events (cf. Bornemann et al, 1979).
Section three addresses the monetary and financial measures of the reform 
launched on 24 June 1967 and analyses the subsequent developments up to the 
mid-1970s. The first part of the analysis looks at the monetary and financial 
provisions of the reform and measures to what extent its implementation was 
relatively successful until the end of the 1960s. It shows to what extent these 
measures helped to significantly stabilise the country's overall economic and 
monetary situation and improve the health of the State's finances. The second part 
of the section concentrates on the development of policies initiated by President 
Mobutu from the early 1970s, especially measures of late 1973 and late 1974, 
known as "zairianisation and radicalisation policies". These consisted of the 
expropriation of businesses owned by foreigners and local people in various 
sectors, including agriculture, industry, commerce, and financial services, the 
ownership of which was transferred to the State or to leading State dignitaries. The 
analysis looks at the adverse effects of these policies on the economy and explains 
how the subsequent deterioration of the overall situation led to another monetary 
and financial adjustment launched on 12 March 1976. It emerges from the analysis 
that the Congolese economy never recovered from the effects of these measures.
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Section four addresses the period starting in 1976, the year that saw the 
launch of another monetary and financial reform and economic recovery 
programme, whose progression up to 1983 is analysed. This year in considered as 
the starting point of another major monetary and economic adjustment programme, 
whose impact up to 1985 is analysed. The analysis looks at the effects of the 
chronic State budget deficits financed by money creation, which was the major 
contributing factor in the development of the money supply and subsequent sharp 
inflationary spiral.
Monetary and financial developments through the second half of the 1980s 
did not fundamentally differ from those of the preceding years. The Government 
continued implementing short-lived adjustment programmes, which resulted in 
partial, but ephemeral, success followed by further deterioration due to a lack of 
continuity in applying adopted policies. Section five relating to the period 1985- 
1995 looks at the profound worsening of the overall economic situation. This 
rapidly led the country from the very high inflation observed in the late 1980s to 
hyperinflation from the early 1990s onwards. The analysis particularly focuses on 
the 1990-1995 period, extended to 1996/97 to mark the end of President Mobutu's 
regime and the beginning of the new era with the coming to power of President 
KabilainMay 1997.
Most of the figures analysed in this chapter are derived from statistics 
published by the Banque du Zaire in its Annual Reports, Monthly Bulletins of 
Statistics and Weekly Statistical Summaries, as they are reckoned to be the most 
reliable. Among other sources consulted are the Institut National des Statistiques 
(INS) statistical publications, IMF and World Bank reports and working papers as 
well as unpublished Government internal memos obtained thanks to various private 
sources.
In the absence of a developed network of specialised financial institutions 
in Congo, the banking system, comprising a Central Bank and a limited number of 
deposit banks, provided almost the entire volume of credit to the Government, 
public and private sector enterprises, and households. Nevertheless, before tackling 
the main issue as indicated above, it is worth mentioning three major financial 
institutions created after June 1960 in addition to those mentioned in Chapter four.
The Societe Nationale d'Assurance (SONAS) was established in November 
1966 through nationalisation of the insurance sector, as will be explained later in 
this chapter. The Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Credit Immobilier (CNECI) was 
created in 1971 to operate as a State-owned building society. It went into 
bankruptcy in 1981, mainly as the combined result of an inadequate financial 
structure, because of lack of financial support from the State, and the Caisse's 
inability to raise long-term funds, given the inflationary conditions in Congo. The 
Societe Financiere de Developpement (SOFIDE) was and still is the most 
important financial institution specialising in the financing of mostly private-sector 
enterprises. It was founded in January 1970, and its capital was provided by the 
State Treasury, the Central Bank, domestic commercial banks, local private-sector 
enterprises and individual investors, about a dozen of European, American and 
Japanese banks, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an affiliate of the 
World Bank group. SOFIDE was granted long-term funds in the form of quasi- 
capital provided by the Government and several low-interest loans from the 
International Development Association (IDA), another member of the World Bank 
group, and from other regional and national financial institutions, such as the 
European Investment Bank, the African Development Bank, and the French Caisse 
Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE) (Leslie, 1987).
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There were also the following financial institutions created after 1960. 
Firstly, the Office National du Logement (ONL) was established in 1968 as a result 
of a merger of the Office des Cites Africaines (OCA) and the Fonds du Bien-Etre 
Indigene (FBI), to build houses and finance their acquisition by local people 
(Kuyena, 1984). Secondly, the Societe Mobiliere et Immobilize (MOBIMO) was 
founded as a holding company in 1962 by the Banque du Congo (formerly Banque 
du Congo Beige), to provide long-term loans to households and small businesses. 
Thirdly, the Credit Agricole Controle (CAC) was established by the Government in 
January 1970 for the purpose of financing agricultural projects with counterpart 
funds generated by US aid. It ceased activities after a few years because its 
resources were exhausted (Kuyena, 1984).
Lastly, the Banque de Kinshasa, created in 1971, in turn established the 
Compagnie Financiere de Kinshasa (COFIKI) as a holding company the same year. 
The Banque de Kinshasa, the first deposit bank to be founded by a Congolese 
businessman, had strong political support from President Mobutu and a subsequent 
direct financial contribution from the Treasury. These institutions all admittedly 
played a role in their respective areas of specialisation. However, as will be seen 
later from relevant figures, their contribution did not significantly count among the 
factors that shaped the post-colonial monetary and financial history of Congo.
The next section explores the monetary and financial developments from 30 
June 1960, date of the country's independence, to 24 June 1967, the date when the 
most significant monetary and financial reform of the 1960s was launched.
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5.2 Monetary and Financial Developments 
from June 1960 to June 1967
5.2. 1. Political and Economic Background
In many African countries, including most of the former British and French 
colonies, decolonisation was accompanied by a new economic and monetary co- 
operation agreement that linked the newly independent state to its former colonial 
power (Francis, 1962). Conversely, however, the breaking of almost all monetary 
and financial links between Belgium and its former colony marked the 
independence of Congo. Only two other sub-Saharan African countries had a 
similar experience in this respect. First, Guinea, a former West African French 
colony, became independent in 1958 under Sekou Toure's dictatorship, and broke 
all links with France. Second, there was the case of the Republic of Mali. In this 
country, monetary and financial links with France, the former metropolitan power, 
were maintained after independence in the early 1960s, but then broken in 1962, 
when the Government decided to pursue a socialist path. However, Mali rejoined 
the Franc Zone in 1967 (Gerardin, 1989).
Since it was not backed by any strong currency, the CF was likely to suffer 
the effects of political and economic crises and centrifugal forces. In this respect 
two series of striking political events that occurred immediately after the 
proclamation of independence were the cause of the early stages of Congolese 
inflation.
At the very beginning of its independence, Congo lost its two wealthiest 
provinces, namely, Katanga, provider of strategic mineral products, such as copper 
and cobalt, and the diamond-producing Southern Kasai. They both seceded quickly 
to form two separate independent States. With the national territory thus reduced in
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size, there was a sharp decline in public revenues, which was not accompanied by 
an equivalent decrease in public expenditure (Oliver and Atmore, 1995).
The second political factor to negatively affect the economy was the overall 
climate of insecurity that arose out of the rebellions, mutinies and widespread 
atmosphere of anarchy among the local population in most of the regions, as a 
result of an incorrect perception of the newly acquired freedom. This sense of 
insecurity resulted in the disruption of communications between large cities and 
rural areas, which in turn caused a decline in food supply. It gave rise to a massive 
and swift emigration of the Belgians who composed the entire managerial body of 
the former Colony at all levels of all institutions (Verhaegen, 1961).
The sudden flight of the Belgians created an opportunity for a new class of 
local people to be rapidly promoted to the highest positions in the public 
administration. Between 1959 and 1961 the share of the local population in the 
nominal national income increased from 66 per cent to 81 per cent, mainly as a 
result of a dramatic increase in salaries and wages paid out of the State Budget to 
the newly promoted Congolese civil servants. From CF3.2 billion in 1959, the 
State's total wage bill climbed to CF8.7 billion in 1961 (Francis, 1962) The 
increase in salaries paid to local people resulted in additional demand pressure 
exerted on a declining supply of consumption goods from rural areas due to the 
climate of insecurity mentioned earlier. It was the main cause of Congolese 
inflation in the early 1960s, which can be regarded, therefore, as due to a 
substitution effect rather than to a public finance deficit. Namely, the ability to pay 
(pouvoir d'achai) previously held by the Belgians was, from then on, in the hands 
of the new bourgeoisie made up of the Congolese employed in the Public 
Administration (Fran9ois, 1962).
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The analysis carried out in Chapter four, section 4.8 relating to the structure 
of money circulation, has shown that before independence the process of money 
creation and the distribution of the money supply between notes and coins, and 
sight deposits, were determined by a private sector dominated by foreign interests, 
mostly involved in export-based economic activities. As will be seen in this 
chapter, starting from 1960, monetary and financial developments became mostly 
dependent on the public sector controlled by the Congolese people. From then on 
Congolese monetary history was marked by a continuous expansion of credit 
allotted by the banking system to the public sector, and the squeeze on the share of 
foreign exchange reserves as one of the factors affecting the money supply, as well 
as a relative decline in the total volume of credit made available to the private 
sector and households.
The ordinary State Budget imbalance recorded for the period between June 
1960 and June 1961 was due more to a sharp decrease in public revenue than to an 
increase in public expenditure. The suspension of metropolitan financial support, 
especially within the framework of the execution of the Ten-year Plan 1950-1959, 
and net contributions from Katanga and southern KasaT, accounted for 41 per cent 
of the decline in public revenue. The rest of the decrease in fiscal revenue was due 
to internal causes, such as the fall in export and import activities and the 
disorganised state of fiscal administration. As a result, a large amount of fiscal dues 
were diverted from the central administration and picked up instead by undefined 
local political and administrative bodies. Overall, as shown in Table 5.1, State 
revenue fell by CF5.5 billion in 1961 compared with 1959 (Leclercq, 1960-1962).
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Table 5.1: State revenue in 1959 and 1961, excluding Katanga 
(in CF millions)
Direct taxes
Indirect taxes
- Entrance fees
- Export duties
- Excise duties
Non-fiscal revenue
Total revenue
Total expenditures
Deficit
Financed by
- External support
- Katanga transfers
- Banks' Treasury Bonds
- Issuing House
- Other
1959
3,200
3,300
1,300
1,100
900
2,900
9,400
12,900
3,500
400
3,100
-
-
-
1961
940
1,748
529
344
875
1,195
3,883
* 12,766
9,383
-
-
550
8,550
283
Difference
in value
-2,260
-1,552
-771
-756
-25
-1,705
-5,517
-134
+5,383
-400
-3,100
+550
+8,550
-
in%
-71
-47
-59
-69
-3
-59
-59
+268
-
-
-
-
Source: based on Leclercq (1961-62) *Public debt and CF500 million capital 
expenditures excluded.
While the State resources recorded a sharp drop, public expenditure 
remained roughly unchanged, as can be seen from Table 5.1, despite the cost 
savings allowed by a suspension of the payment of public debt, and a massive 
departure of Belgians from the Public Administration, as mentioned earlier in this 
section (Vesse, 1961). It emerges from Table 5.1 that while the share of private 
banks in the financing of the State budget deficit in 1961 was limited to no more 
than 6 per cent, the Central Bank's contribution for this purpose amounted to about 
91 per cent (Leclercq, 1962). This was as a result of the strong pressure the 
Government placed on the issuing house, maintaining this pressure over the entire 
period under examination, as will be seen later in this chapter.
It was pointed out earlier that in its first stage, the State Budget imbalance 
was essentially due to a sharp fall in public revenue. Budget expenditure continued 
to grow, and this trend was intensified over time with a further development of 
inflation. As shown in Table 5.2, wages and salaries paid to the new Congolese 
civil servants increased dramatically. They triggered additional inflationary 
pressures since the demand from these people targeted different categories of goods
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and services, especially foodstuffs, the supply of which kept declining as a 
consequence of the general deterioration of the overall situation of the country.
Table 5.2: State expenditure in 1960 and 1961, 
excluding Katanga (in CF millions)
Type of expenditure
Wages/Belgian experts
Wages/Congolese civil servants
Salaries/Congolese employees on
contract
Army pay
Wages/political personnel
Education subsidies
Public debt
Other expenses
Total ordinary expenditures
Budget 
1960
2,357
788
1,050
460
346
1,368
3,933
4,402
14,704
Payment 
1961
400
1,450
2,100
2,000
800
3,500
757
*1,759
12,766
Difference
Value
-1,957
+662
+ 1,050
+ 1,540
+454
+2,132
-3,176
-2,643
-1,938
%
-83
+84
+ 100
+335
+ 131
+ 156
-81
-60
-13
Source: Leclercq (1961-1962)
* CF500 million capital expenditure excluded
Table 5.3 shows that the small increase in revenue recorded in the second 
half of 1961, compared with the first half of the same year, did not compensate for 
the significant expansion of budget expenditure during the same period, which 
resulted in a larger deficit. The size of the gap between public revenue and 
expenditure over this period can be measured by referring to the figures in Table 
5.2. Namely, salaries for Belgian experts fell from CF2,357 million in the 1960 
State Budget to CF400 million in 1961, or a decrease of 83 per cent. Wages and 
salaries paid to Congolese civil servants, to the army and political personnel, and 
subsidies for education jumped from CF4,012 million in 1960 to CF9,850 million 
in 1961, recording an average growth of 145 per cent (Leclercq, 1961-1962).
Table 5.3: Budget expenditure and revenue, 1960-1961 
(in CF millions)
1960 2nd half
1961 1st half 
2nd half 
Total year 1961
Total payment 
(a)
5,647 
5,647 
7,619 
13,266
Total revenue 
(b)
1,756 
1,812 
2,071 
3,883
Total deficit
(c)
3,736 
3,835 
5,548 
9,383
(c)/(a) in
%
68.0 
67.9
72.8 
70.7
Source: based on Leclercq (1961-1962)
With regard to the balance of payments, on the one hand, the deteriorating 
situation in the country hit export activities. This adverse effect was compounded
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by a fall in the prices of a number of raw materials, which caused a decrease of 
about 12 per cent in overall export revenue. The fall in prices related especially to 
agricultural products, such as palm oil, palm nut oil, coffee, cocoa and rubber. 
Moreover, while consumer prices were climbing, prices paid to producers were 
declining, which resulted in a further deterioration of the terms of trade and 
undermined the motivation of peasant farmers involved in the production of 
commodities for export, such as cotton and palm oil (Fra^ois, 1962).
During the same period of time (1960/1961), the volume of exports did not 
vary significantly. However, there was instead a decline in the amount of foreign 
currency receipts from exports, as approximately 20 per cent of official exports 
were not declared, while the remaining 80 per cent were subject to a systematic 
underestimation (Fra^ois, 1962). This concealment of export proceeds was a 
means of bypassing the existing foreign exchange restrictions regarding the 
external transfer of investment revenues. As for imports, their volume increased, 
partly to compensate for the decline in goods from regions that had seceded, such 
as the Kasai, known as an important food supply producer. Because of the foreign 
exchange restrictions, importers had to submit an application to the Central Bank 
through the banking system to obtain foreign currencies intended for the settlement 
of import invoices. To bypass the ban on capital transfers and restrictions on 
investment revenue transfers, invoices relating to the import of goods and services 
paid in foreign currencies were shown with an inflated total amount, to cover up a 
certain amount of flight capital (Fran9ois, 1962).
As a result of the decline in export proceeds combined with the increase in 
imports, the balance of trade recorded a deficit that went on growing as the 
country's administrative structure deteriorated further. Due to foreign exchange 
restrictions the import of certain types of goods, such as luxurious cars, expensive
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foodstuffs and wine, was not allowed through the official foreign exchange market. 
This created an unofficial foreign exchange market, and the gap between both the 
official and unofficial exchange rates widened. In fact, local prices were fixed with 
reference to the exchange rate in force in the unofficial market, where the cost of 
acquiring foreign currencies was much higher than at the official exchange rate. 
And yet at that time the decrease in export and fiscal resources was due more to a 
lack of control caused by the growing administrative inefficiency, and thus, an 
increasing number of smuggling circuits, than to a sharp decline in volumes 
exported (Fran£ois, 1962). The balance of payments deficit was covered by the 
country's own foreign exchange reserves and external resources provided by the 
United States and the United Nations, as shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Balance of payments in 1961 (in CF millions)____
______________________Receipts Expenditures Balance 
Goods 5,121 6,670 -1,549 
Transfers * 1,545 3,199 -1,654 
Capital **824 271 +553 
Total 7,490 10,140 -2,650 
Foreign exchange withdrawal_______________________-2,592 
Source: Bulletin du Conseil Monetaire, 1962
* Including CF1,140 million in foreign currency from the United Nations Mission in
Congo for its local expenses. 
** Including CF502 million as US aid.
These provisions served as a palliative solution, without addressing the 
main issue, namely, a lack of efficient control on export and import activities, as 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which were thus subject to abuses and 
contraband, further exacerbating the inflation caused by a lack of foreign exchange 
reserves.
While credit to the public sector became the main source of money creation 
from June 1960, as shown in Table 5.5, the volume of credit to the private sector 
continued to decline.
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Table 5.5: Banking system's credit to public and private sector, 
1959-1962 (in CF millions)
Year
31.01.1959
30.06.1959
31.12.1959
30.06.1960
31.12.1960
30.06.1961
31.12.1961
30.06.1962
31.12.1962
Credit to public sector
Issuing 
House
1,764
1,804
4,026
4,392
8,374
11,314
15,013
20,977
24,951
Private 
Banks
6,496
6,113
5,315
4,942
5,216
5,318
6,032
6,555
6,892
Total
8,259
7,917
9,341
9,334
13,590
16,632
21,046
27,532
31,844
Credit to private sector
Issuing 
House
903
1,241
453
765
173
8.9
-
0.4
94.9
Private 
Banks
5,400
5,559
5,098
5,458
3,041
2,867
3,131
2,740
2,391
Total
6,304
6,800
5,551
6,223
3,214
2,876
3,131
2,740
2,485
Total
14,563
14,717
14,892
15,557
16,804
19,508
24,177
30,272
34,329
Source: Mambu (1964)
However, during the three months August to October 1960, banks had to
get advances from the Central Bank in order to respond to a massive withdrawal of 
banknotes and external transfers. These transfers were completed in a context of 
panic as Belgians fled the troubled country, and they were facilitated by a lack of 
exchange control (Mambu, 1964).
After a slight decline between June and September 1960, the development 
of money supply followed the expansion of credit allocated to the public sector, 
while its structure reflected the shift in the structure of revenue (Mambu, 1964). 
The net flows of foreign exchange receipts from large companies' export proceeds 
resulted in an immediate increase in bank deposits in the accounts of those 
companies and in the accounts of the State Treasury, which received the 
corresponding duties on such export proceeds.
Table 5.6: Banknote and coin circulation (in CF millions)
Year
1959 June
Dec.
1960 June
Dec.
1961 June
Dec.
1962 June
Dec.
1963 June
Total Note & coin %(b)/(a) Index (b) 
money circulation Junel960=lOO 
supply (a) (b)
16,960
15,811
15,492
18,311
22,151
26,486
31,390
35,067
39,661
6,159
6,315
6,831
6,926
8,838
10,052
11,607
13,288
17,929
63.3
39.9
44.1
37.8
39.9
38.0
37.0
37.9
45.2
90.2
92.4
100.0
101.4
129.4
147.2
169.9
194.5
262.5
Source: based on Mambu (1964)
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Credit to the public sector was converted half into banknote and coin 
circulation, half into bank deposits. Table 5.6 shows the development of the share 
of banknote and coin circulation in the money supply. This new distribution 
reflected an increase in the proportion of wages paid in cash to the newly promoted 
Congolese civil servants. In view of an inelastic, if not decreasing supply, the 
increase in wages and salaries between 1960 and 1963 resulted in a higher demand 
pressure and a subsequent sharp increase in prices, as shown in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Retail price index (Kinshasa markets) and 
______minimum wage________________________
Year Price index % increase in Real wage index 
____________June 1960 = 100 minimum wage July 1960 = 100
1960 June 100.0
July 130.0 +30 100.0
1961 July 188.0 +45 103.0 
1963 April 235.0 +25 55.9
October 294.0_________+25__________68.8_________
Source: Banque Nationale du Congo (1967)
Belgians living in Congo were familiar with payment by cheque and on 
credit, which was an easy and safe way of trading since their wages and salaries 
were paid via a system similar to the present-day personal giro accounts. Their 
massive exodus in the second half of 1960 put an end to this mode of payment, 
which was mostly reserved for expatriates. More cash was needed, therefore, to 
settle payments in general, and for the salaries of the newly appointed Congolese 
civil servants in particular. As inflation was increasing, more cash was required to 
catch up with the rapid upward movement of prices. In the end the State faced a 
shortage of banknotes and could no longer cover the total payment of wages and 
salaries of its employees. The reserve ratio in relation to the money circulation fell 
to 5 per cent in August 1961 (Fran9ois, 1962).
The volume of bank money grew in line with that of banknotes and coin 
circulation. However, as pointed out earlier, while in the 1950s it derived from 
export revenues and external capital inflows, the development of bank money in
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the early 1960s was essentially a result of a dramatic expansion of credit to the 
public sector. Advances from the Central Bank to the State gave rise to bank 
deposits, which the Treasury used to pay its creditors, namely employees and 
suppliers of goods and services. The latter used the amount deposited in their 
accounts to purchase both locally produced and imported goods and services from 
suppliers who, in turn, deposited their sales revenue in bank accounts. In view of 
the existing inflationary context, enterprises tended to anticipate monetary 
depreciation in order to preserve the purchasing power of their revenue, by 
increasing their selling price accordingly (Francois, 1962).
A further deterioration in the economic situation started to affect industrial 
productive capacity. The ban on transfer abroad of revenue from investments and 
rentals mentioned earlier and the decline in economic activity resulted in a surplus 
of cash. Moreover, the sharp fall in foreign exchange reserves already mentioned in 
this section resulted in a severe decline in the import of capital goods, while 
financial difficulties experienced by a number of companies contributed to a 
reduction in the volume of investments. This development gave rise to an apparent 
monetary abundance due to an accumulation of cash flows originally intended for 
investment in capital goods, which, however, had been brought to a halt by the 
crisis. It resulted in the paradox that, while cash flows were growing, the volume 
and quality of producer goods were declining, which, in fact, reflected a further 
disintegration of production capacities (Boulding, 1950).
On the whole, from June 1960 to September 1961, despite the development 
of a large public finance deficit, inflationary pressure was offset to a certain degree 
by a number of deflationary factors, such as the following. First, the increase in 
wages and salaries was partly compensated by a rise in unemployment to about 40 
per cent of the working population. Second, as the State and private sector halted
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capital investment expenditures, the demand for producer goods declined, which 
lowered global demand. On the other hand, demand for consumer goods over the 
same period did not vary significantly, as imports remained at the same level as 
previously, while domestic supply from local manufacturing industry proved to be 
elastic and met such increase in demand as there was (Francois, 1962).
To explain these developments one has to consider the dualistic nature of 
the Congolese economy, characterised by compartmentalised markets. In such a 
context a change in the distribution of purchasing power triggers inflationary 
pressure insofar as the additional demand is directed at markets where the supply is 
rigid or anyway insufficiently elastic. The magnitude of pressure depends, 
therefore, on the behaviour and location of the holders of the incremental revenue, 
as well as on the location of the rigid supply. In the case of Congo, the increase in 
wages and salaries concerned revenue holders with a high propensity to spend, 
especially on local and imported foodstuffs, consumer semi-durables, such as 
clothing, shoes and mats, and consumer durables, including domestic appliances, 
houses and cars (Francois, 1962).
With regard to the impact of the unofficial exchange rate, it remained 
insignificant over this early period of the Congolese inflationary process, as it 
related to marginal transactions carried out by a restricted number of Europeans 
whose incremental inflationary demand was directed at foreign exchange markets. 
At that time there was no connection between domestic prices and the unofficial 
exchange rate, which was referred to for a limited number of transactions, 
especially those regarding luxury goods. In other words, the unofficial exchange 
rate was not yet used on a large scale as the main reference for determining 
domestic prices of widespread consumption goods. As a result, at this early stage of 
Congolese inflation, while the banknote and coin circulation increased by about 41
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per cent between June 1960 and October 1961 (i.e. prior to the monetary 
adjustment of 6 November 1961), prices recorded an increase of only 19 per cent 
over the same period (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967). This is an indication that 
the behaviour of both revenue holders and suppliers had helped up to then to 
maintain inflation within moderate limits.
However, from the third quarter of 1961, two major events contributed to 
an acceleration in the inflationary process. Firstly, a 30 per cent increase in the 
minimum wage caused an expansion of demand. It also increased production costs 
as a result of higher salaries, although enterprises managed to raise their selling 
prices to pass on the increase in cost to their customers (Fra^ois, 1962). Secondly, 
following an exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves a monetary adjustment, to be 
analysed in the next section, came into effect on 6 November 1961, leading to 30 
per cent devaluation. As an immediate result the cost of imports increased by at 
least 30 per cent, which was eventually reflected in an even higher increase in retail 
prices. These two events occurred at a time when local production had reached its 
capacity limits. As a consequence, the adjustment in prices hit not only imports but 
also local products from all sectors of the economy, including goods from rural 
areas (Francois, 1962).
The exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves justified restrictions on 
imports and on other external payments. This gave rise to the development of 
various unofficial markets that formed parallel channels connected with the official 
economy as follows. In the absence of efficient control over import and export 
activities, a portion of foreign exchange export receipts was misappropriated from 
official economic channels to pay for goods that were being imported through 
parallel channels, to meet unsatisfied demand, or to cover other external payments 
that were officially forbidden (Fran9ois, 1962). The high cost of this transactional
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process was added to the already high cost of imports caused by a decline in 
supply. It helped to boost the inflationary spiral and justified the first series of 
monetary adjustments analysed in the next sections.
5.2.2. Monetary Adjustment of 6 November 1961
The first devaluation made after independence was announced on 6 November 
1961. Initially the measure included the possibility of flexible adjustments to the 
CF within fluctuation bands that were not to exceed 20 per cent. In the end the 
adjustment was turned into a formal devaluation of 30 per cent, considered as a 
minimum, essentially aimed at preserving the viability of agricultural export 
enterprises, as they were the only providers of foreign exchange revenue at that 
time. It was also intended to help lower the pressure on foreign exchange reserves 
by reducing the demand for imports (Herman, 1962). Moreover, the adjustment 
was also designed to be the first step of a far-reaching programme to reorganise the 
administration of external trade, and as preparation for an in-depth economic 
reform.
The outcome expected from the adjustment depended on the political crisis 
being resolved, as well as on a reduction in the State budget deficit, and wage and 
salary restraints. These conditions, however, were out of the control of the 
monetary authorities. As a result, the monetary adjustment served as no more than 
a temporary subsidy granted to export enterprises, as they cashed a larger amount 
in domestic currency for their export receipts in foreign currency sold to the 
banking system according to the existing foreign exchange regulation. And yet the 
advantage they gained was immediately offset by an increase in production costs, 
as mentioned earlier.
The devaluation of 6 November 1961 accelerated the exhaustion of foreign 
exchange reserves. On the one hand, it prompted importers to use foreign 
currencies received from the Office des Licences (in charge of import licences) as 
quickly as possible. On the other, importers delayed the sale of their stock in order 
to benefit from further price increases. To prevent this speculative behaviour from 
developing the Central Bank instructed banks to reject any demand for foreign 
currencies intended for pre-payment of imports (Banque Nationale du Congo, 
1967).
The rate of price increases was higher than the devaluation rate. Instead of 
reducing demand by raising the cost of goods supplied, the devaluation helped to 
activate the potential demand, as is reflected by the gap between the 19 per cent 
increase in prices observed from June 1960 to October 1961 and the 41 per cent 
increase in banknote and coin circulation measured over the same period. 
Moreover, a higher velocity of bank money circulation and a decline in idle cash 
resources also reflected an activation of the inflationary process. The prospect of 
devaluation in stages caused anxiety, which made monetary activity more ebullient, 
and increased the velocity of money circulation, as it speeded up the purchase of 
goods to prevent liquid assets from being hit by a further devaluation (Banque 
Nationale du Congo, 1967).
5.2.3. Monetary Adjustment of 6 November 1963
In early 1963 the Katanga secession came to an end and the country was reunited. 
With the resumption of a contribution from province of Katanga, the Government 
was therefore able to count on a subsequently larger volume of potential resources. 
It consequently revised its budgetary policy with the aim of absorbing the public 
finance deficit, and correcting monetary disequilibrium. In the meantime there was
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a recovery in agricultural exports and in the domestic manufacturing industry, 
which resulted in a supply increase. At the same time, the increase in prices 
recorded since the monetary adjustment of 6 November 1961 contributed to a 
reduction in demand pressure. In view of these developments, the year 1963 
seemed, eventually, to offer better opportunities than the first two years of 
independence for a thorough monetary reform accompanied by a revised public 
finance policy (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
On 6 November 1963 a new dual rate of exchange was defined, giving a 
buying rate against the USD of CF150, and a selling rate of CF180. Secondly, a 
new pay scale for career civil servants was adopted, providing increases ranging 
from 13 per cent for the highest positions to 60 per cent for the lowest. The third 
measure was a 25 per cent increase in the minimum wage for contract employees in 
both the public and the private sector. 14 These measures were accompanied by 
credit restrictions for the private sector and by a wage freeze in order to restrict the 
expansion of demand (Mambu, 1964).
For a short time implementation of these provisions helped to reduce the 
size of the public finance deficit and stimulated export activities. However, soon 
afterwards rebellions resumed and spread all over the central and eastern region of 
the country, undermining the process of stabilisation that had started to be 
noticeable in 1964. The situation was dominated by internal conflict between 
political groups opposed to each other. At that time, lacking cohesion and 
discipline, the Government did not have at its disposal the means of efficiently 
implementing a sound financial and wage policy, which could have led to a durable
14 The Congolese public administration comprises two categories of employees. The first category 
includes civil servants whose career plan is governed by specific legislation with a core set of 
provisions common to all civil servants. The second category comprises contract employees, mostly 
unskilled workers, recruited on a casual basis. As a result of several decades of anarchy and
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stabilisation. Furthermore, the existence of restrictions on external payments 
justified by the lack of foreign exchange reserves prevented the country from 
having access to IMF resources and at the same time caused a shortage of goods on 
the market (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967). And yet far-reaching stabilisation 
programme would have required substantial external financial support (from the 
IMF and other lenders) in order to compensate for the exhaustion of foreign 
exchange reserves and provide a comfortable supply of goods and services.
In 1965 there was a modest increase in public revenue, while public 
expenditure grew by 56 per cent. As a result, the year ended with a CF20.9 billion 
deficit, representing 32 per cent of total expenditure (Banque Nationale du Congo, 
1967). Starting from early 1966 the situation improved significantly as, in 
preparation for the far-reaching monetary reform of June 1967, the Government 
took drastic action to reduce the State budget deficit from CF20.9 billion in 1965, 
as mentioned above, to CF5.5 billion, or 8 per cent of total expenditure. Fiscal 
revenue grew threefold as a consequence of the 20 per cent gap between the buying 
and selling exchange rates. At the same time improvements in the drafting of the 
State budget enabled better control of public expenditures (Banque Nationale du 
Congo, 1967).
The most striking event of late 1966 was the nationalisation of the largest 
mining company in the country, the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK), 
announced by President Mobutu on 31 December 1966 along with a set of other 
important changes in the laws governing rights of concessionary companies and 
lands. The UMHK was replaced by a State-owned company called the Generate 
Congolaise des Mines (GECOMIN). The name of the company was changed later
nepotism, the number of civil servants and contract employees increased dramatically, out of all 
control (Bornemann et a/., 1997).
on to Generate de Carrieres et des Mines (GECAMINES) These decisions caused a 
major conflict between Congo and Belgium. The Belgian holding company UMHK 
seized all its subsidiary's outstanding balances in foreign banks across the world 
and all the mineral product shipments and deliveries which had not yet been paid 
for. This seizure of liquid assets was lifted when a co-operation agreement was 
signed in February 1967 between the new company and the Belgian Societe 
Generate des Minerais (SGM), a subsidiary of UMHK, specialised in nonferrous 
metal trading (McDonald, 1979).
At the same time, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the 
Government created a State-owned national insurance company, called Societe 
Nationale d'Assurances (SONAS), to which it granted a monopoly for all insurance 
operations. All private insurance companies established in Congo were allowed to 
continue operating on a brokerage basis (Kuyena, 1984). This nationalisation 
combined with the blatant mismanagement and inefficiency of SONAS helped to 
impede the emergence of a sound non-banking financial sector in Congo. 
5.2.4. Banking Institutions and Exchange Control
At the end of the colonial era the Congolese banking network was dominated by 
two major banks, the Banque du Congo Beige and the Banque Beige d'Afrique, 
which together owned 36 branches, out of the total of 47 private bank branches 
existing in the country in 1960, as shown in Table 5.8.
Political events and unrest that started in June 1960 resulted in a decline in 
the size of the banking network, as many branches were closed because of the 
subsequent fall in economic and trade activities. This development provided an 
opportunity to restructure the management of most banks, allowing the Congolese 
access to higher positions among the management staff.
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Table 5.8: Congolese banking network, 1956-1962
Bank
Banque du Congo Beige
Banque Beige d'Afrique
Societe Congolaise de Banque
Kredietbank Congo
Credit Congolais
B.N.C.I.
Paribas
Total
Number of branches
1956
24
16
4
4
2
1
1
52
1960
21
15
4
4
2
-
1
47
1962
21
12
4
4
2
-
1
44
Source: Mambu (1964) 
The legal aspect of this evolution is reflected in a series of measures taken
since June 1960, summarised as follows. Prior to 1960, almost all the banks 
established in Congo were, in fact, subsidiaries of foreign banks. The first step of 
the process, which was aimed at adapting to the new situation arising out of the 
political change of 30 June 1960, consisted in transferring the banks' headquarters 
from abroad to Congo. The second step consisted in converting the local banks into 
Congolese companies subject to Congolese laws and regulations.
However, in view of their origins, all the banks registered as Congolese 
companies were split into two entities, one established in Congo and the other 
created as an external branch in charge of activities outside the Congolese territory. 
The transformation of the three most important banks was carried out as follows. 
The Banque du Congo Beige became Banque du Congo and established a branch, 
called the Banque Belgo-Congolaise, better known as Belgolaise, in Brussels. The 
Banque Beige d'Afrique kept the same name for its branch in Congo while it 
created an external branch called Banque Beige d'Afrique Europe. The Societe 
Congolaise de Banque remained under the same name in Congo and established the 
Banque Africaine Internationale in Brussels (Kuyena, 1984).
An agreement of 15 November 1960 concluded in New York between 
Belgium and Congo provided for the dissolution of the BCCBRU, and established 
a settlements department. The BCCBRU was to cease activities on 31 August
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1961, while a Decree of 23 February 1961 created a new Central Bank called 
Banque Nationale du Congo. Prior to the operational start of the new Central Bank, 
a Decree of 3 October 1960 established a transitional monetary authority, the 
Conseil Monetaire de la Republique du Congo (the Monetary Council of the 
Republic of the Congo), in charge of implementing monetary and credit policy. 
The transfer of assets and liabilities from the BCCBRU to the Conseil Monetaire 
took place on 31 August 1961, while the sharing out of these between Congo and 
Ruanda-Urundi was completed on 21 September of the same year (Rousseaux, 
1966).
Banking activities in Congo after 30 June 1960 were marked by the 
establishment of exchange control intended at first to curb the outflow of capital 
that was provoked by the post-independence climate of insecurity. On 3 October 
1960 the Government issued a first Decree, which defined in outline measures 
intended to establish exchange control. Later on, as a consequence of the 
exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, a Decree of 29 June 1961 entitled 
"Decree organising exchange control relating to external trade and exchange 
control in general" was issued to reinforce the provisions defined in the Decree of 3 
October 1960 (Moniteur Congolais, 1961).
This Decree gave a special body, the Office des Licences, the monopoly in 
the management of foreign exchange reserves, foreign currencies supply and 
demand and, thus, all transactions in foreign currencies. The function of the Office 
des Licences was to ensure equilibrium in transactions in foreign currencies and to 
combat illicit markets in foreign currencies. In this respect the Office des Licences 
was responsible for mobilising existing assets in foreign currencies, such as export 
revenue, external investment income, repatriation of capital, and for promoting 
activities that could generate revenue in foreign currencies. At the same time, the
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Office des Licences was responsible for the control of imports and all payments in 
foreign currencies. Any external payment was subject to prerequisite approval by 
the Office des Licences, which was in charge of granting export/import licences 
and authorisation for any transaction in foreign currencies (Mambu, 1964).
In view of the economic and financial impact as well as the technical nature 
of the provisions for putting exchange control into effect, the banking system was 
deeply involved in the implementation of the Decree on exchange control. This 
involvement was reflected in the development of banking activities as illustrated by 
the development of credit, deposit and money circulation. Over the period 1960-67 
banking activities were marked by a trend that essentially favoured the public 
sector (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967). As previously mentioned, the dramatic 
expansion of money supply was due to the short-term financing of the State budget 
deficit, by the Central Bank for the largest part, and by private banks in a smaller 
proportion. Financing intended for the private sector played only a modest role in 
the expansion of the money supply.
In the absence of specialised financial institutions, deposit banks provided 
businesses and individuals with the total amount of credit they needed. Between 
1960 and 1963, the need for credit expressed by the private sector remained small, 
as a result of liquidity surpluses held by businesses. The decline in economic 
activity and investment together with exchange restrictions, on the one hand, and 
the expansion of public expenditures, on the other, resulted in an abundance of 
money. As a consequence, credit to the private sector fell to about 43 per cent of 
the 1958 level, as it decreased from CF5.6 billion in 1958 to CF2.4 billion in 1962 
(Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
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Figure 5.1: Commercial bank lending 1958-1967 
(in CF billions)
30.0
25.0
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
I Public sector   Private sector D Total
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967 
As can be seen from Figure 5.1, the evolution of credit allocated by
commercial banks to both the public and private sectors from 1958 to 1967 shows a 
sharp fall in the share of credit to the private sector between 1960 and 1962. This 
reflected both a decrease in economic activities, and a constantly increasing share 
of credit to the public sector over the period 1960 to 1967 (Banque Nationale du 
Congo, 1967).
It will be seen in this chapter that as a result of increasing demand from the 
Government for money printing to finance the State budget deficit throughout the 
period 1960-1995, the Central Bank was gradually reduced to a passive role vis-a- 
vis the Government. In the end it was no longer able to carry out a sound policy to 
fulfil its statutory function of ensuring monetary stability (Mambu, 1994).
The funding of import-related documentary credit within the framework of 
exchange control and the rise of costs triggered by the monetary adjustment of 6 
November 1963 contributed to a reduction in the liquidity of banks and enterprises. 
This amplified the need for credit for the private sector, as shown in Figure 5.1. In 
1963 the volume of credit extended by deposit banks to the private sector was 2.5 
times more than in 1962, as it jumped from CF2.4 billion in December 1962 to 
CF6.1 billion in December 1963, as shown in Figure 5.2.
228
Figure 5.2 Distribution of credit to private sector, 1963-1967 
(in CF billions)
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I Agriculture   Manufacturing industry D Commerce D Other   Total
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967
In view of this development, the Central Bank decided on 4 December 1963 
to fix individual credit limits for each bank, amounting to CF6.1 billion altogether. 
However, although this global limit was respected until the end of 1963, it was 
subject to a number of revisions between 1964 and June 1967. As a result, over this 
period the volume of credit recorded a 180 per cent increase, from CF6.1 billion to 
CF16.9 billion, as shown in Figure 5.1 (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967). Most 
of the increase benefited the agricultural sector, manufacturing industry and 
commerce. Between June 1963 and June 1967 bank credit to agricultural 
enterprises grew from CF900 million to CF3.9 billion, or by 322 per cent. It served 
essentially to finance seasonal crops and to rehabilitate agricultural enterprises that 
had been the victims of political unrest.
As can be seen from Figure 5.2, the increase in total credit granted to 
manufacturing industry was even larger: 350 per cent over the same period, from 
CF1.2 billion to CF5.4 billion. The credit was used for financing domestic 
production intended to replace the declining imports of manufactured goods due to 
lack of foreign exchange reserves (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
The increase in credit to finance seasonal crops had a direct impact on the 
introduction of modern currencies into the rural areas, where the local population
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were the main suppliers of agricultural products for export, and raw materials for 
the domestic industry or for direct consumption. These developments resulted in a 
relative improvement in the supply of agricultural, manufactured and imported 
goods, which was confirmed by the Kinshasa retail price index curve between 1960 
and 1965, as will be seen later in this section (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
5.2.5. Money Supply from June 1960 to June 1967
From June 1960 to June 1967 the global position of Congolese monetary 
institutions was marked by a dramatic expansion of domestic credit. However, the 
impact of the latter on the elements of monetary liquidity held by individuals and 
enterprises was lessened by the consumption of foreign exchange reserves on the 
one hand, and by an increase in the volume of quasi-money, on the other.
To explain the origin of money and quasi-money one has to take into 
consideration that, as stated earlier, from June 1960 to June 1967 the State budget 
deficit was financed essentially by the Central Bank printing money and, to a lesser 
extent, by Treasury bills subscribed by deposit banks. This situation was due to the 
large scale of the deficit compared with the small volume of internal savings that 
could be mobilised for this purpose. As yet there was no organised or active 
financial market outside the existing commercial banks. At the end of 1958, claims 
on State and other public bodies amounted to CF9.4 billion, with money circulation 
at an estimated CF17 billion. The day before the monetary reform of 24 June 1967, 
outstanding credit to the State and public bodies amounted to CF86.5 billion, which 
was larger than the overall money supply, estimated at CF84.6 billion at the same 
date, as throughout the period between 1964 and June 1967 (Banque Nationale du 
Congo, 1967).
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Credit from monetary institutions for the purpose of financing the State 
budget deficit proved to be the main cause of the deteriorating monetary situation. 
At CF5.6 billion in 1958 the volume of credit to the private sector represented 33 
per cent of the money supply (BCCBRU, 1959). At the end of June 1967 bank 
credit granted to businesses amounted to CF17.2 billion or 20 per cent of the 
money supply, demonstrating its decreasing role in the formation of monetary 
liquidity (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
With regard to the foreign exchange reserves, their position as a proportion 
of total money supply fell from 50 per cent in 1958 to about 13 per cent in 
December 1966, as a result of their gradual exhaustion over the period between 
1958 and June 1967, while the claims of the banking system on State and other 
public bodies grew dramatically (Vanderlinden et at, 1980). What needs to be 
underlined is that prior to 1960 the factors affecting the money supply derived 
essentially from productive economic activities, such as exports, which generated 
foreign exchange proceeds. From 1960 onwards, the most important source of 
money supply became the Central Bank's money printing, designed to finance the 
State budget deficit that was caused by excessive and largely unproductive public 
expenditure.
Figure 5.3: Money Supply, December 1958-June 1967 
(in CF millions)*
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
* 1960 and 1967 figures are given as at 30 June and 31 December
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967.
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Figure 5.3 shows the structure of the money supply from December 1958 to June 
1967. Figure 5.4 illustrates the acceleration of the inflation rate, especially starting
from 1965.
Figure 5.4: Money supply, Retail prices and Minimum wage
1200
1000
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  Money supply   Retail prices   Minimum wages
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967
As a consequence of this excessive expansion of credit to the State, money 
supply grew six-fold between June 1960 and June 1967, from CF13.7 billion to 
CF84.6 billion. In 1958 liquid assets held by businesses and individuals consisted 
of 34 per cent cash and 66 per cent bank money. At the end of June 1967 cash 
money represented 43 per cent as a result of successive increases in wages and 
consumer expenditure, as well as a certain amount of hoarding in rural areas.
5.3. Monetary and Financial Developments 
from 1967 to the mid-1970s
5.3.1. Political and Economic Background
As pointed out in the preceding section, the period 1960-65 was marked by 
political instability and outbursts of violence. These undermined the process of 
financial and price stabilisation that began in 1964, following the monetary 
adjustment of 6 November 1963. In the second half of 1965, a parliamentary 
conflict arose between President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Moise
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Tshombe. This disagreement resulted in a dramatic weakening of political 
leadership at the highest level as the members of Parliament loyal to the President 
systematically opposed any initiative from those loyal to the Prime Minister. On 24 
November 1965, Joseph Desire Mobutu, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of 
the Congolese Army, took this opportunity to seize power for a proclaimed period 
of five years, in order to re-establish domestic order. This takeover resulted in a 
radical change in the handling of political and economic power in Congo that was 
to last for a period of more than 30 years, known as 'the Mobutu era', until May 
1997, as will be seen in the rest of this chapter.
During the colonial era the Congolese administration was rather centralised. 
On independence a federalist structure was set up providing for a bicameral 
parliamentary system, with a President and a Prime Minister. Due to the lack of 
national cohesion, this federalist design generated numerous political crises and 
centrifugal forces, which helped to weaken and dismember the State from its very 
beginning. To remedy this situation, President Mobutu began to centralise 
governmental authority immediately upon taking power. In 1967, a new 
constitution was promulgated, which provided that the President would be both the 
Head of State and the Head of Government. The bicameral Parliament was 
suspended and replaced by a National Assembly. The office of Prime Minister was 
eliminated and provincial governors were appointed rather than locally elected. A 
single political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR) was 
created (Leslie, 1987).
In 1974 amendments to the Constitution were drawn up. The revised 
Constitution further strengthened the powers of the President and entrusted the 
country's single party, the MPR, with a central role within the overall government
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of the State. In this respect, the 1974 Constitution established six political bodies 
controlled by the party, and from then on the country became a one-party State.
These constitutional bodies were as follows: the President, the Political 
Bureau of the MPR, the Congress of the MPR, the Legislative Council, the 
Executive Council and the Judiciary Council. The Political Bureau of the MPR was 
the body that developed the party's political ideology. The Congress of the MPR 
comprised members appointed by the Political Bureau for five years. The 
Legislative Council was a mono-cameral body of representatives elected from a list 
drawn up by the Political Bureau. It could initiate and pass certain legislation as an 
independent body. The Executive Council consisted of State Commissioners, 
equivalent to Ministers, nominated by the President, in charge of operational 
Departments of the Government. The Judiciary Council comprised the courts and 
tribunals. Military tribunals could supersede the courts in cases of national 
emergency formally declared by the President (Bobb, 1999).
Following the monetary adjustment of June 1967 GDP increased at an 
average real annual rate of about 9 per cent between 1967 and 1970. However, 
from 1970 to 1973 GDP slowed down to an average real rate of approximately 5 
per cent a year (Leslie, 1987). The decline was essentially due to lower copper 
prices, and poor performance of the agricultural sector. The contribution of export 
sectors other than copper production to global State revenues also decreased 
subsequently (Banque du Zaire, 1979).
During the early 1970s, as the volume of investment was significantly in 
excess of domestic savings, external debt increased, from USD307 million as of 
December 1969 to USD895 million as of December 1973 (Peemans, 1997). The 
Government relied to an increasing extent on budget deficits. In addition, in the 
absence of a comprehensive development plan, investment was allocated primarily
to the mining and manufacturing sectors. The structure of these industries was such 
that they required significant imports of raw materials and intermediate and capital 
goods.
In the meanwhile the agricultural sector was not only neglected in terms of 
investment, but also affected by the overall deterioration of the transport system 
and by political measures taken by the Government starting from late 1972, which 
involved moving all foreigners - farmers and traders - away from border regions. 
In a public speech made in a stadium in Kinshasa at the beginning of 1973, 
President Mobutu explained that this policy was dictated by security concerns and 
related to foreigners established in frontier zones. These were Belgian, Greek and 
Portuguese farmers and sole traders, who in most cases had settled long ago in 
border rural areas and small towns. They were frequently suspected, rightly or 
wrongly, of collaborating with activists in neighbouring countries wanting to 
foment plots in Congo. For this reason, they were to be removed from the border 
area and relocated inside the country, while their businesses were to be handed over 
to local people. These foreigners had acted as catalysts for trade-related activities in 
rural areas. Their removal resulted in a sharp decline in the motivation of local 
people involved in marketable agricultural production, and thus also in their 
contribution to the economy (Young and Turner, 1985).
In November 1973 the Government took a further step in the same direction 
as it initiated a policy mentioned in the first section of this chapter, known as 
"zai'rianisation" measures. Under these the Government began expropriating 
foreign interests in various sectors of the economy, such as farms, small and 
medium-sized industries and trading enterprises (Young and Turner, 1985). 
Zai'rianisation resulted in the further disorganisation of trade channels and a further 
decline in the agricultural sector's contribution to the economy in 1974.
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At the same time, there was a decline in copper prices combined with an 
increase in the price of petroleum, a major import. Moreover, domestic expenditure 
grew rapidly and production efficiency declined as a consequence of the 
mismanagement of zairianisation. In November 1974, despite the lessons that 
should have been learned from the unsuccessful zairianisation, President Mobutu 
decided to intensify this process, by introducing a policy known as "radicalisation" 
(Young and Turner, 1985: 350). This policy consisted of nationalising all 
remaining private companies that had not been subjected to the November 1973 
zairianisation. All businesses, including even those owned by nationals, with a 
turnover of more than Z 1 million were also subjected to the radicalisation 
process. 15 However, the tourism sector as whole, foreign banks, US interests, and 
enterprises that carried out significant investment programmes during the mandate 
of President Mobutu were not targeted by these measures (Young and Turner, 
1985).
In addition to a blatant misuse of public resources, a number of economic 
decisions that had adverse effects were taken from the early 1970s onwards within 
the framework of the ideology of authenticite (authenticity) instituted by President 
Mobutu. The zairianisation policy gave concrete expression to these decisions. 16 
Going down this path proved to be the key factor in the inexorable process of the 
Congolese economy's dislocation and successive stages of inflation and 
hyperinflation during the rest of the 20th century.
In view of the collapse of the agricultural sector, mostly deepened by 
zairianisation, the country's economy remained more than ever largely dependent
15 Z stands for Zaire, a monetary unit created on 24 June 1967 to replace the Congolese Franc (CF) 
at the rate of Zl for CF 1,000, as will be seen in the next section.
16 Authenticite can be defined as an ideology launched by President Mobutu and built on patriotism 
and a strong sense of having a genuine Congolese identity that every member of the national
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on copper exports, and thus on world prices and demand for this commodity. 
Copper prices, which began to rise again in 1973 from their low level of the early 
1970s, kept growing over the first half of 1974 before falling sharply from mid- 
1974. During the same year budgetary expenditures exceeded budgetary credit 
forecast by about Z194 million, the deficit being financed almost entirely by 
Treasury borrowings from the Central Bank. At the same time there was an 
increase in external borrowings for investment projects financed directly by foreign 
donors and for financing imports. During 1974 the balance of outstanding external 
debt rose by almost 50 per cent, to a total of USD 1.3 billion at the end of the same 
year, while the annual rate of inflation increased to about 40 per cent (Peemans, 
1997).
By 1975, the foreign exchange shortage worsened and it became more 
difficult to import raw materials and intermediate goods for local industries. 
Imports decreased by 36 per cent in real terms during the year. GDP declined by 
6.4 per cent in real terms. As a result of the 38 per cent deterioration in the terms of 
trade associated with declines in the price of copper and increases in the cost of 
imported goods, Zaire's deficit on current account remained large. Prior to 1975, 
large deficits on the Government's current account had generally been offset by 
substantial inflows of capital, as a result of which, overall deficits on the balance of 
payments were not significant. However, in 1975 capital inflows declined sharply 
and the overall balance of payments deteriorated dramatically (Vanderlinden et al, 
1980).
community was committed to live out and promote (See: Manifeste du Mouvement Populaire de la 
Revolution, 1967).
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5.3.2. Monetary Adjustment of 24 June 1967
The political background of the 10-year period starting from late 1965 was marked 
by the firm leadership provided by President Mobutu who took power on 24 
November 1965, ensuring political stability, and enabling the implementation of a 
far-reaching monetary and financial reform launched on 24 June 1967. In view of 
the developments witnessed in Congo over the period 1960-1967, the 24 June 1967 
monetary adjustment was intended to resolve the ensuing economic problems: (1) 
monetary financing of public expenditure; (2) decline in production and revenue; 
(3) continuous increase in prices, and (4) disequilibrium in the balance of payments 
(Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
In the preceding section it was established that the political conditions that 
prevailed since the attainment of independence in June 1960 were characterised by 
the mismanagement of public finance, which undermined Congo's economy and 
monetary stability. The Government undertook to implement a series of measures 
aimed at re-establishing equilibrium in public finance and the balance of payments 
in order to ensure the achievement of the basic goal, which was stabilisation of the 
economy and resumption of growth on a durable basis. These measures, concerning 
the foreign exchange system, public finance, revenue policy, credit policy and price 
control, were integrated in a programme drawn up with technical assistance from 
the IMF and submitted to the latter in support of a request for a stand-by credit.
At the same time, as already mentioned in the preceding section, the 
Government created a new monetary unit called the Zaire (symbol 'Z'), equivalent 
to CF 1,000. One Zaire was subdivided into 100 Makuta (symbol 'K', from the
singular Likuta). 17 One Likuta was subdivided into 100 Sengi (symbol 's'). The 
name Zaire given to the new currency derived from the local name for the Congo 
River, Nzadi, written by the Portuguese in the late 15th century as "Zaire", as 
explained in Chapter two. Chapter two also explained the origin of the term 
Makuta given to coins issued by the Portuguese in the 16th century, intended for 
local monetary circulation in their African territorial possession known as Lower 
Guinea (Mahieu, 1924). This term remained in use over the centuries and was 
adopted by the Belgian colonial administration in Congo as the name of a coin of 
small face value, which had a hole in its centre. The term sengi came from a 
phonetic distortion of the French word for five, cinq (which was pronounced 
'senki' or 'sengi'). It was used for the smallest coin, worth five centimes, issued 
during the colonial period. It now became the name for the smallest subdivision of 
the new monetary unit Zaire, with 100 sengi being worth one K (Likuta). The 
smallest coin represented 10s, equivalent to the former monetary unit, i.e. one 
Congolese Franc (Bontinck, 1987).
The Central Bank issued five types of new banknotes: Z5, Zl, K50, K20, 
and K10, and three types of coins: K5, Kl, and slO. The rationale implicit in the 
Decree 67/266 of 23 June 1967 was that the 10s coin was issued in order to provide 
the public with an equivalent of one Congolese Franc as the coin with the lowest 
face value in order to avoid price increases caused by a lack of fractional currency 
(Moniteur Congolais, 1967).
The exchange of banknotes and coins in CF for the new currency was 
initially scheduled to last until 30 June 1968. Because of the public's great 
enthusiasm for the new banknotes and coins, but at the same time, in order to urge
17 To explain the symbol K: in the words 'likuta', also spelled 'dikuta', and 'makuta', the prefixes 
'li' (or 'di') and 'ma' indicate respectively the singular and plural form of the word 'kuta', whose 
origin was explained in Chapter three.
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the population to speed up the exchange process, the official deadline was brought 
forward to 30 September 1967. Nevertheless the commercial banks as well as the 
Central Bank continued to accept CF banknotes and coins for exchange until 30 
June 1968, after which date the Banque Nationale du Congo alone continued 
exchanging the old currency, until the end of the year. At the end of September 
1967, Zaire banknotes and coins represented 66 per cent of money in circulation. 
The exchange of CF circulation for the new notes and coins was completed so 
rapidly that this proportion reached 91 per cent at the end of December 1967, and 
97.5 per cent at the end of March 1968 (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1968).
With regard to external payments, the programme provided two important 
measures. On the one hand, the dual exchange rate established with the monetary 
reform of 6 November 1963, analysed earlier, was abolished and replaced by a 
single exchange rate, which fixed the value of Zl at USD2. The introduction of the 
new currency was accompanied by a devaluation of 67 per cent. At the same time, 
all quantitative and administrative restrictions on imports and exports were 
removed (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
Concerning public finance, two series of measures were implemented. 
Firstly, export and import duties were increased and the 7.5 per cent turnover tax, 
until then applicable to imports, was extended to exports. Secondly, in order to 
achieve an immediate budget equilibrium the Government put ordinary 
expenditures under strict control to prevent any overspending, and provided more 
resources for priority public investments. This objective was immediately 
achievable because of a significant increase in public resources following the 
devaluation that accompanied the introduction of the new currency, and a reform of 
the fiscal regime launched on the same occasion.
The programme provided also that the State borrowing from domestic 
monetary institutions would not be increased. Moreover, the appreciation in the 
value of foreign exchange reserves as a result of the new parity was intended to 
partially offset the Treasury's debt with the Central Bank (Banque Nationale du 
Congo, 1967).
In order to keep demand pressure under control and to avoid further 
inflationary developments the expansion of credit to businesses was subjected to 
clearly defined limits. Namely, the Central Bank continued to apply quantitative 
restrictions by means of ceilings determined for each type of credit. This 
instrument of monetary control proved to be the most appropriate since control 
based on a discount rate could hardly be effective in the context of Congo. In such 
a context, marked by fast-growing prices the interest rate had no influence on the 
demand for money (Gons et al, 2001). The ceiling on global credit to businesses 
fixed at CF16.6 billion on 1 April 1967, remained unchanged in June of the same 
year. In December 1967 the ceiling imposed on the total amount of credit was 
reduced to Z15.9 million (equivalent to CF15.9 billion). However, in the case of 
importers, in order to help them to resolve temporary cash difficulties resulting 
from the higher cost of foreign exchange, the ceiling was raised by Z2 million 
(Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967). The Government also allowed all wages to be 
increased by no more than 40%, to partially restore the purchasing power lost by 
employees as a result of the devaluation (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
At the same time, industries producing for the domestic market and 
importers were allowed to fix selling prices that enabled them to cover all 
manufacturing or import costs and show a profit margin. In order to promote and 
develop agricultural exports, producer prices were increased to compensate for the 
effect of the new exchange rate on exports revenues. Public transport companies'
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tariffs were adjusted so as to eliminate any subsidies. These measures combined 
with the provision of a larger supply of domestic and imported goods were 
intended to encourage the re-emergence of competition and stabilisation of 
distribution channels/networks, which were unsettled over the first half of the 1960
The first stage of the programme's implementation lasted 18 months, from 
late June 1967 to the end of 1968. By and large, the perceivable results had been 
achieved at the end of this first stage with regard to public finance, balance of 
payments equilibrium and stabilisation of prices. With regard to the balance of 
payments, the results achieved over this first 18-month period went beyond the 
expectations. Export proceeds exceeded forecasts, mostly thanks to good prices for 
mineral products as well as an increased volume of exported agricultural products. 
The devaluation resulted in increased export revenues when expressed in domestic 
currency, which acted as an incentive and explained the swift reaction of the 
agricultural sector (Ministere de 1'Economic Nationale et de 1'Industrie, 1969).
While export proceeds increased significantly the sharp devaluation of 24 
June 1967 made the cost of acquiring foreign currencies much higher. As a result, 
the overall volume of external expenditure decreased despite the liberalisation of 
external payments. As a combined consequence of both an increase in export 
proceeds and a decline in external expenditure, foreign exchange reserves increased 
significantly. By the end of 1968, they reached the highest volume ever recorded 
for the ten-year period 1958-1968, namely Z80 million, or USD 160 million 
(Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967). These developments created a new climate of 
economic security in the country as the accumulated foreign exchange reserves 
represented a safety margin of more than three-month' cover for essential goods 
imports.
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Price stabilisation, as the programme's second major objective, was 
achieved by mid-1968, as can be seen from the RPI (Kinshasa) in Figure 5.6. The 
sharp increase shown between June 1967 and June 1968 was due to the 67 per cent 
devaluation of 24 June 1967, which caused an increase in the cost of imports. 
Figure 5.5: Retail Price Index, 1966 - 1969 (1968 = 100)
 Imported goods  Domestic goods
Source: compiled by the author, based on IRES, INS and Banque Nationale 
du Congo, 1969/1970
Price stabilisation was a result of an increase in supply, reflected in the 
resumption of competitive activity among suppliers, such as more dynamic 
advertising campaigns. Mineral and agricultural sectors recorded a significant 
improvement in 1968 as a result of the more favourable conditions created by the 
24 June 1967 monetary and economic adjustment. While mineral export products 
took advantage of high external market prices, as mentioned earlier, agricultural 
output increased for both export and domestic consumption (Banque Nationale du 
Congo, 1968). This represented a significant improvement by comparison with the 
situation, analysed earlier, of the early 1960s, which was marked by a decline in 
agricultural production for both the export and the domestic markets. 
Manufacturing, on the other hand, having made considerable progress until now, 
thanks to the import restrictions imposed in order to save foreign exchange, 
experienced a slight decline, despite the expanding demand and the high degree of 
customs protection.
With regard to public finance, relative equilibrium in the State ordinary 
budget (budget ordinaire} and an increase in public capital investments were 
achieved. However, as early as during this first period of relative success for the 
programme, the Government borrowed from the Central Bank to compensate for a 
temporary shortage of resources. This was mainly due to a one-year delay in the 
implementation of far-reaching stabilisation and restructuring measures, which was 
supposed to have started at the very beginning of July 1967.
The failure to put those reforms into effect resulted in a lack of control on 
budgetary commitments, which expanded and threatened to weaken State accounts. 
To prevent the situation from worsening further, President Mobutu issued a special 
directive in July 1968, requesting corrective action to be initiated by the Minister of 
Finance. Following the execution of this directive, surpluses were accumulated 
during the period July to October 1968 and served to offset deficits recorded during 
the previous twelve months.
Table 5.9 Public revenues and expenditures 
in 1967 and 1968 (in Z millions)
Domestic revenue
First half of year
Second half of year
Total expenditures
First half of year
Second half of year
Total balance
External revenue transfer
Net balance (deficit)
Financed by
-Banking institutions
Other
1967
95.7
28.0
67.1
122.8
41.8
81.0
(27.7)
14.1
(13.6)
8.6
5.0
1968
185.6
93.4
92.2
222. 4
98.7
113.7
(36.8)
19.1
(17.7)
7.8
9.9
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque Nationale 
du Congo (1967)
The country achieved equilibrium of the State budget and recorded an 
increase in public capital investment expenditure despite the absence of any 
significant stabilisation. This result was mostly due to an exceptionally high price 
for exported copper, the most important provider of foreign exchange revenue and
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fiscal revenue for the country, and subject to a very high tax rate. Table 5.9 shows 
the evolution of public revenue and expenditure in 1967 and 1968, and highlights a 
significant increase in both resources and expenditure between 1967 and 1968, as a 
result of the devaluation of 24 June 1967 (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
At the end of the first half of 1968 the public finance situation deteriorated, 
recording expenditure of Z98.7 million and revenue of Z93.4 million for the period, 
or USD197.4 million and USD186.8 million respectively. The deficit represented 
off-budget expenditures initiated for the most part by President Mobutu who 
considered himself exempt from budgetary limitations and controls, the same way 
as King Leopold II had considered the overall resources of the Congo Free State to 
be at his personal disposal (Young and Turner, 1985).
Table 5.10: Consolidated public finance position, 1966-1968 
(in Z millions)
A. Ordinary domestic revenue
B Ordinary expenditure
a. from domestic resources
b. from external resources
C. Ordinary budget balance
D. Capital expenditure
a. from domestic resources
b. from external resources
C. Gross balance (D-C)
F. External transfer revenue
G. Net balance (deficit)
H. Financed by
Monetary institutions
Other domestic credit
External credit
Counterpart funds
1966
61.8
70.9
60.7
10.2
-9.1
8.9
5.7
3.3
-18.0
7.8
-10.2
+5.5
+2.2
+3.7
-1.0
1967
95.1
100.0
87.5
12.5
-4.9
22.8
13.9
8.9
-27.7
14.1
-13.6
+8.6
+ 1.1
+8.2
-4.4
1968
185.6
179.9
160.2
19.7
+5.6
42.5
21.4
21.1
-36.9
19.1
-17.8
+7.8
.
+9.4
+0.6
Source: Banque Nationale du Congo (1968/1969) 
As shown in Table 5.10, on the one hand, ordinary expenditure for the year 
1968 amounted to Z179.9 million (USD359.8 million), or 2.5 times the amount of 
Z71 million recorded in 1966. On the other hand, as a measure of the relative 
success of the June 1967 adjustment programme, ordinary revenue amounted to 
Z185.6 million in 1968 (USD371.2 million), or a threefold increase by comparison
with 1966. It is worth stressing, as shown by these figures, that for the first time 
since 1960 the State ordinary budget recorded a surplus, of Z5.6 million (USD 11.2 
million). Capital expenditure amounted to Z42.5 million (USD85 million) in 1968 
compared with Z9 million (USD 18 million) in 1966 (Banque Nationale du Congo, 
1968).
Nevertheless, despite the Z5.6 million ordinary budget surplus, the year 
1968 ended with a Z17.8 million overall deficit, compared with a deficit of Z13.6 
million in 1967 and of Z10.3 million in 1966. The difference was that there was a 
larger external contribution to cover the deficit in 1967 and 1968 than in 1966, 
External resources transfers consisted of donations, subsidies and technical 
assistance costs, which Congo received from various sources. These were 
Governments within the framework of bilateral co-operation agreements, or other 
organisations, such as specialised national, regional and international institutions 
(Banque Nationale du Congo, 1968/1969).
The largest portion of the aid came from the United States in the form of 
food aid, under the programme known as PL 480, which operated as follows. Food 
imported within the framework of these provisions, such as rice, wheat and meat 
(beef and chicken), among other products, represented balance of payments 
support. The goods were sold to local commercial firms. The proceeds went into a 
special fund controlled by a joint administrative body comprising local government 
and US representatives, for the purpose of financing a range of development 
projects (Leslie, 1987).
In the first stage of the programme, from June 1967 to the end of 1968, as a 
result of a delay in implementing the programme's corrective policies, public 
expenditure was not yet subject to tight control. It increased faster than revenue, 
which resulted in a widening of State budget deficits between 1966 and 1968.
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Table 5.10 above also shows that between 1966 and 1967, financing of the deficit 
through the printing of money increased by about 56 per cent. It declined slightly 
(by 9 per cent) in 1968, compared with 1967, as a result of the ordinary budget 
surplus of Z5.6 million recorded for the first time since 1960, as mentioned earlier 
in this section (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1968).
During the same period 1966-1968, considered on a current price basis, 
GDP approximately doubled, while Treasury disbursements increased threefold, 
which shows that State expenditure tended to grow faster than GDP. On the other 
hand further analysis of ordinary domestic revenue indicates a threefold increase in 
State fiscal revenue between 1966 and 1968. As shown in Table 5.11, the share of 
GDP held by the State in taxes grew from 22.5 per cent to 28.3 per cent 
respectively as a result of the devaluation of 24 June 1967 as well as an effect of 
the fiscal reform implemented at that time (June 1967) (Banque Nationale du 
Congo annual report, 1968/1969).
Table 5.11 Relative importance of public finance in the economy, 
1966-1968 (in Z millions)
A. Marketable GDP
B. State disbursement
Ordinary expenditure 
Capital expenditure 
C. Domestic revenue
Indirect taxes
Direct taxes
E. External revenue transfer
F. Net balance (deficit) 
G. Contribution /Public Administration & Army
1966
274.9
80.9
71.0 
9.0 
61.8
44.0
10.4
7.8
10.3 
50.2
1968
656.4
234.2
179.9 
42.5 
185.6
145.6
28.0
19.1
17.8 
81.2
Structure
1966
100.0
29.4
25. 8 
3.3 
22.5
16.0
3.8
2.8
3.7 
18.3
in%
1968
100.0
35.7
27.4 
6.5 
28.3
22.2
4.3
2.9
2.7 
12.4
Source: Banque Nationale du Congo (1968/1969)
The second stage of the stabilisation programme was due to run from 1969 
to 1970 and was intended to consolidate the results achieved over the first stage. 
This second phase was also aimed at initiating further actions designed to engage 
the country in a more dynamic economic development process.
However, the precariousness of the results achieved at the end of 1968, as 
shown by the figures analysed in this section, especially in terms of public 
resources allocation, was such that the country did not meet the conditions required 
for a durable stability. The nature of public expenditure, essentially characterised 
by motives of consumption and the unpredictability concerning the large-scale 
spending initiated by President Mobutu was always a major contributory factor in 
the mismanagement and deterioration of public finance in Congo.
Overall, the Congolese Government repeatedly failed to stick to the 
discipline required for preventing public expenditure from expanding beyond 
budgeted limits. Three major factors explain this state of affairs: (1) poor quality of 
budget forecasts, (2) high inflation rate that constantly eroded the real value of 
nominal fiscal revenues, and, last but not least, (3) incessant and unpredictable 
interference by President Mobutu. The latter, as mentioned earlier, and as has been 
pointed out by many analysts, such as Leslie (1987), considered himself to be not 
subject to any form of constraint. He could make large non-budgeted withdrawals 
from the Central Bank in local currency as well as in foreign currencies. 
Furthermore, Mobutu who regarded himself above the law, used to order the 
Treasury, the Central Bank or any state-owned company, such as Gecamines, to 
finance any project to which he decided to give his support.
5.3.3. Banking Institutions from 1967 to the mid-1970s
In the absence of active specialised financial institutions the banking network, 
comprising the Central Bank and a small number of deposit banks, was the most 
closely involved in dealing with credit and savings matters. Starting from 1968, 
beyond its powers formally defined by law, the Banque Nationale du Congo played
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a more important operational role because of the public sector's large volume of 
foreign exchange reserves and deposits, which it held.
Between June 1967 and June 1969 the volume of foreign exchange reserves 
in the hands of the Central Bank jumped from Z9.9 million to Z88.1 million, 
following the transfer of the accounts of Gecamines from commercial banks to the 
Central Bank, in compliance with a Presidential Decree of 13 January 1968 
(Moniteur Zairois, 1968). The reason for this shift was to ensure close State control 
of the resources of the State-owned company.
A special unit called Inspection Financiere de la Gecamines was created 
within the Central Bank for this purpose. Two officers, one from the Ministry of 
Finance, one from the Central Bank, were in charge of monitoring the operating 
and investment budgets of Gecamines and subsequently also of authorising 
withdrawals of funds from the main accounts kept by the Banque Nationale du 
Congo. The amounts withdrawn were transferred into the operational accounts of 
Gecamines held in commercial banks. In fact, the efficiency of the monitoring 
system was limited since it did not exercise any control of the utilisation of funds 
deposited in Gecamines' accounts with commercial banks (Banque Nationale du 
Congo, 1968/1969).
Furthermore, the relative share of credit to the public sector as a component 
of the money supply decreased compared with the share of foreign exchange 
reserves, as shown by a decline in the rate of its expansion. From Z79.6 million in 
June 1967, its volume amounted to Z89.7 million at the end of 1968, recording the 
smallest growth rate, 12.7 per cent, for many years (Banque Nationale du Congo, 
1968/1969).
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Figure 5.6: Money Supply, 1967-1976
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Banknote and coin circulation "^"Central Bank
  Deposit banks Post Office
 "Total bank money Total money supply ___
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque du Zaire annual reports 
1967-1976
One of the outstanding features of the development of commercial banks 
activities after June 1967 was a significant increase in resources at the banks' 
disposal, especially in the form of sight deposits, as shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. 
An increase in bank deposits can derive from any or all of the following: (1) an 
increase in export proceeds in particular, or external resources in general, converted 
into the domestic currency; (2) an increase in Government borrowing to finance the 
State budget deficit by money printing; and (3) an expansion of lending to the 
private sector. The inflationary potential of such deposits differs depending on each 
one of these factors. An analysis of the evolution of deposit figures carried out in 
this and subsequent sections aims at establishing a link between the structure of the 
money supply and the development of inflation and hyperinflation observed in 
Congo, especially after the 1970s.
The period between June 1967 and June 1969 was marked by a dramatic 
increase in bank deposits. This growth was essentially due to an improvement in 
external payments conditions, with the combined effect of an increase in prices for 
exports and faster transfer of export proceeds. From Z42.9 million in June 1967 
sight deposits grew to Z92.3 million in June 1969, an increase of Z49.4 million, or
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115 per cent. This doubling was also caused by an increase in the volume of credit 
to the private sector.
Figure 5.7 shows the evolution of bank deposits for the period December 
1966 to December 1976. As during the period 1967-69, the increase in deposits 
remained the main cause of the expansion of banks' resources over the period 1970 
to June 1971. The novelty during this period, however, was a significant increase in 
time deposits, which grew fourfold, from Z4.5 million in December 1969 to Z19.1 
million in June 1971, moving from 5.3 per cent to 14.1 per cent of total deposits 
(Banque Nationale du Congo/Banque du Zaire annual report series 1967-1976). 
Figure 5.7: Breakdown of bank deposits, 1966-1976
V V
 Total bank deposits "  "Sight deposits ~""^Time deposits
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque du Zaire 
annual reports 1966-1976.
This development was a result of the particular effort made by banking 
institutions to promote the development of time deposits with the support of the 
Banque du Zaire, 18 which issued a regulation allowing a higher interest rate on this 
type of deposits. The aim of this policy was to give the public an attractive 
incentive for savings with the prospect of selling Government bonds, as will be 
seen later, and improving the means of meeting the demand of businesses in need 
of investment funds. Time deposits served as a basis for determining the total
amount each bank was allowed to advance in medium-term loans. Therefore, an 
increase in time deposits enabled banking institutions to expand their medium-term 
credit operations. Starting from 1970 the structure of the money supply began to 
deteriorate dramatically. The deterioration continued over the rest of the period 
1967-1976. As shown in Table 5.12, the share of foreign exchange reserves started 
to decline, falling from 43.4 per cent in December 1970 to 30.1 per cent in 
December 1971.
Table 5.12: Variation of factors affecting money supply, 1968-1976 
(in Z millions)
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
1968 
31 D
+24.3
+7.6
+3.8
+35.7
+38.2
+24.5
+ 13.7
-2.5
1969 
31 D
+27.7
-5.0
+7.2
+29.9
+21.0
+ 16.6
+4.4
+8.9
1970 
31 D
-3.7
+ 11.9
+ 15.0
+23.2
+27.1
+34.1
-7.0
-3.9
1971 
30 J
-14.6
+26.2
+ 11.9
+24.1
+ 18.2
+ 15.2
+3.0
+5.9
31 D
-12.5
+4.1
+5.5
-2.9
-3.4
-12.6
+9.2
+0.5
1972 
30 J
-13.5
+ 13.9
+19.6
+ 17.6
+ 18.9
+26.2
-7.3
-1.3
31 D
+ 10.9
+ 15.9
+ 14.2
+41.0
+27.7
+ 19.9
+7.8
+ 13.3
1793 
31 D
+30.8
+24.3
+28.8
+46.4
+39.3
+25.9
+ 13.4
+7.1
1974 
31 D
-43.3
+ 139.0
+96.3
+ 192.0
+ 164.7
+ 101.6
+63.1
+27.3
1975 
31 D
-113.0
+ 120.9
+85.0
+92.9
+ 105.4
+71.3
+34.1
+55.7
1976 
31 D
+71.5
+378.8
+66.2
+516.5
+226.5
+216.3
+10.2
+290.0
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque du Za'ire, annual reports 1967-1976 
Legend: a: Foreign exchange reserves; b: Credit to State Treasury; c: Credit to private sector; d: 
Assets = Liabilities; e: Monetary liquidity: f: Money; g Quasi-money; h: Other.
The reason was that, in the meantime, the Government had failed to collect 
sufficient fiscal revenues and to control the volume of public expenditure. As a 
result, the share of Government borrowings essentially financed by the Central 
Bank, increased constantly, thus exerting a stronger inflationary pressure 
(Vanderlinden et al, 1980). The development of time deposits was in line with the 
regulation issued by the Banque du Zaire regarding the setting up of monetary 
instruments aimed at ensuring sound credit control. The Memorandum and Articles 
of Association of the Central Bank gave the Banque du Zaire the task of 
implementing an economic policy aimed at promoting investment in priority
18 Following the change in the country's name from Republique Democratique du Congo to 
Republique du Zaire on 27 October 1971, as mentioned in Chapter two of this study, the Banque 
Nationale du Congo took the name Banque du Zaire on the same date.
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sectors, such as agriculture and transport, and, at the same time, ensuring price and 
monetary stability (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
From 1963, the Central Bank exercised credit control by direct means, 
defining quantitative limits for each bank, basically according to the volume of 
deposits held by the bank in question. On the occasion of the monetary adjustment 
of 1967, a Decree of 22 June 1967 redefined the Banque du Zaire's responsibilities 
regarding to credit policy. These provisions were reinforced by a Decree of 14 
January 1972, which redefined the regulatory requirements governing the 
protection of savings and control of financial intermediaries, and which was known 
as the Banking Law (Moniteur Zai'rois, 1972). The Central Bank continued to set 
ceilings as a means of controlling the volume of credit. The demand for credit 
increased, especially following the devaluation of June 1967, as the new exchange 
rate required larger amounts of local currency to acquire foreign exchange for the 
purpose of financing imports and for other external payment
By and large, implementation of the monetary adjustment of June 1967 
programme resulted in the restoration of equilibrium in public finance and the 
balance of payments. The sharp devaluation of the national currency on the 
occasion of the issuance of the new monetary unit, the Zaire, combined with fiscal 
reform, provided the State with increased resources, on the one hand, and improved 
competitiveness of exports, on the other. In particular, it contributed to an 
improvement in the profitability of agricultural exports, in conjunction with a 
worldwide economic upward trend over the period 1967-69 (Leslie, 1987).
Export production resumed its expansion, and, as will be seen later, prices 
began to stabilise in June 1968. With regard to the balance of payments in 
particular, thanks to favourable copper prices and a considerable increase in 
agricultural export proceeds, the results were far better than expected. On the basis
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of 1966=100, the global price index of major mineral and agricultural exports 
calculated by the Central Bank moved from 94.3 at the end of 1967 to 98.6 at the 
end of 1968 (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1969/1970). 19 As mentioned earlier, the 
increase in export earnings was the result of an improvement in external as well as 
internal operating conditions. Mineral products were exported at favourable prices 
and agricultural exports increased in volume while the price of some of the 
commodities, such as coffee, increased significantly (Ministere de FEconomie 
Nationale et de 1'Industrie, 1969).
There was a small decrease in overall external expenditure due to a slight 
fall in imports caused, as mentioned earlier, by the sharp devaluation that 
accompanied the change of monetary unit. From Z70 million in the first half of 
1967, imports fell to Z47 million in the second half of the same year. At the same 
time there was an increase in other external expenditure, such as travel expenses 
following the liberalisation of external payments, which enabled people to travel 
abroad more frequently. The same liberalisation resulted in an increase in the 
transfer of expatriates' revenues and in the Government's external expenditure in 
foreign currencies (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967).
While the mining industry and agricultural sector enjoyed improved 
economic and financial operating conditions, the domestic manufacturing industry 
experienced a decline, for the following reason. Prior to the monetary adjustment of 
June 1967, the manufacturing sector took advantage of the import and external 
payment restrictions that meant demand having to be met with domestically 
produced goods. Following the liberalisation of external payments introduced by 
the monetary adjustment, the domestic manufacturing industry, which until then
19 A separate price index is calculated for mineral exports and agricultural exports, and weighted by 
85 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. The global index is the sum of the weighted outcome.
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had enjoyed a somewhat oligopolistic position, was affected by the stabilisation of 
consumption demand and the reappearance of competitiveness (Ministere de 
I'Economie Nationale et de 1'Industrie, 1969).
With regard to public finance, due to a delay that affected implementation 
of the stabilisation and restructuring measures decided in 1967, the goals targeted 
for the first stage of the programme were not achieved. In fact, no specific action 
had been taken so far in order to improve monitoring of the way the budget was 
administered, especially with regard to revenue collection. The financial 
equilibrium mentioned earlier was more specifically a result of favourable external 
trade conditions than an effect of improved internal governance. Over the first half 
of 1968 the Government even had occasional recourse to financing from the 
Central Bank (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1967). On the whole, the economic and 
monetary adjustment of June 1967 initiated a new era of economic growth, as GDP 
that had remained stagnant until then, resumed an upward trend, increasing by 
about 7 per cent per year in real terms starting from 1968 (Banque du Zaire, 1979).
However, because of the June 1967 devaluation, prices paid to rural 
producers of agricultural goods for export and for domestic consumption, as well as 
wages,
consequence, profits earned by exporting companies exceeded expectations, which 
enabled the Government to increase its revenue through indirect taxation, namely 
by raising the VAT by 60 per cent in 1967 (Lacroix, 1970; cited by Peemans, 
1997). Between 1967 and 1968 the earnings of workers in the private sector 
declined by 20 per cent in real terms. In 1968 the public sector legal minimum 
wage in the region of Kinshasa, the capital, represented on average 40 per cent (33 
per cent in the case of the lower categories of employees) of the 1960 level 
(Peemans, 1997). It emerges from these developments that the June 1967
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remained below export proceeds expressed in local currency. As a
stabilisation programme did very little, if any, to improve the living conditions of 
the population, which continued instead to decline, as can be seen from the figures 
above.
The beginning of the 1970s witnessed a downturn. In 1970 the Banque du 
Zaire introduced indirect qualitative means of controlling credit. The main 
objective of the recourse to these monetary instruments was to encourage the 
financing of economic activities considered a priority, such as crop production, as 
mentioned earlier, and investments. The system of direct credit control was 
essentially based on a number of ceilings allotted to specific economic sectors or 
groups of economic agents. For example, a special allocation was reserved for 
businesses created and owned by nationals in order to stimulate their development. 
In July 1970 the Banque du Zaire issued a set of measures contained in its 
instruction No. 8, which established indirect means of providing medium- and 
long-term loans intended for investments. Lending of this type was allowed under 
the condition that a certain percentage of it was covered by time deposit, the size of 
which depended on the duration of the deposit. In July 1972 a further amendment 
of instruction No. 8 removed the compulsory coverage for credit for the purpose of 
investment in agricultural activities.
Nevertheless, despite all these measures aimed at granting the agricultural 
sector an increasing nominal volume of credit, the relative share of this sector 
continued to decline over the time. It fell from 33 per cent in December 1970 to 24 
per cent in December 1971, and 23 per cent in June 1972. On 3 July 1972 the 
Banque du Zaire issued a revised regulation aimed at totally liberalising credit to 
the agricultural sector (Banque du Zaire, 1972).
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5.3.4. Money Supply from 1967 to the mid-1970s
As pointed out earlier, between June 1960 and June 1967, the main cause of 
monetary expansion was an excessive increase in borrowing by the Treasury. From 
June 1967 to June 1970 the development money supply was to a certain extent 
marked by accumulated balance of payments surpluses. On 30 June 1967, the 
money supply comprised 43 per cent banknote and coin circulation (34 per cent in 
1958) and 57 per cent bank and Post Office demand deposits. The growth of the 
share of banknote and coin circulation compared with 1958 was due to successive 
increases in wages and salaries over the period, a growth in the population's 
consumption expenditure, as new wage-earners began to use cash, and a certain 
amount of hoarding in rural areas. The proportion of bank deposits as a component 
of the money supply shifted from 57 per cent in June 1967 to 66 per cent at the end 
of June 1968 (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1968/1969).
Quasi-money liquidity comprised time deposits and provisions in domestic 
currency intended for the purchase, at an uninsured exchange rate, of foreign 
exchange needed for payment for imports, the exchange value of foreign exchange 
accounts held by residents, and funds in local currency generated from external 
grants and loans to the State. On 30 June 1968 quasi-money represented about one- 
third of the money supply (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1968/1969).
The expansion of money supply in 1969 continued to be marked by an 
increase of 32.5 per cent in foreign exchange reserves (39.8 per cent in 1968) as a 
result of favourable prices of exports, especially copper, which continued to benefit 
from high prices until the mid-1970s. On the other hand there was a decline of 5.4 
per cent in lending by the banking system to the Treasury, which was benefiting 
from an increase in export duties following the favourable export prices mentioned 
earlier, especially during the second half of 1969. In the meantime the volume of
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credit to enterprises recorded a relative increase and consequently contributed to a 
more significant extent to the development of money supply. For the first time 
since the monetary adjustment of 24 June 1967, during the first half of 1969, total 
credit to businesses recorded a significant increase, as it grew by 48.4 per cent 
compared with lending figures at the end of 1968 (Banque Nationale du Congo, 
1968/1969).
Figure 5.8: Retail prices and money supply indices, 1968-1970 
(June 1968=100)
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  Shop prices ^^  Market prices     Money supply
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque du Zaire, 
1970/1971
The volume of credit from the banking system to the Government 
constitutes by definition the monetary financing of the State Treasury. The banking 
institutions subscribed Treasury bonds issued by the Government, the Central Bank 
taking the largest part of the issued securities. During the second half of 1969 and 
the first half of 1970 no use was made of this type of financing, which explained 
the relative stability of prices observed in 1969 and over the first half of 1970, as 
can be seen from Figure 5.8 above.
By and large, the global structure of the money supply over 1969 proved to 
be fairly stable, even showing a slight 2.4 per cent decline during the second half of 
the same year. However, the expansion of the money supply resumed over the first 
half of 1970, recording a 13.8 per cent increase in six months, essentially due to the
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following three causes: (1) increase in foreign exchange reserves; (2) expansion of 
credit to enterprises and households, and, from 1 January 1970, (3) abolition of 
compulsory provisions for imports (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1969/1970).
This growth of the money supply was a source of additional demand 
pressure, which undermined the relative price stability observed until the middle of 
1970. Indeed, from a level of 1.3 per cent between December 1969 and December 
1970 the increase in average index retail prices in Kinshasa rose to 12.5 per cent 
between December 1970 and December 1971 (IRES, 1972).20 The decrease 
recorded between June 1967 and June 1970 in the relative share of banknote and 
coin circulation in the global structure of money supply reflected a decline in the 
wealth of the local population, those whose income was essentially held in cash. 
With regard to bank deposits, the share of each of the three major holders - private 
enterprises, households, and the public sector - remained the same in 1969 as in 
1968: 53 per cent for private enterprises, 23 per cent for households, and 17 per 
cent for the public sector (Banque Nationale du Congo, 1969/1970).
From December 1969 to December 1970, the money supply increased by 
22.4 per cent, to Z186.0 million compared with Z151.9 million at the end of 1969. 
This development resulted from an increase in lending to the Treasury and to 
private enterprises and households. The change in the share of each component of 
the money supply that began in the early 1970s continued over the period 1970- 
1975 (Banque du Zaire, 1976). A major change occurred in the structure of money 
supply from 1972 onwards. It consisted of a decline in the share of banknote and 
coin circulation in favour of bank money. The proportion of this in the money 
supply amounted to 59.2 per cent compared with 58.2 per cent in 1973 and 1972. A
20 IRES stands for Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, Universite Lovanium de 
Kinshasa.
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close correlation between this development and the structure of bank money 
depositors can be established. Namely, it reflects a decline in the share held by 
households from 35.1 per cent to 27.4 per cent, and an increase in the share held by 
businesses from 61.8 per cent to 68.8 per cent (Banque du Zaire, 1976).
Two major factors explain this change in the structure of bank deposits. 
Firstly, it could be seen as an effect of zairianisation insofar as the change in the 
ownership of businesses previously belonging to foreigners was likely to trigger a 
reduction in the volume of undisclosed external transfers of revenue. Secondly, the 
development of bank money was also a result of the opening of new bank branches. 
In this respect figures relating to the geographical distribution of money supply 
revealed the marked predominance of the region of Kinshasa, which was the 
country's most important industrial and commercial region. It held 81.1 per cent of 
the money supply in 1974 compared with 69.3 per cent in 1973.
Similarly, the relative share of the region of Kinshasa in the total volume of 
bank money amounted to 71.4 per cent in 1974 compared with 61.8 per cent and 
63.9 per cent in 1973 and 1972 respectively. The region of Katanga, known as the 
second industrial development area, held 15.3 per cent of bank money in 1974, 
compared with 22.5 per cent in 1973 and 19.8 per cent in 1972 (Banque du Zaire, 
1974). The two most industrialised regions of the country therefore between them 
held 86.7 per cent of bank deposits. The smallness of the remaining portion - 13.3 
per cent - for the rest of the country reflected the banking network's obvious 
weakness and lack of presence in much of the huge territory, and thus a lack of 
monetary penetration and of integration into the monetary economy of most of the 
rural population. It also reflected the decline in agricultural activities in areas 
known in the past for a more significant output of coffee and tea among other 
export products, such as the northern and eastern regions.
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With regard to the components of the money supply, the decline in foreign 
exchange reserves from the early 1970s continued. This was a result of an increase 
in foreign exchange expenditure due to the growing cost of external debt servicing. 
As a consequence, the share of foreign exchange reserves as a component of money 
supply fell by one-half in 1974 compared with 1973.
The increase in banking institutions' lending to enterprises that had started 
in the early 1970s continued, owing to the ongoing business recovery subsequent to 
the 24 June 1967 monetary adjustment. From Z137.9 million at the end of 1973 the 
volume of this type of credit amounted to Z234.3 million at the end of 1974, 
recording 69.8 per cent growth, compared with increases of 50.6 per cent and 51.8 
per cent in 1973 and 1972 respectively. The volume of credit to the Treasury 
continued to expand as well, as it grew from Z188.5 million at the end of 1973 to 
Z327.5 million at the end of 1974, recording an increase of 73.7 per cent in twelve 
months. The excessive development of public expenditure, regardless of budgetary 
rules and available resources, was a direct consequence of anarchic budgetary 
management by the Government the consequences of which are analysed in the 
next paragraph.
This lack of budgetary discipline regardless of strict formal legal 
provisions, which were constantly breached with impunity at all levels of the 
country's political and administrative organisation, was one of the most typical 
features of the Congolese monetary and financial crisis over the second half the 
20th century. Overall the Congolese economic situation in 1975 was characterised 
by the following features: (1) accelerated inflation reflected in a dramatic increase 
in retail prices, as illustrated by Figure 5.10, (2) sharp fall in raw material prices 
and subsequent decline in export proceeds followed by a further fall in output, (3) 
exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, (4) appearance of a negative balance of
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foreign exchange reserves, and (5) a dramatic increase in internal credit (Banque 
du Zaire, 1975).
As a consequence of a decline in public revenue following adverse 
economic effects of the 1973 and 1974 zairianisation and radicalisation policy 
analysed in a previous section, the Treasury requested more financing from the 
banking system in 1975. This additional borrowing, essentially financed by 
monetisation, increased the inflationary pressure witnessed since the beginning of 
the 1970s. Public expenditure decreased by 20 per cent in 1975 compared with 
1974. The decline resulted from an attempt to halt the rise of State operational 
expenditure. Furthermore, for lack of foreign exchange reserves, the Government 
resorted to renouncing the completion of a number of capital investment projects, 
which entailed costs in foreign currencies (Banque du Zaire, 1975).
Public revenue declined sharply as a consequence of a severe fall in exports 
and imports combined with a fall in prices for exported raw materials. In addition 
there was a growing incidence in the frontier regions of tropical commodities, such 
as coffee and palm oil, being smuggling out of the country, which consequently 
reduced the tax base.
Overall, the end of the first half of the 1970s was marked by the combined 
adverse effects of external and internal factors. From an external point of view the 
economic recession that hit industrialised countries after 1973 resulted in a decline 
in the demand for major raw materials exported by Congo, and this contributed to a 
widening of the deficit on the external current account. From an internal point of 
view the decline in export revenues was due not only to unfavourable external 
prices but also to a fall in the volume of exported agricultural and mineral products. 
The decrease in agricultural exports was a consequence of the 1973/74 
zairianisation and radicalisation policies. Furthermore, the fall in the export of
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mineral products was one of the adverse effects of a long-lasting civil war in 
Angola. This war caused the closure of the cheapest means of transporting 
Congolese products, namely the Benguela railway that linked the Congolese 
mineral province of Katanga to Lobito seaport in Angola.
As a consequence of these developments the State budget deficit widened 
and led the Treasury to require more monetary financing from the Central Bank in 
the absence of domestic savings that could be invested in financial securities issued 
for this purpose. This monetary financing helped to reinforce inflationary pressures 
as a result of further decline in supply and increase in demand, as can be seen from 
Figure 5.10 (Banque du Zaire, 1976).
Figure 5.9: Money supply, Retail prices and Minimum 
wage, 1971-76 (1970=100)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Source: based on Banque du Zaire annual report series 1971-1978 
The next section addresses various programmes attempted from the mid- 
1970s to the mid-1990s in order to halt the deterioration of the overall economic 
and financial position and restore the basic conditions needed for resuming a 
durable development process. It will be seen from the analysis carried out that all 
the programmes failed systematically soon after they were launched. This study 
looks at the major monetary and financial aggregates and events year by year, in as 
much detail as possible. This approach has proved to be the most efficient means of
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showing the extent to which a poor governance, carried out on a one-day-at-a-time 
basis, was the reason why all the stabilisation programmes attempted were doomed 
to failure.
5.4. Monetary and Financial Developments 
from the mid-1970s to 1995
5.4.1. Monetary Adjustments over the Period 1976-1980
In order to cushion demand pressure due to excessive internal borrowing in 1975 
mentioned in the previous section, the Central Bank issued an instruction in the 
middle of 1975 that increased banks' compulsory reserve ratio from 40 to 45 per 
cent (Banque du Zaire, 1975). The recourse to this monetary instrument 
consequently reduced the volume of liquid assets that the banks had available for 
loans. Nevertheless it failed to result in a significant decrease in the volume of 
credit, which instead continued to grow (Banque du Zaire, 1977). The combined 
effect of worldwide economic crisis and adverse outcome of the zairianisation and 
radicalisation policies mentioned in the previous section, contributed to a further 
deterioration of the Congolese economic situation. To put an end to the continuing 
overall decline, President Mobutu created in November 1975 a special four- 
member team called Comite de Stabilisation (Stabilisation Committee), which 
comprised the Head of the Presidential Bureau, the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister in charge of State-owned enterprises and the State's shareholdings in joint 
ventures, known in Congo at that time as Ministre du Portefeuille (Minister of the 
Portfolio) and the Governor of the Banque du Zaire (Young, 1985).
The Committee's first task was to present to the President a set of measures 
aimed at addressing the most urgent problems first. The second task was to draw up
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an overall adjustment programme and define appropriate actions for each sector of 
the economy. The programme was prepared with technical and financial support 
from the IMF and launched on 12 March 1976. It was essentially aimed at 
gradually restoring financial equilibrium in order to restore long-lasting growth 
prospects for the country (Bornemann et aL, 1997).
The domestic dimension of the programme consisted of urgent measures 
relating to the State budget, lending, wages and prices. With regard to the budget, 
the programme fixed ceilings for the following: (1) public expenditure, (2) money 
creation for the purpose of financing the budget deficit, and (3) expenditure in 
foreign currencies. A ceiling was also placed on the volume of credit to enterprises 
and households in order to keep the demand pressure under control (Banque du 
Zaire, 1976).
Furthermore, the monetary unit, which had been pegged to the US dollar 
since the creation of the Zaire at the rate of Zl = USD2, was devalued by about 40 
per cent and the peg was changed from the USD to the IMF Special Drawing Right 
(SDR). The new parity therefore became Zl = SDR1 or USD1.20. The peg to the 
SDR was supposed to help reduce exchange fluctuations (Bornemann et aL, 1979). 
This devaluation was intended to improve export businesses' cash position and 
reduce public and private consumption in order to establish a balance between 
demand and supply. The measure was also aimed at increasing State budgetary 
resources and at helping to offset the operating deficit of Gecamines. The 
programme provided for a gradual reduction in the annual external debt servicing 
cost by USD90 million. The objective of this provision was to restore external 
credibility. In the meanwhile multilateral negotiations regarding medium-term and 
long-term external debt were planned for the purpose of reducing the debt servicing 
burden starting from 1976.
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Lastly, a series of measures were issued to improve agricultural production 
and facilitate the recovery of enterprises that had been subjected to the 
zainanisation and radicalisation policies addressed earlier. Following the overall 
mismanagement by a vast majority of the new owners, most of the farms and small 
and medium-size expropriated businesses were gradually given back to their former 
owners. With regard to the enterprises nationalised within the framework of the 
radicalisation policy the Government and representatives of the former 
expropriated owners entered into negotiations. These resulted in a partnership 
agreement under which the former owners recovered 60 per cent of the shares, 
while the remaining 40 per cent were either retained by the State which was 
supposed to pay compensation for them, or were sold to local people (Young and 
Turner, 1985).
Implementation of the 1976 programme failed to meet expectations, and the 
economy showed no sign of recovery, while the State budget deficit financed by 
money printing amounted to Z300 million, or five times the budgeted deficit for the 
same year (Vanderlinden et al, 1980). Following the failure of the 1976 monetary 
adjustment programme, the Government drew up another monetary reform 
programme for 1977, which included the following major provisions: (1) reduction 
of borrowing by the State Treasury from Z300 million to Z160 million; (2) 
additional export dues on petrol and coffee; (3) quantitative control on credit by 
means of the imposition of ceilings; (4) freezing of wages and salaries at their 1976 
level; (5) tighter control over revenue from exports; and (6) progressive settlement 
of outstanding external payments and redefinition of external debt policy aimed at 
enabling the State to seek funds on the capital markets for productive and priority 
investment projects. This programme was developed with the support of the IMF 
and the benefit of a stand-by credit agreement. It was also intended to test the
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capacity of the State to put an end to the squandering of resources and stick to 
sound financial management (Bornemann et at., 1979).
Like all the previous programmes, this new one also failed to meet 
expectations. Despite a sharper increase in revenue than in expenditure in 1977, the 
global deficit of the State budget amounted to Z273.5 million for the year, 
compared with Z160 million budgeted. In 1978 the deficit amounted to Z566.2 
million. This development was the result of the mining sector's reduced 
contribution to total budgetary revenue, down to 20 per cent and 15 per cent in 
1977 and 1978 respectively, compared with 50 per cent in 1974. A continuing 
depressed level of export prices for copper and the consequent weakening position 
of Gecamines, which had meant the company receiving sizeable tax relief since 
1975, explained this sharp fall (Bornemann et al., 1979).
As well as the inflationary impact of chronic budget deficits, the volume of 
credit distributed by the banking system to enterprises and households was 
expanding faster than was needed by the economy to sustain growth of marketable 
GDP. The expansion of credit was the only means of absorbing the excessive 
liquidity at banks' disposal. To fight the inflationary effect of these developments 
the Banque du Zaire introduced more stringent provisions concerning its reserve 
requirement policy. However, in the absence of any effective measures to improve 
supply conditions, the increase in public consumption expenditure, financed by 
money creation essentially from the Central Bank, resulted in a higher demand 
pressure, reflected in higher prices and in the currency's subsequent decline in 
purchasing power.
At the same time, the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves reduced 
import capacity while the volume of short- and medium-term external debt 
servicing arrears was growing dramatically. At the end of 1978 the external debt
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was estimated at about USD3 billion, of which one-third represented accumulated 
arrears. Exchange rate policy and exchange control measures taken during the 
period 1977-78 were generally designed to address the problem of growing foreign 
exchange scarcity. Despite continual tightening-up of the payment regime, arrears 
continued to accumulate year after year. This situation was a consequence of the 
borrowing frenzy the Government had initiated in the early 1970s, which is 
explained as follows. As one of the outcomes of the monetary adjustment of June 
1967, the increase in public fiscal resources, combined with favourable export 
prices between 1967 and 1970, resulted in a temporary restoration of equilibrium in 
the State's accounts. This relatively comfortable position contributed to an 
improvement in the country's credit rating. It enabled the Government to borrow 
on the international financial markets in order to compensate for the deterioration 
in the terms of trade observed since the early 1970s (Leslie, 1987).
Most of the loans negotiated during that period were contracted on 
unfavourable terms and without due consideration to the return in terms of output 
and foreign exchange. A few examples are: (1) the very expensive project to 
transport electrical power from the Inga dam to the mining region of Shaba; (2) a 
USD200 million steel mill at Maluku, near Kinshasa; (3) the construction of Voix 
du Zaire (a broadcasting centre), the country's radio and television station at an 
estimated cost of USD 100 million; and (4) the construction of an International 
Trade Centre in Kinshasa. Between 1972 and 1974, Citibank was the lead manager 
in arranging loans to Zaire for a total of about USD 164 million. By 1974, US 
commercial banks had granted USD200 million in US government-guaranteed 
loans and USD 123 million in unguaranteed loans to Congo (Leslie, 1987). As a 
result, very soon the country started failing to meet its commitments and to 
accumulate a heavy burden of external debt arrears (Vanderlinden et a/, 1980).
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Following a devaluation of about 40 per cent and a change of peg from the 
USD to the SDR in March 1976, the exchange rate of the Z against the SDR 
remained unchanged at Zl = SDRl until the end of October 1978 (Bornemann et 
aL, 1979). During this period, due to rapid inflation, Zaire's export competitiveness 
was adversely affected. So was the profitability of domestic production compared 
with rival products imported through official channels. In an effort to increase 
exports of diamonds from small-scale producers through the official market, 
starting from April 1977, the Banque du Zaire began to apply a preferential 
exchange rate to the export proceeds from these diamonds. In this respect, the 
exchange rate was revised from Z1.825 to Z2.20 for USD1 in August 1977, and 
Z2.92 for USD1 in January 1978. In view of serious dislocations in the domestic 
economy resulting from the widening disparity between the official and unofficial 
market rates, the Government initiated a new policy of successive devaluations of 
the national currency. Between November 1978 and January 1979 the Z was 
devaluated by a cumulative 50 per cent (Bornemann et al., 1979).21
It emerges from the analysis carried out in this section that starting from the 
mid-1970s the Government went on from one adjustment to another. In June 1981 
the Z was subjected to another devaluation of 40 per cent. However, the same 
causes as in the case of previous adjustment programmes undermined the 
implementation of planned measures and the achievement of goals that were 
targeted in 1981. The first contributing factor to the programme's chronic failure 
was excessive monetary financing of the State current budget deficit, which caused 
a 37 per cent increase in money supply for the year. In addition, irrational 
economic decisions, improvisation, wasting of resources in unproductive
21 From Zl = SDR0.9 on 1 November 1978 to Zl = SDR0.81 on 7 November 1978, to Zl 
SDR0.7614 on 27 November 1978, and to Zl = SDR0.5 on 2 January 1979.
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investments and widespread corruption, all led to the overall dislocation of the 
economy. These monetary and financial developments took place in a context 
marked by a severe deterioration of the transport infrastructure, decline in export 
volume and proceeds, exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, decrease in 
imports, and growing external debt and accumulated arrears on external payments 
and debt servicing (Leslie, 1987).
5.4.2. Banking Institutions and Money Supply over the Period 1976-1980
The analysis carried out in the following sections explains how periods of high 
inflation and hyperinflation developed in Congo between mid-1975 and 1995 as a 
consequence of the overall mismanagement of public finance. It tracks the 
quantitative developments of the money supply to establish a strong correlation 
between the process of money creation intended to finance chronic State budget 
deficits and the development of inflation over the period. As well as the 
quantitative dimension of the money creation process, the analysis attempts to 
depict as far as possible the socio-political context of the period.
In 1976, the money supply expanded more rapidly than in 1975, which 
brought its volume to Z678.7 million at the end of the year, compared with Z462.4 
million at the end of 1975, implying 46.8 per cent growth (Banque du Zaire, 1976). 
The main cause of this expansion was a large volume of borrowing by the 
Treasury. The increase in money creation for the Treasury was aimed at 
compensating for an expected reduction in fiscal revenue from Gecamines. Within 
the framework of the 12 March 1976 stabilisation programme, the Government 
extended substantial tax relief to this mining company (Bornemann et al, 1979).
Furthermore, lending to businesses and households decreased by about 22 
per cent, falling from Z85.4 million at the end of 1975 to Z66.2 million at the end
of 1976. This decline reflected interruptions in the production process due to an 
exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, which in turn caused a shortage of 
domestic semi-processed goods and imported products. As a matter of fact the 
downward trend was a continuation of the adverse effect of zairianisation, despite 
the reversal of government policies launched in September 1976 to return most 
businesses to their former owners (Bomemann et a!,, 1979).
In 1976, contrary to what happened in 1975, the increase in the money 
supply affected bank money more than fiduciary money, as the share of the latter 
fell from 44.4 per cent in 1975 to 42.2 per cent in 1976, while the share of bank 
money rose from 55.6 per cent to 57.8 per cent (Banque du Zaire, 1976). A steady 
depreciation of the national currency led to an increase in nominal value spending 
to compensate for the decline in purchasing power. As a result, the relative share of 
bank deposits held by households decreased from 30 per cent at the end of 1975 to 
26.5 per cent at the end of 1976. The share of bank deposits held by public and 
private enterprises grew from 67.5 per cent in 1975 to 70.3 per cent in 1976. This 
was due to the combined effect of an adjustment of industrial prices, and a decline 
in the stock of imported raw materials, for lack of sufficient foreign exchange to 
cover the related external payments. With regard to the regional distribution of 
bank deposits, the share of Kinshasa declined slightly, from 71.2 per cent in 1975 
to 68.6 per cent at the end of 1976 (Banque du Zaire, 1976).
The changes in the composition of the money supply revealed an 
improvement in the balance of foreign exchange reserves as it moved from a 
negative position, with a Z45.5 million deficit at the end of 1975 to a Z26 million 
positive balance at the end of 1976. This development was due to (1) an 
improvement in the trade balance resulting from the overall impact of the 12 March 
1976 devaluation, (2) periodic rescheduling of external debt servicing payments, as
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the due dates became imminent, and (3) withdrawal of IMF facilities. The 
improvement in the trade balance resulted from high prices for exported tropical 
commodities, such as coffee, which led to higher export earnings, as well as from a 
rescheduling agreement with official creditors regarding loans totalling USD389 
million maturing between 1975 and 1977 (Bornemann et al., 1979).
As a result, the country managed to slightly improve its net foreign asset 
position and to build up funds in an earmarked account with the Bank for 
International Settlements, for the purpose of repaying the principal due to a group 
of banks participating in the Club of London. Furthermore, this improvement in the 
net foreign asset position enabled domestic banks to cover an increased proportion 
of their customers' letters of credit in foreign exchange, which they were obliged to 
do, in view of the country's unfavourable credit standing (Bornemann et al., 1979).
As mentioned earlier, the country's external payments problems derived 
from the rapid increase in its external debt servicing obligations, which reduced its 
creditworthiness and led lenders to become increasingly reluctant to lend to the 
country. The result was a decrease in the volume of new loans as well as an 
improvement in loan conditions, given that since 1976 the Government had been 
anxious to avoid loan arrangements on unfavourable terms. At the same time, as a 
consequence of the 12 March 1976 stabilisation programme, the Government 
became more cautious in its borrowing policy. In 1976, a special body called 
Office de Gestion de la Dette Publique (Office of Public Debt Management) 
(OGEDEP), was set up, in charge of managing the public debt (Leslie, 1987).
The banking system's net credit balance with the Treasury amounted to 
Z804.4 million at the end of 1976. This represented an 88.9 per cent increase on the 
total of Z426 million at the end of 1975. As well as the decrease in revenues 
resulting from the tax relief granted to Gecamines, as mentioned earlier, this
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recourse to increased borrowing from the banking system was due to the fact that 
State operational expenditure grew faster than the increase in public revenues 
expected as an effect of the 12 March 1976 adjustment programme. In the 
meantime, from Z319.4 million at the end of 1975 the volume of credit to 
enterprises and households grew by 20.7 per cent, to Z385.6 million at the end of 
1976 (Banque du Zaire, 1976). Compared with the 88.9 per cent increase in credit 
to the Treasury over the same period of time, this modest expansion of credit to the 
private sector illustrates the prominent role of public expenditure financed by 
money creation in the development of inflation in Congo.
In 1977 money supply increased by Z461.5 million, or twice the growth 
recorded in 1976, as a result of a 39.3 per cent increase in the volume of credit to 
enterprises and households, while the amount of credit to the Treasury increased by 
42.4 per cent. Time deposits in 1977 recorded 97.8 per cent growth, as a 
consequence of a quasi-total absence of investment opportunities for businesses, 
which resorted to depositing their surplus liquidity in bank accounts, despite the 
high inflation rate. Moreover, regardless of a significant improvement in the prices 
of exported commodities, such as coffee, timber and tin, the balance of foreign 
exchange reserves became negative, showing a deficit of Z201.7 million. The 
reasons for this were as follows: (1) low copper prices, which remained a major 
contributing factor; (2) upsurge of fraudulent exports, especially of gold, diamonds 
and coffee through the north-eastern boundaries; and (3) underestimation of 
repatriated export proceeds (Banque du Zaire, 1977). While low prices for exported 
commodities were due to external market conditions, smuggling and 
underestimated exports were facilitated by an inefficient fiscal and customs 
administration.
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From Z804.8 million in 1976 the volume of credit to the Treasury amounted 
to Z 1,145.8 million at the end of 1977, a 42.4 per cent increase, as a consequence 
of further expansion of public expenditure. These consisted of budgeted as well as 
unforeseen and unplanned expenses. A closer look at the State budget revealed that 
most of the spending forecasts were underestimated whereas revenue forecasts 
were overestimated. Moreover, the inflation rate was such that the real value of 
public revenues collected was far below the level estimated at the time of budget 
setting. Furthermore, it is worth repeatedly stressing that a large portion, if not the 
largest, of the unforeseen and unplanned expenditure was due to unpredictable 
discretionary decisions by President Mobutu, who used to interfere in the State 
budget management. He frequently did so regardless of legal provisions as he 
considered himself above the law and, therefore, exempt from any restrictions. The 
volume of credit to enterprises and households amounted to Z537.0 million in 1*977 
compared with Z385.6 million in 1976. The 39.3 per cent increase was essentially 
due to difficulties encountered in exporting goods across the country's eastern 
border, which delayed the repatriation of export proceeds and, thus, the repayment 
of the associated loans.
To explain the increase in public expenditure, one has to consider that in 
addition to habitual overspending, initiated mostly by President Mobutu, the years 
1977 and 1978 were marked by two guerrilla attacks on Kolwezi in the region of 
Katanga. The first attack, called the 80-day war was launched on 8 March 1977 
from bases in Angola by the Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo (FLNC) 
and was repelled in 80 days by the national army, with the assistance of Moroccan 
troops. On 3 May 1978 the FLNC launched a second attack and occupied Kolwezi. 
Following reports of the killing of European citizens, the French and Belgians 
joined the national army in a paratroop-drop operation, which forced the FLNC to
withdraw back to Angola. The 1977 war of 80 days, together with the second 
attack in early May 1978, hit the heart of the economy, the copper belt, which 
aggravated an already difficult economic situation. As a result of these two wars, 
mineral production and export declined, with a subsequent fall in foreign exchange 
reserves, and in fiscal and customs revenues along with other adverse effects on the 
overall economy, such as a further decrease in industrial production capacity, 
unemployment, and deterioration of the transport and social infrastructure (Banque 
du Zaire, 1977-1978; Leslie, 1987).
In 1978 lending by the banking system to the Treasury amounted to Z528.2 
million and remained the main cause of inflationary pressure. The renewed 
acceleration of the increase in total credit, at a rate of 41 per cent for the year, was 
the result of developments in credit to the Treasury on the one hand, and to 
enterprises and households on the other. With a larger deficit in the State budget, 
the Central Bank stepped up its lending to the Government, by means of printing 
money, especially during the last quarter when the increase reached an annual rate 
of 79 per cent. For the year as a whole the increase reached 51 per cent, nearly 
twice as high as in 1977 (Banque du Zaire, 1978).
The expansion of credit to businesses and households slowed down 
substantially in 1978 when the growth rate fell to nearly half the level reached in 
1977, because of reduced demand for loans as a result of the low level of economic 
activity and restrictive policies adopted by the Central Bank. Such growth that 
there was in lending to enterprises was largely directed at the agricultural sector, 
where the increase that had started in 1977 continued during 1978 (Banque du 
Zaire, 1978). The major factor responsible for this situation was a significant 
increase in outstanding loans to the coffee sector. Namely, due to favourable world 
market prices and to a liberalisation of the coffee export sector, new loans to coffee
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exporters rose considerably. The repayment of these loans was to be covered by the 
coffee export proceeds. However, transportation problems caused delays in 
shipment and thus, in sales. In the meantime there was a significant fall in coffee 
prices, which caused substantial losses for some exporters who were having to sell 
at lower prices. As a result, a large number of outstanding agricultural loans 
remained unpaid for a period far beyond the contractual terms, and became a cause 
of concern for the banking sector, as the overdue credits were deducted from the 
quota available for new lending (Banque du Zaire, 1978).
In addition to the causes mentioned above, the following contributing 
factors are worth taking into account to explain the expansion of credit to 
enterprises and households: (1) lending to assist the recovery of large distribution 
companies, (2) liberalisation of credit terms for loans intended for commercial 
activities in the interior of the country, and (3) liberalisation of commercial 
activities as a result of "dezairianisation" measures (Banque du Zaire, 1979).
The continuation of money creation on a large scale to finance the 
Treasury's widening deficit and the increase in credit to enterprises and 
households, combined with a decline in the overall supply, resulted in excessive 
liquidity in the economy. The effect of this was a high inflation rate of 80 per cent 
in 1978, and 115 per cent in 1979. Since wages and salaries never kept up with 
inflation the resulting decline in purchasing power was substantial. As no possible 
action could be undertaken to improve demand due to its inelasticity, the Central 
Bank and the Government decided to merely reduce the volume of money supply. 
Therefore the Banque du Zaire announced on 25 December 1979 the withdrawal of 
Z5 and Z10 banknotes, which were in any case subject to speculative hoarding 
(Mabi, 1997). The reason for this was that first, banks were experiencing a 
dramatic shortage of liquidity and could, therefore, hardly convert deposits of their
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customers into cash. Second, the Z5 and Z 10 notes proved to be the most needed in 
an increasing number of transactions requiring cash payment, especially due to the 
inconvertibility of bank deposits. Third, as a result, people undertook to hold large 
amount of these notes for their own use in the future, or to be exchanged later on 
for bank deposits when the exchange rate cashlbank deposit was at the highest in 
favour of cash holders, as yet payments in favour of public bodies, such as fiscal 
dues and other public administrative authorities were made in bank deposits. 
The subsequent reduction of money supply affected essentially banknote 
and coin circulation. The volume of the later fell by a half as measured at the end of 
December 1979 compared with the volume recorded at the end of November of the 
same year (Banque du ZaIre, 1980). Overall, the 25 December 1979 withdrawal of 
banknotes resulted in dramatic losses for most of the citizens all over the country. 
for the following reasons. On the one hand, the exchange period allowed - namely 
five days, copied from a similar exchange operation carried out in Belgium after 
the Second W orId War - was too short in the Congolese context. 
In view of the sparseness of the banking network over such a large country, 
the great majority of citizens were unable to exchange their modest and yet 
precious savings for new banknotes. This created a deep feeling of frustration 
among the population, who consequently developed a profound distrust of the 
Government (Kabuya et al., 1981). In 1979, the Congolese economy benefited 
from an increase in export proceeds due to favourable prices for exported 
commodities, such as copper, cobalt, tin and coffee. And yet the overall evolution 
of net foreign exchange reserves was marked by an insufficiency of foreign 
exchange in relation to the constantly growing volume of public expenditure and 
liabilities in foreign currencies. (Banque du ZaIre, 1979). Moreover, the State 
budget deficit continued to grow, mostly as a result of the overall mismanagement 
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of public finance. For the same year total borrowing by the Treasury accounted for 
82.3 per cent of the money supply, while claims on the private sector represented 
28.2 per cent.
Figure 5.10: Exchange rate Zl/USD and Zl/SDR, 
1967-1979
 Zaire 1 in US$    Zaire 1 in SDK
Source: compiled by the author, based on Kabuya et al. ( 1979)
The Government launched a further stabilisation programme aimed at 
halting the deterioration of the country's overall economic, financial and social 
situation. A set of measures were introduced, including another devaluation 
announced on 27 August 1979, which reduced the January 1979 exchange rate of 
Z2 for SDR1 to Z2.66 for SDR1, or Z2.05 for USD1 (Banque du Zaire, 1979).22
The devaluation of 27 August 1979 was one of the measures taken within 
the framework of an adjustment programme defined with the support of the IMF 
for the period running from 1 July 1979 to the end of 1980. The main objective of 
the programme was to restore equilibrium between demand and supply of goods 
and services. In this respect, measures were taken to limit and to better control the 
allocation of credit and foreign exchange resources to the State and to private-
22 Launched on 24 June 1967 to replace the CF at the rate of Zl = CF 1,000, and pegged to the USD 
at the rate of USD1 = Z0.50, the Zaire was worth USD0.49 by the end of 1979, as a result of the 
following course of events, which is shown in Figure 5.10. On 12 March 1976 the Z was pegged to 
the IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR) at Zl - SDR1. At that time the equivalent value of the Z 
against the USD was Z0.81 = USD1. Between 1 November 1978 and 2 January 1979 the exchange 
rate was adjusted in four steps to Z2 = SDR1 (Kabuya et a/., 1979).
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sector enterprises and households, as a means of curbing the development of 
factors responsible for the expansion of money supply. A ceiling was accordingly 
placed on the rate of increase in credit to both the State Treasury and to businesses. 
At the same time a total amount of USD90 million credit was made 
available by the Central Bank to industrial and agricultural companies in August
1979 to enable them to import raw materials and semi-finished products. This first 
allocation was followed by a second of USD20 million granted in September 1980, 
and a third of USD 15 million in December of the same year. These facilities were 
granted within the framework of an investment programme known as the Mobutu 
Plan, aimed at increasing the supply of goods intended for the domestic market as 
well as for export. The agricultural sector and transport facilities were to take the 
largest share of the funds to invest. The programme also provided for a progressive 
reduction of Congo's arrears on external payments in order to steadily restore the 
country's creditworthiness.
The implementation of this programme was relatively successful as 
measured in absolute values. At the end of 1980 the State budget deficit amounted 
to Z337 million. This deficit was financed by Z90 million in external resources, 
and by Z238 million from the domestic banking system, or about one-half of the 
monetary financing ceiling of Z440 million targeted in the programme (Banque du 
Zaire, 1980). This development was the result of more efficient tax collection by 
the fiscal administration and a carrying forward of some expenditure initiated in
1980 to the fiscal year 1981. At the same time, outstanding loans to businesses and 
households amounted to Z 1,014 million at the end of 1980 compared with Z879 
million at the end of 1979, showing a smaller increase, at Z135 million, than the 
Z300 million targeted in the programme (Banque du Zaire, 1980).
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With regard to the settlement of external debt arrears, a total of SDR50 
million was repaid in 1980 compared with the SDR40 million targeted, thus 
reducing the volume of arrears to SDR418 million. At the same time repayment of 
external public debt amounted to SDR317 million in 1980 compared with SDR173 
million paid back in 1979. Lastly, this slowdown in the expansion of the money 
supply combined with an improvement in the supply of consumption goods to 
domestic markets, contributed to a reduction in demand pressure. This process is 
illustrated by the IRES consumer average retail prices index in Kinshasa, 
considered representative of the living conditions of the vast majority of the wage- 
earning population. The index increased by less than 50 per cent, a smaller rate 
than the targeted 55 per cent, and much smaller than the rate of 120 per cent 
recorded in 1979 (Banque du Zaire, 1980).
By the late 1970s/early 1980s, despite the implementation of the July 1979 
to December 1980 adjustment programme, the country continued to face serious 
economic and financial difficulties, mainly for the following reasons. Firstly, a 
sharp decline in prices of exported commodities, especially copper and cobalt, 
resulted in a further deterioration at the beginning of 1981. Secondly, in addition to 
the effect of external factors, such as international market conditions, the 
worsening of the overall economic and financial situation was due to profound and 
persistent imbalances, as mentioned earlier in this study. These were intensified by 
the destabilising economic measures of zairianisation and radicalisation 
implemented during the early 1970s. They remained the most significant 
contributing factors to the ongoing economic and financial deterioration, along 
with an excessive external debt burden (Bornemann et al, 1987).
The poor governance of public affairs over the period analysed, and 
especially by the early 1980s, was best demonstrated by the increased volume of
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monetary financing to make up for insufficient public revenues. This systematic 
recourse to money creation was aimed at covering a chronic State budget deficit 
that was widening constantly, as mentioned earlier, because of a total lack of 
budget control and discipline, and because of the growing volume of unproductive 
overspending (Leslie, 1987).
Despite a slight increase in foreign assets, the structure of money supply did 
not vary. The relative share of net claims on the Treasury remained above 80 per 
cent, and was the main cause of inflationary pressure. The share of claims on 
enterprises and households fell from 28.2 per cent to 25.8 per cent, whereas the net 
balance of foreign assets remained negative (Banque du Zaire, 1980). The 
expansion of public expenditure in 1980 was partially due to a non-budgeted rise in 
salaries awarded to teaching staff in the public education sector at the beginning of 
the year. This increase in salaries was intended to cool down the turmoil caused by 
a group of 13 parliamentarians led by Etienne Thsisekedi, a strong political 
personality, with the publication of an open letter urging political and economic 
reforms, and the establishment of multi-party openness (Bobb, 1999).
The imbalance between forecast revenue and expenditure was such that it 
undermined the fulfilment of commitments agreed with the IMF within the 
framework of the 1979-1980 stabilisation programme, which soon collapsed 
(Vanderlinden et al, 1980). As will be seen later, from that period onward, 
President Mobutu made ever-more use of non-budgeted salary increases and the 
granting of special pecuniary facilities, such as discretionary allocation of funds 
taken from the Treasury to carefully selected pressure groups. These included 
journalists, trade union leaders and teachers, who were granted such privileges in 
order to dampen down the rising public demand for freedom and democracy. These 
attempts to stifle the population's desire for fundamental rights and dignity resulted
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in a significant increase in public spending. However, they failed to hold back the 
will of the people, which grew steadily stronger over the 1980s and led to the major 
political changes that marked the 1990s.
5.4.3. Monetary Adjustments over the 1980s
In view of the failure of the 1979-80 programme, the Government prepared another 
adjustment plan for the period 1981-83. A contribution of SDR912 million was 
expected from the IMF in support of this three-year programme, which set the 
following goals for 1981: (1) 2 per cent GDP growth; (2) 45 per cent annual 
inflation rate; (3) 36 per cent money supply growth (compared with 66.1 per cent in 
1980); (4) 38 per cent banking system domestic assets growth (the same as in 
1980); (5) Z850 million ceiling on State Treasury borrowings, and (6) Z475 million 
ceiling on total lending to businesses and households. For the three-year period the 
Government drew up a Z6.9 billion public investment programme (Banque du
Zaire, 1982).
The main objective of the new programme was to reduce the annual 
inflation rate to 45 per cent and the current external deficit to SDR160 million, or 7 
per cent of GDP. During the first half of 1981 a number of measures were 
introduced, including the following. In February 1981, the Central Bank revised the 
scale of allocation of export proceeds that commercial banks were allowed to make 
available to their customers to cover the cost of priority imports. The proportion 
was raised from 35 per cent to 45 per cent, and this was reserved for the import of 
raw materials, intermediate consumer goods, industrial equipment spare parts, 
commercial vehicles, and capital goods. The increase was made possible by 
abolishing the allocations for energy resources and non-priority goods, respectively
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2 per cent and 5 per cent, combined with a reduction, from 33 per cent to 30 per 
cent, of the proportion allocated for consumer goods.
Furthermore, the import of goods financed by foreign exchange resources 
acquired outside the banking system was liberalised, allowing a wider range of 
products, provided that an import declaration was presented to the banking system. 
This measure was designed to encourage holders of accounts kept abroad in foreign 
currencies to repatriate their liquid assets in the form of imported goods (Banque 
du Zaire, 1981). In April 1981 the Central Bank increased credit interest rates. 
Moreover, starting from 1 June, most prices were liberalised and price control 
measures removed. Lastly, on 19 June the Zaire was devalued by 40 per cent 
against the SDR (Departement de 1'Economie Nationale, 1981).
Right from the start of 1981, the Government failed to meet the 
requirements for a successful completion of the three-year programme, which was, 
therefore, abandoned. Its failure was due to both external and internal factors. On 
the one hand, the continuing stagnation of Western countries' economies led to 
falling demand for the major commodities exported by Congo. As a result of low 
international prices for copper and cobalt, total export earnings fell from Z 1,954 
million in 1980 to Z 1,475 million in 1981 (Banque du Zaire, 1981).
This fall in foreign exchange proceeds undermined the adjustment 
programme that had been launched with financial support from the IMF, as 
mentioned earlier. As a consequence, the volume of external payments arrears 
increased (OGEDEP, 1981). The withdrawal of the IMF's financial support was 
followed by an increasing reluctance on the part of other institutional lenders, 
international and national, to consider loan requests from Congo. This attitude 
resulted in a dramatic reduction of external resources available to Congo, which
283
restricted the country's ability to import goods and subsequently worsened the 
overall supply. (Leslie, 1987).
On the other hand, however, to explain the significant increase in money 
supply, which amounted to Z 1,277.6 million in 1981 compared with Z979.9 
million in 1980, one has to look at the Government's implementation of the State 
budget provisions over the same year. Despite measures taken to improve the 
collection of public revenue and curb expenditure, the latter grew by about 60 per 
cent while revenue increased by only 26.6 per cent. As a consequence the net 
negative balance of the State budget, financed by money creation, amounted to 
Zl,722.4 million, or five times the Z337.5 million deficit recorded in 1980 (Banque 
du Zaire, 1981).
Furthermore, the banking system's outstanding net claims on businesses 
and households amounted to Z 1,343.4 million at end-1981, compared with 
Zl,014.3 million in 1980. This increase of Z328.1 million was smaller than the 
ceiling of Z475 million specified in the programme. Meanwhile the suspension of 
financial support from the IMF, which resulted from the failure to implement the 
programme, combined with the decline in export earnings, led to an increase in 
external payments arrears (OGEDEP, 1981).
The economic and financial situation of Congo worsened in 1982. The year 
was marked by a further decline in production in all sectors of the economy, 
including export agriculture, domestic manufacturing, and the mining industry. To 
a large extent this regression was due to a lack of foreign exchange resources. 
Export earnings in 1982 increased by only 3 per cent over the 1981 figure. This 
poor performance resulted from a sharp decrease in the market prices for major 
exports, such as copper (20 per cent fall) and cobalt (50 per cent price fall), 
combined with an overall deterioration of the terms of trade (Institut National des
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Statistiques, 1982). This situation meant there was an overall balance of payments 
deficit of SDR600 million for the year, of which less than a half was covered. 
Furthermore, due to the suspension of disbursement of the IMF facilities agreed in 
June 1981 and the decline in grants and loans from other international and bilateral 
partners, the net balance of external transfers was nil (Banque du Zaire, 1981).
At the end of 1982 accumulated external arrears amounted to USD700 
million, not including commercial and invisible transactions. Government spending 
had grown by 46 per cent, faster than public revenue, which increased by 31 per 
cent. This was a result of the overall decline in economic activity, stagnation of 
external trade and a reduction of Gecamines' capacity as the major contributor to 
public revenue. As a consequence of this development the State budget deficit 
amounted to Z2.8 billion or 8.9 per cent of GDP, compared with 5.9 per cent in 
1981. Given repayments of external debt that had been made, the Treasury's 
overall deficit amounted to Z3.3 billion for the year 1982, compared with Z1.7 
billion for 1981 (Banque du Zaire, 1982).
By late 1982 the Government led by the Prime Minister, then called 
Premier Commissaire d'Etat (First State Commissioner), Leon Kengo wa Dondo, 
initiated a number of measures aimed at providing tighter control on public 
expenditure and more efficient collection of fiscal revenue. The main objective was 
to curb the expansion of domestic demand and improve the allocation of public 
resources. In addition to these budgetary and monetary policies other measures, 
designed to remove price controls and to liberalise small-scale mining and trading 
in diamonds and gold, known as diamant artisanal, by designating a preferential 
exchange rate to be applied to this trading activity, were also taken in early 1983 
(Beaugrand, 1997). Prior to this liberalisation policy, the exploitation of diamonds 
and gold was a monopoly of large mining companies, and thus forbidden to others.
285
Nevertheless an increasing number of small producers were involved in this kind of 
until then clandestine activity.
With this liberalisation policy the Government aimed to combat smuggling 
in precious minerals and to return to official economic channels the largest portion 
possible of the foreign exchange generated in the grey economy by small 
producers. Thanks to severe spending cuts the management of public finance over 
the first half of 1983, marked by reduced recourse to financing by the Central 
Bank, resulted in a balanced budget. This formal equilibrium was reflected in a fall 
in the growth rate of money supply, combined with a slowdown in the expansion of 
credit to enterprises and households (Banque du Zaire, 1983).
However, by mid-1983, the overall economic situation of the country was 
still marked by a rapid increase in prices, an overvalued exchange rate, a large 
balance of payments deficit, and a growing volume of external payments arrears. In 
view of this development, and fortified by the improved management of public 
finance recorded for the first half of 1983, the Government decided to implement a 
more far-reaching economic and financial adjustment programme, with financial 
support from the IMF. The essential objective of this new programme was to 
reduce the current balance of payments deficit. In this respect, on 9 September 
1983 the Government defined a new exchange regime in three parts, namely (1) 
modification of the exchange rate, (2) introduction of a floating exchange regime 
and (3) liberalisation of the exchange regulations (Leslie, 1987).
These measures were put into effect on 12 September 1983. The exchange 
rate was modified from Zl = SDR0.1575 to Zl = SDR0.03542, which implied a 
devaluation of 77.5 per cent compared with the exchange rate in force on 22 June 
1981 (Beaugrand, 1997). At the same time a floating exchange regime was adopted 
on two levels. An official foreign exchange market was established for conducting
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a limited list of transactions with foreign currencies provided by the Central Bank. 
An unofficial free market, reserved for transactions conducted by commercial 
banks using their available foreign exchange, was also set up. A foreign exchange 
inter-bank market was established with the task of fixing a free exchange rate of the 
Z against the USD on a weekly basis. The Central Bank could intervene in this 
market in order to strike a balance between demand and supply if necessary (Leslie, 
1987).
At the launching of the monetary reform there was a gap of 10 per cent 
between the official and the unofficial exchange rate. This gap was gradually 
reduced and completely closed on 24 February 1984, the date from which the 
exchange rate was freely determined by the market. This change went together with 
a wide liberalisation of exchange and external trade regulations. In this respect a 
number of measures were put into effect, including the following: (1) abolition of 
the compulsory transfer of 30 per cent of export proceeds to the Central Bank, (2) 
elimination of residents' accounts in foreign currencies, (3) simplification of import 
procedures and abolition of the related requirement for prior approval from the 
Central Bank, and (4) relaxation and subsequent abolition, from 1 March 1984, of 
the provisions that assigned export proceeds for specific purposes (Banque du 
Zaire, 1984). In addition to the revision of the exchange and external trade regime, 
other measures were taken regarding the State budget, credit, prices and salaries, 
aimed at limiting the expansion of domestic demand (Beaugrand, 1997).
Before the monetary reform was launched in September 1983, budget 
expenditure, held under tight control, remained below the level reached at the end 
of the same period in 1982. Starting from the fourth quarter of 1983, State budget 
disbursements increased significantly as a mechanical effect of the 77.5 per cent 
devaluation of September 1983. Such was the case, for instance, with regard to the
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exchange value of external debt servicing costs expressed in Zaire. Furthermore, 
the devaluation also resulted in an increase in public revenue, as the exchange rate 
adjustment significantly improved the contributing capacity of Gecamines and 
widened the tax base related to external trade (Sumata, 2001).
On the same occasion regulations regarding interest rates were revised. 
Interests applied by the banking system for short and medium-term loans to 
businesses in all sectors and to households were liberalised and adjusted so that 
they remained above the inflation rate. However, the liberalisation did not apply to 
loans for agricultural activities concerned with non-coffee exports, which carried 
an annual interest rate of 15 per cent. The Central Bank increased the discount rate 
from 15 to 20 per cent, while the interest on Central Bank loans to the Treasury 
was increased on September 1983 from 3 to 7 per cent, applicable to claims on the 
Treasury arising after that date. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, 
the increase in the Central Bank discount rate had no limiting effect on the 
expansion of money supply. Similarly, a higher interest rate on loans from the 
Central Bank to the Treasury did not significantly reduce the volume of borrowing 
that was required for financing the State budget deficit (Banque du Zaire, 1985).
The price liberalisation policy was reinforced by a law of 12 September 
1983, which took into consideration the overall increase in costs that followed the 
parity adjustment. Lastly, the programme provided for a phased increase in wages 
and salaries, with an across-the-board rise of 40 per cent over the two years 1983 
and 1984, the first phase on 1 October 1983, and the second on 1 April 1984. The 
regulation regarding interest rates was in line with the liberalisation policy aimed at 
eliminating price disparity, among other objectives. On the other hand the increase 
in salaries was intended to partially restore the purchasing power lost as a result of
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the devaluation, with the aim of containing the growing pressure from the public 
(Banque du Zaire, 1985).
As well as the short-term monetary and financial objectives of the 
programme the Government drew up a medium-term investment plan for the period 
1983-85, which received financial support from the World Bank. The goal of this 
plan was to loosen the main constraints that were hindering the country's economic 
development, and to modernise the major productive sectors. Financial support 
expected from the IMF within the framework of the overall adjustment programme 
amounted to SDR342.5 million, including a SDR228 million stand-by credit 
arrangement and a SDR114.5 million compensatory financing facility (Banque du 
Zaire, 1982).
Because of the expanding foreign debt burden, the volume of available 
foreign exchange resources proved to be insufficient to cover the balance of 
payments deficit. In view of this situation the Government resorted to negotiating 
further debt rescheduling with the Paris Club, which resulted in a rescheduling 
agreement concluded on 20 December 1983. At the end of 1983 Congo's external 
debt amounted to USD4.6 billion, of which 63 per cent was owed to lender 
members of the Paris Club, about 10 per cent to private banks (Club of London), 13 
per cent to international institutions, and the balance to other public and private 
creditors (Kikassa, 1989). The total amount of debt rescheduled under the Paris 
Club agreement of 20 December 1983 was USD 1.4 billion. As a result of the 
agreement, the annual debt servicing cost was lowered to USD651 million, of 
which USD221 million was effectively paid before the end of the year (OGEDEP, 
1984). This rescheduling policy continued over the whole period covered by this 
study, and explains the impact of recapitalisation and consolidation of unpaid 
arrears on the exponential increase of Congo's external debt.
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The policy of financial restraints that had started in late 1982 and was 
reinforced within the framework of the adjustment programme of mid-September 
1983, resulted in an increase in fiscal revenues in 1983 (88 per cent more than in 
1982). This improvement was especially a consequence of improved tax collection 
in general and also of payments from Gecamines in particular (OGEDEP, 1984). 
The State budget deficit represented 2 per cent of GDP in 1983, compared with 8.7 
per cent in 1982. It was entirely financed by money creation by the Central Bank 
but was limited at Z2.6 billion, compared with Z3.3 billion in 1982. Lending to 
enterprises and households continued to grow at the same rate of 50 per cent, as in 
1982, because the private sector seemed to adopt a wait-and-see policy over the 
final quarter of 1983 following the mid-September monetary reform.
On the other hand, the expansion of money supply, which slowed down 
during the first half of 1983, accelerated following the adoption of the new 
exchange rate. As a result of the conversion of foreign exchange deposits and 
buyback of residents' foreign currency accounts, together with an acceleration in 
public spending at the end of the year, the money supply increased from Z.2 billion 
at the end of 1982 to Z3.4 billion at the end of 1983, recording 74 per cent growth 
(Banque du Zaire, 1983).
The devaluation of mid-September 1983 resulted in a dramatic increase in 
the cost of imported goods and services, such as fuel, the price of which rose 
fivefold because of the price liberalisation policy. As this increase was passed on to 
all other sectors of the economy, the retail price index grew by 28 per cent in 
September alone, while the average monthly inflation rate prior to September was 
at 4 per cent. In the end the average inflation rate for 1983 amounted to 76 per cent, 
compared with 37 per cent in 1982. However, as a result of a relatively comfortable
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volume of foreign exchange reserves at the banks' disposal, and rather low 
demand, no significant demand pressure was noticed.
As a result, the external exchange rate remained stable until early 1984. Set 
at USD1= Z9.29 on 9 September 1983, the exchange rate in the free market was 
fixed at USD1= Z30.04 at the first inter-bank market fixing session of 21 October, 
and Z30.89 on 29 December 1983. The 10 per cent fluctuation margin established 
between the official exchange rate and the rate of exchange in the free market was 
gradually narrowed until it was cancelled out by February 1984, when the single 
exchange rate stood at USD1 = Z33 (Banque du Zaire, 1983).
As it emerges from the analysis of the Central Bank's annual reports and 
other sources referred to, beyond the manipulation of the exchange rate and its 
ephemeral effects in the short term, the Congolese adjustment programmes failed to 
produce sustainable positive results in the long run. The Congolese authorities 
generally explained this failure by pointing to external causes, such as a decline in 
export earnings, and deterioration in the terms of trade. This study has instead 
shown that the most striking causes of the collapse of all the programmes 
undertaken were essentially internal. Namely, the chronic deterioration of the 
overall monetary and financial situation was due to a total lack of control of public 
finances in relation to both receipts and expenditures. This lack of control was itself 
due to (1) a lack of social development and people-oriented policies, (2) absence of 
budgetary discipline, and (3) improvisation established by the Mobutu dictatorship 
as a principle of management (Leslie, 1987; Beaugrand, 1997).
The inefficiency of the adjustment policies implemented was clear from the 
poor quality of attendant measures and reforms designed to accompany the 
monetary adjustments as well as from the blatant deficiency in the implementation 
of such measures and reforms. The overall situation suggests that what mattered
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most for the Congolese authorities was the statement of intent to be made at the 
launching of any adjustment programme in order to receive a substantial 
contribution from the IMF and other international, multilateral and bilateral 
financial organisations. No wonder, therefore, if soon after the exchange rate 
adjustment, the monetary and financial situation started to deteriorate again - if 
indeed it had ever stopped doing so for a while - since nothing was done to address 
the structural changes from which a durable improvement could be expected 
(Bornemann et al, 1979; Beaugrand, 1997).
5.4.4. Banking Institutions and Money Supply over the 1980s
In 1983 money supply increased by 87 per cent as a result of the devaluation and, 
to a lesser extent, of an increase in the volume of credit to enterprises and 
households. The volume of claims on the Treasury, which used to be the most 
significant contributing factor to the expansion of monetary liquidity, recorded a 
significant contraction following relatively better governance, as explained in the 
preceding section.
The Government continued implementation of the adjustment programme 
over 1984, and succeeded in limiting the expansion of money supply at 22 per cent, 
which reflected a significant deceleration until the middle of the year. The State 
budget deficit amounted to no more than Z1.4 billion and the retail price index 
increased by only 8.6 per cent over the first six months. However, as early as the 
end of the first quarter of 1984 the exchange rate began to deteriorate due to a 
widening imbalance between the supply of and demand for foreign currencies. This 
led to the imposition of more drastic restrictions on foreign payments as external 
debt servicing absorbed an ever-larger proportion of the scarce available external 
resources. From Z30.89 to the US dollar on 29 December 1983, as mentioned at the
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end of the preceding sub-section, the exchange rate fell to Z35 to the US dollar on 
March 1984, recording a 13 per cent depreciation in comparison with December 
1983 (Banque du Zaire, 1984).
In an attempt to restore relative equilibrium between supply and demand, 
two series of measures were introduced. Firstly, during the second quarter of 1984, 
the Central Bank issued a regulation, limiting the net balance of foreign assets each 
bank could hold, to 100 per cent, then to 75 per cent of its share capital. In addition, 
imports were subject to a deposit equal to 50 per cent, then 65 per cent of the value 
of the import in Zaire currency (Banque du Zaire, 1984). At the same time the 
regulation regarding the banking system's compulsory reserves was redefined in 
order to reduce banks' liquidity. Secondly, in order to encourage the public to 
invest in public securities, and thus contribute towards financing State budget 
deficits, and consequently reduce the volume of money printing by the Central 
Bank for this purpose, the Government instructed the latter in April 1984 to issue 
Treasury bonds on behalf of the Government.
The issuance of Treasury bonds also was an attempt to discourage the 
increasing hoarding of banknotes as a preference for cash was growing in line with 
the expansion of grey economy activities, and for tax avoidance motives. In 1984, 
the proceeds of the issuance amounted to Z200million, which served to finance the 
State budget deficit and consequently helped a little to limit the monetary financing 
of the latter to Z1.2 billion (Banque du Zaire, 1984). Although the issuance of 
Treasury bonds subscribed by the public continued for a while, it cannot be 
considered a great success, especially because of the high inflation rate, which 
made the investment worthless, as the nominal interest rate was far below the 
inflation rate.
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The overall improvement observed from late 1983 as a result of financial 
restraints as well as liberalisation of prices and external payments implemented 
over the period 1982-83 continued through 1984 under favourable international 
economic conditions. As a consequence of more efficient collection of public 
revenues, money creation intended to enable the banking system to lend to the 
Treasury remained below the ceiling fixed in the adjustment programme. However, 
40.5 per cent of public spending went on external debt repayments, while the share 
of public resources reserved for investment was falling, recording a decline of 44.2 
per cent (Banque du Zaire, 1984).
In an attempt to halt the progress of inflation the Central Bank set up direct 
and indirect means of controlling the volume of credit, such as ceilings defined by 
sector, compulsory reserves ratios and rediscount rate. Table 5.13 shows the 
growth of money supply between 1977 and 1985, indicating the variations in its 
major components.
Table 5.13 Variation of factors affecting money supply, 1977-1985 
(in Z millions)
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
1977
-277.7
+341.0
+ 151.4
+264.7
+461.4
+379.0
+82.4
-196.7
1978
-81.0
+548.1
+ 103.9
+571.0
+666.6
+593.3
+73.3
-95.6
1979
-27.5
+726.6
+191.0
+890.1
+292.9
+ 157.9
+ 135.0
+597.2
1980
+48.5
+770.8
+ 150.9
+970.2
+ 1,452.9
+ 1,369.6
+83.3
-482.7
1981
-1,147.0
+ 1,851.7
+300.4
+1,005.1
+ 1,353.9
+ 1,188.9
+ 164.4
-348.2
1982
-711.7
+3,279.5
+629.5
+3,797.5
+3,238.3
+2,820.6
+417.7
-41.0
1983
-8,404.9
+2,497.8
+860.7
+5,046.4
+6,147.9
+6,646.5
-98.6
-11,194.3
1984
-3,350.8
+2,868.7
+ 1,536.2
+1,053.1
+4,768.8
+4,365.3
+403.5
-3,715.7
1985
-14,214.1
+ 1,450.7
+4,789.4
-6,974
+4,711.8
+5,081
-369.2
-11,685.8
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque du Zaire annual reports 1977-1986 
Legend: a: Foreign exchange reserves; b: Credit to State Treasury; c: Credit to private-sector 
enterprises; d: Assets = Liabilities; e: Money supply: f: Money ; g Quasi-money ; 
h: Other
The results achieved in 1984 were overall in line with the goals of the 
programme initiated in September 1983. However, the situation started to 
deteriorate again in 1985 as the main causes that justified the implementation of an 
adjustment programme started to reappear. As previously pointed out, the 
repetition of the same causes resulting in the same effects is the main reason why
294
this study has adopted the procedure of tracing the progress of the money supply 
year-by-year. This has helped to shed light on the ephemeral nature of the short- 
lived adjustment programmes implemented in Congo.
From 40.7 per cent in 1984 the external debt-servicing burden represented 
about 50 per cent of public expenditure in 1985 (OGEDEP, 1985). The annual rate 
of inflation increased from 14.3 per cent in 1984 to about 40 per cent in 1985, 
mainly as a result of the price liberalisation policy, as prices of imported goods, 
especially fuel, the price of which was frozen until then, recorded a dramatic rise 
due to the effect of the liberalisation measures and devaluation. The fuel price 
increase was passed on to transport and all other sectors, which resulted in a 
general increase in all prices. This development pushed the inflation rate back to a 
level as high as 40 per cent for the year (Departement de 1'Economic Nationale, 
1985).
The money supply rose from Zl8,791.5 million at the end of 1984 to 
Z23.924.8 million at the end of 1985, recording 27.3 per cent growth, due to 
increased borrowing from the banking system by the Treasury, for the purpose of 
financing State budget deficit. The structure of the money supply at the end of 1985 
confirmed the preference for cash money, as the proportion of banknotes and coins 
increased from 46.8 per cent of total money supply at the end of 1984 to 51.3 per 
cent at the end of 1985. In the meantime the volume of banknote and coin 
circulation outside the banking system amounted to Z 14.517.2 million at the end of 
1985, an 18.1 per cent increase over the 1984 figure (Banque du Zaire, 1985). This 
reflected increasing disintermediation, which resulted in a dramatic shortage of 
cash, an issue to be addressed later.
From Z8,994.7 million at the end of 1984, sight deposits rose to Zl0,584 
million at the end of 1985, which represented 18.1 per cent growth due to deposits
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made in commercial banks, while deposits in the Central Bank's accounts fell 
slightly. The share of businesses in total sight deposits decreased from 66.2 per 
cent at end-1984 to 62.3 per cent at end-1985, while the share of households 
increased from 27.3 per cent to 30.0 per cent over the same period, in line with the 
preference for cash mentioned earlier. Because of the increasing difficulty of 
transforming their bank deposits into cash, many enterprises involved in cash- 
generating activities, such as food retailers, decided to retain and manage large 
amounts of cash in their own safes (Beaugrand, 1997).
Furthermore, the analysis of the factors affecting the money supply revealed 
a worsening of the negative net balance of foreign exchange reserves during 1985, 
which was essentially due to an increase in drawings from the IMF facilities. In this 
respect foreign exchange liabilities grew by Zl6,698.7 million, while foreign assets 
recorded an increase of only Z2,484.6 million. This situation was due to 
sluggishness in productive activities and exports, as well as to a persistent decline 
in prices for the main commodities exported (Banque du Zaire, 1985).
The economic recovery that resulted from the stabilisation programme 
initiated in 1983 and analysed in the preceding section was so modest that even 
though Western creditors praised the efforts at adjustment made by the country, 
there was no further allocation of funds in the form of foreign loans and grants. 
This was despite the fact that the adjustment programme took place in the context 
of two crucial circumstances. First, there was a general world economic recovery, 
which seemed likely to boost international commodity prices and improve 
Congolese export revenues and debt servicing capacity. Second, there was the 
expectation of additional financial support from the country's donors. In the event, 
commodity prices remained low, and the need for external funding, which became 
even more vital for the country, was not met (Leslie, 1987).
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The reappearance of a high inflation rate, as underlined earlier in this 
section, and illustrated in Figures 5.11 and 5.12 which show the development of 
money supply and the price index from the early 1980s, reflected the limited 
efficiency of the adjustment programmes implemented by the Government. These 
programmes could not bring about a return to long-term stabilisation unless the 
structural causes of the economic deterioration were removed. 
Figure 5.11: Money supply, 1976-1985
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque du Zaire 
annual reports 1976-1985.
Figure 5.12: Money supply, Retail prices and 
Minimum wage, 1978-1985
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
  Retail prices index
  Money supply index
  Minimum wage index
Source: based on Banque du Zaire annual reports 1978-1985
Overall, the situation continued to reveal structural weaknesses in the 
Congolese economy. Firstly, foreign exchange resources were increasingly 
insufficient for the volume of imports considered in line with the basic needs of the 
country, while at the same time there was an ever-increasing external debt 
servicing. Secondly, public revenue and expenditure were evolving in opposite
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directions. While public revenues were diminishing in nominal and real terms, 
public spending was expanding in excess of the budgetary target, which resulted in 
a structural deficit financed by money printing. The growth of consumption 
expenditure and external debt servicing costs absorbed such a large portion of the 
scarce resources that no significant resources were reserved for public investments. 
The decline in private investments combined with severe deterioration in 
the country's infrastructure contributed to the reduction in overall output capacity 
and the widening imbalance between supply and demand of goods and services on 
domestic markets. Lastly there was the public administration's overall inefficiency, 
which resulted in a total loss of confidence on the part of the private sector vis-a- 
vis the Government (Leslie, 1987).
5.5. Hyperinflation over the First Half of the 1990s
5.5.1. Political and Economic Background of the Early 1990s
As a consequence of the persistent structural weaknesses analysed in the previous 
section all other attempts at monetary and financial adjustment programmes 
initiated over the second half of the 1980s were doomed to failure. 
Figure 5.13: Money supply, 1985-1991
/
<=& %m 
a*3> 
Source: compiled by the author, based on Banque du Zaire 
annual reports 1985-1991
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The recourse to money printing for financing large State budget deficits 
continued and led the country from high inflation to hyperinflation, starting from 
the late 1980s/early 1990s, as illustrated by the expansion of money supply shown 
in Figure 5.13 and by the movement of the consumer price index shown in Figure 
5.14. From about 40 per cent during the first half of the 1980s, the annual inflation 
rate averaged about 70 per cent over the second half of the same decade 
(Beaugrand, 1997).
Hyperinflation can be defined as starting from the moment when the 
monthly rate of increase in prices exceeds 50 per cent and ends in the month before 
the increase in prices falls and remains below this rate for at least one year (Cagan, 
1956). Some other scholars, such as Salama and Vallier (1990), define 
hyperinflation with reference to three stages. Firstly, the increase in prices becomes 
exponential, out of control and unpredictable. Secondly, relative prices lose their 
consistency, which helps to speed up the increase in prices. Lastly, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the national currency to exert its essential monetary 
functions as a store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account. The national 
currency is then overtaken by some other foreign currency, generally the US dollar.
Figure 5.14: Consumer index annual percentage
change, 1989-1996 (Kinshasa markets)
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Source: compiled by the author, based on Beaugrand (1997)
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Figure 5.14 depicts the acceleration of price increases over the period 1992- 
94. From 56 per cent in 1989, the annual increase in consumer prices reached 256 
per cent in 1990, 2,500-4,500 per cent between 1991 and 1993, and 10,000 per 
cent in 1994, before falling back to 370 per cent in 1995 and 657 per cent in 1996, 
as a result of a relative improvement in the public governance, as will be explained 
later (Beaugrand, 1997).
This study refers to an alternative definition considered more suitable for 
Congo's case. Namely, on the basis of a threshold average monthly inflation rate of 
20 per cent over three months, the corresponding quarterly inflation rate amounts to 
73 per cent, and nearly 8,000 per cent on an annual basis. Based on this definition, 
Congo's hyperinflation began in November 1990 (Beaugrand, 1997). All major 
contributing factors analysed in this chapter to explain the monetary and financial 
developments in Congo over the period from 1960 to the end of the 1980s 
continued to play the same role throughout the 1990s. However, as well as the 
direct impact of these factors, the hyperinflation that developed since the early 
1990s and the overall collapse of the Congolese economy derived mostly from 
political events that occurred between 1990 and 1997. Namely, on 24 April 1990, 
in keeping with the current of democratisation that arose from the collapse of the 
former Soviet bloc, President Mobutu launched a process of democratisation 
involving among other things the establishment of a multi-party system.
This announcement was the starting point of a transitional period that 
rapidly turned into a permanent crisis. On the one hand, the political opposition 
was determined to seize the opportunity presented by the proclaimed openness to 
oust Mobutu, whom they considered an obstacle to real democratisation. On the 
other hand President Mobutu, along with his supporters, was resolute in his 
determination to stay in 
Nonetheless, he accepted the principle of a kind of Etats Generaux known 
as the Conference Nationale (National Conference) and subsequently Conference 
Nationale Souveraine (Sovereign National Conference), as will be explained later 
in this section. The aim of the Conference was to bring together representatives of 
social bodies from all regions in order to scrutinise the past developments of the 
country and to draw up a plan for democratic regeneration. The ultimate objective 
of the National Conference was to draft a new Constitution reflecting a clearly 
defined democratic orientation, and to prepare the ground for legislative elections 
(Meditz and Merrill, 1994). The opening of the National Conference on 7 August 
1991 and its closure on 15 August because of a dispute regarding participants' 
accreditation and political wrangling marked the beginning of an institutional 
deadlock, which this section will analyse, in the lights of its effect on the 
contemporary monetary and financial developments.
On 23/24 September 1991, soldiers dissatisfied with the low level and late 
payment of salaries looted containers at Ndjili international airport. The looting 
spread all over Kinshasa the capital. On 29 September President Mobutu, 
complying with a request from the opposition, appointed Etienne Tshisekedi, a 
charismatic opposition leader, as Prime Minister. On 21 October Mr Tshisekedi 
was dismissed, on the grounds that he refused to sign an oath of allegiance to the 
President, and he was replaced by Bernardin Mungul Diaka, another opposition 
leader, who was subsequently disqualified by the opposition. One month later, on 
25 November 1991, President Mobutu appointed Jean Nguz A Karl I Bond as 
Prime Minister to replace the unpopular Mungul Diaka (Bobb, 1999).
On 17 January 1992 Prime Minister Nguz reopened the National 
Conference, which he closed a few days later on the grounds that its running costs 
were too high. On 22 January about 30 soldiers seized the national radio station in
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Kinshasa to demand democracy. However, the mutiny was rapidly reduced to 
silence. On 16 February 1992 security forces attacked and killed a number of 
protesters who had marched through numerous areas of the capital Kinshasa 
following Sunday morning church service to demand the reopening of the National 
Conference (Bobb, 1999).
On 6 April 1992 the National Conference reopened and declared itself 
"sovereign", with the power to take enforceable decisions as from 17 April 1992, 
and renamed itself Conference Nationale Souveraine (CNS). A Catholic 
Archbishop, Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya, was elected Chairman of the 
Conference with strong support from the opposition. On 15 August of the same 
year the National Conference elected Mr Etienne Tshisekedi as Prime Minister 
again for a transitional period defined in a Transitional Act adopted by the CNS on 
14 August 1992. The aim was for the Prime Minister to oversee the transition to 
democracy, while the constitutional prerogatives of the President were reduced.
The President promulgated the nomination of Etienne Thsisekedi on 19 
August, but the Government remained largely powerless as Mobutu continued to 
interfere in the management of the country through his supporters, who used all 
possible means of putting a spoke in the Government's wheel. In any case, despite 
his charisma as a fierce political opponent of Mobutu, Mr Thsisekedi did not prove 
to have the skills expected from a Prime Minister in charge of the efficient day-to- 
day management of a country in a situation as difficult as that confronting Congo 
(Beaugrand, 1997).
Faced with the new Constitution drafted by the CNS, which considerably 
limited the powers of the President, Mobutu instructed the former single-party 
Parliament to hold a separate Conference, called "Conclave du Parlement", a sort 
of parallel to the National Conference, which he mandated to draft another
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Constitution more to his liking. At the end of this parallel Conference President 
Mobutu appointed another Prime Minister, Faustin Birindwa, who formed another 
Government, the members of which came from the Conclave du Parlement. In the 
meantime the Government of the elected (by the CNS) Prime Minister Etienne 
Tshisekedi claimed legitimacy from the CNS, but was denied the power to govern 
effectively by President Mobutu. As a result, the country found itself with two 
Parliaments and two Governments, none of which was able to govern effectively 
(Mabi, 1997).
The confusion that resulted from this situation affected monetary and 
financial developments over the first half of the 1990s. In December 1992, as the 
value of the currency was continuously falling due to inflation, the Central Bank 
issued new banknotes with a face value of Z5 million, worth about USD2, which 
Prime Minister Etienne Thsisekedi declared illegal. When the Treasury undertook 
to settle its commitments, including the payment of wages and salaries, with the 
newly issued banknotes, most of the recipients refused to accept the Z5 million 
notes, which gave rise to the accumulation of additional wage arrears. In December 
1992 and January 1993 new riots and looting took place in various areas of the 
country, and soldiers demonstrated, demanding the payment of salary arrears. In 
February 1993, the Central Bank announced the issuance of Z10 million banknotes 
(worth about USD4), while at the same time, a 15-ton shipment of 5 million Zaire 
notes was seized in Belgium at the request of Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi 
(Beaugrand, 1997).
On 22 October 1993, the Central Bank implemented a so-called monetary 
reform, which consisted of the following major steps: (1) issuance of new 
banknotes called Nouveau (New) Zaire (NZ); (2) freezing of bank money; (3) 
exchange of banknotes in circulation on the basis of NZ1 for Z3 million, and
devaluation at the rate of Z9 million or NZ3 USD1 (Mabi, 1997). The issuance of 
new banknotes stripped of six zeros was intended to facilitate the handling of 
money as well as simplifying recording and accounting processes. The freezing of 
bank money was aimed at reducing the excessive volume of the money supply, in 
order to cool down the high pressure of demand and to lower the high inflation 
rate. The devaluation was justified by the fact that the national currency was 
overvalued in relation to foreign currencies. The opposition boycotted the NZ notes 
as it had the Z5 million notes. So did the soldiers when the Government attempted 
to pay them with the new notes. The dissatisfaction of unpaid soldiers gave rise to 
another wave of rioting and looting (Beaugrand, 1997).
The set of measures of 22 October 1993 proved to be the worst monetary 
reform ever attempted in Congo. It contributed to further undermine the already 
dislocated system of monetary intermediation (Mabi, 1997). The Central Bank's 
attempt to slow down the depreciation of the NZ on the inter-bank market failed. 
As early as the end of the year one USD was worth NZ102 on the parallel market, 
recording a differential of 191 per cent with the inter-bank market. In November 
and December 1993 the monthly inflation rate reached about 250 per cent. 
Although the rate slowed to 191 per cent in January 1994, over the three-month 
period to the end of that month there was a cumulative price increase equivalent to 
more than 3,300 per cent on a yearly basis (Beaugrand, 1997). 23
23 From 1990 onwards, prices were increasingly set in foreign currency (US dollars or Belgian 
Francs), although small-scale transactions generally continued to be fixed in ZaTre. 
As wages in the formal economy were settled in Zaire, wage earners no longer made use of the 
sharply falling domestic currency as store of value. Soon after they cashed their wages these were 
exchanged for foreign currency. Offices acting as foreign exchange bureau and street money- 
changers proliferated, forming an active foreign exchange market known as a parallel market that 
was handling transactions on a continuous basis, from a few dollars to several thousands dollars.
Overall, due to a sharp decline in export receipts and exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves 
held by the central bank and commercial banks, which formed the official inter-bank market, the 
volume of imports and other external payments financed by these resources decreased dramatically. 
This resulted in an increasing volume of imports and other external payments financed by resources
Public revenue collection fell by about 50 per cent while public expenditure 
went on growing. These developments were the result of inefficient governance 
accompanied by a sharp decline in economic activities and repeated strikes in the 
civil service. The transitional process became endless and remained unfinished. To 
measure its cost requires taking into consideration not just the sum of directly 
related expenses. One also has to consider the monetary and financial impact of the 
subsequent collapse of the overall political system and the absence of governance 
in the country, especially between 1991 and 1994 (Mabi, 1997).
To put an end to the situation where there were two governments and two 
parliaments, as mentioned earlier, which resulted from the failure of the CNS, an 
agreement was concluded in October 1993 between representatives of the Conclave 
du Parlement and representatives of the opposition. On the basis of this agreement 
the Haut Conseil de la Republique (High Council of the Republic), a parliamentary 
body which included a large number of former CNS participants among its 
members, and the Conclave du Parlement merged to form a transitional Parliament 
called Haut Conseil de la Republique-Parlement de Transition (HCR-PT), 
comprising about 800 members. In March 1994 this transitional Parliament 
approved an arrangement providing for a 15-month transition to the end of July 
1995, during which time the Prime Minister was to be chosen in consultation with 
political parties from outside the President's party (Beaugrand, 1997).
in foreign currencies acquired on the parallel market, that is to say, at a higher cost than the official
exchange rate.
The parallel market was held and operated on an informal basis by various intermediaries from 
the street money-changers to large commercial companies acting through several unofficial bureau 
de changes. Following the adoption of floating exchange rate regime in September 1983, and the 
resorption of the gap between the official and the parallel rate of exchange, the most important of 
these companies formed a kind of board that liaised with the central bank and the commercial banks 
grouped in the Association Za'iroise de Banques in fixing the exchange rate applicable on a weekly 
basis for all transactions in foreign currencies.
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On 14 June 1994 Leon Kengo wa Dondo, a leader from the moderate 
opposition, was elected as Prime Minister by the Parliament and President Mobutu 
ratified his nomination soon afterwards. As soon as Prime Minister Kengo took 
office in July 1994, he suspended the Governor of the Central Bank on the grounds 
that he refused to account for his management to the new Government. It took 
about four months for President Mobutu to sign the relevant revocation Decree in 
November 1994, and a new Governor of the Banque du Zaire nominated by the 
Prime Minister was appointed in January 1995 (Beaugrand, 1997).
Over the first half of 1995 the Banque du Zaire resumed issuing banknotes 
and securities, and undertook to recover stocks of banknotes and printing plates 
from the less reputable supplier that had been entrusted by the former Governor of 
the Banque du Zaire with the task of printing banknotes. Starting from the second 
half of 1994 the increase in money supply slowed down steadily from about 230 
per cent in the first and second quarters to 155 per cent in the third quarter, and 100 
per cent in the fourth quarter of the year. However, the result of this development 
was not tangible until the fourth quarter of 1994, as the inflation rate remained 
high, above 50 per cent per month on average between January and September 
1994, then declined to about 25 per cent in October and November, and fell to less 
than 10 per cent in December of the same year (Beaugrand, 1997).
Starting from early 1995 Central Bank operations gradually came back 
under control, which enabled the Government to focus on improving tax collection 
and on establishing tight control over public spending procedures and volume, with 
the aim of matching expenditure to available resources. As a consequence, 
government revenues increased, amounting to the equivalent of USD 150 million 
for the first half of 1995, or 10 per cent above the level achieved in 1994 for the 
whole year. With regard to expenditure, the Kengo Government systematically
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delayed payments, including the payment of arrears in wages and amounts owed to 
suppliers. This strategy resulted in fictitious surplus balances in the Treasury 
accounts at the Central Bank (Beaugrand, 1997).
Inflation slowed to an average monthly rate of 10 per cent during the first 
half of the year. However, additional inflationary pressure resumed because of two 
major causes that affected the Central Bank's financial position. Firstly, to cover 
the high cost of banknote printing and payments of other short-term external 
commitments, in view of the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, the Central 
Bank resigned itself to selling its own banknotes on the unofficial market for 
foreign currencies so that it could import the inputs needed for printing banknotes. 
Secondly the weakening position of a number of commercial banks led the Central 
Bank to provide for an expansion of banks' refinancing. Furthermore, by 
September 1995, under increasing political pressure the Government started using 
the surplus balances accumulated so far to pay the allowances of members of 
parliament and salary arrears to civil servants and other public administration 
employees, and to carry out some urgent public works, such as road repairs.
This use of government surplus balances deposited at the Central Bank 
pushed up the inflation rate from about 13.5 per cent during the third quarter of 
1995 to 23 per cent by the end of the year. Meanwhile the Government's revenue 
collection policy resulted in a fall in revenue to the equivalent of USD55 million 
(Beaugrand, 1997). Price increases resumed on a larger scale, which led to 
hyperinflation accompanied by, among other adverse effects, a severe shortage of 
banknotes, which will be addressed in the next section.
5.5.2. Monetary and Financial Developments from 1990 to 1995
In order to speed up the democratisation process launched in April 1990, as 
mentioned in the preceding sub-section, the opposition organised a series of 
demonstrations throughout the rest of the year. In an attempt to cool down the 
ferment created by these widespread demonstrations, the Government decided to 
grant unsustainable wage increases that nearly tripled the wage bill by October 
1990 compared with the November 1989 average (Mabi, 1997). Moreover, the 
subsequent large increase in expenditure resulting from this decision occurred in a 
context marked by a fall in revenue from the mining sector. This fall was due to 
declining world market prices, but mostly to a major accident, in which a cave-in at 
Kamoto, a major Gecamines mining site, caused a 12 per cent decrease in copper 
production and exports (Beaugrand, 1997).
Overall, 83.4 per cent of the State budget deficit, which amounted to about 
Z518.6 billion in 1990, was financed through monetisation by the Central Bank, 
2.6 per cent by issuance of Treasury bills on the money market, while external 
borrowing contributed 14 per cent. This development resulted in a large increase in 
money supply from Z273.6 billion at the end of 1989 to Z784.6 billion at the end of 
1990, which represented a 179.5 per cent increase, compared with 61.1 per cent 
growth from 1988 to 1989. As over the previous years, this increase reflected an 
expansion of the banking system's claims on the Treasury (Banque du Zaire,
1990).
The structure of money supply revealed an exponential growth of banknote 
and coin circulation over the previous years. From Z82.8 billion at the end of 1988, 
the volume of banknote and coin circulation nearly doubled in 1989, to Z 153.1 
billion, and jumped to Z427.1 billion at the end of 1990, recording a 179 per cent 
increase between 1989 and 1990. The same trend was observed in the development
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of bank money, which grew from Z 106.9 billion at the end of 1989 to Z318 billion 
at the end of 1990, recording a 179.8 per cent increase, essentially due to a higher 
volume of deposits in private banks. (Banque du Zaire, 1990).
The beginning of 1991 was marked by the development of a form of 
pyramid savings scheme known as Operation Bindo, initiated by unauthorised 
financial intermediaries. The latter received deposits in cash and paid back a few 
weeks later, generally 45 days, up to ten times the initial deposit. As a 
consequence, the public withdrew a huge volume of cash from banks, to be 
invested in the pyramid savings scheme. The massive withdrawal rapidly resulted 
in a severe shortage of banknotes within the banking system. For a certain period of 
time the Government turned a blind eye to the phenomenon and did nothing to 
prohibit this activity. According to officials contacted by the author at the time, the 
Government was reluctant to order a ban, which would have angered the large 
number of people involved in this process of easy money. Eventually the Central 
Bank published a rather belated statement on the danger of ventures of this kind. 
Following this, the Government took measures to halt the operation. The 
government ban came too late, however, as the pyramid began to collapse in the 
second half of 1991 (Banque du Zaire, 1991).
The Central Bank resorted to issuing an increased volume of banknotes of 
greater face value. However, the pressure continued to grow over the year. At the 
same time, the Central Bank was urged to provide the Government with more 
credit for the purpose of financing expanding expenditure. Most of this spending 
related to the political events of that time, such as the cost of maintaining in the 
capital thousands of representatives who were brought in from all the provinces 
between 1991 and 1995 to participate in the National Conference mentioned 
earlier, and in all the subsequent negotiations. Moreover, in order to avoid a further
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loss of confidence in the country's still fragile monetary and financial system, the 
Government decided to refund individuals who had lost their savings invested in 
Operation Bindo. This intervention by the Treasury gave rise to additional money 
printing by the Central Bank for financing the subsequently larger State budget 
deficit (Banque du Zaire, 1991).
Starting from 1992, inflation accelerated and the velocity of broad money 
increased dramatically. This resulted in frequent shortages of banknotes at the 
Central Bank, which made the conversion of bank deposits into cash very difficult, 
if not impossible at times. Considering the high cost of printing banknotes, the 
Central Bank often reserved its stock of notes for the Government's use and also its 
own, while commercial banks had to wait for a relatively long time to get their 
reserves converted into cash. As a consequence, depositors resorted to operating 
their bank accounts through transfers or cheques at a large discount. As a result of 
the difficulty in converting bank deposits into cash, a special money market was 
born. On this market, bank money was exchanged for cash at a domestic exchange 
rate. At the beginning of 1992, the exchange rate on this market was Zl in a bank 
deposit for Z0.50 in cash. By early 1993 Zl in cash was worth Z12 in bank money 
(Mabi, 1997). A peak was reached in June 1993 when the domestic rate for 
changing cash into deposit money was Zl in cash =Z170 in bank money 
(Beaugrand, 1997).
By late 1993, it was roughly calculated that foreign banknotes in circulation 
amounted to the equivalent of USD300-400 million (Beaugrand, 1997). These 
banknotes were mostly US Dollars, but also European and other foreign currencies, 
such as the BF, the CFA Franc, which circulated in regions sharing a border with
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member countries of the Banque Centrale des Etats de 1'Afrique Centrale (BEAC), 
and Zambian Kwachas, which circulated in southern regions.24
Furthermore, there were widespread rumours that counterfeit notes were 
being printed on a large scale. While the rumours were not confirmed and the 
question remained unresolved, it has to be borne in mind that since the Banque du 
Zaire often delayed the introduction of banknotes with a high face value, 
counterfeiting the Zaire currency would have produced rather low seigniorage 
gains. As a matter of fact, over the period 1993-94, legal banknotes were often 
issued without being accurately reported on the Central Bank's balance sheet, 
especially when the printing was left in the hands of less reputable foreign 
suppliers, obviously as a means of reducing printing costs.
The printing facilities of Banque du Zaire in Kinshasa could produce about 
half of the requirement for new banknotes, but at a very high cost as all key inputs, 
including printing plates, security paper and ink, were imported (Beaugrand, 1997). 
Furthermore, in view of the widespread refusal to use the new banknotes, partly as 
a political expression of opposition to President Mobutu, the old Zaire currency 
continued to circulate in Western Kasai' province. At the time of the monetary 
reform the volume of old notes not exchanged for new notes was estimated at about 
Z460 trillion (Banque du Zaire, 1994).
Overall, from the early 1990s foreign currencies, especially the USD and 
the BF, increasingly served to set prices for medium- and large-scale transactions, 
while small-scale transactions continued to be made in the local currency. Because 
of the high rate of inflation, revenues earned in domestic currency were 
systematically converted into foreign currencies as a more reliable store of value.
24 CFA, which initially stood for Colonies Fran9aises d'Afrique, now stands for Cooperation 
Financiere en Afrique Centrale (see: Godeau, 1995).
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As a result, foreign exchange bureaux and street money-changers appeared and 
became very active, trading on a continuous basis. At the same time, the currency 
was depreciating in sudden and rapid steps, generally in connection with the 
rhythm of issuance of notes and when the latter were made available to the State 
Treasury in large quantities, or when a delivery was expected.
Over 1995 and 1996 the Central Bank appeared as the major contributing 
factor in boosting inflationary pressures. As pointed out earlier, its deficit was 
essentially due to the high cost of printing banknotes and the settlement of short- 
term debts comprising arrears vis-a-vis foreign suppliers of banknotes and security 
paper. As a matter of fact the average cost per unit of banknotes issued by the 
Banque du Zaire was relatively low; about USD 100 per thousand, including 
transportation charges, but the volumes were huge. In 1995 the Central Bank issued 
some 830 million new banknotes at an aggregate cost of about USD80 million. The 
fear remained that the introduction of higher denomination notes would provoke 
hostile political reactions like the repudiation demonstrated in 1992 and 1993. 
During this period the currency stock increased by some NZ1.5 trillion, or the 
equivalent of USD 180 million (converted monthly at the parallel exchange rate). In 
the end, almost half of the currency issued by the Central Bank during that period 
was used for acquiring the foreign exchange needed for paying for the issuance of 
banknotes (Beaugrand, 1997).
The failure of the attempt at democratisation launched in 1991 resulted in 
the collapse of President Mobutu's regime, defeated by Laurent Kabila who led 
rebel forces from the eastern regions of Congo to the capital, Kinshasa, between 
September 1996 and May 1997. Laurent Kabila took power on 17 May 1997, and 
became President of the country, changing its name from the Republic of Zaire 
back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Time has shown that the
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hyperinflation of the period 1990/91 to 1994 had resumed by late 1996 and 
continued to worsen over the second half of the 1990s, which is beyond the scope 
of this study. The next section therefore concludes the analysis that has been 
carried out in this chapter.
5.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, the study has explored major facts of the Congo's monetary and 
financial history over the period between 1960 and 1995, and shown how this 
history was dominated by the high cost of various political events that occurred in 
those years. It has also demonstrated, on the one hand, the inefficiency of the 
policies implemented during this period, and on the other, blatant misuse of scarce 
public financial resources. The analysis has shown that all measures and actions 
taken in the monetary and financial field were dictated by the need to resolve short- 
term problems caused by the vicious circle within which the country was locked as 
a result of inefficient governance over many years. The study has highlighted these 
major features of Congo's post-colonial monetary and financial history over the 
four periods examined in the four analytical sections mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter.
The first period, running from June 1960 to June 1967, started with a major 
political change, namely the attainment of independence on 30 June 1960. The 
sovereignty acquired was a result of the political process that began in 1956 and 
culminated with the riots of January 1959. It was followed by a phase of 
nationwide disorder, which weakened the economy and caused severe monetary 
and financial difficulties. The analysis has demonstrated the profound effect that 
the mismanagement of public finance had on the monetary and financial affairs of
Congo after 1960. Soon after the proclamation of independence on 30 June 1960, 
the new Government failed to keep the expansion of public spending under control. 
Between 1960 and 1963 the State budget deficit more than doubled. Money supply 
grew more than fourfold.
To compensate for the decrease in the public collection of funds, the 
Central Bank provided the Treasury with the resources it needed by printing 
money. Consumer prices increased six- to sevenfold as a result of a decline in the 
supply of both domestic and imported goods, following nationwide insecurity, 
regions seceding just after independence, and the subsequent decline in export 
revenues. As a result, the balance of payments deteriorated, and a parallel market 
for the CF appeared where the spread between the official exchange rate and the 
parallel speculative rate became ever wider.
Two devaluations completed on 6 November 1961 and 6 November 1963 
produced positive effects that were short lived, for two main reasons. Firstly, a 
rebellion that started in 1964 offset the stabilisation of prices and the reduction in 
the public finance deficit. Secondly, the two devaluations, a mere monetary 
manipulation, could not resolve basic problems of governance, such as maintaining 
order, sound and efficient financial and administrative management, and the 
regeneration of rural areas. In the absence of structural corrective measures, State 
budget deficits financed by money printing resumed and resulted in additional 
money supply expansion and further price increases. From the very outset of 
independence, the scale of the chronic State budget deficits proved to be out of all 
proportion. As an example, in 1961, as analysed in section 5.2 of this chapter, the 
following figures were recorded: (1) total revenue: CF3,883 million, (2) total 
expenditure: CF 13,266 million, (3) deficit: CF9,383 million, (4) money printing to 
finance the deficit: CF8,550 million.
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Nineteen months after President Mobutu took power in November 1965, an 
economic, monetary and financial reform was launched on 24 June 1967, aimed at 
putting an end to the overall deterioration and at creating appropriate conditions for 
the country to resume a process of durable development. At the time of the 
launching of the 24 June 1967 monetary reform Congolese wage earners had 
already lost 45 per cent of their purchasing power as measured in June 1960. Soon 
after the monetary reform was launched they lost a further 15 per cent as an 
immediate effect of the devaluation.
Also on 24 June 1967 the Government launched the implementation of a 
series of measures regarding the foreign exchange system, taxation, public finance, 
credit and price control, with the aim of putting the economy back on its feet. A 
new currency, called the Zaire (Z), subdivided into 100 makuta (K), and pegged to 
the US dollar, replaced the Congolese Franc (CF). The conversion was carried out 
on the basis of CF 1,000 = Zl = USD2, which represented a devaluation of 67 per 
cent.
Positive results following the implementation of these measures were 
recorded as early as 1968, showing a restoration of basic equilibrium, which 
enabled the Government to consider a bolder development programme starting 
from 1970. However, regardless of an average six per cent growth rate between 
1970 and 1974, the economy deteriorated as a consequence of inconsistent 
financial and economic decisions, such as the zairianisation policy, and heavy 
external borrowings (Young and Turner, 1985; Leslie, 1987). As an overall effect, 
these policies resulted in a sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves, and an 
exacerbation of the external debt-servicing burden. Furthermore, they severely 
undermined production and distribution sectors, especially general farming and 
livestock-rearing businesses, and small-scale commerce. Overall, they ruined the
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confidence of domestic and external investors in Congolese government 
institutions and policies.
The second period, from June 1967 to early 1976, included several years of 
prosperity, namely the final years of the 1960s and the first years of the 1970s, as a 
result of a relatively successful implementation, until late 1973, of the June 1967 
reform. This period also witnessed favourable prices on the international markets 
for most of Congo's exports. From early 1974, the situation started to deteriorate 
again, mostly as a consequence of the irrational economic policy of zairianisation. 
This second phase ended in March 1976 with the adoption of corrective monetary 
and financial measures, which marked the starting point of a third period that ended 
in 1985. This third period was characterised by an increasing number of attempts to 
carry out adjustment programmes at ever shorter intervals, which reflected the 
precipitate nature and blatant inefficiency of the Government's economic policy.
Between 1976 and 1980 alone, seven monetary adjustments were carried 
out. However, for the same reasons as during the preceding periods the economic 
situation continued to deteriorate and the currency to depreciate. Namely, the 
overall development remained dominated by a total lack of control over 
increasingly expanding public spending and growing external debt burden, 
compounded by the poor performance of fiscal revenue collection, and the decline 
in export receipts following a fall in both the volume and the prices of exported 
goods. As a result, the country sank deeper and deeper into a vicious circle of a 
general crisis. To remedy the fall in purchasing power the Government usually 
resorted to measures whose efficiency was open to doubt, such as price and supply
control.
In order to maintain low prices for consumers in large cities and achieve a 
kind of social stability, the Government unilaterally fixed prices of agricultural
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products at a low level. This policy of subsidy to consumers at the expense of the 
vast majority of the population involved in agricultural activities contributed to the 
depopulation of the rural areas. The agricultural sector was deserted and collapsed 
for lack of appropriate incentives. The lack of motivation among rural communities 
was worsened by the high cost of transport, mainly as a result of both insecurity 
and the severe deterioration of the transport network. Moreover, the price of 
finished goods most in demand was so high that most manufactured goods were out 
of reach of the rural population. These circumstances slowed down the spread of 
the use of money in rural areas, which were anyway at a disadvantage because of 
the absence of a well-developed banking structure and an insufficient network 
throughout the country.
The fourth period ran from 1985 to 1995. It was essentially marked, among 
other features, by a process of gradual deterioration of the monetary and financial 
situation. This worsening was a result of inefficient governance reflected in the 
inexorable course that went from high inflation to hyperinflation, against a 
background of political anarchy. Starting from the early 1990s, the country entered 
a stage of hyperinflation. The Government that came to power in July 1994 
attempted to carry out policies aimed at improving the overall governance of the 
country. The first target was the re-establishment of effective control over the 
issuance of currency, and the equilibrium of State budget operations. Secondly the 
Government took action in order to improve the efficiency of the public 
administration in charge of finance, which resulted in doubling tax revenue 
collection. Expenditure control was strengthened at the State Treasury. 
Disorganised issuance of banknotes was halted. As a result, inflation slowed down 
sharply from 230 per cent in the first and second quarter of 1994 to a monthly 
average of 10 per cent during the first half of 1995.
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However, although inflation fell significantly, it was not brought under 
control. The reason was that the targeted minimum revenue proved to be 
insufficient to fund core budgetary expenditure as well as the fixed costs of the 
Central Bank. As a result of the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves the 
Central Bank resorted to issuing banknotes and selling them on the domestic 
market for foreign currencies, which it needed for paying for the printing of 
currency notes. Consequently, inflation resumed an upward trend which, combined 
with the "Tanzi effect", further depressed Government revenue and this, in turn, 
undermined the possibility of stabilising the economy (see: Tanzi, 1977). 25
As previously claimed, the analysis carried out in this chapter focused on 
the banking system's process of money creation for the purpose of financing the 
chronic deficits in the State budget. The analysis has shown that periods of high 
inflation and hyperinflation experienced by Congo over the last three decades of 
the 20th century were a consequence of overall mismanagement of economic and 
financial policies in general, and of the country's public finance in particular. It has 
demonstrated that the overall poor performance was due to inappropriate economic 
policies, lack of continuity, laxity regarding breaching of laws and regulations, 
failure of the judiciary to apply penalties, resulting in subsequent impunity and 
corruption, and to a lack of political loyalty and commitment to the public interest 
at the highest level of the State. It has also demonstrated that the few short periods 
of relatively efficient governance with less use of money creation to finance State 
budget deficits were marked by a decrease in the rate of inflation.
25 The Tanzi effect [also known as Tanzi Olivera effect in reference to the pioneering article 
published by Olivera (1967), quoted by Beaugrand (1997)], refers to the erosion of the tax base by 
inflation. Generally there is always a delay between the moment when tax payments are determined 
and the time they are collected by the tax administration. In case of high inflation, the longer the lag 
between tax assessment and tax collection the smaller the real income effectively collected (Tanzi, 
1977).
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Nevertheless, overall, public finance mismanagement remained the 
dominant factor that had conditioned monetary and financial affairs in Congo since 
1960. The gap between spending that was expanding out of Government control 
and declining public resources continued to widen, despite numerous attempts at 
stabilisation programmes. In the meantime the monetary and financial system 
remained underdeveloped and, starting from the early 1990s, as a consequence of 
the large volume of banknotes that was by then circulating outside the banking 
system, banking and non-banking financial institutions failed to play a significant 
role in the domestic monetary and financial intermediation process.
As far as the population was concerned, the issue of money and finance 
meant a gradual erosion of the purchasing power of any monetary revenue, because 
of chronic inflation. It also meant a loss of confidence in government institutions as 
a result of the operation to withdraw banknotes that was carried out under appalling 
conditions in the late 1970s, and which was perceived by small savers as the 
confiscation of their savings. It also meant a loss of confidence in the national 
currency, which, in the context of hyperinflation, failed to play its proper role as a 
medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value, and standard of deferred 
payments. These are, after all, the classical functions of money, which any national 
currency worthy of the name ought to fulfil, and any national government is 
expected to safeguard.
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Chapter Six:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This thesis has explored the monetary and financial systems of Congo from 
1885 to 1995, with the traditional monetary practices of five centuries ago in the 
background. The Kingdom of Congo, whose monetary usages provided a 
starting point for this thesis was estimated in the 15th century to cover an area 
of 300,000 square kilometres (Cuvelier, 1946). About one-third of this area 
became an integral part of the territory that the Belgian King Leopold II took 
possession of in 1884 and led the 1884/85 Berlin Conference to recognise as 
the Congo Free State, and as his personal property. This royal possession of 
2,345,410 square kilometres (80 times the area of Belgium) covered the largest 
part of the Congo basin as defined by the 1885 Berlin Act. 1 It comprised a 
population estimated at about 10 million at the time of the foundation of the 
state, amalgamating up to 200 ethnic groups with some 400 dialects belonging 
to four basic languages: Kikongo, Kiluba, Lingala and Swahili (Verhaegen, 
1961).
1 Article 1 of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin signed on 26 February 1885 defined 
the basin of Congo as 'bounded by the watersheds (or mountain ridges) of the adjacent basins, 
namely, in particular, those of the Niari, the Ogowe, the Schari, and the Nile, on the north; by 
the eastern watershed line of the affluents of Lake Tanganyika on the east; and by the 
watersheds of the basins of the Zambesi and the Loge on the south. It therefore comprises all the 
regions watered by the Congo and its affluents, including Lake Tanganyika, with its eastern 
tributaries'(Keith, 1919:303).
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In November 1908 Belgium took over the Congo Free State to form the 
colony known as the Belgian Congo. In the late 1950s Belgian Congo 
comprised about 14 million people. In addition to the four languages mentioned 
above, the French language introduced by the Belgian colonial power served as 
a common means of communication among people of such diverse origins 
(Goffm, 1953).
On 30 June 1960 the Belgian colony became an independent State under 
the name of Democratic Republic of the Congo. Joseph Kasa-Vubu was 
appointed President and Patrice Emery Lumumba Prime Minister. The Belgian 
withdrawal was abrupt and ill prepared. As early as July 1960 the Force 
Publique (the army and police) mutinied. The Government requested the United 
Nations to intervene. The country split into several secessionist regions. 
Lumumba, who was backed by the East European bloc, was deposed by 
President Kasa-Vubu and murdered. His supporters took control of the 
northeastern region of Stanleyville (now Orientale). MoTse Tshombe, who was 
backed by Belgian private interests, declared the mineral-rich southern region 
of Katanga to be independent. Albert Kalondji Ditunga declared the diamond- 
rich southern region of Kasaif to be independent. In Leopoldville (now 
Kinshasa), the capital, President Kasa-Vubu, the army under General Moburu, 
the Government and the Parliament disputed responsibilities with one another 
until the appointment of Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister in August 1961.
In 1963 all the seceded regions were brought under central control and 
the country reunited. Tshombe became Prime Minister in 1964. A constitutional 
dispute between President Kasa-Vubu and the new Prime Minister was ended 
on 24 November 1965, when General Mobutu seized power in a bloodless coup.
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President Mobutu, who ruled the country for about 32 years without 
interruption until May 1997, changed the name of the State into the Republic of 
Zaire in 1971. President Laurent J. Kabila toppled the Mobutu regime in May 
1997 and re-named the country Democratic Republic of the Congo. In January 
2001 he was assassinated and his son Joseph Kabila was appointed President. 
Kabila recently concluded a peace agreement with representatives of all military 
and political groups who had rebelled against his father's ruling regime. The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, a homeland for about 56 million people 
today, shares 10,730 kilometres land boundaries with the following nine 
countries: Angola (2,511 km), Burundi (233 km), Central African Republic 
(1,577 km) Republic of the Congo (2,410 km), Rwanda (217 km), Sudan (628 
km), Tanzania (459 km), Uganda (765 km), and Zambia (1,930 km).
Accounts of Portuguese travellers, who were the first Europeans to 
establish contact with the Kingdom of Congo in the late 15th century, 
mentioned a number of local devices that were used as currency in the 
Kingdom. The monetary functions of some of these devices survived in 
traditional communities long after the introduction of modern currencies in 
Congo, and are still in use today. A preliminary question to be answered was 
whether and to what extent monetary practices known since the 15th century 
had influenced, if ever, the modern history of money and finance in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The nzimbu, a small seashell, known since the 15th century as 'the best 
currency of the Kingdom of Congo', was just one device used as currency 
(Pereira, 1617, cited by Dartevelle, 1953: 94). A number of other devices 
mentioned in this study also served as currency in the Kingdom (Mahieu,
1924). A small mat made of raffia fibre, called lubongo (also spelled libongo), 
was used as money in some areas of the Kingdom of Congo where the nzimbu 
was not legal tender. The common term for money or wealth in today's 
Congolese languages, which is mbongo, derives from lubongo (Mahieu, 1924; 
Dartevelle, 1953; Bontinck, 1987; Rivallain, 1994). The adoption of names of 
ancient monetary devices for modern currencies is an obvious link between past 
traditional monetary usages and modern times. This connection also proves that 
in the mind of the local people the traditional concept of money is of the same 
nature as the modern concept.
Copper crosses and brass rods of different lengths, called mitako, served 
as money for a long time in traditional communities and were accepted by the 
colonial administration for payment of taxes. The mitako was so popular among 
the local population that in 1886, the authorities of the Congo Free State issued 
a Decree by which it was granted the quality of legal tender along with the 
currency issued by the State. This legal recognition was a result of the 
acceptability that the mitako enjoyed among the local population, which is one 
of the key characteristics necessary for a device to qualify as money.
The large number of devices that were used as money makes it difficult 
to identify a clearly defined traditional monetary system. Cuvelier (1946), 
Mahieu, (1924), Dartevelle (1953), Bontinck (1972) Rodney (1981) and 
Shillington (1989, 1995), among other scholars, claim the existence of well- 
structured monetary systems in different areas of Africa, such as the Kingdom 
of Congo and the Mali Empire, but they all failed to give much information, if 
any, about the composition and regulation of the systems they pictured. The
present study, however, has shed new light on some controversial issues, such 
as the following.
First, the nzimbu shell was adopted as a currency of the Kingdom of 
Congo long before the Kingdom had any contact with the Portuguese or any 
other Europeans. (Mahieu, 1924; Dartevelle, 1953; Bontinck, 1987; Rivallain, 
1994). Therefore it is inaccurate to claim, as some authors, such as Wertz 
(1952), have done, that shell currencies in general and the nzimbu in particular 
were introduced into Congo by the Portuguese. Second, regardless of the 
predominantly barter-based mechanisms of exchange that existed, the local 
population made use of money, namely the nzimbu and other devices mentioned 
in this study, to settle a variety of transactions. This is in line with the reference 
made to Kindleberger (1984) at the beginning of this study about the 
coexistence of barter and money-based mechanisms of exchange even in 
developed economies. Money was needed especially when the exchange 
involved traders from distant regions.
The sharp fall in the exchange rate of the nzimbu against the Portuguese 
currency, reported in this study, especially from the early 17th century onwards, 
reflects the adverse impact of the massive import of cowries, as a substitute for 
the nzimbu, on the stability of the local currency. In line with Gresham's Law, 
the people of the Kingdom, who regarded cowries as false money, hoarded the 
genuine nzimbu that they reserved for specific transactions, while cowry money 
circulation expanded (Bontinck, 1987). Be that as it may, regardless of the 
substitution of the nzimbu with cowries, the former continue even in present 
times to serve as money in a number of traditional transactions, such as 
marriage payments (Banque du Congo Beige, 1960; Bontinck, 1987).
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Nevertheless, a number of questions regarding pre-colonial monetary 
usages still remain unanswered, mainly because of the difficulty in carrying out 
further research, given the absence of documentation. None of the sources 
consulted provided an answer to questions such as when the nzimbu was 
adopted as a currency, and who made the decision to do so. And yet, in line 
with Dartevelle (1953), we assume that one of the Kings of Congo made this 
decision since it was established that the money supply was under the control of 
the King. Also still unanswered is the question why the nzimbu shells were 
selected as a currency. Their porcelain-like brilliance was put forward as a 
reason by some scholars, such as Germain (1922) and Fischer (1949), but this 
does not hold, as the nzimbu shells selected for monetary purposes were not 
brilliant but in fact were rather drab (Dartevelle, 1953). Their strength and small 
size were not peculiar to them, as there were many other seashells with the 
same characteristics. In view of these considerations, we believe that the choice 
of the nzimbu as a currency is likely to have been motivated by political reasons 
or by mystic or magical factors that the King took into account for purposes that 
were clearly defined, but still unknown to us.
Furthermore, most of the sources we referred to in this study, such as 
Mahieu (1924), Cuvelier (1946), Dartevelle (1953), and Rivallain (1994), 
provide detailed description of the nzimbu and other shells, local or imported. 
However, they do not provide sufficient information, if any at all, about the 
volume of nzimbu extracted from the Angola coasts over several centuries 
(Rivallain 1994). Nor do they provide quantitative information about the import 
of shells, such as cowries, from other parts of the world in connection with the
development of the slave trade, or in line with further changes that affected the 
local population, as the use of cowries increased significantly over time.
Most of the transactions regarding the exchange of goods and services 
between members of a traditional community were settled through non profit- 
oriented compensatory mechanisms that excluded the use of money (Bohannan, 
1959). In such a system, all the essential needs for survival were met by means 
of barter-based compensation mechanisms. The role of money was, therefore, 
relatively limited. This explains why the local people tended at first to view 
European-style currencies, especially paper money, with detachment and 
mistrust.
By and large, with reference to the functions of money as a medium of 
exchange, unit of account, store of value or wealth, and standard of deferred 
payment, the nzimbu, lubongo and mitako, among other traditional devices, 
possessed the essential characteristics commented on at the beginning of this 
study, to qualify as money. However, despite the unanswered questions relating 
to the monetary policy implemented in the Kingdom, the King of Congo was 
reckoned to be the owner of the nzimbu shell reserves, of which he controlled 
the collection and storage. Given the lack of any other information relating to 
the regulation of the supply of the Kingdom's main currency, Luanda Island, 
where the nzimbu shells were stored under the supervision of a King's 
comptroller, can only be regarded as a store of King's wealth, rather than a kind 
of issuing house.
In a traditional system of exchange, the capacity of a device for playing 
a monetary role derived essentially from its usefulness, as a tool or an 
adornment, rather than from a formal definition laid down by a regulatory
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authority. This traditional perception of commodity money also explains the 
reservation that the local people expressed initially about European-style 
modern currencies. It was hard for the local population to accept a banknote, as 
there was no connection between the intrinsic value of this physical medium 
and the (face) value assigned by law to that piece of printed paper. The 
widespread popularity of the mitako was partly, if not essentially, due to the 
usefulness of the metal wire for non-monetary purposes.
By creating the Association Internationale du Congo in 1884, King 
Leopold II founded 1'Etat Independant du Congo, to which the 1885 Berlin 
Conference gave recognition. This study locates the start of the modern history 
of Congo at this point. Throughout a transitional period starting from the 
creation of the Congo Free State, modern currencies were introduced by gradual 
progression from a barter-based to a money-based system of exchange. In this 
process the Administration of the Congo Free State made use of the existing 
barter practices to such an extent that, at first, it institutionalised the payment of 
taxes and salaries in kind, regardless of the inherent abuses mentioned in this 
work. This was followed by a further interim stage with the establishment of a 
list of goods which were given the function of commodity money.
The monetary function assigned by law to the mitako was, therefore, a 
further step towards the introduction of a principally money-based system of 
exchange. Namely, the value of all merchantable goods listed in the State's 
stores was, during a first stage, calculated in mitako and, during a second, 
converted into State currency. In view of the monetary traditions that had long 
followed the patterns referred to above, this approach proved to be the most 
effective means of persuading the local population to steadily adopt modern
currencies designed for an economic model very different from the traditional 
one.
This study made anecdotal references to illustrate the fact that in 
addition to a device's usefulness that allowed it to be accepted and to qualify 
for a monetary function, as far as European-style forms of money were 
concerned, the local population attached much importance to the quality and 
reliability of the issuer. They regarded an acknowledgement of a debt issued by 
a locally well-known trader as more reliable than a coin or banknote bearing the 
effigy of a King they never saw, or the effigy of a dead monarch they 
considered worth less than a living one. The more remote the connection 
between the intrinsic worth and the legally assigned face value, the more 
reluctantly the local people accepted a device, such as a banknote, as money. 
This attitude was a consequence of the link that they maintained between the 
intrinsic worth of a good and its acceptability as money, in line with their notion 
of commodity money.
The Congo Free State founded by King Leopold II was recognised by 
the 1884/85 Berlin Conference as a personal property of a sovereign and, at the 
same time, it was regarded as a free land, comparable to an international colony 
(Beernaert, 1885, cited by Salmon, 1988), in the sense that it was to remain 
open to free circulation of people, goods, capital and currencies from all 
nations. While at the 1884/85 Berlin Conference King Leopold II committed 
himself to comply with this free circulation requirement, the reality on the 
ground was different as he favoured Belgian interests and set up a State 
monopoly over the major part of the territory.
King Leopold IPs financial and development policy for the Congo Free 
State was based on six main strategic components, which derived from the 
ownership that he claimed over the Congolese territory. First, terres vacantes 
(vacant lands), defined as lands not occupied by local people for their survival, 
were to be considered State property called Domaine prive (State land). Second, 
a vast royal property comprising large tracts of land named Domaine de la 
Couronne (Crown land) was formed with the aim of generating income directly 
for the King. Third, King Leopold II granted concessions to various companies, 
in which he took substantial shareholdings to provide himself with a large part 
of any profit earned. Fourth, to ensure the necessary workforce for both the 
State land and the Crown land, the Congo Free State launched in 1891 a regime 
of labour-tax, which gave rise to all sorts of abuses and brutalities inflicted on 
the local population. Fifth, King Leopold II made use of private enterprises to 
carry out investments that required large amounts of capital, while, sixth, he 
reserved the most lucrative trading activities for the State, under an absolute
monopoly.
As a consequence of the implementation of this policy King Leopold II 
succeeded in building up a diversified portfolio of shares in a large number of 
businesses in various sectors of the economy. The largest part of this portfolio 
was handed over to the Congo Free State, and later on, transferred to the 
Belgian Congo when the royal possession became a Belgian colony in 
November 1908. Thanks to this transfer the Colony started with a fairly strong 
financial position despite the burden created by the borrowings that the King 
had made in the name of the Congo Free State to finance investments in which 
the State was not involved.
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In addition to the large volume of funds borrowed by, or in the name of, 
the Congo Free State, most of the returns from the Domaine de la Couronne 
were intended for investments made by the King in Belgium and in some other 
European countries, such as France. All monetary and financial provisions set 
up for the Congo Free State were generally initiated by the King or had to be 
submitted to his arbitrary approval. The decision making process consequently 
lacked efficient control mechanisms. As a consequence of this lack of any kind 
of safeguard, King Leopold II carried out a financial policy that was dictated 
solely by his own ambitions. This study established how this policy resulted in 
a financial burden for the Congo Free State at the expense of the local 
population.
On the whole, the result of Leopold IPs policy dramatically moved 
away from the civilising objective put forward by the King at the 1884/85 
Berlin Conference to persuade Europe to let him take over most of the Congo 
basin. He presented the Association Internationale du Congo as "a 
philanthropic, innocuous and non-political organisation, which aimed at 
suppressing the slave-trade and introducing legitimate commerce into the 
Congo basin while supporting the principles of free trade" (Slade, 1962: 39). 
King Leopold II succeeded, instead, in setting up a genuine commercial, 
industrial and financial empire to the great benefit of himself and, later on, of 
Belgium, regardless of his formal commitments before the major colonial 
powers. Furthermore, this study considered the labour-tax regime and 
accompanying inhuman conditions to be a real form of slavery practised by a 
monarch who presented himself at the Berlin Conference as a defender of the 
local people against slave-traders.
The monetary and financial provisions defined for the Colony in the 
1908 Law on the Government of Congo known as the Charte Coloniale 
(Colonial Charter) entailed, in many cases, a wide gap between the legal 
framework and the real situation on the ground. On the one hand, there was a 
legally established separation between Belgium and its Colony, making them 
two distinct entities. On the other, depending on what was at stake, the Belgian 
colonial power addressed Congolese monetary and financial issues regardless of 
this legal separation. This study identified various cases where Belgium 
breached the legal provisions to favour metropolitan interests at the expense of 
the Colony (Wertz, 1952).
The colonial economy was essentially dualistic in the sense that 
industrialised and technologically advanced sectors existed in cohabitation with 
traditional outdated methods of production, which dominated large areas of the 
economy. As a consequence of this feature, banking branches were established 
in large cities and in a small number of areas showing a significant degree of 
industrial and commercial development. The majority of the population living 
in vast and unexploited territories seldom, if ever, had contact with the banking 
network and were not, therefore, actively involved in the process of introducing 
modern currencies into the country.
Prior to the creation of the Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du 
Rwanda-Urundi (BCCBRU) most banks operating in Congo were de facto 
subject to the controlling authority of the Commission Bancaire Beige. Since 
most of those banks were established in Congo as subsidiaries of Belgian banks, 
the colonial monetary system before 1951 can be considered an extension of the 
Belgian metropolitan monetary system. This is another illustration of the
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fictitious nature of the formal separation established by law between Belgium 
and its Colony. In this respect, one should bear in mind that in many Belgian 
political and business circles Congo was regarded as the tenth province of the 
Kingdom of Belgium (Stengers, 1956).
This situation was in line with the strong dependence of the Congolese 
Franc on developments that affected the metropolitan currency and overall 
monetary and financial system and policy. As a consequence, whenever the 
metropolitan currency was devalued, the Congolese Franc was devalued in the 
same proportion - and thus unduly weakened - regardless of any objective 
arguments against keeping the two currencies at par (Van Den Ven, 1925). These 
fluctuations in the exchange rate due to external causes had a disruptive impact 
on the Colony's Budget, and were condemned in vain by many civil servants of 
the colonial administration, such as Max-Leo Gerard (1925), member of the 
Conseil Colonial (Gerard, 1925).
A Decree of 30 July 1951 authorised the creation of the BCCBRU. The 
functions of issuing house, banker to the colonial administration, banker to the 
other banks, and other roles defined by previous agreements between the colonial 
administration and the Banque du Congo Beige were transferred to the BCCBRU. 
In addition to this, the Decree of 30 July established the BCCBRU as a 
supervisory authority with a clearly defined controlling power over the Congolese 
banking and financial institutions. Nevertheless, we consider this weaning of the 
Congolese banking system off the Commission Bancaire Beige of little 
significance in view of the subjection of the overall colonial monetary and 
financial policy to metropolitan interests, as highlighted in this study.
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Metropolitan Belgium ruled its sole Colony on the basis of a principle 
stating that "a national territory should be defined as the whole space under the 
sovereignty of the occupying State" (Vattel, 1863: 495). The consequence of this 
view was that, from a Belgian viewpoint, although Belgium and Congo formed 
two distinct territorial entities subject to different legal provisions that did not 
grant the same civil and political rights to their inhabitants, they were, 
nevertheless, considered two parts of one single State (Halewyck, 1910). This 
concept, which implied that the colonial power was entitled to circumvent any 
legal provisions regarding the Colony when Belgian interests required it, explains 
numerous contradictions uncovered in this study. Depending on circumstances, 
Belgium alternatively played in favour of or against the legal separation, provided 
that its interests were out of harm's way.
As another result of the dualistic feature of the colonial economy, the 
development of commercial and industrial businesses, which paid salaries in cash, 
contributed to broadening the circulation of banknotes and coins among the local 
population in industrial zones and large cities. In the rural areas, the introduction 
of modern currencies was achieved faster in those regions involved in the 
production of commodities intended for export or for supplying raw materials to 
domestic manufacturing companies. The demand for money was driven by a need 
for imported and domestically manufactured goods, which served as a catalyst for 
the development of agricultural and other lucrative activities whose produce was
sold for cash.
Nevertheless the study underlined the effects of three major limiting 
factors that impeded the introduction of modern money among the local 
population: (1) predominance of traditional mechanisms of exchange, (2) low
income of local people and (3) very poor density of the banking network. Overall, 
during the colonial era the process by which the rural areas, where the vast 
majority of the local population lived, were integrated into the monetary economy 
was too embryonic to be considered significant.
The major political events that occurred in Congo from the beginning of 
the 1960s onwards resulted in a very high cost for the country in terms of waste 
of resources and inflation, among other adverse effects. The main cause of the 
poor monetary and financial performance was the irrelevance and inefficiency of 
the policies implemented over the period. These policies were characterised by a 
misuse of public resources, combined with a lack of long-term vision in the 
management of public affairs. All provisions introduced and actions taken in the 
monetary and financial field throughout the period 1960-1995 were dictated by 
the need to resolve short-term problems.
In addition to all the considerations put forward to explain the overall 
anarchy that followed the attainment of independence in Congo, this study 
pointed out two major patterns that we perceived to be of fundamental 
importance. First, the sudden removal of the colonial order created a sense of 
freedom, the excess of which resulted in anarchic and iconoclastic behaviour. 
This led most of the citizens of the newly created Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to decide whatever they considered suitable for their own interests, 
regardless of legal and regulatory provisions intended to ensure sound governance 
(Verhaegen, 1961). Second, as already mentioned in this study, during the 
colonisation process the metropolitan power did everything to impede any 
cohesion of the numerous tribes that composed the local population. This did not 
help the citizens of the independent Congo to build up a national consciousness
following the attainment of independence in June 1960. Likewise, the vast 
majority of political leaders and civil servants promoted to high positions in the 
public administration made use of their authority with a strong sense of belonging 
to a tribal community rather than to a national entity (Baeck, 1998).
As a consequence, most of the people entrusted with some authority made 
use of the principle of solidarity inherent in the exchange mechanisms in 
traditional communities analysed in this study. They cited an alleged obligation to 
satisfy the needs of members of their own tribes, which they could not afford with 
their own resources, to justify the misuse of public funds for this purpose 
(Huybrechts et al, 1980). This misconduct went hand in hand with nepotism and 
corruption, and gave rise to numerous examples of powerful individuals acting 
with impunity that resulted from administrative weaknesses and steadily became 
a nationwide system. Starting in the early 1990s, the country entered a stage of 
hyperinflation when the money supply increased exponentially, as a result of 
unprecedented expansion of public expenditure that was linked to political events 
and financed essentially by money printing.
The local population in general perceived the country's monetary and 
financial problems in terms of a gradual impoverishment, caused by the endemic 
inflation. This perception also led to a loss of confidence in government 
institutions as a result of the banknotes withdrawal, referred to in this study, and 
which was carried out in appalling conditions in the late 1970s and seen as the 
confiscation of the savings of small savers. Furthermore, it meant a loss of 
confidence in the national currency which, in the context of hyperinflation, failed 
to exercise the normal functions of money.
Leon Kengo wa Dondo, a former Congolese Prime Minister (1994 97), 
depicted the tragedy of Congolese public governance in a three-word formula. 
Namely, he stated that managing the State Budget under President Mobutu's 
incessant interference consisted essentially of 'managing the unexpected'. 
President Mobutu established such a fierce dictatorship that he treated public 
resources and the population as if the whole country belonged to him, in the same 
manner as King Leopold II had proclaimed himself the owner of the Congo Free 
State. However, unlike Leopold II as a constitutional King subject to Belgian 
laws, President Mobutu considered himself above the law and had full control 
over all national institutions. There were therefore no institutional or legal 
mechanisms that could definitely limit or counterbalance his power. Beyond the 
adverse effect of the poor governance of public affairs, this study considered the 
post-1960 Congolese monetary and financial crises to have resulted to a large 
extent from an institutionalised misuse and abuse of power. This was reflected in 
the adoption of inappropriate decisions and policies whose implementation 
resulted in a deepening deterioration of the overall economy and, eventually, in 
the collapse of the whole political system.
Future research should address the following issues, which this study 
mentioned but did not explore: 'dollarisation' of the economy; street money 
markets; and the existence of different monetary zones in the same country, 
where banknotes withdrawn from circulation in some regions continued to 
circulate in some others. These issues became crucial especially in view of the 
developments of the early 1990s onwards, characterised by a political imbroglio 
and hyperinflation that ruined trust in the national money and favoured the use of 
foreign currencies.
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To close, first of all we believe that this study provided clear evidence of 
the influence of the past traditional monetary experience on the existing monetary 
and financial system of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Second, looking 
at the monetary and financial history of the Congo Free State and the Belgian 
Congo, our research challenged the established opinion on several issues taken 
for granted until now, and on which this study shed new light. The study has, in 
particular, highlighted implications of the failure to respect the legal separation 
between Belgium and its Colony as two distinct entities. And third, we underlined 
the key role of the political systems and events, marked by an outstandingly poor 
governance of public affairs and an institutionalised misuse and abuse of power, 
to explain the chronic monetary and financial crises in Congo in the post-1960 
era.
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Appendix 1: African continent old map (1570) showing the position of the 
Kingdom of Congo 
Elisee Reclus (1888)
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Appendix 2: Ancient Kingdom of Congo map. 
Cuvelier (1946)
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Appendix 3: Map of the Congo Free State (1885-1908) showing lands 
allocated to various recipients, such as Domaine prive, Domaine de la 
Couronne, concessionary companies, companies with ownership rights, etc
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Appendix 4: Contemporary map of Africa
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